

conclusions at either end of the book, and they're repeated throughout.

Kallenberg is disarmingly modest about the way his work developed: 'I feared that there was something terribly un-Wittgensteinian about the way I had framed the task' (p. 250). But he went ahead with it: and, despite that modesty, it should still be pointed out that the failings of the book come about through 'Hauerwasolatry'. Hauerwas in his puff on the book's dust-jacket is delighted to note this himself 'this extraordinary book... wonderfully exposes the high-wire act that constitutes 'my work'..., an absolutely wonderful book.'

Kallenberg has set out to write first about Wittgenstein, and then about Hauerwas. The argument journeys down a highway made straight by Wittgenstein in the aporetic desert; preparation, so the argument goes, for Hauerwas the Christ. The theme must simply be hammered out, chapter by chapter, as we make our way. Unless you (like Stanley) are a real fan of Stanley's, this structure makes for some rather tedious reading, and will make you wonder: What does *Ethics as Grammar* do? What are the effects of the Hauerwas-Wittgenstein ecclesiology? Well, those no-good, cry-baby, enlightenment liberals seem to be kicked about a bit. And namby-pamby abstract notions like 'human rights' and 'the categorical imperative' are laughed out of church. Oh, and we can proceed in orthodox fashion, much as before. There—Wittgenstein's not so difficult after all.

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ON CREATION, CONSERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS 20, 21 and 22 by Francisco Suarez SJ, translation, notes and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, *St Augustine's Press, South Bend, Indiana, 2002, £29.00 hbk.*

Suarez (1548-1617) presented his *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (1597) as detailed examinations of the metaphysical underpinnings of theologians' theology. This annotated translation of three of the 54 Disputations aims to present his conception of metaphysical inquiry and his account of efficient causality as 'alternatives to the standard accounts...that dominate contemporary Anglo-American philosophy' (vii). Profesor Freddoso presents the alternatives as internal, within the currently received assumptions. Their value could rather be in serving to undermine the received problematic.

Creation, discussed in Disp.20, is 'the first emanation of all beings from the First Cause' (107), with God considered as First Cause, not as First Being, which is being presupposed, though with promise of demonstration in Disp.29. God's governance of creation is 'the sort of continuous...dependence those entities have on that same First Cause for esse and operation (107): treated under the heads of conservation (Disp.21) and concurrence (Disp.22).

Creation ('a creature's dependence on God') 'is something that exists within the creature' and 'is distinct in reality from the creature itself' (70,71). This tree's being created is thus no part of its nature, but is that nature, viewed as an instantiated singular, and viewed as related (not-necessarily) to the presupposed divine nature. It is called 'distinct in reality' from the tree itself, on account of the pre-modern treatment of relations relied on here. The

conservation of the tree in being, is in reality nothing other than its creation (121). Yet despite insisting that talk of conservation as continued creation is improper, and involves nothing more than 'continuity in our way of conceiving it' (123), he cannot resist an Aristotelian physicist's discussion of instants (122-25), of just the kind to suggest the contrary: a suggestion reinforced by Freddoso's glosses of 'initial', 'initially' and some of his introductory explanations (e.g.xci).

In concurrence, 'God acts *per se* and immediately in every action of a creature,...this influence is absolutely necessary in order for the creature to do anything' (152). His concurrence 'is *per se* and essentially something in the manner of an action, or at least something in the manner of being-made, that emanates immediately from God' (179). It 'is nothing other than the secondary cause's action itself insofar as it flows *per se* and immediately from the First Cause' (212). 'God offers his sufficient concurrence to free causes not only with respect to those acts that they effect or are going to effect, but also with respect to those acts that they could effect if they so willed' (237). More generally, 'a secondary cause...depends only on the First Cause as on a universal agent that has an immediate influence within its own order on the lower cause's action' (242). Discussion of 'universal' causes, faintly suggestive of some medieval discussions among Muslims, concludes the Disputation.

Freddoso's Introduction can be seen as a contribution in its own right to current philosophical theology. Yet he surely makes unduly heavy weather of the relations between metaphysics and theologians' theology. Suarez is clear enough: 'These principles and truths of metaphysics are connected with theological conclusions and discussions in this way: if scientific knowledge (*scientia*) and/or as much knowledge of a broader kind as can be had (*perfecta cognitio*) were to be swept away, it might be necessary for a scientific knowledge of the latter too to be undermined – at so great a cost!' (Proemium to the whole of the Disputations). For example, if you are left with presupposing a metaphysics in which only things of some determinate kind can be said with truth to exist, you can hardly be surprised if a doctrine in which God is strictly infinite, and in no genus or species, cannot be squared with it. Or again, if you are left with no more than a metaphysics taking 'no entity without identity' to hold without reservation, not only as a regional theology for (possible) objects of scientific inquiry, you can expect to wriggle in vain, in your Trinitarian theology.

The translation is good, where checked. If its tone naturalises Suarez too readily within the problematic of modern academic 'theism', so much the better for its chances of undermining from within some of that discipline's more questionable assumptions. This is not, I think, Freddoso's aim, but is something which may be found welcome in a naturalisation of Suarez, as in some of Freddoso's own admirable work too.

The book is carefully proof-read and admirably finished: with an outline of the whole of his *Disputationes* (cxxi-cxxiii), indexes of names and of subjects, and footnotes where they are useful, at the bottom of the page.

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