

SOVIET SCHOLARS AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. By *Richard B. Remnek*. Foreword by *W. W. Kulski*. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1975. xvi, 343 pp.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India in 1955 signaled the advent of a more pragmatic turn in Soviet foreign policy. After the death of Stalin, the Soviets realized that it was inadvisable to simply write off those like Jawaharlal Nehru who wished to avoid adopting permanent positions on issues related to the Cold War, and the scope of Indo-Soviet relations grew apace. Aid was extended, the volume of trade grew impressively, and Moscow began to identify closely with Indian foreign policy positions.

Scholars were quick to respond to this development. Since the fifties, scholars like Druhe, Kautsky, Stein, Sager, Kapur, Sen Gupta, and Donaldson (to mention but a few) have examined issues ranging from Soviet-Indian economic relations to the Kremlin's attitude toward Indian communism. Although the subject matter of these studies has necessarily overlapped, Richard Remnek makes a bold attempt in the volume under review to probe an unknown issue: the relationship between Soviet policy toward India and Soviet scholars.

In many ways, the book is impressive and valuable. The author has exhaustively researched the subject and displays a thorough knowledge of Soviet writings on India. In addition, the first chapter and the epilogue contain the most balanced and readable account of Soviet policy toward India that is available to date. Remnek is cautious and rightly emphasizes that Soviet influence in India, despite extensive financial commitments there, has essentially been limited. The relationship has been characterized by overlapping interests not by Soviet domination.

However, the volume is not a study of Soviet foreign policy. It is, instead, an explicit attempt to study the impact of Soviet scholars on the Soviet approach to India. Unfortunately, the work has certain shortcomings. What the reader will find is a detailed and informative account of the evolution of Soviet Indian studies. Remnek discusses the emancipation of Indian studies in the USSR from the Stalinist strait jacket, of Khrushchev's early optimism regarding the revolutionary potential of the developing world, and the more cautious appraisal of the Indian scene by Soviet scholars since the late Khrushchev period. In contrast to the early Khrushchev period, Soviet scholars now advocate short-term solutions to India's agricultural problems (for example, their emphasis on the value of high grain purchase prices to boost production) in addition to basic structural changes. In the case of industry, they have coupled a growing dissatisfaction with the state sector with a tendency to upgrade the importance of light industry. As for the study of social change in India, questions have been raised about the suitability of class as a unit of analysis, and it is no longer assumed that the caste system is a mere feudal vestige that is bound to succumb to the onslaught of industrialization.

When it comes to the key issue of assessing the extent to which such studies have affected Soviet policy toward India, certain important questions are not answered satisfactorily. How does the conclusion that the impact of Soviet scholars on policy making is growing in certain selected fields follow from what is essentially an account of the evolution of Soviet Indian studies? Have the changes in Soviet Indian studies affected Soviet policy, or has it in fact been the other way around? These are important problems, especially since Remnek's study does not contain any case that explicitly demonstrates the nature and extent of the contribution of Soviet scholars to Soviet foreign policy.

This is not to imply that the problems result from faulty scholarship on Remnek's part. This is far from being the case. In fact, it is doubtful whether academic research can ever give us clear-cut answers to such complex questions. In fairness to the

author, it must be noted that he is fully aware of the problems inherent in this kind of research. The point made here is simply that the value of this volume lies in the detailed information which it provides on the development of Soviet Indian studies, not in its ability to elucidate the link between Soviet scholars and Soviet policy toward India.

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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD INDIA: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY. By Robert H. Donaldson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974. xiv, 338 pp. \$15.00.

The importance which Moscow continues to place on its relations with India has been the subject of several books by Western as well as Indian scholars. Donaldson's study, as the author himself points out, is not a diplomatic history of Moscow's relations with New Delhi, nor is it a history of the Indian Communist movement. Instead, it focuses on Soviet efforts to bring about changes in Marxist-Leninist doctrine to suit their changing postures toward India. The author also convincingly challenges the way in which some writers have interpreted several important writings of the Stalin era.

Donaldson believes that considerations of Soviet national interests rather than those of ideology have determined Moscow's policy toward India. The Soviets, in his view, have gone through their own version of "de-eschatology" for the sake of national security and survival. From their earlier support of a violent revolution in India, they have moved to a position in which the slogan of armed struggle is pronounced "absurd." Even their assessment of Indian social forces has been guided by the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. To be sure, although they fully supported the "national bourgeois" government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the long-term goal, in doctrinal terms, of a Communist India has not been given up; but that, as the author rightly says, "must continue to be voiced if the remaining viability of Marxism-Leninism, both as an instrument of mass control and as a justification for the very rule of the Soviet leadership, is to be preserved."

If Soviet policy toward India is determined by Moscow's national interests, the same could also be said of India's policy toward the Soviets. But here Donaldson voices criticism which has been typical of many Western scholarly and journalistic writings. Pointing to the difference in India's stand on Suez and Hungary in 1956, he says: "India seemed to prefer to take her stand on clear-cut cases of 'imperialist aggression' against non-Western countries and to stand on the sidelines when Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe was at issue." India's policy on Hungary, as well as on many similar issues, should be seen in the light of Washington's reluctance to provide economic assistance to projects in the public sector and its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir in the United Nations. Moscow's policy on these issues, on the other hand, converged with India's concerns and objectives. Moreover, India feared a possible Western-sponsored U.N. action in Kashmir and, consequently, opposed a similar U.N. intervention in Hungary.

On the whole, Donaldson makes a careful and judicious use of his sources. A first-rate study, the book adds immensely to our understanding of Moscow's efforts to reinterpret Marxism-Leninism in order to justify or support changes in its foreign policy.

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