

THE IMPACT OF A CRIME WAVE: PERCEPTIONS, FEAR, AND CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICE

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In 1980, Phoenix, Arizona, experienced a "crime wave." A structural equation model based on a two-wave survey of the population shows that the crime wave had a powerful impact that was almost a mirror image of what the fear of crime literature would predict. Demographic groups thought to be most fearful (e.g., women and the elderly) were least affected while groups thought to be least fearful (e.g., well-educated whites) were affected most. In addition to demographic factors, our analysis demonstrates that crime rate perceptions and confidence in the police are integral components of fear, especially in the context of a crime wave. These findings have important implications for crime policy specifically and for criminological research generally.

A "crime wave" ordinarily begins with an abrupt increase in reported crime. Crime and *reported* crime are not necessarily correlated, of course, so this distinction is crucial (Hindelang, 1974; 1976; Skogan, 1974). Crime-reporting institutions (media, police, etc.) play an essential role in any crime wave. A newspaper can start a crime wave independent of crime rates (Steffens, 1931). Similarly, the police find it all but impossible to suppress crime, but *reported* crime can be suppressed with relative ease (Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963; Seidman and Couzens, 1974). In either case, crime waves are not necessarily a function of "real" crime increases but, rather, may be a function of media and/or police crime-reporting practices.

A final component of any "crime wave" definition is social reaction: crime waves are always public phenomena. Fishman's (1978: 531) statement of this point is typical:

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When we speak of a crime wave, we are talking about a kind of social awareness of crime, crime brought to public consciousness. It is something to be remarked upon at the corner grocery store, complained about in a community meeting, and denounced at the mayor's press conference. One cannot be mugged by a crime wave, but one can be scared. And one can put more police on the streets and enact new laws on the basis of fear. Crime waves may be 'things of the mind,' but they have real consequences.


Research on crime waves has been largely qualitative, focussing on the role of crime-reporting institutions (Molotch and Lester, 1974; Tuchman, 1973) or on the consequences of crime waves for social elites (Berk and Rossi, 1977; Sennet, 1969). The more general social reactions have not been widely studied.

One likely reaction to a crime wave is, as Fishman notes, a heightened level of fear. Fear of crime in turn has several consequences which must be treated as indirect reactions. Fear elicits avoidance behavior. It can, for example, inhibit routine social interaction and alter life-styles (Hartnagel, 1979; Wilson, 1975). Attitudinal consequences of fear may be less tangible than these behavioral consequences but they are no less important. Fear obviously affects the quantity and quality of police-citizen interactions (O'Neil, 1979; Schneider *et al.*, 1975). But more importantly, individuals who are fearful lose confidence in the ability of local governments to solve problems (Conklin, 1971; Ennis, 1967; Smith and Hawkins, 1973). A crime wave in this sense may have serious political consequences. When the electorate believes, correctly or not, that the government cannot control crime, crime becomes a political issue, a basis for voting incumbent officials and administrations out of office.

Figure 1 shows a structural model relating a crime wave to perceptions of the crime rate, fear, and confidence in the police. A crime wave affects perceptions of the crime rate by definition. Reflecting Fishman's view, we further hypothesize that a crime wave will directly affect fear of crime and confidence in the police. Confidence in the police is also expected to have a direct effect on fear, so the model implies that factors which affect confidence in the police will have indirect effects on fear.

The internal dynamics of this model are, with one exception, identical to other models suggested in the literature (Garofalo, 1981; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Hartnagel, 1979); we

Figure 1. A Structural Model of the Implications of a Crime Wave



posit a direct impact of recent victimization on fear. Some research (Fowler and Mangione, 1974; Block and Long, 1973; Furstenberg, 1971) has found no correlation between victimization and fear of crime. This research is not based on an extensive multivariate causal model, however. We have included a direct path from victimization to fear in order to test for that effect when other variables and processes are controlled.

Several demographic variables are exogenous to this system. Prior research has shown that education, sex, age, and race are correlated with perceptions, fear, and confidence, but the precise causal mechanism for these correlations is unknown. One explanation is that these demographic variables measure the individual's perceived *risk* of victimization. Actual and perceived risk are negatively correlated for some groups, however. Men are victimized more frequently than women, for example, but women are more fearful than men (Clemente and Kleiman, 1977). Similarly, although age and victimization are inversely related, the elderly are more fearful than the young (Antunes *et al.*, 1977; Cook *et al.*, 1981; Goldsmith and Tomas, 1974). A related hypothesis that would seem to account for this anomaly is that perceived vulnerability to victimization, not perceived risk, is the most important fear-producing factor

(Kidder and Cohn, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Women and the elderly often perceive themselves as physically vulnerable, unable to defend themselves if attacked (Cook *et al.*, 1981; Gordon *et al.*, 1980; Riger *et al.*, 1978). Nonwhites and the poor are more fearful, according to this theory, because they live in high-crime areas and, hence, are more socially vulnerable than whites and the well-off (Clemente and Kleiman, 1977; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).

Despite the extensive body of research in this area, little is known about the dynamics of fear. Most findings are simple correlations and, although variations of our model have been widely noted, none has been tested. Empirical research in general and tests of theory in particular have been limited by the fact that there is ordinarily little variance in either perceptions of the crime rate or fear. In a study of community cohesion, for example, Hartnagel (1979: 189) notes that:

. . . the absence of any relationship between the perception or the fear of crime on the one hand, and the indicators of neighborhood cohesion and social activity on the other . . . is partly statistical; that is, the product of insufficient variation in the perception and fear of crime.

This conclusion is typical. Given the normal, static perceived level of crime, past research has been able to show only that some individuals are fearful while others are not. It has not explained the dynamic relationships between perceptions and fear, nor has it explained the processes which make people more or less fearful over time.

In light of this, the most important exogenous variable of our model is the crime wave. To the extent that a crime wave affects perceptions of crime, generating fear in individuals who would otherwise not be fearful, it is what Campbell (1969) calls a "natural experiment," a fortuitous opportunity to study the dynamics of fear.

I. THE CRIME WAVE

In 1979 and 1980, we conducted a two-wave survey of Phoenix households as part of a team policing experiment. Our survey instrument covered such topics as attitudes toward police, recent victimization experience, and perceptions of crime, safety, and police effectiveness.¹ The first survey wave, conducted in early September, 1979, had a sample of 572 respondents with 84.9 percent response. The second wave,

¹ These survey data are described in an appendix.

conducted in late July, 1980, had a sample of 635 respondents with 86.6 percent response. Interviews were conducted by telephone from a central location with close supervision. To ensure sampling of persons with unlisted phone numbers, phone numbers were selected by random digit dialing.

Table 1. Responses to Victimization Items Collected from Randomly Selected Phoenix Telephone Households in September, 1979 and July, 1980

	Sept 79	July 80
<i>Has anyone in your household requested police assistance of any kind within the last six months?</i>		
- yes	38.6%	36.5%
<i>Has anyone in your household called the police to report a crime within the last six months?</i>		
- yes	25.9%	22.2%
<i>Household victimization within the last twelve months</i>		
Break-in, burglary, etc.	13.0%	11.4%
Attempted break-in	10.3%	13.3%
Robbery	7.5%	6.8%
Physical assault	5.6%	6.5%
Vandalism of home, car, etc.	31.8%	30.8%

Table 2. Responses to Perceptual Items Collected from Randomly Selected Phoenix Telephone Households in September, 1979 and July, 1980

	Sept 79	July 80
<i>Within the past year, has crime in your neighborhood increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?</i>		
- increased	26.2%	35.6%
<i>What about the City of Phoenix in general? Within the past year, has crime in Phoenix increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?</i>		
- increased	61.5%	76.7%

Due to profound changes in attitudes and perceptions across the two survey waves, the data were useless for their intended purpose. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the most important dimensions of the change. As shown in Table 1, victimization item responses remained constant across the two waves. As shown in Table 2, however, perceptions of the crime rate changed markedly. Prior research (e.g., Conklin, 1971; Fowler, 1974; Fowler and Mangione, 1974) suggests that these responses will be stable over time. The differences in Table 2 are remarkable in this broader context and, in the present context,

they are central to our structural model. They measure the public reaction which defines a crime wave.

In fact, several UCR crime rates did increase substantially in the ten months between survey waves.² The conclusion drawn from Table 2 is that the public was aware of this UCR crime wave. But because victimization rates remained constant, public awareness could not have been due to aggregate personal experience. A plausible alternative hypothesis is that this effect was due to media crime reports. Although perceptions of crime may be influenced by a variety of sources (e.g., friendship networks), prior research demonstrates that media reports are a crucial source of crime information (Gordon and Heath, 1981). This is especially so when crime is an "emerging issue" as in the case of a crime wave (Hubbard *et al.*, 1975).

Local newspapers, radio, and TV gave the 1979-80 UCR rate increases prominent coverage. To capture the objective dimensions of this media campaign, we analyzed crime news printed on the front-pages ("A" and "B" sections) of Phoenix's two daily newspapers for the last six months of 1979 and the first six months of 1980. Our analysis shows that the quantity of crime reports did not increase substantially from September, 1979 to July, 1980. This is consistent with prior research (Hurley and Antunes, 1977; Jones, 1976; Davis, 1952) which has found no relationship between UCR rates and the quantity or frequency of media crime reports.

Qualitative differences from 1979 to 1980, on the other hand, were substantial. In the first six months of 1980, for example, the two papers carried 35 crime-related editorials versus 20 in the last six months of 1979. The editorials published in 1980 were also more likely to concern local issues and were more likely to be critical of local law enforcement agencies. Crime thus became an editorial issue in Phoenix during the first half of 1980.

More importantly, in the first six months of 1980, crime news began to reflect a crime wave theme. According to Fishman (1978), a "crime wave theme" is a journalistic device which links a set of apparently unrelated crimes together so that they are recognized as early signs of an emerging issue. Whatever the cause, the local media suddenly "discovered" in

² McCleary *et al.* (1982a; 1982b) argue that the increase in UCRs from late 1979 to 1980 is due to the retirement of the incumbent police chief in July, 1979. The ensuing administrative shake-up in the Phoenix Police Department led to changes in UCR coding procedures.

early 1980 that Phoenix was being ravaged by crime.³ There were several important aspects of the media campaign, but coverage of crime statistics is most germane. In the last six months of 1979, the newspapers printed only two front-page articles about UCR increases. Both articles, moreover, were positive in tone, reporting local UCR increases but noting that these increases were smaller than increases in other large cities. During the first six months of 1980, on the other hand, eleven stories about the UCR increases appeared on the front page and all were negative in tone. An *Arizona Republic* story on May 26, for example, was run under the sarcastic headline "Crime pays . . ." And on April 26, a *Phoenix Gazette* story was headlined (with no apologies to Eliot) "April is the cruelest month" for robberies; on May 30, an *Arizona Republic* story noted in its headline that robberies were "plaguing" the city. These stories did not report specific crimes but, rather, reported "trends." In May and June, robbery stories in both papers began to carry running counts in their headlines; "35th armed robbery this month . . ." Finally, although Phoenix has a relatively low homicide rate, both papers gave prominent coverage to a slight rise in UCR homicides. In June and July, three front-page stories reported homicide "trends." An editorial decried the "trend," attributing it to lenient judges, pampered criminals, and a general breakdown in the moral fabric of society.

Given this media campaign, the differences in Table 2 are not surprising. We cannot, of course, attribute the differences in Table 2 solely to the media campaign but, given the consistent body of research in this area (especially Hubbard *et al.*, 1975), media effects appear to be the most plausible explanation for these differences.

II. A TEST OF THE MODEL

Our model of the effects of the crime wave (Figure 1) was tested with the survey data. Operational definitions of the variables are given in an appendix. Estimates of the model

³ Two factors explain this runaway media campaign. First, in 1980, an election was held on a 40 million dollar bond issue to build more jails in Phoenix. Both papers took strong editorial stands supporting the bond issue, and insiders have claimed that the media campaign was part of this editorial stand. Second, in late 1979, long-standing relationships between local police and the media broke down. Personnel changes at the papers brought new reporters to the "police beat" while incumbent chiefs of three local police departments simultaneously retired. The new chiefs had relatively little experience dealing with "police beat" reporters and vice versa. The runaway media campaign was a spontaneous result of these two coincidental factors.

parameters, calculated with LISREL IV (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1980), are given in Table 3. The model is a viable portrait of the effects of the crime wave. The rho coefficient for the model (see Burt, 1973; Tucker and Lewis, 1973) is .94 and, in our experience, this value is quite high. The model also explains 25 percent of the variance in fear of crime.

Before we discuss the parameter estimates and implications of this model, we must clarify several statistical assumptions of the model.

Exogenous Correlations

Since victimization is related to age, sex, race, and education, all of these correlations are included in the model. The correlation between crime wave and victimization is not included. Had a "real" crime wave occurred, our crime wave variable would be correlated with victimization. Because the two survey waves were random samples, we expected our crime wave variable (a dummy measuring the survey wave) to be uncorrelated with demographics. Age, race, and sex were hypothesized to be uncorrelated with each other, but all were expected to be correlated with education. All exogenous correlations were tested for significance with an F-statistic (Blalock, 1979: 417) and, except for the age-race correlation, our hypotheses were supported.⁴ Given the higher birth rate and shorter life-expectancy of blacks and Hispanics, minorities have a younger mean age than the white population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980). We included the age-race correlation in our model to reflect this empirical result.

Interactions

Prior research (e.g., Clemente and Kleiman, 1977; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) found no interactions between demographics and perceptions, fear, or confidence. We conducted logistic regressions for endogenous variables to test this assumption. None of our equations had significant multi-way interactions, so the linear assumption is empirically justified.

⁴ Correlations among the exogenous variables are

	Sex	Age	Race	Educ.	Victim.	Cr. Wv.
Sex	1.000					
Age	-.065	1.000				
Race	-.018	.174	1.000			
Educ.	.055	-.096	.259	1.000		
Victim.	.073	-.163	-.119	-.083	1.000	
Cr. Wv.	-.028	-.059	.007	.043	-.021	1.000

Causal Direction

Prior research does not clearly specify the causal relationship between fear and confidence. To test the validity of our model, we estimated reciprocal effects for each endogenous variable pair. It seems certain from this analysis that perceptions precede fear in causal ordering. The estimated effect from perceptions to fear was strong and significant, while the effect from fear to perceptions was weak and insignificant. The results for confidence-fear and perceptions-confidence were more ambiguous but supported our model nevertheless.⁵ We include confidence as an effect of perceptions and fear as an effect of confidence because this is the most empirically and theoretically viable specification.

Given these assumptions, our final model leads to a set of findings about the crime wave specifically and about the dynamics of fear generally. Direct effects of the model are given in Table 3. The correlations in this table are simply the zero-order correlations among the exogenous variables. The standardized parameters are maximum likelihood estimates of the latent endogenous variables (Perception, Fear, and Confidence) regressed on the exogenous variables and on the other latent variables. These maximum likelihood estimates are interpreted as path coefficients. The measurement level parameters refer to the regression of the observed indicators (P_1 , P_2 , C_1 , C_2 , F_1 , and F_2) on the corresponding latent constructs (Perception, Fear, and Confidence). These coefficients are (confirmatory) maximum likelihood factor loadings. Finally, since our most important findings concern fear, we have decomposed the total effects for fear in Table 4.

Crime Wave

The crime wave had a significant effect on perceptions of crime ($p = .25$), as expected, but it had no significant direct effect on fear or confidence. These latter findings are contrary

⁵ To estimate one of the reciprocal effects, we excluded a statistically insignificant exogenous variable. For the confidence-fear estimate, both parameters were insignificant. However, the effect for the direction shown in Figure 1 was much larger than the effect running in the opposite direction.

Table 3. Zero-Order Correlations and LISREL IV Estimates for the Figure 1 Model Parameters

	Correlations				Standardized Parameters		
	Sex	Age	Race	Victim	Perception	Confidence	Fear
to -----							
From Education							
From Sex	(.05)* (1.00)	(-.09)	(.26)	(-.08) (.06)	.10*	.05*	-.17 -.43
From Age	—	(1.00)	(.17)	(-.16) (-.12)	-.14 .04	-.11 .28	.21 -.09
From Race	—	—	(1.00)	(1.00)	.14	.16	-.09
From Victimization	—	—	—	—	.36	-.01*	-.05*
From Crime Wave	—	—	—	—	.25	.02*	.02*
From Perception	—	—	—	—	—	-.28	.34
From Confidence	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.20

Measurement-level parameters for Perceptions: $P_1 = .50$; $P_2 = .26$; $e_P = .88$
 for Fear: $F_1 = .74$; $F_2 = .76$; $e_F = .75$
 for Confidence: $C_1 = .66$; $C_2 = .76$; $e_C = .89$

* not statistically significant at $P_{.05}$

Table 4. Decomposition of Total Effect for Exogenous Impacts on Fear of Crime

Variable	Indirect Effect (Perception)	Indirect Effect ^a (Confidence)	Indirect Effect ^b (Total)	Direct Effect (Total)	Total Effect
Education	.03	-.01	-.03	-.17	-.20
Sex	-.05	.02	-.03	-.43	-.46
Age	-.01	-.06	-.09	.21	.12
Race	.05	-.03	.00	-.09	-.09
Victimization	.12	.00	.11	-.05	.06
Crime Wave	.08	.00	.09	.02	.11

^a Calculated with the two-step path from the exogenous variable to confidence to fear; the three-step path from the exogenous variable to perception to confidence to fear is not included.

^b Since three-or-more-step paths are not given here, the total indirect effect is not the sum of indirect effects through perception and confidence.

to our expectations and, given the literature's preoccupation with direct effects on fear, may be surprising. Perceptions had a powerful effect on fear ($p = .34$), so the indirect effect of the crime wave on fear is substantial; see Table 4. The zero-order correlations reported in the literature are no doubt due to this strong indirect effect. Finally, the crime wave had no indirect effect on fear through confidence in the police.

Victimization

Consistent with prior research (Block and Long, 1973; Fowler and Mangione, 1974; Furstenberg, 1971; 1972), we found no direct effect of recent victimization experience on fear ($p = -.05$). A partial explanation may be that most of our victims were victims of property crime (see Table 1), whereas our fear of crime indicators involve fear of assaultive crime. Recent victimization experience has a direct effect on perceptions of the crime rate nevertheless and, through perceptions, a strong indirect effect on fear. Victimization, in fact, is the single most important cause of crime rate perceptions ($p = .36$). At the same time, it has no direct effect on confidence in the police.

Race

The direct effect of race on fear is negative. Nonwhites are more likely to be afraid than whites, controlling for the effects of other exogenous variables and perceptions. However, Table 4 reveals a positive indirect effect of race on fear through perceptions. Whites are more likely to perceive increasing crime rates and, as a result, become fearful. When combined into a single effect, the opposite-signed direct and indirect effects of race on fear cancel each other. This would explain why some research has found no race effect on fear. The effect will not be apparent unless perceptions are controlled. Race also has a positive effect on confidence in the police. Whites have more confidence than nonwhites, leading to a small negative indirect effect of race on fear. Nonwhites have less confidence in the police and, as a result, are more fearful.

Age

Controlling for all other independent variables, the *direct* effect of age on fear is stronger than the *total* effect of age on fear. The primary mediating factor here is confidence in the police. Age has a strong direct effect on confidence ($p = .28$). The elderly have more confidence in the police and, as a result, are less fearful than would otherwise be expected.

Sex

Sex has the largest single direct effect on fear ($p = -.43$). This direct effect accounts for most of the total effect of sex on fear. Women are also more likely to perceive rising crime rates and, as a result, sex has a small indirect effect on fear through perceptions. Sex has no effect on confidence in the police, so there is no indirect effect on fear through this variable. The zero-order correlation between victimization and sex is positive, so even though women are more fearful than men, they are less likely to be victimized.

Education

Education has a direct negative effect on fear. Since we are not controlling for occupation or income, education is our primary SES indicator. Less educated individuals are more likely to live in high-crime areas, so the direct inverse relationship between education and fear is not surprising. Education has a small positive indirect effect on fear through perceptions. Better educated individuals are more likely to perceive rising crime rates and, thus, become fearful. The relationship between education and perception is particularly important here because better educated people are more likely to read newspapers. The direct effect of education on confidence is insignificant, so there is no indirect effect on fear through this variable.

Perceptions

As noted, perception of rising crime rates is due to the strong direct effects of the crime wave and victimization; the next most important causes are sex and race. As an independent variable, perception is the second most important cause of fear (after sex) and is an important cause of confidence ($p = -.28$). Individuals who perceive rising crime rates lose confidence in the police.

Confidence

Only three variables have significant direct effects on confidence. These are perceptions, age, and race. Whites, the elderly, and people who believe that crime is not on the rise have more confidence in the police, controlling for other variables. Confidence in the police, moreover, has a substantial negative effect on fear ($p = -.20$). Individuals who have more confidence in the police are less fearful.

III. DISCUSSION

Our findings have two policy implications. First, because confidence in the police reduces fear among the elderly, fear of crime among the elderly might be reduced by programs designed to increase their confidence in the police. Second, whites have significantly more confidence in the police than nonwhites and, through an indirect effect, less fear of crime. An implication of this finding is that programs designed to improve police-minority relations will also reduce fear of crime among minorities.

But our findings have more important implications for theory. From the beginning, we were guided by the fear of crime literature and many of our results are consistent with this literature. Concerning the direct effects of exogenous variables on fear, for example, we found nothing new. As shown in Table 4, however, these same exogenous variables often have indirect effects on fear—through changing perceptions of the crime rate—that run counter to the direct effects. Individuals who ordinarily are not fearful become fearful when they perceive rising crime rates. And because the crime wave and prior victimization variables are important causes of perceptual change, they are essential to our understanding of fear.

The elderly are an exceptional group in this sense. Fear among the elderly is not due to perceptions of the crime rate. It is therefore likely that a “crime wave” would have less impact on fear among the elderly than among the young.

Blacks and Chicanos are more fearful than whites, and the less educated are more fearful than the better educated. Our findings again support prior research on this point. The direct effects of race and education and indirect effects through perceptions have opposite signs, however. Whites and the better educated are more likely to perceive rising crime rates and, while not ordinarily fearful, they are more likely than nonwhites and the less educated to be affected by crime waves.

Finally, we found that recent victimization experience has no direct effect on fear. Victims are more likely to perceive rising crime rates, however, and by means of indirect effects, become fearful. A crime wave will thus affect the fears of these individuals.

But while many of our findings are consistent with the fear of crime literature, other findings contradict previous research. By virtue of an indirect effect, for example, we found that recent victims *are* significantly more fearful; that minorities *are*

more fearful than whites but that this fear is due in no small part to lack of confidence in the police; and that, when confidence in the police is controlled, the elderly are more fearful than previous research has suggested. We would not have been able to spot these inconsistencies with prior research had we not used a relatively sophisticated causal model. Our most important finding is that perceptions of the crime rate and confidence in the police are important in the causal modeling of fear. Without much exaggeration, we may say that fear of crime cannot be measured outside a model that simultaneously accounts for perceptions and confidence. These variables deserve further investigation.

APPENDIX DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES (See Figure 1.)

Exogenous variables include the sex, age, race, education, and recent victimization experience of the respondent, and the crime wave. These variables are operationalized as

Sex: male = 1, female = 0

Age: in years

Race: Anglo white = 1, all other = 0

Education: years schooling completed (zero to seventeen)

Victimization: burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, attempted robbery, or physical assault in the last twelve months = 1, all other reports = 0

Crime Wave: a dummy variable, = 0 for the pretest (September, 1979), = 1 for the posttest (July, 1980)

Endogenous variables include perception of the crime wave, confidence in the police, and fear of crime. Two items measure the degree to which a respondent is aware of the crime wave:

P₁: Within the past year, do you think crime in Phoenix has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

decreased or stayed the same = 0, increased = 1

P₂: Within the past year, do you think crime in your neighborhood has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

decreased or stayed the same = 0, increased = 1

Two items measure a respondent's fear-related confidence in the police:

C₁: *How would you rate the speed of the Phoenix Police Department in responding to emergency calls for assistance? Excellent, good, fair, or poor?*

excellent = 1, good = 0, fair or poor = -1

C₂: *How would you rate the speed of the Phoenix Police Department in responding to general service or non-emergency calls for assistance? Excellent, good, fair, or poor?*

excellent = 1, good = 0, fair or poor = -1

Two items measure the level of a respondent's general fear of crime:

F₁: *How safe would you feel walking alone at night in your neighborhood? Would you feel very safe, somewhat safe, or not safe at all?*

very safe = -1, somewhat safe = 0, not safe at all = 1

F₂: *Think of the worst area within a mile of your house. How safe would you feel walking alone at night in this area? Would you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or not safe at all?*

very safe = -1, somewhat safe or somewhat unsafe = 0, not safe at all = 1

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