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## CONTENTS

Modernization: Theories and Facts	<i>Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi</i>	155
Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS	<i>Gerald M. Easter</i>	184
Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order	<i>Daniel S. Treisman</i>	212
Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East	<i>Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner</i>	250
REVIEW ARTICLE		
Germany after Unification: Normal at Last?	<i>A. James McAdams</i>	282
The Contributors		ii
Abstracts		iii

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# ABSTRACTS

## MODERNIZATION

### THEORIES AND FACTS

By ADAM PRZEWORSKI and FERNANDO LIMONGI

What makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall? The main question is whether the observed close relation between levels of economic development and the incidence of democratic regimes is due to democracies being more likely to emerge or only more likely to survive in the more developed countries. We answer this question using data concerning 135 countries that existed at any time between 1950 and 1990. We find that the level of economic development does not affect the probability of transitions to democracy but that affluence does make democratic regimes more stable. The relation between affluence and democratic stability is monotonic, and the breakdown of democracies at middle levels of development is a phenomenon peculiar to the Southern Cone of Latin America. These patterns also appear to have been true of the earlier period, but dictatorships are more likely to survive in wealthy countries that became independent only after 1950. We conclude that modernization need not generate democracy but democracies survive in countries that are modern.

## PREFERENCE FOR PRESIDENTIALISM

### POSTCOMMUNIST REGIME CHANGE IN RUSSIA AND THE NIS

By GERALD M. EASTER

The recent wave of democratic transitions has stimulated scholarly interest in a previously undeveloped area of study: comparative presidentialism. Comparative presidentialism seeks to define variant types of presidentialism that have emerged from transition processes, to identify the conditions that shape institutional choice and to understand more clearly the causal relationship between institutional choice and democratic regime outcomes. Using the postcommunist transitions, this paper contributes to the emerging comparative presidentialism literature by suggesting a revision to the argument that presidentialism leads to failed democratic transitions. The paper focuses attention away from the institutional rules of the game and toward the actors who actually make the institutional choice. Three postcommunist cases, distinguished by their different regime outcomes, are compared: Russia, Uzbekistan, and Estonia.

## RUSSIA'S "ETHNIC REVIVAL"

### THE SEPARATIST ACTIVISM OF REGIONAL LEADERS IN A POSTCOMMUNIST ORDER

By DANIEL S. TREISMAN

Since 1990 Russia has experienced an unexpected "ethnic revival." Varying widely in geography, culture, economic development, and institutional history, the country's thirty-two ethnic regions offer a chance to weigh the evidence for alternative theories of separatist activism. This paper examines statistically why some—such as Chechnya and Tatarstan—have come to epitomize demands for greater independence, while others—such as Mordovia or Chukotka—have remained largely quiescent. It finds that, while a Muslim religious tradition predisposed a region's leaders to press greater separatist demands, such primordial factors were filtered through a rational calculus of the region's relative bargaining power in negotiations with the center and of the leader's own organizational interests. Contrary to some leading theories, the most developed, resource-rich, and high-income groups and regions were more separatist than more economically backward ones.

## GENDER, FEMINISM, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

EXPLORING RELATIONSHIPS WITH SURVEY DATA FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

By MARK TESSLER and INA WARRINER

In an effort to contribute to the dialogue between gender studies and international studies, this report presents findings from an empirical investigation based on the integrated secondary analysis of survey data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The goal is to assess the utility of both gender and attitudes pertaining to the circumstances of women in accounting for variance in views about war and peace, and thereafter to examine the degree to which political system attributes constitute conditionalities associated with important variable relationships. Major findings include the absence of gender-linked differences in attitudes toward international conflict in all four of the societies studied and a significant relationship in each of these societies between attitudes toward gender equality and attitudes toward international conflict. Based on data from the Arab world and Israel, with attitudes about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict treated as the dependent variable, the research also aspires to shed light on more practical considerations pertaining to the international relations of the Middle East.

## GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION

NORMAL AT LAST?

By A. JAMES MCADAMS

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the concept of “normalcy” has occupied a prominent place in the pronouncements of Germany’s most powerful politicians and policymakers. In addition, it has also suffused much of the emerging literature on the domestic and international implications of German unification. Some observers argue that unification embodies the call to normalcy, offering Germany’s leaders the opportunity to put their nation’s past behind them. Others treat the events of 1989–90 as part of an ongoing challenge to German identity. Finally, a third group of scholars regards the invocation of German unity as an excuse for papering over the crimes of the Nazi past. Although there is no a priori basis for considering any one of these approaches the most appropriate for assessing contemporary German affairs, this does not mean one’s choice of terms is totally arbitrary. If German normalcy is to mean anything analytically, it must minimally represent an attainable and worthy goal to which the leaders of the Federal Republic can aspire in their efforts to make Germany more like other European states.