

*The First Hundred Years***General**

The introduction explains the importance of the intellectual confrontation between the Academic Carneades and the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus in the middle of the second century BCE. The brilliance of Carneadean critique clearly drove Antipater to respond and adapt, but it seems clear that the Stoic was no match for the dialectical skill of the Academic and that his response took the form of writing books rather than engaging in oral debate. Here's how two later followers of Plato presented the reaction of Antipater to Carneades:

[I-1] Plutarch *On Talkativeness* 23, 514cd

Excessive chatter is less irksome when it is on some scholarly topic. But people of that disposition must get used both to doing a bit of writing and to undertaking some dialectic personally. The Stoic Antipater, it seems, was neither willing nor able to come to grips directly with Carneades in his fluent and voluble attacks on the Stoic school; instead, Antipater wrote and filled volumes with replies to Carneades, and so was nicknamed "Ink-beller."

[I-2] Numenius fr. 26 in Eusebius *Preparation for the Gospel* 14.8.10–11

Carneades' ideas always won out and no one else's ever did, since his opponents were quite incompetent public speakers. His contemporary Antipater, at any rate, undertook to struggle to write something but never uttered anything in public to counter the stream of arguments produced on a daily basis by Carneades. He said not a word, nothing, not in the schools and not in the public porticoes, and no one ever heard a peep out of him. He waved around the threat of a written reply and sat in a corner writing books to leave for later generations to read. His books were feeble then and even more so now against Carneades, who manifestly was, and was recognized at the time as being, a force of nature.

Plutarch is a Platonist and Numenius a Platonically inclined neo-Pythagorean, and both are pleased to emphasize the failure of Antipater to respond to Academic critique. The Academic Cicero too bears witness to this aspect of Antipater's philosophical career in I-3. For Mnesarchus, see in particular I-6, I-17 to I-19.

[I-3] Cicero *Academica Posteriora* Book 1, Nonius (p. 65 Müller s.v. *digladiari*)¹

What is Mnesarchus so indignant about, and why does Antipater fight to the finish with Carneades in so many books?

In addition to his attempt to reclaim Plato (see I-74) and to respond to Carneades' attacks, Antipater also considered the history of his own school in retrospect, recognizing that even before his time there had been philosophically significant disagreement within its walls. Significant differences in doctrine remained a characteristic feature of the school until its eventual demise.

[I-4] Plutarch *Stoic Self-contradictions* 1034a²

In his book on the disagreements between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Antipater reports that Zeno and Cleanthes refused to become Athenian citizens, for fear that they seem unfair to their homelands.

The need to respond to powerful criticism from Carneades made Antipater into an innovative figure in the history of the school.³ He also needs to be put in a larger context, which involves looking at what we know about the school's leading figures for some decades after his activity as well. We have some scattered information about the personnel of the school from the second century BCE to the first century CE, some of which will appear in the extracts below. We are also fortunate to have a partial list of post-Chrysippean Stoics preserved in the 'index locupletior' of Diogenes Laërtius:⁴

[I-5]

Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes, Apollodorus, Boethus, Mnesarchides, Mnesagoras, Nestor, Basilides, Dardanus,

1 At p. 79 of *De compendiosa doctrina I–III*, ed. J. H. Onions, Oxford 1895. Also at p. 20 of Plasberg's Teubner text.

2 See also *SVF* 3 Antipater 67, from Philodemus *On the Philosophers*, for a reference to Antipater's *Against the Schools* (*kata tōn hairesēōn*).

3 It seems likely too that Antipater took an interest in the practical applications of Stoic ethics to ordinary social issues. He is the earliest Stoic from whom Stobaeus quotes substantial passages offering practical advice on, for instance, marriage. See I-107 and I-108.

4 Most conveniently found on p. 66 of Dorandi's edition (2013).

Antipater, Heraclides, Sosigenes, Panaetius, Hecaton, Posidonius, Athenodorus, a second Athenodorus,⁵ Antipater, Arius, Cornutus.

Further information comes from the fragmentary *History of the Stoics* by the Epicurean Philodemus:

[I-6] Column 53

[Panaetius] was his student, a successor to leadership of the school of Antipater. Dardanus, son of Andromachus, from Athens, was also a member of Antipater's school at Athens. And Apollodorus of Athens⁶ ...

Column 51

... Panaetius, son of Nicagoras, from Rhodes; Mnesarchus, son of Onesimus, from Athens; Dardanus, son of Andromachus, from Athens;⁷ Apollodorus from Seleucia on the Tigris; Boethus, from Sidon ... [?] from Bithynia

The cardinal significance of this period for the development of the school is confirmed by external evidence as well. Over 300 years later Athenaeus preserved a key bit of school history:

[I-7] Athenaeus *Philosophers at Dinner* 5.2 (p. 186 Kaibel)

At any rate, there are in the city [Athens] gatherings of lots of philosophers, some called 'Diogeneans,' some 'Antipatreans' and some 'Panaetians.'

That is, distinguishable strands within the school were named for Antipater's teacher (Diogenes of Babylon), for his student (Panaetius of Rhodes) and for Antipater himself. Athenaeus does not tell us what distinguished each of these brands of Stoicism from the others, but it is not much of a stretch to suppose that the Diogeneans were relatively conservative adherents to the great doctrinal synthesis of Diogenes' teacher Chrysippus and that those named for Panaetius, the most important innovator of the era, were no doubt the most adventurous – from the point of view of Chrysippus' version of Stoic doctrine.

Panaetius was one of Antipater's students, and clearly an important innovator. But another student, Archedemus of Tarsus, was important in a different way, as

5 There is some question about the identity of Stoics named Athenodorus; see *DPhA I* 497.

6 Possibly this is the philosopher documented at *DPhA I* 245.

7 Vimercati (2004, ch. III, p. 40 and elsewhere) assumes that Mnesarchus and Dardanus were scholarchs, but also concedes that the school was fragmented in their day. Sedley (2003, p. 27) argues that neither was a scholarch and that the school was already largely decentralized in the period after Panaetius.

a representative of the more conservative side of school teaching. Scholars studying this period in the history of the school often emphasize how different it was from earlier Stoicism, so it is worth remembering that a great deal of the school's activity remained squarely within a more conservative tradition.⁸ It is noteworthy, for example, that Archedemus was generally regarded by later Stoics as one of the great authorities for school doctrine. Epictetus, roughly 200 years later, still treats him as a suitable subject for scholarly engagement alongside Chrysippus.

[I-8] Epictetus *Discourse* 2.17.40

We won't get close to making progress even if we work through all the introductions and treatises of Chrysippus, with those of Antipater and Archedemus thrown in.

[I-9] Epictetus *Discourse* 3.2.13, 15

13. Let's look at your opinions too. Surely it's obvious that you don't value your moral character at all, but you look to the outside, to things beyond your moral character – things like what so-and-so will say about you and who you will seem to be: if you are a scholar, if you've read Chrysippus or Antipater. And if you've also read Archedemus, then you've got it all! ... 15. Go away now and read your Archedemus; then if a mouse drops down and makes a noise, you're scared to death. You're waiting for the kind of death that killed – what was that man's name again? Krinis.⁹ He was proud of understanding Archedemus too.

[I-10] Epictetus *Discourse* 2.4.10–11

“But I'm a learned man and understand Archedemus!” Yes, and with your understanding of Archedemus go be an adulterer, a faithless man, a wolf or an ape instead of a human being. What's to stop you?

[I-11] Epictetus *Discourse* 3.21.7

“Yes, and I'll explain for you Chrysippus' doctrines better than anyone can and I'll elucidate his language so it's as clear as can be – maybe I'll even throw in some of the pizzazz of Antipater and Archedemus.”

This is echoed by Seneca, who treats Archedemus as an authority alongside Posidonius (see IV-28). The evidence in the present chapter confirms this characterization of Archedemus and reminds us that even in a time of innovation (as by Panaetius and Posidonius) there was also a great deal of continuity in doctrine.

8 Even Posidonius (see Chapter 2) is regularly cited as a standard authority on physics alongside representatives of the early school.

9 A minor Stoic known for his work on logic. See I-30.

Antipater's student Panaetius represents a major focus of innovation in later Stoicism. His philosophical activity was characterized, according to Cicero, by a welcome openness to other schools and by a definite elegance of presentation:

[I-12] Cicero *On Goals* 4.79

Panaetius avoided their [earlier Stoics'] grim severity and rejected their sour doctrines and prickly discourse. In content he was milder than they were, in mode of expression he was more accessible, and he was always quoting Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and Dicaearchus – as his own books make evident.

Here are some of the salient facts about Panaetius' career. A native of Rhodes, born into an aristocratic family, he studied in Athens under Antipater and then took over the leadership of the school (above I-6). But he also founded an influential school of Stoic philosophy at Rhodes. Some of his many students were no doubt taught in Rhodes (such as Plato of Rhodes,¹⁰ Posidonius from Syrian Apamea¹¹ and Stratocles¹²). Others no doubt heard him lecture in Athens; we learn¹³ of a grammarian Apollodorus who was himself an Athenian. But there were many other students, most of whom cannot be placed securely.¹⁴ Most were Greeks, but Romans were also attracted to his school in numbers. We hear of the philhellene Rutilius Rufus,¹⁵ Gaius Fannius,¹⁶ the distinguished Q. Mucius Scaevola (if we are to believe Cicero in his dialogue *On the Orator*¹⁷), one Marcus Vigellius,¹⁸ all of this in addition to Panaetius' association with Scipio Africanus and Scipio's friend Laelius.¹⁹ Panaetius may well have taught more than the content of Stoic philosophy, of course, since we have many reports of his work on the authenticity of various philosophical works,²⁰ with a special interest in Socrates and Plato.

10 Diogenes Laërtius 3.109 = Panaetius T 45 (Alesse) = fr. 157 (van Straaten). For the translated main texts, references to Alesse's (1997) collection of evidence for Panaetius and to van Straaten's (1962) collection of fragments can be found in the Concordance. For convenience I provide such references in the notes for extracts cited there.

11 Cicero *On Divination* 1.6–7 = F 26 E-K.

12 Philodemus *History of the Stoics* col. 17 = Panaetius T 42 = fr. 161: "It is particularly appropriate to review the [works] written by Stratocles of Rhodes, who was a student of Panaetius."

13 Suidas *Lexicon* A 3407, p. 305 Adler = Panaetius T 43.

14 Strabo 14.48 = Panaetius T 44 = fr. 150; Diogenes Laërtius 5.83–84 = Panaetius T 46 = fr. 153.

15 Cicero *Brutus* 113–114 = Panaetius T 48. 16 Cicero *Brutus* 101 = Panaetius T 50.

17 Cicero *On the Orator* 1.75 = Panaetius T 49 = fr. 145; Cicero *On the Orator* 1.45 = fr. 155.

18 Cicero *On the Orator* 3.78 = Panaetius T 51 = fr. 162.

19 See Alesse T 21 – T 38, and pp. 167–173.

20 And possibly other philological topics: Athenaeus 14.35 634cd = Panaetius T 154 = fr. 93. "Aristarchus the grammarian, whom Panaetius, the philosopher from Rhodes, used to call a prophet since he could easily divine the intent of poems." This isn't surprising,

[I-13] Plutarch *Life of Aristides* 27, 335cd

[Various authors report that Socrates had two wives.] But Panaetius has given a satisfactory response to these authors in his work *On Socrates*.

[I-14] Diogenes Laërtius 2.64

Panaetius thinks that of all the Socratic dialogues those by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aischines are genuine; he hesitates about the dialogues of Phaedo and Euclides and eliminates all the rest.

[I-15] Diogenes Laërtius 3.37

Euphorion²¹ and Panaetius said frequently that the beginning of the *Republic* had been discovered to have been frequently revised.

[I-16] Diogenes Laërtius 7.163

Panaetius and Sosicrates say that only the letters belong to [Aristo of Chios], and the rest of the works are by the Peripatetic Aristo.

Panaetius' students included two particularly important philosophers, Hecaton from Rhodes and Posidonius, but also a pair of Stoics whose impact is more difficult to assess, Mnesarchus and Dardanus.

[I-17] Cicero *On the Orator* 1.45

For when I [L. Licinius Crassus] was quaestor [110 BCE] and made the journey from Macedonia to Athens I heard outstanding people lecturing, since the Academy was flourishing, as was being said at the time, with Charmadas, Clitomachus and Aeschines in charge. Metrodorus was there too; along with them he had been an attentive student of Carneades, who was, as they told it, the sharpest and most fulsome of speakers. Mnesarchus, the student of your [Scaevola's] friend Panaetius, was also in his prime then, as was Diodorus, the student of the Peripatetic Critolaus.

[I-18] Cicero *Lucullus* 69

Did [Antiochus²²] think up anything for himself? He says just what the Stoics say. Was he dissatisfied with his previous views? So why didn't he switch schools, to the Stoics in particular, since this was

since many philosophers lectured on Homer; exegesis of Homeric and other poetry was a feature of Stoicism from the beginning.

21 An Academic from Chalcis of the third century BCE.

22 Antiochus of Ascalon, the revisionist Academic who abandoned scepticism in the first century BCE.

exactly where they disagreed with the Academics? Well? Was he really dissatisfied with Mnesarchus? With Dardanus? They were the leading Stoics in Athens at the time.²³

[I-19] Cicero *On Goals* 1.6

Among Stoics, what did Chrysippus leave out? Nevertheless, we read the works of Diogenes, Antipater, Mnesarchus, Panaetius and many others and especially my friend Posidonius.

Although both Panaetius, the most important philosopher in this chapter, and Posidonius (Ch. 2) preferred to expound their doctrines in the order Physics, Logic, Ethics (I-20), their doctrines and those of other Stoics are presented in the order Logic, Physics, Ethics, for the sake of uniformity with the ordering adopted in the rest of this book.

[I-20] Diogenes Laërtius 7.41

Diogenes of Ptolemais begins [the teaching of philosophy] from ethics, while Apollodorus makes ethics second; Panaetius and Posidonius begin from physics, according to Posidonius' student Phainias in book 1 of his *Lectures of Posidonius*.

Part A: Logic and Dialectic

In the area of logic, which includes grammatical theory, Antipater and Archedemus were fairly conservative, for the most part making minor adjustments to the system of Chrysippus. In I-21 we learn that Antipater made a minor but significant addition to the theory of the parts of speech.

[I-21] Diogenes Laërtius 7.57

There are five parts of speech, as Diogenes says in his *On Utterance*, and so does Chrysippus: proper name, noun, verb, conjunction, article. In his *On Speech and Things Said* Antipater adds the adverb.

Similarly, Antipater restates but does not substantially alter Chrysippus' account of definition.

[I-22] Diogenes Laërtius 7.60

According to Antipater in book 1 of his *On Definitions*, a definition is an analytical statement expressed with precise correspondence [to a thing] or, as Chrysippus says in his *On Definitions*, an explication of what is proper to a thing.

23 Probably in the early 90s BCE.

This is confirmed by Alexander of Aphrodisias (*On the Topics* pp. 42.27–43.2 = *SVF* 3 Antipater 24), who says that Antipater’s and Chrysippus’ accounts of definition amount to the same thing: “Those who say that a definition is an analytical statement expressed with precise correspondence [to a thing], meaning a summary unfolding of the *definiendum*, and by ‘with precise correspondence,’ meaning that it neither exceeds nor falls short, are saying that a definition is no different from ‘an explication of what is proper to a thing.’”

On other matters, as in modal logic, Antipater and Archedemus parted company with Chrysippus. See V-13, which contains a lengthy discussion of the so-called Master Argument propounded by the dialectician Diodorus Cronus. There Epictetus mentions the solution proposed by Antipater, who followed Cleanthes rather than Chrysippus, and reports that Archedemus wrote a book on the topic.

Carneades pressed the Stoics particularly hard in the area of epistemology. Antipater deployed the traditional argument from inaction (*apraxia*) against Academic scepticism: since action requires belief, on the Stoic theory, and belief is consequent on assent, the very fact that people act means that they give assent; but if sceptics are right no intellectually responsible person can give assent (given the uncertainty of things); hence no action is possible for a sensible person. The denial of action is intended to raise the dialectical cost of scepticism, but the Stoic strategy, which predates Antipater, did not persuade Academics. Carneades simply revised the theory of action to require only assent to the likelihood of something being the case, rather than to its truth. Hence scepticism was rendered compatible with action and Antipater’s use of the *apraxia* argument ultimately failed. See above I-1 to I-3.

[I-23] Plutarch *Stoic Self-contradictions* 1057a

In their battles against the Academics, Chrysippus himself and Antipater devoted their greatest effort to the argument that one could neither act nor be motivated without assent ...

Antipater’s engagement with Carneades’ claim to know nothing (not even that he knows nothing) is reported by Cicero in his dialogue on Academic scepticism. For discussion, more sympathetic to Antipater than any of the ancient sources, see Burnyeat (1997, pp. 280–290).

[I-24] Cicero *Lucullus* 17, 28

17. Some philosophers (and not the lightweights either) thought that no one should argue against the Academics ... and that there is no reason to debate with people who agree with nothing; and they criticized the Stoic Antipater who put a lot of energy into that project ...

28. This led to Hortensius' demand that you [Academics] should grant that this, at least, was grasped, i.e., that nothing is graspable. Carneades used to resist fiercely when Antipater made the same demand, saying that it is consistent for someone who asserts that nothing can be grasped to still grant that this one thing can be grasped, though other things can't. Carneades used to say that, far from being consistent to do so, it was in fact utterly incompatible with it. For someone who says that nothing can be grasped is not making any exceptions; it follows necessarily that the claim, which hasn't been excepted, cannot be understood and grasped at all.

The theory of the criterion of knowledge was particularly important in Hellenistic epistemology. In the report at I-25 'criterion' is used in two senses. In a particular instance, the criterion for coming to hold a belief, i.e., for correctly judging, is the quality of the impression to which assent is given. A cataleptic impression is one that is guaranteed to provide a true representation of some feature in the world. In a broader sense, there are various psychological and cognitive capacities which are deployed in the making of true judgements and the forming of correct beliefs. Over time various Stoics came to different views about what should be on this list. It does not seem that these differences made a substantial difference to the basic theory. Boethus' inclusion of desire (*orexis*) as a criterion probably indicates an interest in distinguishing an ethical criterion from an epistemological criterion (rather like Epicurus); it probably means that a correct *orexis* is criterial, *orexis* being a desire having as its object something thought of as 'good.'

[I-25] Diogenes Laërtius 7.54

They say that the criterion of truth is the cataleptic impression, that is, the impression produced by an actual thing, according to Chrysippus in book 2 of his *Physics* and Antipater and Apollodorus. Boethus accepts several criteria, mind, perception, desire and knowledge; but Chrysippus disagrees with himself and says in book 1 of *On Reason* that the criteria are perception and preconception. Preconception is a natural conception of universals. Certain other older Stoics accept right reason as a criterion, according to Posidonius (F 42 E-K) in his *On the Criterion*.

Cicero does not tell us in I-26 whether Antipater and Archedemus parted company with Chrysippus about conditionals, as Chrysippus disagreed with his own teacher Cleanthes. But they did apparently disagree with each other on some logical issues.

[I-26] Cicero *Lucullus* 2.143

On the topic taught as foundational by dialecticians, how to distinguish true and false conditionals (like ‘if it is day, it is light’), there is a huge debate. Diodorus has one view, Philo another, Chrysippus yet another. And Chrysippus dissents from his own teacher Cleanthes on so many issues. And don’t Antipater and Archedemus, leading dialecticians and very stubborn men, disagree on many points?

Alexander of Aphrodisias reports that some later (“younger”) Stoics maintained that a syllogism with only one premise could be valid; cf. Alexander *On the Topics* p. 8.16–19 = *SVF* 3 Antipater 26. The acceptability of single-premise arguments is alluded to by Epictetus *Discourse* 1.7.10; see Barnes (1997, pp. 140–141). Alexander is surely right to explain the success of such arguments as being due to their enthymematic character (they rely on a suppressed premise which is supplied by the interlocutor or reader). That being so, the disagreement about their acceptability cannot be about their validity (since they are as valid as the full argument once the suppressed premise is articulated) but must focus on the merely formal issue: is it philosophically acceptable to employ that *form* of argument? It is an indication of the Stoic interest in formalism that it proved controversial for Antipater to champion single-premise syllogisms.

[I-27] Alexander of Aphrodisias *Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics* (CAG vol. 2 p. 17.10–24)

Moreover the word ‘posited’ in the plural shows that what is posited [in a syllogism] must not be only one thing nor can there be just one premise, but at least two. What the younger [Stoics] call ‘single-premise syllogisms’ are not syllogisms. For as the term *syllogism* shows, it means a certain *synthesis* of statements²⁴ ... What are called single-premise syllogisms are sometimes thought to be syllogisms because the audience adds the second premise owing to its familiarity. “You are breathing, therefore you are alive” is thought to be a syllogism because on his own the listener adds the other premise, because it is familiar: “everyone who breathes is alive.” For if it were not familiar no one would grant the conclusion “you are alive” on the basis of “you are breathing” but would ask for the reason.

24 The syllables *syl-* and *syn-* are from the preposition *sun*, meaning ‘with’ and apparently entail that there are at least two elements combined.

[I-28] Sextus Empiricus *Against Learned Men* 8.443

It is utter nonsense to reply, as one might in response to this objection, that Chrysippus does not approve of single-premise arguments. Not only do we not have to believe Chrysippus' statements as though they were oracular pronouncements, but we also don't have to pay attention to the testimony of men who are undermined by the conflicting testimony of their own witnesses. For Antipater, among the most illustrious members of the Stoic school, said that single-premise arguments *can* be constructed.

Antipater's apparent lack of commitment to strict formalism in logical theory anticipates later criticisms, such as those of Seneca and Epictetus, that traditional Stoic logic was unproductively formalistic; see **IV-9** to **IV-11**, **V-16**. Galen adds that Antipater thought that simpler procedures of logical analysis than those of Chrysippus would be adequate. In the continuation of this passage, Galen makes a similar criticism of Chrysippus' logical practice. Antipater's acceptance of single-premise syllogisms (**I-27**, **I-28**) may reflect a similar concern about keeping logic connected to normal discourse, especially if we see that acceptance as reflecting an impatience with formalism.

[I-29] Galen *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates* 2.3.18–19

18. You can find many people well trained in the analysis of syllogisms based on two conditionals and indifferently concluding syllogisms and some similar syllogisms that employ the first and second *themata*. Likewise for experts in syllogisms based on the third and fourth *themata*. 19. And yet, as Antipater wrote, most of these syllogisms can be differently analysed more succinctly.

The Stoic Krinis is often cited for particular formulations in logical theory, as illustrated by these passages in Diogenes Laërtius. None of them seems to constitute a substantial change in doctrine.

[I-30] Diogenes Laërtius 7.62, 7.71, 7.76

7.62 A partitioning is the ordering of a genus into topics, as Krinis says; for example, of good things some are in the soul and some in the body.

7.71 A paraconditional is, according to Krinis in his *Art of Dialectic*, a proposition connected with the conjunction 'since,' beginning with a proposition and concluding with a proposition; for example, "Since it is day it is light."

7.76 An argument, according to Krinis, is that which is composed of a premise, an additional statement, and a conclusion; for example, something like this: "If it is day, it is light. It is day. Therefore it is

light.” For the premise is “If it is day, it is light”; the additional statement is “It is day.” And the conclusion is “Therefore it is light.”

For Archedemus and Apollodorus on the ‘issues’ or *staseis* in rhetoric, which is part of *logikē*, see II-7.

Part B: Physics

Basic Cosmology

In this period most Stoics were relatively conservative about physics and cosmology. In the extracts that follow, the conservatism of even Posidonius (see also Ch. 2) is apparent. By contrast, Panaetius was an innovator in cosmology. His assertion that the cosmos is indestructible coheres with his doubts about the conflagration (see I-36). Moreover, Boethus of Sidon, like Antipater a student of Diogenes of Babylon, is said to have denied the standard Stoic doctrine that the cosmos is a living animal. It is not clear why he did so or what the significance of this innovative view is meant to be.

[I-31] Diogenes Laërtius 7.142–143

142. ... Zeno states his views on the generation and destruction of the cosmos in his *On the Universe*, Chrysippus in book I of his *Physics* and Posidonius (F 99a E-K) in book I of *On the Cosmos*. And Cleanthes and Antipater in book 10 of *On the Cosmos*. Panaetius claims that the cosmos is indestructible.

That the cosmos is an animal, rational and alive and intelligent, is asserted by Chrysippus in book I of *On Providence* and by Apollodorus in his *Physics* and by Posidonius. 143. It is an animal in the sense that it is a living, perceiving substance. For an animal is superior to a non-animal but nothing is superior to the cosmos; therefore the cosmos is an animal. And it’s alive, as is clear from the fact that our soul is a fragment of the cosmos. But Boethus says that the cosmos is *not* an animal. That the cosmos is one is said by Zeno in his *On the Universe* and by Chrysippus and Apollodorus in their *Physics*, and by Posidonius in book I of his *Treatise on Physics*.

Antipater, Apollodorus of Seleucia and Apollophanes, like Posidonius after them, all held conservative views on the size and shape of the cosmos. The references to *sumpnoia* and *suntonia* (translated as ‘sharing of *pneuma* and tension’) are apparent references to the doctrine of cosmic *sumpatheia* (see II-23, II-52, V-29, VI-55).

[I-32] Diogenes Laërtius 7.140

The cosmos is one and it is limited, with a spherical shape. For this kind of shape is most suitable for movement, according to Posidonius in book 5 of his *Account of Physics* (F 6 E-K) and Antipater in his *On the Cosmos*. The infinite void, which is incorporeal, envelops the cosmos from the outside. The incorporeal is that which can be occupied by bodies but is not occupied. Inside the cosmos there is no emptiness; rather, it is unified. For this is necessitated by the fact that there is a sharing of *pneuma* and tension between heavenly phenomena and those on the earth. Chrysippus talks about the void in his *On the Void* and in book 1 of his *Art of Natural Philosophy* and so does Apollonphanes in his *Physics* and Apollodorus, and Posidonius in book 2 of his *Account of Physics* (F 6 E-K).

If the cosmos is a living animal, it must have a mind, that is, a leading part (*hēgemonikon*). Other Stoics' views, including those of Antipater, can be found at **II-16**. The next two extracts suggest that Archedemus held an innovative view about the location of the cosmic mind, namely, that it was at the centre of the cosmos, perhaps inside the earth. In **I-34** Simplicius mentions Archedemus' view in passing while commenting on Aristotle's discussion of the doctrine, presumably Pythagorean, that fire rather than earth is at the centre of the cosmos. We should be hesitant about attributing the reasoning, which Aristotle constructs for the Pythagoreans, to Archedemus.

[I-33] Aëtius *Placita* 2.4.17 = Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.187.6–7

Archedemus claimed that the *hēgemonikon* of the cosmos was in the earth.

[I-34] Simplicius *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* (CAG vol. 7 pp. 512.28–513.9)

For it is possible to generate a plausible argument that fire is in the middle location but that earth is not. And furthermore he sets out the plausible argument by assuming as a premise that the most honourable sublunary body deserves the most honourable sublunary location and reasoning from it in the first figure, as follows. Fire is the most honourable body. The most honourable location is appropriate to the most honourable body. The conclusion is that the most honourable place is appropriate to fire. But the most honourable location is in the middle, since the limit is most honourable and the limits of the cosmos are the outermost and the middle. Consequently, the middle location is sublunary. So if the most honourable location is

appropriate to fire and the middle is the most honourable sublunary location, then the middle is the location appropriate to fire. After Aristotle, Archedemus held this view, but Alexander says that one must do some research to investigate which thinkers before Aristotle held this view.

Time was an important topic in Stoic physics; there are few significant changes in this period. For the idea that the present is the limit of past and future, see also Posidonius' view at **II-29**. Archedemus recognized the partless present (the 'now') as an actual limit of the extended past and future. This is likely to have been an updated way to express the traditional view (see *SVF* 2.509 = Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.106), though Stoics at least from Chrysippus on also recognized a broader (*kata platos*) sense of 'now' which is part past and part future (this is clearly what Plutarch is exploiting in this passage). Plutarch's critique of Archedemus' formulation in **I-35** exploits Stoic views about the nature of limits, but he is wrong to suppose that Stoics are committed to the view that all of time resembles the now in the sense of a limit between past and future rather than in the broader sense. See also **I-59** and LS 51C with commentary.

[I-35] Plutarch *On Common Conceptions* 1081e–1082a

And among the Stoics, Archedemus says that the 'now' is a sort of juncture and meeting point of the past and the future, and in doing so he eliminates, unknowingly it seems, all of time. For if the 'now' is not time but a limit of time and if every part of time resembles the 'now,' then time as a whole evidently has no parts but is resolved completely into limits and meeting points and junctures. But Chrysippus, wishing to give a sophisticated division, says in his *On the Void* and in some other works that the past part of time and the future part of time do not exist but only subsist, and that only the present exists; but in books 3, 4 and 5 of *On Parts* he says that of present time part is future and part is past. So it turns out that Chrysippus divides the existent part of time into non-existing parts of what exists, or rather that he leaves no part of time in existence, if the present contains no part that isn't either future or past.

Conventional Stoicism held that the cosmos exists in the time between the creation of a world order by a complex process beginning with cosmic fire and the destruction of that order in the periodic conflagration (as outlined in **I-38**; see also **II-14**, **II-15**). Panaetius' rejection of this view would align him more with Aristotelian cosmology, but it is not clear whether he was directly influenced by Aristotelian theory or came to this view for his own reasons; the doubts of his teacher Diogenes of Babylon (**I-37** section 77) may have played a role. Boethus,

another student of Diogenes, also rejected conflagration. The reasoning attributed to him by Philo is essentially Eleatic; the odd idea of a cosmic ailment is reminiscent of Melissus B7 (DK) who refers to the pain or distress of 'what is.' But it would be rash to attribute that reasoning to Panaetius as well. It is possible that both Boethus and Panaetius were influenced by a critique of the conventional Stoic view by Carneades.

[I-36] Arius Didymus *Epitome* fr. 36 = Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.171.5-7 = *Dox. Gr.* p. 469

Panaetius thinks the eternity of the cosmos is more plausible and more congenial to him than is the doctrine of the conflagration of the universe.

[I-37] Philo *On the Eternity of the Cosmos* 76-78

76. Some of those who held the opposing view [about the eternity of the cosmos] were won over by the truth and changed their position. For beauty has a seductive power and the truth is amazingly beautiful (just as falsehood is exceptionally ugly). So Boethus of Sidon and Panaetius, powerful advocates of Stoic doctrines, were divinely possessed and abandoned the doctrines of conflagration and regeneration; and they boldly adopted the more pious doctrine that the entire cosmos is indestructible. 77. They say that Diogenes too, when he was young, subscribed to the doctrine of conflagration, but in later life came to doubt it and suspended judgement. For it is typical of old age, not youth, to see to the heart of important and contested issues, especially those determined not by sense perception, which is unreasoning and deceptive, but by mind, which is most pure and unsullied. 78. Boethus uses very persuasive demonstrations, which I will proceed to report. If, he says, the cosmos is generable and destructible, then something will come to be from what is not, which even the Stoics regard as extremely bizarre. Why is this? Because one cannot find any destructive cause, either inside or outside of the cosmos, which will eliminate the cosmos. For there is nothing outside the cosmos, except perhaps a void, since the elements are integrated into the cosmos in their entirety; and there is no ailment within it of a kind which could be the cause of dissolution for so great a god. But if it is destroyed without a cause, then obviously the origin of its destruction will come from what is not, and that is something which the mind will not accept.

[I-38] Cicero *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.118

The stars are fiery by nature and that is why they are nourished by the exhalations from the earth, the sea and bodies of water; the sun raises

the exhalations from warmed fields and from bodies of water. The stars and the *aithēr* as a whole are nourished and renewed by the exhalations and they shed them again as rain, then draw them back from the same source. Little or nothing is lost to consumption by the fire of the stars and the flame of the *aithēr*. It's on this basis that our school [the Stoics] believes the doctrine that Panaetius said he had his doubts about, that at the end the entire cosmos would go up in flames. For when the moisture is used up the earth won't be nourished and the air won't circulate, since when the water is consumed the air cannot rise. At that point there is nothing left but fire, which is a living thing and a god, to renew the world and bring back the same beautiful order again.

Seneca's lengthy discussion of the nature of comets includes the following report that Panaetius held that comets are not ordinary stars but some sort of optical phenomenon. What is reported by Seneca does not suffice to explain why Panaetius held this view.

[I-39] Seneca *Natural Questions* 7.30.2

Panaetius, and anyone else who wants to hold that a comet is not a regular star but a misleading semblance of a star, has to deal carefully with the issues of whether every part of the year is equally suitable for producing comets, whether every part of the heavens is equally suitable for producing comets, whether they can be observed wherever they go, and other issues too.

Hellenistic science divided the earth up into several zones demarcated by key lines of latitude; for Posidonius' zone theory, see **II-41** and **II-42**. The equatorial torrid zone (between the two tropics) was often held to be uninhabitable, but Panaetius correctly held that this was not so.

[I-40] Anon. *Commentary on Aratus* (p. 97.1–6 Maass 1892)

Some, including Panaetius the Stoic and Eudorus the Academic, say that the torrid zone is habitable, because the temper of its air is produced by the very strong etesian winds there and because the exhalations from the great sea mix the vapours of the cold element with the warmth of the hot element.

The Gods

Stoic theology is complex and many kinds of god are recognized. All Stoics held that the cosmos as a whole is divine, which is the standard view attributed here to Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius. The animating force of the cosmos is god (also

referred to as nature) and most Stoics after Chrysippus held that it is *pneuma*; this accounts for Antipater's view that it is 'air-like,' as that description applies well to *pneuma*. Cleanthes seems to have emphasized the fiery nature of god, at least in his reference to Zeus's thunderbolt (*SVF* 1.537 *Hymn to Zeus* lines 9–10) and in his interest in Heraclitus; perhaps this is the view picked up by Boethus, whose identification of god with *aithēr* goes well with his identification of god with the sphere of the fixed stars.

[I-41] Diogenes Laërtius 7.148

Zeno says that the entire cosmos and the heavens are the substance of god; similarly, Chrysippus too in book 1 of his *On the Gods* and Posidonius in book 1 of his *On the Gods* (F 20 E-K). Antipater says in book 7 of *On the Cosmos* that god's substance is air-like and Boethus says in his *On Nature* that the sphere of the fixed stars is god's substance.

[I-42] Aëtius *Placita* 1.7.24–25

Mnesarchus held that god is the cosmos which contains the primary substance, derived from *pneuma*. Boethus claimed that the *aithēr* is god.

From the earliest days Stoics sought to incorporate traditional features of Greek theology and mythology by means of etymological identification, a project that appears most extensively in the work of Cornutus in the first century CE (see III-55). Antipater seems to have revised Cleanthes' etymology for 'Lycian' Apollo, who is associated with the sun. Stoics also sought to explain stories told about the gods in traditional myths by mapping them onto some aspect of their physical theory. In I-43 Macrobius tells us that Antipater explained the legend of Apollo slaying the dragon in terms of natural atmospheric phenomena.

[I-43] Macrobius *Saturnalia* 1.17.36 and 1.17.57

1.17.36 We believe that there are causes for Apollo's epithet 'Lykian.' The Stoic Antipater says that Lycian Apollo is so called because everything is 'brightened' [*leukainesthai*] when the sun shines. Cleanthes remarks that Apollo is called Lykian because just as wolves [*lykos*] snatch sheep so too Apollo himself takes up moisture with his rays ...

1.17.57 According to the Stoic Antipater, this is the rationale from physics for the story of the slaying of the dragon. When the earth was still moist, an exhalation from it rose forcefully and rapidly into the upper regions; there it was heated and took on the appearance of a snake. When it returned to the lower regions, it corrupted

everything there with its power of putrescence (which is only produced by heat and moisture). Its dense murk covered over the sun itself and so seemed to practically extinguish its light. But in time it was thinned out, dried out, and destroyed by the godlike heat of the sun's rays, as though struck by a volley of arrows. And so arose the legend of Apollo slaying the dragon.

Antipater's conception of god is conventional and in line with traditional Stoic doctrine. In I-44 Plutarch's attempt to drive a wedge between Chrysippus and Antipater exploits in a sophisticated manner the different senses of 'god' that Stoics routinely avail themselves of. The indestructible god is the single divine principle, often called Zeus, that is identified with nature and its rational structure. Heavenly bodies, such as the sun and moon, are also treated as gods (see Antipater's account of Apollo as the sun in I-43), but these are destroyed into Zeus at the conflagration and so are destructible.

[I-44] Plutarch *Stoic Self-contradictions* 1051ef, 1052ab

1051ef Antipater of Tarsus says this verbatim in his *On the Gods*: "Prior to the discourse as a whole we will briefly reason out the clear conception that we have about god. We conceive of god as a blessed and indestructible animal, beneficent towards human beings." Then, when he explains each of these points he says this: "Everyone thinks that [the gods] are indestructible" ... [Plutarch then quotes from Chrysippus views which he claims contradict those of Antipater.]

1052ab I would like to juxtapose with this a bit of what Antipater says: "Those who remove beneficence from the gods are in partial conflict with the preconception of the gods in the same way as those who hold that they are subject to coming to be and passing away."

Divination

Following his teacher Diogenes, Antipater adhered to conventional Stoic doctrine on the topic of divination (see II-23). But his student Panaetius did not, as he expressed doubts about the doctrine and even, according to Cicero in I-47, suspended judgement on the matter. I-51 suggests that Panaetius was influenced by the Academic Carneades in questioning his school's doctrine. As he often did, his student Posidonius (II-21 to II-24) reverted to something very close to the Chrysippean view. Despite Carneades' challenge, Antipater clearly followed Chrysippus' precedent closely, collecting even more anecdotal 'confirmations' that the gods send to human beings signs of the future. Boethus of Sidon (I-50 to I-52) seems to have admitted the kind of 'divination' that comes from observing

correlations among natural phenomena that enable prediction of natural events, rather than the less persuasive anecdotes about direct messaging from the gods to individuals about particular future events. Posidonius seems to have accepted both kinds of divination, but Panaetius (I-52) apparently refused to acknowledge such empirical prediction as being divination. His position is best interpreted as a disinclination to compromise in order to salvage some Stoic theory of 'divination.' When it came to the kind of astrological prediction of individual fates practiced by Chaldaean astronomers, Cicero notes that Panaetius would not compromise his rejection of their theory, whereas Diogenes had tried to do so (I-53). If we consider the range of Stoic positions from Diogenes to Posidonius, it is clear that divination had become one of the more divisive issues within the Stoic school.

[I-45] Cicero *On Divination* 1.82–84

82. That divination is real is proven by this Stoic argument. If the gods exist and do not announce future events to humans, then either they do not love human beings or they do not know the future or they think that knowledge of the future is not of interest to humans or they think it is beneath their dignity to give advance signs of future events to humans. But they do not fail to love us, for they are beneficent friends of the human race. Nor do they fail to know the very things that they themselves have determined and specified. Nor is it not in our interest to know future events, for if we know we will be more careful. Nor do they think it is inconsistent with their dignity, for nothing is more outstanding than beneficence. Nor is it the case that they cannot know future events in advance. 83. Therefore it is not the case that the gods exist and that they do not give signs. The gods do exist; therefore they give signs. And it is not the case that they give signs and provide no means for us to know what they give signs of – for then they would be giving signs in vain. Nor if they provide these means is it the case that divination does not exist. Therefore divination exists. 84. This argument is used by Chrysippus, Diogenes and Antipater.

[I-46] Cicero *On Divination* 1.6

But though the Stoics stood up for practically the entire field of divination and even Zeno had in his treatises sown some seeds for it and Cleanthes had enriched them somewhat, it was that brilliant genius Chrysippus who came along to set out his complete theory of divination in two books, one on oracles and one on dreams. Following him, his student Diogenes of Babylon published one book on divination; and Antipater published two, and my friend

Posidonius (F 26, T 10 E-K) published five. But Posidonius' teacher Panaetius, student of Antipater and virtually the leading member of the school, fell away from the Stoics; he did not dare to deny that there is a power of divination, but he did say that he had doubts. He, as a Stoic, was allowed to do this on a particular topic despite the great displeasure of the school. Aren't we allowed by the Stoics to do the same thing on other topics? Especially in view of the fact that the point Panaetius was unclear about seemed more obvious than the light of the sun to the rest of his school.

[I-47] Cicero *Lucullus* 107

For first you say that it is impossible for anyone to give assent to nothing. And *that's* obvious! For Panaetius (in my opinion the leading member of the Stoic school) says that he has his doubts about the very point which all Stoics except himself think is most certain (that the responses of *haruspices*, the auspices, oracles, dreams and prophecies are true) and that he suspends judgement about it. If he can do that with regard to matters that the people he learned from regard as certain, why can't the sage do the same thing with regard to the other issues?

[I-48] Cicero *On Divination* 1.123

Similarly it is recorded that when Socrates saw his friend Crito with a bandage on his eye he asked what had happened. Crito replied that when he was walking in a field a branch got bent back and recoiled and hit him in the eye; Socrates said, "Well, you didn't listen to me when I told you not to go, relying on my usual divine sign." Again, when Socrates was retreating with Laches himself after the defeat at Delium, where Laches had been the commander, they came to a crossroads. Socrates refused to retreat on the same road as everyone else took. When they asked why he didn't take the same road, he said he had been warned off by god. Those who took the other road ran into the enemy's cavalry forces. Antipater assembled a great many examples of amazing divinations by Socrates, but I will pass over them. You are familiar with them and I don't need to remind you.

[I-49] Cicero *On Divination* 2.144

And don't the guesses made by the interpreters themselves reveal their own cleverness rather than the force and cohesion of nature?

A runner planning to go to the Olympic games dreamed that he rode in a four-horse chariot. In the morning he went to the diviner. He said, “you will win! That is what the speed and power of the horses reveals.” Then the same man went to Antiphon. He said, “you are bound to lose. Or don’t you see that four ran ahead of you?” Then another runner – and it is these dreams and ones like them that fill Chrysippus’ treatise and also that of Antipater ... See also **II-23**.

[I-50] Cicero *On Divination* 2.47

For the causes of such advanced meteorological signs have been investigated by the Stoic Boethus, whom you mentioned, and by my friend Posidonius (F 109 E-K); even if the causes of these things aren’t discovered, still the phenomena themselves can be noted and observed.

[I-51] Cicero *On Divination* 1.12–13

12. There is a certain power in nature which presages future events on the basis of a lengthy observation of signs and a kind of divine inspiration. So Carneades should stop pressing the point – which even Panaetius used to do – asking whether Jupiter has commanded that the crow should call from the left and the raven from the right ...
13. So let’s consider things which, though distinct from divination, are somehow similar to it:

and the surging sea often warns that high winds will come, when suddenly it swells up from the bottom, and the rocks coated with snow-white, salty spray strain to reply threateningly to Neptune; or when from a lofty mountain peak a strongly howling wind arises and grows as it is repeatedly bounced off the rocks.²⁵

And I see that your predictions are jam-packed with this sort of advance signs. So who can work out the causes of these advance signs? (Though I note that the Stoic Boethus did try and made some progress, to the point where he could give an account of events at sea or in the sky.)

[I-52] Diogenes Laërtius 7.149

They say that all things happen according to fate: Chrysippus in his *On Fate*, Posidonius in book 2 of *On Fate* (F 25 E-K) and Zeno; Boethus says it in book 1 of *On Fate*. Fate is a connected cause of

25 These lines are from Cicero’s translation of Aratus’ *Diosemeia*.

things as a whole, or the reason by which the cosmos is run. Moreover, they say that divination as a whole is real – if providence exists as well.²⁶ And they assert that it is a craft as well, on the basis of outcomes, according to Zeno and Chrysippus in book 2 of *On Divination* and Athenodorus²⁷ and Posidonius in book 2 of his *Account of Natural Philosophy* and in book 5 of his *On Divination* (F 7, 27 E-K). Panaetius, on the other hand, says that there is no such thing.

[I-53] Cicero *On Divination* 2.87–91

87. ... Let's skip over this kind of divination and move on to the prodigies of the Chaldaeans. Plato's student Eudoxus, who was in the judgement of the most learned men the leading astronomer by far, had this view on the matter and left it in writing: that we should definitely not believe the Chaldaeans when it comes to the prediction and observation of individual lives based on birth days. 88. Panaetius too, the only Stoic to reject the predictions of the astronomers, mentions that Anchialus and Cassander, the best astronomers of his own day, did not use this kind of prediction although they excelled in the other parts of astronomy. Panaetius' friend, Scylax of Halicarnassus, excelled in astronomy and in governing his own city and he rejected the entire Chaldaean branch of prediction.

89. Those who defend these Chaldaean birth-day predictions argue as follows ... 90. What unbelievable madness! (It's not enough to call every mistake mere stupidity.) And Diogenes the Stoic made one concession to them, granting that they could make predictions, but only about what general nature a person would have and what he or she might be good at; he said that the rest of what the Chaldaeans predict cannot in any way be known, that though twins are similar in appearance their outcomes in life are usually quite different. Proclus and Eurysthenes, kings of Sparta, were twin brothers, but they did not live to the same age (for Proclus died a year before his brother) and his accomplishments were far more glorious than his brother's. 91. But even this concession to the Chaldaeans by the excellent Diogenes was a kind of compromise and I say that it is incomprehensible.

26 I retain *ei* (if), the reading of ms B, rather than Kühn's emendation to *hēi* printed by Dorandi.

27 Probably Athenodorus of Tarsus, who appears in Chapter 3 of this book.

Metaphysics

Antipater and Apollodorus hold conventional views on the central metaphysical topic of substance (that is, body). Apollodorus' argument in support of the qualitative malleability of matter is probably traditional. But, if the text in **I-54** is reconstructed properly, Antipater is merely clarifying an issue about the structure of matter (its infinite divisibility) that may have been left ambiguous by Chrysippus; he has almost certainly preserved the original intent of Chrysippus' theory. Similarly, Mnesarchus makes an essential clarification with regard to the relationship between the substance of an object (roughly what Aristotle would have called its matter) and the peculiar quality which is responsible for making the object what it uniquely is (very roughly what Aristotle would have regarded as its form). See LS 28D and commentary p. 173, where the theory as set out by Mnesarchus and Posidonius is treated as a clearer expression of an essentially Chrysippean doctrine. For the notion of matter being mouldable into different kinds of objects, cf. Marcus Aurelius 7.23.

For Archedemus on the active and passive principles, see **II-14**. On **I-54** see LS, vol. I, p. 303.

[I-54] Diogenes Laërtius 7.150

According to the Stoics substance is body and it is limited, as Antipater says in book 2 of *On Substance* and Apollodorus in his *Physics*. And it is affectible, as the same man [Apollodorus] says. For if it were unchangeable [*atreptos*], the things which come into being would not come to be from it. Hence the former [Antipater]²⁸ holds that division, which Chrysippus says is infinite, is not *to* infinity (for there is no infinity for division to arrive at); rather, division is unceasing ...

[I-55] Arius Didymus *Epitome* fr. 27 = Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.179.6–17 = *Dox. Gr.* p. 463. Continues from **II-31**.

Mnesarchus says it is clear that what concerns the peculiarly qualified and what concerns the substance are not the same. For things that are the same must have the same attributes. If someone were to mould a horse, for example, and then mash it up, and subsequently make a dog, it would be reasonable for us, upon seeing this, to say that the latter did not exist previously but now does. So what we say about the qualified and what we say about the matter are not the same. And in general it seems implausible to think that we are the same as our substance since it often turns out that the substance (say, of Socrates)

28 Following the text in Dorandi, who accepts a straightforward emendation by Rashed.

exists before he is born, while Socrates doesn't yet exist, and that the substance persists after Socrates is destroyed, when he no longer exists.

The phenomenon of mixture is vital to Stoic metaphysics, and most later Stoics accepted some version of Chrysippus' theory of 'total mixture' as part of the account of corporeal entities (for there must be a total mixture of the individuating *pneuma* with the 'substance'). Aristotle's theory of mixture is set out in *On Generation and Corruption* 1.10. It is not clear whether Antipater's student Sosigenes, of whom little else is known, made any significant changes when he drew on Aristotle's theory (as, no doubt, Alexander wants us to believe) or whether he merely recast the theory in terms that made its relationship to Aristotle's theory more perspicuous.²⁹ We need not conclude that Antipater himself drew on Aristotle's theory.

**[I-56] Alexander of Aphrodisias *On Mixture and Growth* ch. 3
(p. 216.4–12 Bruns)**

Among those who claim that matter is unified, the Stoics seem to have been the first to deal with the issue of mixture and to have done so most intensely. Though there was disagreement on the issue within the school (for various Stoics disagreed about the way that mixture comes about), it seems that the most eminent view about mixture within the school is the one stated by Chrysippus. Among the post-Chrysippean Stoics, some followed his view but others, having been able subsequently to learn Aristotle's view on the matter, put forward on their own much of Aristotle's theory of mixture – one of this group is Sosigenes, the student of Antipater.

Apollodorus' definition (if that is what it is) of body does not seem to innovate significantly. His account of other basic terms in physical theory (I-58) is no doubt similarly conservative. The reference to walking and running in "the incorporeal place" seems to be a reference to walking and running 'on the spot,' wherein one makes the motions of walking or running without actually advancing to a new place. The specification that place is an incorporeal is not germane to the issue but is of course standard Stoic doctrine. The etymological explanation of a condition offers an account of why the word for a characteristic or disposition of a body is derived from the verb 'to hold' or 'to have.'³⁰ The mereological implications of Stoic theory for any extended entity (see the end of I-58) are significant; though the claim about various quantities may be spelled out here in full generality for the first time, it does not seem to be a substantive innovation. Similarly, Apollodorus'

29 Sorabji (1988, p. 81) argues that Sosigenes had access to Aristotle's *Gen. Corr.*

30 The same account could be given of *hexis* and its relationship to *echein*.

account of time in I-59 is a formulation of the conventional, no doubt Chrysippean, theory. See also I-35 and II-29.

[I-57] Diogenes Laërtius 7.135. Continued at II-27.

According to Apollodorus in his *Physics*, body is what is extended in three dimensions (length, breadth, depth); this is also called a 'solid' body. A surface is the limit of a body or that which has only length and breadth but not depth.

[I-58] Arius Didymus *Epitome* fr. 24 = Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.166.24–167.14 = *Dox. Gr.* p. 460

Apollodorus in his *Art of Natural Philosophy* says that motion is a change in place or shape with regard either to the whole of an object or to its parts. A 'condition' [*schesis*] is a holding in place or shape [*schēma*], and to be in a condition [*ischesthai*] is this sort of thing. There are two primary kinds of motion, straight and circular, and several species of them. There are many motions around the same point and in the same place, such as walking, and running without leaving the incorporeal place; and at the same time there are motions straight ahead and to the sides and forwards and backwards and to the right and the left and in a circle and also swift and slow, as occurs with those who are sailing and in conditions similar to these. As we said that every body has a part that is a body and every surface a part that is a surface and every line a part that is a line and every place a part that is a place and every time a part that is a time, so too by the same analogy we should say that every motion has a part that is a motion and every condition a part that is a condition.

[I-59] Arius Didymus *Epitome* fr. 26 = Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.105.8–16 = *Dox. Gr.* p. 461

In his *Art of Natural Philosophy* Apollodorus defined time as follows: time is the interval of the motion of the cosmos and it is infinite in the way that all of number is said to be infinite. For part of time is past, part is present and part is future, but all of time is present in the way that we say that the year is present, that is, in broader outline; all of time is said to obtain although none of its parts obtains coextensively.

The later Pyrrhonian sceptic, Sextus Empiricus, often argues from the fact of disagreements, especially within a school, to the unsoundness of the theories disagreed about. Hence he is highly motivated to report on philosophers who disagree with the doctrines of their own school. Basilides the Stoic, about

whom little else is known, seems to have denied the existence of incorporeals, but we do not know what he meant by that. He may simply have said that incorporeals *are not*, that is, they are not beings (*onta*), which is standard Stoic doctrine, since incorporeals are said to subsist rather than to *be* (which applies only to bodies). Or he may have proposed a more radical revision to Stoic doctrine and argued that the incorporeals (place, void, time, sayables) do not even subsist; but if so, we know nothing about his reasons for such a drastic revision. It is not certain whether the testimony in I-60 should be attributed to this Basilides or to his homonym from the second century CE. *SVF* reports this evidence in volume III, p. 268, clearly assuming that he is the earlier Basilides.

[I-60] Sextus Empiricus *Against Learned Men* 8.258

We observe that there were some who denied the existence of sayables, and not just the members of other schools, such as the Epicureans, but Stoics too, Basilides for example, who held the view that there are no incorporeals. Consequently, one must maintain suspension of judgement about signs.

The Soul

It is standard Stoic doctrine that the soul is composed of *pneuma*, which is a special blend of air and fire. See II-71 for Antipater's adherence to this doctrine. Macrobius' report of Boethus' view, then, is equivalent to the standard doctrine. It is not clear why it is attributed to Boethus rather than to some other and better known Stoic thinker. While regarding soul as being composed of *pneuma*, Boethus seems also to have defended the Stoic doctrine that a soul can survive the death of the body if it has a degree of *tonos* (tension) high enough to enable it to cohere when its bodily host has broken down. To do so he draws on an argument from Plato's *Phaedo* (I-62): since it is the principle of life, the soul will either perish or withdraw to a new place when death comes to the body. Immortality of the soul does not follow from this argument, since the ability to animate the body and to remain coherent after its death depends on the degree of *tonos*. Weakly tensed souls do not last long outside the body, while the best souls may survive even until the next conflagration. See Arius Didymus fr. 39, Diogenes Laërtius 7.157 and other texts at *SVF* 2.809–822.

[I-61] Macrobius *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* I.14.19–20

Plato said that the soul is a self-moving essence, Xenocrates that it is a self-moving number, Aristotle that it is an *entelecheia*, Pythagoras and Philolaus that it is a harmony, Posidonius (F 140 E-K) that it is a form, Asclepiades that it is an harmonious exercise of the five senses,

Hippocrates that it is a fine breath dispersed throughout the body, Heraclides of Pontus that it is light, Heraclitus the natural philosopher that it is a spark of the essence of the stars, Zeno that it is a breath joined to the body, Democritus that it is a breath interwoven with atoms having such an ease of movement that it penetrates the whole body; the Peripatetic Critolaus said that it consists of the fifth element, Hipparchus that it is fire, Anaximenes that it is air, Empedocles and Critias that it is blood, Parmenides that it is composed of earth and fire, Xenophanes that it is composed of earth and water, Boethus that it is composed of air and fire, Epicurus that it is a mixture of fire and air and breath.

[I-62] Simplicius *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* (CAG vol. II p. 247.23–26; commenting on *De Anima* 430a23)

[Aristotle] did well to add immortality, as Plato added indestructibility in the *Phaedo*, so that we don't think, as Boethus did, that the soul is, like a principle of life [*empsuchia*], deathless on the grounds that it does not wait around for death as it approaches, but that it exits the body as death approaches it and then perishes.

Panaetius maintained the usual Stoic view about the soul: that it is corporeal (belonging to the domain of the four elements) and made up of two of the elements, fire and air, the components of *pneuma*. A cohesive soul persists after death and, being light, tends to move upwards when free of the body. A weak soul dissipates soon after death, but one with a high degree of *tonos* maintains its cohesion for quite some time after death.

Panaetius firmly maintains the mortality of the soul, despite his admiration for Plato. Compare Boethus (I-62), who even relied on an argument from the *Phaedo* to support the doctrine that the soul can maintain its cohesion after death and separation from the body. Panaetius' arguments for the mortality of the soul, summarized here, are familiar: all that comes to be must pass away, but the soul comes to be – produced by its parents, as indicated by inherited traits – so it is mortal; and anything that can be sick or weak can die. Cicero's own rejection of this is probably inspired by sympathy with Platonic views and depends on the claim that the mind is somehow distinct from the rest of the soul and so is excluded from the scope of these arguments based on physics. Panaetius evidently maintained the traditional Stoic view that the soul is a metaphysical unity and not a compound of distinct parts, the view on which Cicero's argument relies.

In I-65 "genuine" seems to mean 'a true representation of the historical Socrates' (see I-14). We can conclude from this and from I-64 that Panaetius wanted to preserve a version of Socrates consistent with Stoic doctrine, while recognizing that

Plato's own views could conflict with Stoicism. For a similar effort by Antipater to co-opt Plato himself, see I-74.

[I-63] Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 1.42

Let us utterly reject the notion that it [the soul] is a chance conglomeration of round, light atoms, something that Democritus thinks is warm and breathy – that is, living. But if the soul is in the domain of the four elements of which all things are said to be composed, then it must be made up of ignited 'breath,' which is the view I think Panaetius in particular adopted, and so come to occupy the higher regions. For these two elements have nothing that draws them downwards and they always tend upwards. Thus either these elements dissolve, in which case this happens quite some distance from the earth's surface, or they persist and maintain their condition,³¹ in which case it is even more necessary that they move towards the heavens and that the dense, thick air near the earth is broken up by them as they push through it. The soul is warmer, indeed, more fiery than the air here, which I just said is dense and thick. And you can infer this from the fact that our bodies are composed of the earthy sort of elements and get their warmth from the heat of the soul.

[I-64] Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 1.79–80

79. So are we to believe Panaetius, who disagreed with his beloved Plato? All over the place he calls Plato divine, supremely wise, most reverend, a very Homer among philosophers; but he does not accept this one doctrine, the immortality of the soul. His view is – and no one disagrees – that whatever is born eventually dies. And souls are indeed born, as is proven by the fact that they resemble those who produce them; this resemblance is apparent in mental as well as in physical attributes. He adduces another argument: everything that feels pain can also be sick; but what can get sick can also die; and souls feel pain, so they can also die. 80. These arguments can be refuted; they come from a man who does not realize that when we speak of the eternity of souls we are talking about the mind, which is free of all disorderly motion, and not about the parts in which grief, anger and desire operate; the man he is arguing against holds that these passions are separate and detached from the mind.

31 *Habitus*, Cicero's translation for the Greek term *hexis*.

[I-65] Asclepius Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (CAG vol. 6.2 p. 90.20–24)

A certain Panaetius had the nerve to hold that the dialogue [*Phaedo*] is not genuine. For since he held that the soul is mortal, he wanted to pull Plato down to his own level; so since Plato obviously makes the rational soul immortal in the *Phaedo*, for this reason Panaetius holds that the dialogue is not genuine.

Panaetius, Mnesarchus and others made revisions to the standard Stoic theory of parts of the soul. Conventional Stoicism identified eight parts of the soul (the five senses, voice, reproductive powers, and the mind or leading part of the soul [*hēgemonikon*]). Panaetius relocated two of these, the vocal power becoming a power of the mind and reproduction being assigned to 'nature,' leaving six parts of the soul proper.³² According to Panaetius, some of the powers that define human life belong to soul (*psuchē*) and some to the lower level of organization, *phusis* or nature. The relationship between *psuchē* and *phusis* in earlier Stoicism is in some respects unclear, but Panaetius makes a sharp distinction between those powers belonging distinctively to soul and those that should be assigned to 'nature.' The four-part model (I-70) is clearly a version of the standard eight-part model, with all five senses combined into a single power. There is also a way of looking at the soul which denies that it has parts (see the discussion in ch. 2 of Inwood 1985), but this reflects a different division of the soul's capacities, one that denies the distinctness, recognized by most Platonists and Aristotelians, of the rational part from desire and *thumos* in favour of what is often called psychological monism, according to which desires are cognitive states. Mnesarchus proposes yet another minor revision of the basic model, aimed at simplifying the categorization of the soul's parts. For the relationship between Panaetius' theory of soul partition and moral psychology, see the introduction to I-94 below.

[I-66] Nemesius On the Nature of Man 15 (p. 72 Morani)

The philosopher Panaetius holds that the vocal [capacity] is a part of voluntary motion, and he is quite right to say so. And the reproductive [capacity] is not a part of the soul but of nature.

[I-67] Nemesius On the Nature of Man 26 (p. 87 Morani)

There is also another division of animal capacities; they say that some belong to the *psuchē*, some to *phusis* and some to *zōē* [life]. Intentional [*kata probairesin*] capacities belong to the soul, whereas the non-intentional [*aprobairētoi*] belong to nature and life. The soul's capacities are two: voluntary motion [*kath' hormēn*] and perception.

32 See Inwood (2014a) and Tieleman (2007, pp. 128–130).

Voluntary motion includes locomotion and the ability to move the whole body; vocal utterance; and breathing. For it is in our power to do and not do these things. The capacities that are not in our power belong to nature and life but happen willy-nilly, like nutrition, growth, and reproduction (which belongs to nature) and the circulatory pulse (which belongs to life).

[I-68] Tertullian *On the Soul* 14

The soul is divided into parts: two according to Plato, three according to Zeno, five according to Aristotle and six according to Panaetius.

Contrary to what is suggested by Proclus' comment, there is nothing distinctively Platonist about the view that psychological traits are an emergent property of the physical composition of the soul. See Sedley (1993); see also Galen *The Faculties of the Soul* (most helpfully in the translation with commentary by P. N. Singer 2013).

[I-69] Proclus *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* 1.162

Panaetius and some other Platonists, when dealing with the phenomena, recognized that a temperate blend of the seasons tends to produce wise people. Because the seasons of its year are well balanced, Attica is well suited for generating wise men.

[I-70] Ps-Galen *History of Philosophy Dox. Gr.* p. 615.3–10

The Stoics say that there are four parts of the soul: rational, perceptual, vocal, reproductive. Some of them said that the soul is simple and partless, for they say that the soul is nothing except practical wisdom, which they also call mind and intelligence. Mnesarchus, making a judgement about the Stoic view of the matter, eliminated the vocal and reproductive parts, since he thought that they participated in the perceptual capacity, and held that the parts of soul were only the rational and the perceptual. And one could quite reasonably agree with this view.

Part C: Ethics

As with physics, so in ethics, most of the major innovations in this period are the work of Panaetius. Much of what we learn about his ethical theory must be extracted from Cicero's *On Duties* (*De Officiis*), for which Panaetius' *On Appropriate Actions* (*Peri Kathēkontōn*) was the major source. The degree of dependence on Panaetius, and so the precise reliability of the Stoic theories in

this work, is controversial. Even if one takes a sceptical view about the issue, Cicero seems to be offering at the least a Stoic-inspired theory in books 1 and 2; in book 3 he offers a more independent theory, since the topics treated there were not dealt with by Panaetius. But even in book 3, he relays valuable information about other Stoics from this period (Diogenes and Antipater). The Stoic coinage, *kathêkon*, is often translated ‘appropriate (action),’ while Cicero’s translation for it, *officium*, which has different nuances, is often rendered ‘duties.’ The term ‘duty’ has rather too strong an overtone of unconditional moral requirement, which is incompatible with the highly situational character of *kathêkonta*; but there is no evading the sense of obligation in the term *officium*. Hence, at relevant points, I translate both *officium* and *kathêkon* as ‘responsibility,’ though the more familiar ‘appropriate’ is also used. For the title of Cicero’s work, I retain the familiar translation *On Duties*.

Foundations

This outline account of the foundations of the cardinal virtues in human nature, and especially in the rational capacities which distinguish us from other animals, is almost certainly derived from the work of Panaetius, though there may be some adjustments made by Cicero. The basic inclinations that underlie and are the raw material for the virtues are all essential components of human nature, which in that sense is the foundation for the virtues and the happy life. Though some important features of human nature are shared with animals (self-preservation and concern for offspring), the features that underlie distinctively human virtues are all derived from or critically modified by our rational capacities. The term ‘honourable’ translates Cicero’s *honestum*, which is his rendering of the Greek *kalon*, elsewhere translated as ‘noble.’ For the similarities of this passage to *On Goals* 2.45–47 see Dyck (1996, p. 85).

[I-71] Cicero *On Duties* 1.11–14

11. First of all, nature has bestowed on animals of every species the inclination to protect themselves, their life and their body; and to steer clear of things which seem likely to harm them; and to pursue and procure all the necessities of life, such as food, shelter and things of that sort. Moreover, all animals share a desire for mating in order to produce offspring and a particular concern for those offspring. But the most significant difference between humans and beasts is this: since beasts are only affected by the senses, they only respond to what is at hand in the present and are aware of the past and future to a very limited degree. But human beings have a share in reason and as a result they perceive consequences, discern causes and are not unaware of the preconditions and results of things. They make comparisons between

things that are similar and draw connections between future situations and the present; they can readily see the whole course of life and make the necessary preparations for living that life. 12. The same nature connects human beings one to another through the power of reason so they can share both speech and life. Most of all, it creates in human beings an extraordinary love for their offspring and drives them to desire that there should be social interaction and gatherings, and to participate in them; this is why people are eager to provide for the care and feeding not just of themselves but also of their wives, their children and everyone else whom they love and are obliged to defend. This commitment stirs their spirit and renders them better at getting things done.

13. It is above all characteristic of human beings to enquire into and probe for the truth. Consequently, when we are free of our essential obligations and concerns we are eager to see, hear and learn, and we believe that learning matters that are arcane or amazing is essential for the happy life. From this we see that what is true, simple and pure is best suited to our human nature. This desire for seeing the truth is accompanied by a definite lust for leadership: no mind that has been properly educated is prepared to yield to anyone except an adviser, a teacher or a commander duly appointed under law for the sake of general utility. This is the basis for greatness of soul, that is, the capacity to treat merely human affairs with disdain. 14. And it is an important result of our rational nature that human beings are the only species that can see what orderliness is, what it is that is fitting, and what limits there should be in our words and actions. And so no other species sees what it is that is beautiful, charming and harmonious in visible things. Our rational nature transfers an image of this from the visual realm to the mental and holds that the preservation of beauty, stability and orderliness is even more important in the domain of our thoughts and actions; and it is careful to avoid doing anything that is undignified or effeminate and likewise to avoid doing or even thinking about anything that is motivated by lust.

It is from these components that the honourable which we are seeking is composed. And even if it is not generally appreciated it is still honourable and, as we rightly claim, it is by nature praiseworthy even if no one actually praises it.

The *Telos* and the Good

Material from book 3 of Cicero's *On Goals* is included here because, whatever Cicero's precise sources, it represents a version of Stoic doctrine stemming from the period covered by this collection. Not only is Diogenes of Babylon the source quoted most often in book 3, but the *telos* formula of Antipater is alluded to in section 20. The missile and target model for *telos* is another indicator (see I-72 section 22 and Panaetius in I-92, both of which may derive ultimately from Aristotle's use of the nearly synonymous term *skopos*; see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a22–24 and *Eudemian Ethics* 1214b6–11); see also Alpers-Gözl (1976). In the sections dealing with *oikeiōsis*, there are several features more characteristic of Antiochean or Peripatetic thought; Schmitz (2014) thinks this indicates a Peripatetic source for aspects of the text, but this is not necessarily the case. It could also be the result of Cicero's own work in shaping the debate between schools in *On Goals*. Either way, it marks a development in the first century BCE. We observe in Cicero's text a kind of parity between basic practical desires and a natural desire for pursuing truth, and this was probably not an explicit feature of Chrysippus' theory of ethical foundations (see Diogenes Laërtius 7.85). It is, however, even more prominent in Panaetius (see I-71) and in Epictetus (V-5, V-47 section 2). For the importance of self-perception, see also IV-31 and VI-28 to VI-32. The reference to proceeding from 'natural starting points' is reminiscent of Panaetius' approach (see I-71). For the recognition of 'greatness of soul' as a virtue alongside justice, wisdom and self-control, see also I-71 section 13, I-87 section 128, I-93 section 17 and I-99. It may well have been characteristic of Panaetius' conception of the cardinal virtues.

[I-72] Cicero *On Goals* 3.16–18, 3.20–25

[Cato speaks as a representative of the Stoic school.]

16. Those whose doctrine I approve of hold that as soon as an animal is born (this being the appropriate starting point) it is attached to itself and is inclined to preserve itself and to love its constitution and the things which preserve that constitution, but is alienated from death and from those things which seem to threaten it with death. That this is so they prove as follows. Before pleasure or pain can affect them, young animals pursue things that promote their security and well-being and reject the opposite, something which would not be the case unless they loved their constitution and feared death. Moreover, this could not be the case unless they possessed a perception of themselves and loved themselves on that basis. From this one ought to understand that the starting point is derived from self-love. 17. Most Stoics do not think that pleasure should be counted among the natural starting points, and I strongly agree with them for fear that

there would be many shameful consequences if nature seemed to have made pleasure one of those things that are the primary objects of appetite. The following seems to be a sufficient demonstration as to why we love those things which were first embraced by nature: if given a choice, there is no one who would not prefer that all parts of his body be appropriate and sound rather than dwarfed and twisted, even if the latter were equally useful. We think that cognitions (which we might call grasps or perceptions or, if one doesn't like or understand these terms, *katalēpseis*) are to be embraced for their own sake, because they have within themselves a feature that includes and contains the truth. We can grasp that this is present in children, whom we observe to be delighted if, using reason, they discover something all by themselves even if it does not do them any good. 18. We think that the crafts are worth acquiring for their own sake both because there is something within them worth acquiring and because they consist of cognitions and contain something which is intrinsically rational and orderly. They think that we are alienated from false assent more than from everything else that is contrary to nature ...

20. Since, he said, we have begun from natural starting points with which the next stages should fit, let us move on. Next is this initial division. They say that the valuable (we should call it thus, I think) is that which either is itself in accord with nature or brings about something that is worth selecting because it has a certain heft that is worth valuing (which they call *axia*). Conversely, not valuable is that which is the opposite to this. With the starting points established in such a way that things that accord with nature should be taken for their own sake and their opposites rejected, our first responsibility (that's how I translate *kathēkon*) is that one preserve oneself in one's natural constitution, and next that one hold onto things that accord with nature and eliminate their opposites. When the process of selection and rejection has been established what follows next is responsible selection, then continuous selection and finally selection that is stable and consistent with nature. This is where for the first time the good begins to be present and what can truly be called good begins to be understood. 21. For the first attachment of a human being is to those things which are according to nature. But as soon as he acquires understanding (or rather, conception, which is what they call *ennoia*) and perceives the orderliness and, if I may put it thus, harmony of what is to be done, then he puts a much higher value

on that than on all those things which he loved at first and concludes by rational cognition that he should recognize that in it is located the highest good for human beings, which should be praised and chosen for its own sake. Since the good is situated in what the Stoics call *homologia* and we might call 'agreement' (if that is acceptable) – since, then, this is the locus of the good to which everything is referred, i.e., both honourable deeds and the honourable itself, which alone is counted among the goods – although it arises later it is nevertheless the only thing that is worth choosing purely in virtue of its own character and worth. None of the primary natural things³³ is to be chosen for its own sake. 22. But since what I labelled 'responsibilities' are based on natural starting points, they must also be referred to them. Hence, we can say correctly that all responsibilities are referred to our acquisition of the natural starting points. Still, this is not the ultimate good, since honourable action is not a feature of our primary natural attachments. Honourable action is posterior and, as I said, arises later, but nevertheless it too is according to nature and it incites us to pursue itself much more powerfully than all the previously mentioned natural things. But first off you need to root out the mistake of thinking that a consequence of this theory is that there are two ultimate goods. Suppose someone's task is to direct a spear or arrow at some target; his ultimate good is to do all that he can to direct his missile to the target; that is what we mean by referring to the ultimate good. In an analogy of this sort we suppose that the thrower is to do all that he can to direct his missile to the target, but his ultimate aim, as it were, is really to do all that he can to carry out his task – and this is the sort of thing we mean when we refer to the ultimate good in life – while the actual hitting of the target is to be 'selected,' as it were, not 'chosen.'

23. But since all our responsibilities proceed from the natural starting points, wisdom itself must proceed from them. Just as it often happens that someone who is being recommended to someone values more highly the person to whom he is being recommended than the person by whom he is being recommended, so it isn't at all surprising that we are first 'recommended' to wisdom by the natural starting points but later wisdom itself becomes more dear to us than those things by way of which we came to wisdom. And just as our

33 The *prōta kata phusin*. See the *telos* formula of Antipater at I-75 to I-77. See also *Acad.* 2.138, Aulus Gellius 12.5.7–9 and Inwood (1985: appendix 1).

limbs have been given to us so as to make it clear that they were given for the sake of a particular way of life, so too the soul's desire, which the Greeks call *hormē*, was apparently given to us not for just any kind of life but for a particular way of living, and so too for reason and perfected reason. 24. For just as an actor or a dancer is not assigned just any delivery or movement, but a definite one, so too life is to be lived in a certain mode, not just any mode. And we say that this mode is in agreement and consistent. For we do not think that wisdom is like steersmanship or medicine, but rather like the acting and dancing that I mentioned just now. Its goal, the execution of the craft, is within it, not sought from the outside. And yet there is also a certain dissimilarity between these crafts and wisdom, precisely because in those crafts the correct actions still do not contain all the factors of which they consist; but [in the case of wisdom] what we call 'right' or 'right actions' (if that is acceptable; they call them *katorthōmata*) contain all the aspects of virtue. Only wisdom is completely self-contained; this is not a feature of the other crafts. 25. Comparing the goal of medicine and steersmanship with that of wisdom is naïve. For wisdom embraces greatness of soul and justice, with the result that the wise man regards all that can happen to a person as beneath his notice; and that is not a feature of the other crafts. But no one could possess the virtues that I just mentioned unless he resolved that one thing is not distinguished from another by any other factor than whether they are honourable or shameful.

As in logic, so too in ethical theory: Stoics of this period often formulated earlier theory in new terms without intending to alter the basic doctrine substantially. Cicero makes this point explicitly for Diogenes' formulation of the good in I-73. Antipater wrote a book arguing that Plato had shared key Stoic views on the nature of the good. (See I-64 and I-65 on Panaetius' view about the immortality of the soul; being unable to argue that Plato believed that the soul is mortal, he apparently held that Socrates at least thought so.) In this period Platonic ethics, especially his theory of the good, had become a point of contention with different philosophers vying for the honour of having Plato agree with them (see Inwood 2014b).

[I-73] Cicero *On Goals* 3.33

But 'good,' a term often deployed in our discussion, is clarified by a definition as well. Their [the Stoics'] definitions differ slightly from each other, but still get at the same point. I agree with Diogenes, who defined the good as 'what is complete by nature.' Pursuant to that, he said that benefit (let's use this term for *ōphelēma*) is a motion or state resulting from what is complete by nature.

[I-74] Clement *Stromata* 5.14.97 (p. 390 Stählin)

Antipater the Stoic wrote three books on the theme “that according to Plato only the honourable is good.” Antipater demonstrates that according to Plato virtue is sufficient for happiness. And he adds to this many other [Platonic] doctrines that are consonant with those of the Stoics.

From the beginning, Stoics proposed different formulations of the goal of life (*telos*). I-75 and I-76 report a number of post-Chrysippean formulations of the *telos*, some of which represent attempts to respond to criticisms of the conventional view made by Carneades, for whom Antipater was clearly the main target. For the conventional view held by Hecaton, see II-76. For Posidonius’ criticism of Antipater’s second formulation, see II-77. On the various Stoic formulations of the goal, see especially Striker (1986) and LS 63–64.

[I-75] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.76.6–15

Chrysippus wanted to make the goal [*telos*] clearer and expressed it as “living according to the experience of what occurs by nature.” Diogenes: “to be reasonable in the selection of what is according to nature and rejection [of the opposite].”³⁴ Archedemus: “to live fulfilling all the appropriate acts.”³⁵ Antipater: “to live continuously selecting things that are according to nature and rejecting things contrary to nature.” And often he formulated it this way too: “to do everything in one’s power continuously and unswervingly in order to achieve the primary³⁶ natural things.”

[I-76] Clement *Stromata* 2.21.129 (p. 183 Stählin)

[Diogenes thought that the goal consisted] in being reasonable, which he specified as consisting in the selection of what is according to nature. His student, Antipater, supposed that the goal consisted in constant and unswerving selection of things that are according to nature and disselection of things that are contrary to nature. And Archedemus, moreover, explained it thus: the goal is <to live> selecting the most important and authoritative things according to nature, not being able to pass them over.³⁷ And in addition to this Panaetius

34 Virtually identical reports of Diogenes’ definition of the *telos* are given at Diogenes Laërtius 7.88 and by Clement (see I-76).

35 The same formulation is given at Diogenes Laërtius 7.88 = *SVF* 3 Archedemus 19.

36 The Greek term is *probēgoumena*. It could also be translated as ‘dominant’ or ‘leading.’

37 There is no consensus about the meaning of the Greek verb *huperbainein* here. On this interpretation (LSJ s.v. 3.), the claim is that the agent cannot forgo pursuit of things that are according to nature, whether or not (s)he attains them.

(T 53 = fr. 96) claimed that living according to the starting points given to us by nature is the goal. In addition to them all, Posidonius (F 186 E-K) said that it was living in contemplation of the truth and order of the universe, helping as much as possible to bring it about and in no respect being led astray by the irrational part of the soul. And some of the younger Stoics defined it thus: the end is living in agreement with the human constitution.

[I-77] Plutarch *On Common Conceptions* 1072c, e–f

1072c They claim that rational³⁸ selection of things that are according to nature is the essence of the good. But selection is only rational if it is directed at some good, as we said earlier. So what is this goal? According to them, it is nothing other than being rational in the selection of things that are according to nature. Well, first of all, this eliminates and banishes the concept of the good. For, we may assume, being rational in one's selections is an event based on a disposition, viz. rationality. So if we are forced to conceive of this as being derived from the goal and of the goal as dependent on this, then we lose the concept of them both! ... 1072e Now then, you have already exposed the result [of their theory]: the goal is to be rational in the selection of things which have value for being rational. For they deny that they either have or conceive any essence of the good and happiness except for this oh-so-valuable rationality in the selection of what has value. 1072f But there are some who think that this criticism is directed at Antipater and not at the school. For under pressure from Carneades he resorted to these evasive neologisms.

Value and Indifferents

Perhaps the central doctrine in Stoic ethics is the distinction between two kinds of value, the good and the indifferent. It is significant that this detailed account of axiological dualism is largely attributed by Diogenes Laërtius to Stoics of our period, though it is clear that Chrysippus and others shared the view in some form. For Posidonius' alleged deviation from this, see II-78 and comments there. The agreement of Hecaton and Chrysippus is striking. In I-79 Diogenes gives some detailed considerations pointing to the rationale for the stark barrier between indifferents and goods.

38 'Rational' and 'rationality' in this context translate the Stoic terms *eulogos* and *eulogistia*. These terms may also be translated as 'reasonable' and 'reasonableness.'

[I-78] Diogenes Laërtius 7.101–104

101. They say that only the fine³⁹ is good, according to Hecaton in book 3 of his *On Goods* and Chrysippus in his work *On the Fine*. And this is virtue and what participates in virtue, which is equal to the claim that every good thing is fine and that the good is equivalent to the fine, indeed is equal to it. For since it is good, it is fine. But it is fine. Therefore it is good. And it seems that all goods are equal and that every good is maximally worth choosing and does not admit of either relaxation or intensification. And they say that of existent things, some are good, some bad and some neither. 102. At any rate, the virtues (practical wisdom, justice, courage and self-control, etc.) are goods and their opposites (folly, injustice, etc.) are bad. Things which neither benefit nor harm are neither [good nor bad], such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good reputation and noble birth; and so too their opposites (death, disease, labour, ugliness, weakness, poverty, bad reputation, low birth, etc.), as Hecaton says in book 7 of *On the Goal* and Apollodorus in his *Ethics* and Chrysippus. For these are not good things, but indifferents of the preferred type. 103. For just as heating rather than cooling is proper to the hot, so too benefitting rather than harming is proper to the good. But wealth and health no more benefit than harm. Therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Again, they say that whatever can be used well and badly is not good. But it is possible to use wealth and health well and badly. Therefore wealth and health are not good. Posidonius (F 171 E-K), however, says that these things are among the goods. But Hecaton says that not even pleasure is a good, in book 9 of his *On Goods*, and so does Chrysippus in his book *On Pleasure*. For there are shameful pleasures and nothing shameful is good. 104. And ‘benefitting’ is moving or sustaining something in accordance with virtue, while ‘harming’ is moving or sustaining something in accordance with vice.

[I-79] Cicero *On Goals* 3.49–50

Diogenes holds that wealth has a power that not only is conducive to pleasure and health but is even essential to them, whereas it does not have the same relationship to virtue and the other arts. Money can conduce to them but cannot be essential to them. So if pleasure or good health are goods, then we have to classify wealth as a good too.

³⁹ *Kalon*, the approximate counterpart of the Latin *honestum*, translated as ‘honourable.’

But if wisdom is a good it does not follow that we must also call wealth a good. And nothing not classed as a good can be essential to something that is classed as a good; and because the awareness and comprehension in which the arts⁴⁰ consist are desirable, since wealth is not classified as a good it cannot be essential to any art. 50. But even if we were to concede the point about the arts, the same argument would not, however, apply to virtue, because it demands extensive study and practice, which is not the case for the arts, and because virtue embraces a stability, solidity and consistency in one's whole life⁴¹ and these are not observable features of the arts.

In I-80 Cicero makes a sharp distinction between Diogenes, who stood firmly by the value theory of Chrysippus, and his followers (presumably including Antipater) who were unable to maintain their doctrine without alteration in the face of criticism from Carneades. Hence these later Stoics made adjustments to the weighting among indifferents in response to the pressure from Carneades – a movement in the direction of common sense and generally held views – but this does not entail that they gave up the distinction between good and indifferent. The doctrine that external circumstances, which include the indifferents, constitute the raw material for virtue is a key feature of Chrysippus' value theory (see Plutarch *On Common Conceptions* 1069e). The concession that there can be value to one's life in circumstances that obtain after our deaths is reminiscent of Aristotle's struggle with this issue in *Nicomachean Ethics* I (1100a17–b11, 1101a22–b9).⁴² Problems of value theory were evidently high on the agenda at the time. I-81 and I-82 provide further evidence that Antipater is responsible for further adjustments in the weighting and categorization of the indifferents and even for the coining of a new technical term for a kind of value. It is reasonable to see these refinements as responses to criticism of Chrysippean value theory (or its formulation) and to competing Peripatetic theories about the value of external and bodily goods going all the way back to Aristotle. Despite the implications of Seneca's wording in I-82, we do not have to conclude that Antipater abandoned the distinction between good and indifferent. It is more likely: (a) that he conceded the importance of externals (indifferents) in morally significant decisions, provided that virtue was not compromised; and (b) that Seneca objected to this degree of accommodation to critics of Stoic value theory. I-83 again shows Antipater debating a fine point in value theory dealing with wealth and poverty; he coins or applies a technical term in so doing, which again arouses Seneca's irritation. Seneca's impatience with Antipater here may be related to the possibility that he

⁴⁰ It is not clear whether these arts are 'practices' (*epitēdeumata*) or what are later called *liberales artes*.

⁴¹ This is probably the *idia pēxis* mentioned in *SVF* 3.510.

⁴² For the position of Critolaus, head of the Peripatetic school in the mid second century BCE, on some of these issues see Inwood (2014c, ch. 3) and Hahm (2007).

knew this aspect of Antipater's theory only secondhand, through Posidonius. The sophisms discussed by Seneca in this letter may be of Academic origin, but it is striking that Peripatetics (Critolaus and his followers, one assumes) are the principal advocates of the challenge and themselves offer a solution to it. The Stoic response made by Antipater is presumably more 'strict' than the Peripatetic one and reflects their axiological dualism, but even this seems insufficiently rigorous to Seneca, who prefers Posidonius' response. See commentary on Letter 87 in Inwood (2007). I-104 confirms that Antipater insisted (against his teacher Diogenes) that a virtuous state of mind was decisive even in the face of very significant practical advantages. For Panaetius' position on these issues, see I-89.

[I-80] *Cicero On Goals* 3.56–57, 60–61

56. Some of the things we call preferred are preferred for their own sakes, some because of their results, and some for both reasons. Certain facial expressions, postures and movements are preferred for their own sakes. Other things (money, for example) will be called preferred because they lead to results. But others are preferred for both reasons, such as sound sense organs and good health. 57. But when it comes to good reputation ... Chrysippus and Diogenes said it wasn't worth extending your baby finger for it if you discount its utility, and I strongly agree. But their successors were unable to resist the pressure of Carneades, so they said that what I refer to as good reputation is preferred and worth obtaining for its own sake and that a freeborn and properly educated man should want to be appreciated by his parents, by his neighbours and by good men just for its own sake and not because it is useful. And, these Stoics say, just as we are concerned for our children for their own sakes (even if they are born after our death) so too we should be concerned for our future reputation, even after our death, for its own sake, even though it is no longer useful ...

60. But since all of our responsibilities are based on them [preferred and dispreferred indifferents], the claim that all of our deliberations have reference to them is a reasonable one. Among these are [deliberate] departure from life and remaining alive. Someone who has in his life more that is according to nature has a responsibility to remain in life. But someone who has or seems to be about to have more that is contrary to nature has a responsibility to depart from life. From this it is clear that it is sometimes the responsibility of the wise person to depart from life even though he is happy and of the foolish person to remain in life even though he is wretched. 61. For the good and bad which we have often discussed are a subsequent development; but the

primary factors in nature, whether they are favourable or contrary, fall under the judgement and choice of the wise person and they are, as it were, the subject and raw material for wisdom. And so the entire deliberation about remaining in life or moving on from it should be regulated by the things which I mentioned above. For <the virtuous person> is not kept in life because of his virtue nor should those who lack virtue seek death. And it is often the responsibility of a wise person to abandon life despite his extreme happiness, if it can be done in a timely way. For their view is that living happily, i.e., living according to nature, is a matter of timeliness. And so wisdom instructs the wise person to abandon herself if it is advantageous to do so. That is why, since that impact of vice is not enough to justify suicide, it is obvious that it is the responsibility of foolish people, who are also wretched, to remain in life if they have a preponderance of those things which we say are according to nature. And since he is equally wretched whether he leaves life or stays alive and duration does not make his life any more worth fleeing, it is reasonable to say that those who can enjoy a preponderance of natural advantages should stay alive.

[I-81] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.83.10–84.3

Everything according to nature possesses value and everything contrary to nature possesses disvalue. There are three senses of value: the estimation and honour of a thing in itself; the exchange value set by an assessor; and third, what Antipater calls 'selective value.' In accordance with this kind of value we choose, when circumstances permit, these particular things rather than those; for example, we choose health rather than disease, life rather than death, wealth rather than poverty. They say that there are analogously three senses of disvalue, reversing the senses applied to the three kinds of value.

[I-82] Seneca *Letters on Ethics* 92.5

Some think that the highest good can be increased, on the grounds that it is not sufficiently 'full' if chance factors are hostile. Antipater, one of the great authorities of this school, says that he allows a certain amount to external factors, but a very small amount. But do you realize what it means not to be satisfied with daylight unless a bit of firelight contributes its own illumination? What weight can a spark have in the bright sunshine?

[I-83] Seneca *Letters on Ethics* 87.38–40. Continues from II-78.

38. Cheer up! You've only got one knot left, though it is a tough one. "A good does not come to be from bad things. But wealth comes to be from aggregating many instances of poverty. Therefore wealth is not a good." Our people do not accept this argument, but the Peripatetics both pose it and offer a solution. But Posidonius (F 170 E-K) says it is a sophism well known in every dialectical classroom and that Antipater refutes it thus: 39. "poverty is a term applied not with reference to what is possessed but with regard to what is missing (or, as the ancients say, 'privation' – the Greek term is *sterēsis*). It indicates not what one has but what one does not have. Thus nothing can be filled up by many instances of emptiness; many *things* generate wealth, not many instances of want. You misunderstand poverty," he says. "Poverty is not the possession of a few things but the failure to possess many things. So the term is not applied on the basis of what one has but on the basis of what one lacks." 40. I could explain my point more easily if there were a Latin word for *anhuparxia*, non-existence. This is the term Antipater assigns to poverty. I don't see what poverty is other than the possession of a little. We can deal with this issue, which is the essence of wealth and poverty, when we ever have abundant free time; but at that point we will also reflect on whether it might not be preferable to assuage poverty and make wealth less arrogant than to go to court over terminology, as though we'd already settled the substance of the case.

Another text illustrating that debate about the importance and value of indifferents was common among Stoics. See I-78 and I-80 above.

[I-84] Sextus Empiricus *Against Learned Men* 11.73

The Stoics say that pleasure is an indifferent and not a preferred one. Cleanthes says that it is not according to nature and that it has no value in life, just as a cosmetic has no value, while Archedemus says that it is according to nature in the way that armpit hair is natural but that it does not actually have value. Panaetius says that some pleasure is according to nature and some is contrary to nature.

The Antipater mentioned by Cicero in I-85 is to be distinguished from Antipater of Tarsus, who is much discussed in this chapter and lived in the second century BCE, nearly 100 years before Antipater of Tyre, who seems to have died in the mid-40s BCE. His criticism of a fellow Stoic, Panaetius, is not unusual in the school, and we note that Cicero is typically inclined to defend Panaetius from criticism. See also his

remarks on the omission of an important theme from Panaetius' *Peri Kathēkontos* (I-100 to I-102).

[I-85] Cicero *On Duties* 2.86

On the topic of teachings about what is useful, Antipater of Tyre, the Stoic who recently died at Athens, thinks that Panaetius omitted two things, care for one's health and money. I suspect that these items were omitted by that excellent philosopher on the grounds that they are so simple – for certainly they are useful.

In I-86 Cicero presents a critic of Stoicism who found a way to turn against the Stoics an allegedly puzzling silence about pain, a dispreferred indifferent. Panaetius discussed the indifferents and had views about the relative weight of some and evidently gave advice on how to cope with dispreferred indifferents, such as pain. Although this is completely compatible with Stoic value theory, the critic exploits it to suggest that Panaetius was critical of or even rejected the essential points of Stoic theory. It was typical of Antiochus, whose views are represented here, to complain about the emptiness of Stoic technical terminology (such as that dispreferred things need to be distinguished from bad things).

[I-86] Cicero *On Goals* 4.23

[A critic of the Stoics speaks.] What difference does it make whether or not you call wealth, prosperity, and health 'good' or 'preferred'? The man who calls them good doesn't devote any more effort to them than you, who label the same things 'preferred.' Panaetius, an exceptionally high-minded and serious man, worthy of his friendship with Scipio and Laelius, dedicated a treatise on enduring pain to Quintus Tubero. In it he never made the claim, which would have been the key to the debate if it could be proven, that pain is not an evil. Instead, he discussed what pain is and what its characteristics are, how uncongenial it is to us, and also the means for enduring it. Though Panaetius was a Stoic, it seems that in his judgement the vapidness of their terminology stands condemned.

Virtue

Though later Stoics such as Hecaton have retained the standard Stoic view on the virtues (sufficiency for happiness and unity in the sense of reciprocal entailment), this text claims that Posidonius and Panaetius abandoned the sufficiency thesis by conceding that some externals are necessary for happiness. That these Stoics actually took this position seems unlikely (see I-89); I-87 seems to reflect

a polemical claim made in the course of the debate with Peripatetics about the role of external goods and the sufficiency thesis.

[I-87] Diogenes Laërtius 7.125–128

125. They say that the virtues reciprocally entail each other and that someone who has one has them all. For they have common theorems, as Chrysippus says in book 1 of *On Virtues*, and Apollodorus in his *Physics in Ancient Philosophy* and Hecaton in book 3 of *On Virtues*. 126. For the virtuous person both understands and does what ought to be done. Things that ought to be done fall under choice, endurance, distribution and persistence, so that if someone does some things in accordance with choice, some in accordance with endurance, some in accordance with distribution and others in accordance with persistence, then he is practically wise and courageous and just and self-controlled. Each virtue has its own principal subject matter; for example, courage deals with things to be endured, practical wisdom with things to be done and not to be done and neither; and similarly, the other virtues deal with their own proper subject matter. Practical wisdom is accompanied by good deliberation and understanding, self-control by personal discipline and orderliness, justice by equality and reasonableness, and courage by constancy and vigour ...

127. Virtue is sufficient for happiness, according to Zeno and Chrysippus, in book 1 of his *On Virtues*, and Hecaton in book 2 of his *On Goods*. 128. For if, he says, greatness of soul is sufficient for making people superior to everything and it is a part of virtue, then virtue is sufficient for happiness, since it holds in contempt even what appear to be troublesome obstacles. Panaetius and Posidonius (F 173 E-K) say, however, that virtue is not sufficient, but claim that we also need strength, health and external prosperity.

Alesse (1997, p. 192 and pp. 185–186) argues persuasively, following much earlier discussion, that I-88 and the related I-92 stem from Panaetius. Panaetius' theory is that each of the virtues has an identifiable 'starting point' in a distinct feature of human nature, a view also developed at length in book 1 of Cicero's *On Duties* which depends heavily on Panaetius' theory. The joint fulfillment of all these natural inclinations as virtues leads to the achievement of a happy life according to nature. See I-71, I-72, I-76.

[I-88] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.62.7–14

The goal of all these virtues is to live consistently with nature; each of them enables a person to achieve the goal in its own way. For people

have, given by nature, starting points for the discovery of our responsibilities, for the stabilization of our impulses, for endurance and for distributing things. The fact that each virtue carries out its own function, but in a mutually harmonious fashion, enables a person to live consistently with nature.

Cicero here confirms Panaetius' commitment to the sufficiency thesis and to a strong form of axiological dualism.

[I-89] Cicero *On Duties* 3.12

But if it was Panaetius who said that virtue should be cultivated because it is productive of utility (like those who determine what should be pursued by an assessment of pleasure or freedom from pain), then he would be able to say that there are times when utility conflicts with what is honourable. But since he is the kind of man to hold that the only good is what is honourable and that the things which conflict with the honourable owing to a superficial appearance of utility do not make life better when they are present nor worse when they are missing, he oughtn't to have brought in the kind of deliberation in which the honourable is compared to what *seems* to be useful.

The equality of errors (*hamartēmata*) is a standard Stoic doctrine, one of the so-called paradoxes. It would not be surprising if some Stoics reacted to dialectical critique of the paradoxes by attempting to soften them (though without abandoning core doctrines, like the sufficiency thesis). There is, of course, a sense in which the doctrine that all mistakes are equal (equal in that they are all mistakes) is compatible with a common-sense claim that there are differences among them (some mistakes violate a greater number of appropriate actions than others or have greater consequences among the indifferents, etc.). Heraclides is otherwise virtually unknown; for Athenodorus see III-40 to III-47.

[I-90] Diogenes Laërtius 7.121

But Heraclides of Tarsus, an associate of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus held that moral errors [*hamartēmata*] are not equal.

The four virtues attributed to Posidonius and his followers are no doubt the four cardinal virtues, a common top-level classification used since Plato. The threefold distinction reflects the three parts of philosophy. Panaetius' distinction of virtues into theoretical and practical (I-91, see also I-93) is merely another approach to top-level classification, perhaps influenced by Aristotle's contrast between theoretical and practical intellectual virtues in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6. The vague reference to even more kinds of virtue advanced by Cleanthes,

Chrysippus and Antipater no doubt reflects the richly ramified complex of subtypes of virtue that turns up in Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.60–62, Diogenes Laërtius 7.92–93 and ps-Andronicus *Peri Pathōn* part 2, in Glibert-Thierry (1977, pp. 259–261). See also *SVF* 3.266–273.

[I-91] Diogenes Laërtius 7.92

Panaetius, at any rate, says that there are two kinds of virtue, theoretical and practical. Others say there are three: logical, physical and ethical. Posidonius (F 180 E-K) and his followers say there are four, while Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Antipater say there are even more.

I-92 is the central text for Panaetius' views on the unity of virtues; note the use of target language (compare the analogy of the spear and the goal at **I-72** section 22); **I-93** is Cicero's account of how (according to Panaetius) the four cardinal virtues relate to human responsibilities. Panaetius is committed to the distinctness of each virtue, since each has a different domain of concern and (as we see at **I-88**) a distinct foundation in a feature of human nature; but he is also committed to their essential unity through their shared relationship to the overall goal of life. For the top-level contrast of theoretical and practical virtues, see also the introduction to **I-72**, **V-5** sections 1–2 and **V-47** section 2. In **I-93** section 19 Cicero expresses a concern about excessive concentration on purely theoretical activities; this may reflect his own concerns, but it is hardly foreign to Stoicism; this same concern appears in even stronger form in Aristo, Epictetus and Seneca; and even Chrysippus recognized a need for balance in order to avoid falling into a self-indulgent concentration on theoretical enquiry (*Stoic Self-contradictions* 1033cd). So it is just as likely that Cicero's caveat stems from Panaetius.

[I-92] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.63.10–64.12

They [the Stoics] say that the virtues differ from one another in their principal focus. The principal focus of practical wisdom in the first instance is thinking about and doing what ought to be done; in second place is thinking about what one should distribute <and what one should choose and what one should endure>, all for the sake of doing what ought to be done without mistake. The special focus of self-control is predominantly to render one's impulses stable and to think about them, and in second place to think about the issues that fall under the other virtues, all for the sake of handling oneself without mistake when dealing with one's impulses. And similarly for courage, in the first instance to think about everything one should endure and in second place to do so for the issues that fall under the other virtues. And justice in the

first instance considers what is proper to each person, and in second place etc. etc. For all the virtues consider what belongs to all of them and the issues governed by the various virtues. For Panaetius said that the situation with the virtues was as though there were a single target set up for several archers and this target had on it lines of different colours. Each archer would then aim at hitting the target, but one would do so directly by way of hitting, for example, the white line, another by way of hitting the black line, and another by way of hitting a line of some other colour. For just as they make hitting the target the highest goal while each archer aims directly to do so in a different way, so too all the virtues make the goal happiness, which consists in living in harmony with nature, but each virtue achieves it in a different way.

[I-93] Cicero *On Duties* 1.15–20

15. ... Although these four [virtues] are connected and intertwined with each other, nevertheless from each of them distinct kinds of responsibilities emerge. For example, the first part of virtue that I outlined, where we located theoretical and practical wisdom, involves the investigation and discovery of truth and this is the proper function of this virtue. 16. For when an individual best perceives in each subject what is most true and can both perceive and explicate the rationale for it with exceptional acuity and speed, he is duly held to be superior to all in theoretical and practical wisdom. And that is why this virtue takes truth as a kind of raw material to work with and to range over. 17. The other three virtues have as their objects the things we need for attaining and retaining what is essential for the activities of life: the preservation of a unified human society and the manifestation of an outstanding greatness of soul both in enhancing wealth and other advantages for oneself and one's family and even more importantly in the ability to despise these same benefits. Moreover, a certain orderliness, stability, moderation and other similar characteristics are involved in areas where one needs to take action as well as to have a kind of mental activity. For it is by deploying a measure of balance and orderliness on the practicalities of life that we will be able to maintain our honour and dignity.

18. The first of the four domains into which we have divided up the essential nature of the honourable consists in knowing the truth, and it engages most directly with human nature. For we are all attracted, indeed drawn to a desire for knowing and understanding; we think it

is wonderful to excel in this and take it to be bad, disgraceful in fact, to be in error, to be ignorant and to be led astray. This branch of virtue is both natural to us and honourable and in it there are two kinds of failure to avoid. First, we should not mistake what we don't know for what we do know and so rashly give our assent to it; those who want to avoid this mistake (and that should be everyone) will take their time and exercise caution when assessing things.

19. The second mistake is that some people are overly enthusiastic about devoting their energies to the investigation of arcane and difficult problems which aren't essential. If those mistakes are avoided, then all the care and attention devoted to honourable matters that are worth knowing will be praised, and rightly so. For example, I've heard about Gaius Sulpicius, an astronomer, and I know firsthand Sextus Pompeius, the geometer, as well as many dialecticians, several eminent legal theorists – all of which are subjects that involve ascertaining the truth. To be diverted from taking action by one's enthusiasm for theory is a violation of our responsibilities – for action is the essence of what is praiseworthy in a virtue. Still, one can often take a break from action and there are many opportunities to retreat to one's studies – and our ceaseless mental energy can keep us going in our enthusiasm for learning even when we don't devote our efforts to it. All mental activity and thinking, though, will either deal with deliberation about issues which are honourable and conduce to a good and happy life or will focus on the enthusiastic pursuit of understanding and knowledge.

20. So much, then, for the first source of our responsibilities; of the other three, the most comprehensive is the line of reasoning which grounds social bonds among people and a kind of shared life. There are two aspects of this virtue: justice (where the glory of virtue is most magnificent and which is the basis for claiming that certain men are 'good') and its associated virtue, beneficence, which one can also call kindness or generosity.

The 'honourable' (*honestum*) is Cicero's term for the 'fine' (*kalon*) and is co-extensive with the virtues. In I-94 Cicero no doubt blends some of his views with those of Panaetius, but the essentials seem to belong to Panaetius. Note the typically Stoic (and Aristotelian, see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1097b33–34) feature in section 96: the account of human virtue rests on isolating those features of human nature that distinguish us from non-rational animals. See also Seneca IV-32 and IV-43. The emphasis on social propriety as a necessary component of the virtues is strongly emphasized by Panaetius, perhaps for the first time in the

school, and is reflected in the importance of the concept of the ‘fitting’ (Greek *to prepon*, Latin *decorum*) both in itself and as a feature of all the virtues. This development will help to distinguish the Cynic lifestyle from Stoic practice and is further reflected in Epictetus’ emphasis on modesty (*aidōs*). It also fits well with Cicero’s own inclinations in favour of conformity with social mores, views which no doubt influenced his sympathy for Panaetius’ thought. In this connection we should note the use of the contrast in sections 101–102 between *hormē* (‘appetite,’ elsewhere translated as ‘impulse’) and *logos* (reason) to make the *prepon* connect especially to self-control (see also *On Duties* 1.132). This might help to explain the apparent flirtation with psychological dualism which we also see in I-95. It is controversial whether the opposition between appetite and reason Panaetius employs here means that he abandoned the essentially cognitivist account of human psychology that is generally characteristic of the school in favour of a reason/appetite dualism associated more frequently with Plato and Aristotle. See Tieleman (2007), who minimizes Panaetius’ innovations in psychology; Dyck (1996, pp. 260–261); Alesse (1997, pp. 256–257); Vimercati (2004, pp. 107–110). A great deal turns on whether in section 101 *duplex vis animorum atque natura* refers to two powers within the *hēgemonikon* or to two distinct parts within the soul. The evidence we have for Panaetius’ division of the soul (I-66 to I-68) does not suggest a strong dualism of soul parts into reason and desire on the Platonic/Aristotelian model; but the emphasis on the need for appetites to *obey* reason in I-95 points in that direction. In Inwood (2014a, p. 82) I retain in a weaker form the commitment to a quasi-dualistic approach to moral psychology that I embraced in Inwood (1985, pp. 292–293), while arguing that Panaetius’ approach to soul partition was a relatively small modification of Chrysippus’ theory.

[I-94] Cicero *On Duties* 1.93–103

93. We still have to discuss the sole remaining part of honourableness. Here we find modesty, a certain orderliness in life, self-restraint, self-control and the calming of all mental upset, and a balance in dealing with things. This topic covers what can be termed *decorum* in Latin, since it is called *prepon* [the fitting] in Greek. 94. It has the characteristic of being inseparable from the honourable; for what is fitting is honourable and what is honourable is fitting. It is, however, easier to grasp than to explicate how the honourable and the fitting differ. For the fitting becomes apparent when honourableness precedes it. And so the fitting becomes apparent not only in the part of honourableness which is our present topic of discussion but also in the three areas previously discussed. For it is fitting to deploy reason and discourse prudently and to do what you have to do with reflection and to see and contemplate the truth in all matters; and on the other hand, it is

as unfitting to be deceived, to be in error and to falter as it is to be raving mad. All that is just is fitting, and on the other hand all that is unjust is unfitting in so far as it is shameful. A similar account applies to courage: for a manly and great-souled action seems to be worthy of and fitting for a man, and its opposite is unfitting in so far as it is shameful. 95. Hence what I am calling 'fitting' is relevant to every form of the honourable, and not relevant in a way that demands abstruse reasoning to appreciate but is quite obvious. For there is and is understood to be an element of the fitting in every virtue; in fact, it is easier to distinguish the fitting from virtue in concept than in fact. Bodily charm and beauty cannot be separated from health, and similarly the fittingness that we are discussing now is in fact blended together with virtue, though it is distinct from it in thought and concept.

96. The fitting can be described on two levels. For we have an understanding of a kind of general fittingness which is found in every case of the honourable, and there is another, subordinate to it, which applies to the individual parts of the honourable. The former is generally defined roughly thus: the fitting is what is harmonious with human excellence in respect of that in which human nature differs from the other animals. The definition of the fittingness that is subordinate to the general reflects their view that the fitting is that which is harmonious with nature in the sense that it displays self-restraint and self-control along with a certain patina of gentlemanliness.

97. We can appreciate that this is how fittingness is understood from the fact that poets observe fittingness – and this is generally the topic of extensive discussion in another context. We say that poets observe what is fitting when what is worthy of each role is said and done. For example, if Aeacus or Minos⁴³ were to say, "let them hate me as long as they fear me" or "the father is himself his children's tomb," then that would seem unfitting because our general view is that they were just men; but if Atreus⁴⁴ says it, they get vigorous applause because the speech is worthy of the role. But the poets are going to judge what is fitting for each person based on the role, while nature has endowed us with a role that brings with it a tremendous

⁴³ Legendary kings of Aegina and Crete respectively.

⁴⁴ The early and tyrannical king of Mycenae; he took revenge on his brother Thyestes by killing and cooking Thyestes' sons and serving them to their father.

superiority over other animals. 98. That is why poets have to see to what suits and is fitting for vicious people too – given the wide range of roles they deal with. But nature has given us parts to play that are characterized by steadfastness, self-control, self-restraint and modesty; the very same nature teaches us to attend to the way we treat other people. The result is that we can readily discern both the fittingness that is relevant to honourableness generally and that which is observable in each and every branch of virtue. For just as bodily beauty stimulates our eyes by the apt configuration of the limbs and delights us due to the charm and mutual harmony of all the parts, so too what shines forth as fitting in someone's life stimulates approval among his companions owing to the orderliness, consistency and self-control of all his words and deeds.

99. And so we should exercise a kind of deference towards others, both the best people and everyone else. For it is a mark not just of arrogance but even of utter corruption to ignore other people's views of oneself. There is, though, a difference between justice and modesty when it comes to taking account of other people. Justice includes not harming people while modesty includes not giving offense to people – and the latter is the key feature of the fitting. So, now that I've set out all of this, I think we understand what we mean by 'fitting.'

100. But the responsibility that follows from what is fitting takes the road which leads towards harmony with and maintenance of nature; if we follow the fitting as a leader, we will never go astray and we'll pursue what is by nature sharp and perceptive, what is suitable to human sociability, and what is energetic and strong. But the key feature of the fitting lies in the part of virtue we are discussing. For it's not just natural bodily motions that we should approve of, but even more so the motions of the mind which are also suited to nature.

101. For the nature and capacities of the mind are twofold. One part is situated in the appetite (that is, *hormē* in Greek) which drags a person back and forth; the other is situated in the reason that teaches and makes clear what we should do and what we should avoid. The result is that reason is in charge and appetite obeys. But every action should be free of rashness and thoughtlessness; and we shouldn't do anything for which we cannot provide a plausible justification. That is pretty much the definition of an appropriate action. 102. So we must bring it about that the appetites obey reason; they shouldn't get out in front of reason nor abandon it owing to sloth or laziness; the appetites should be calm and free of all mental

disturbance. The result will be that complete consistency and complete self-control will shine forth. For the appetites that stray far afield and, as though leaping with lust or fear, are not restrained by reason, these appetites certainly exceed due bounds and limits. They abandon and reject their obligation to obey; they don't listen to reason, though they are naturally subordinate to it. These appetites don't just disturb the mind, they also upset the body. Just look at the faces of angry men or of men aroused by some desire or fear, men wild with excessive pleasure. Their faces, voices, movements and posture are all transformed. 103. To return to the outline of appropriate action, from all of this we can learn that all of our appetites must be limited and calmed and that we must arouse our concentration and care, so that we do nothing rashly or haphazardly, nothing recklessly or thoughtlessly.

Almost certainly drawing on Panaetius, in **I-95** (and compare **I-93**) Cicero characterizes virtue with respect to three major focuses: pursuit of truth, consistency, etc. (theoretical wisdom); control of one's own desires and behaviour; and mutually respectful relationships with other people, whom one needs in order to fulfill one's *telos*. Here Panaetius draws a close connection between the basic attributes of human nature and attaining the *telos*. See also **I-71**. The functions of virtue listed here correspond to the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, self-control, justice and courage, though the last two are closely intertwined.

[I-95] Cicero *On Duties* 2.18

Moreover, virtue as a whole is generally concerned with three things. One is concerned with discerning in each matter what is true and clear, what is consistent with what, what follows from what, what is the origin of each thing, and what is the cause of each thing. The next is to restrain the unruly movements of the mind (which the Greeks call *pathē*) and to make the appetites (which they call *hormai*) obedient to reason; third is to treat our associates with moderation and intelligence, so that with their cooperation we might fully attain and accumulate what our nature requires, and so that with the help of the same people we might protect ourselves from any disadvantages inflicted upon us and avenge ourselves on those who try to harm us and inflict on them as big a punishment as fairness and human decency will permit.

The description of virtue as a completion in **I-96** may be related to Diogenes' definition of the good as "what is complete by nature" (**I-73**). It is hard to decide whether this notion of virtue should be attributed to Hecaton, who is certainly responsible for the classification of virtues into those based on knowledge and those

that are not (the latter not being genuine virtues in the Stoic sense, but widely agreed favourable traits, and so highly advantageous preferred indifferents). The kind of courage which is non-theory-based must be a robust physical inclination for aggression, rather than true courage, which requires knowledge of what is fearful and what is not. The idea that such attributes are dependent on and consequences of real virtues does not undermine the key points of Stoic doctrine. Hecaton seems to have developed this presentation of the standard virtue theory of the early school.⁴⁵ It is noteworthy that Socrates himself is not taken as evidence that virtue is teachable but relies instead on the fact that his followers (Antisthenes and Diogenes, presumably of Sinope) made progress. The point is presumably that *Socratic* teaching can lead towards virtue and this would not be illustrated by the moral status of Socrates himself.

[I-96] Diogenes Laërtius 7.90–91

90. Virtue in one sense is, generally, a completion for each thing ...⁴⁶ for example of a statue. And there is non-theory-based virtue, for example health, and theory-based virtue, for example practical wisdom. For in book 1 of *On Virtues* Hecaton says that the virtues which consist in theorems are knowledge-based and theory-based (for example practical wisdom and justice). The non-theory-based are those which are understood by extension from those understood to consist in theorems (for example health and strength). For it turns out that health follows and is in extension from self-control, which is theory-based, just as strength supervenes on the building of a vault. 91. They are called non-theory-based because they do not involve assent;⁴⁷ examples are health and courage. In book 1 of his *Ethical Treatise*, Posidonius (F 29 E-K) says that it is an indication that virtue can exist that the followers of Socrates, Diogenes and Antisthenes, were making progress; and that vice can exist because it is the opposite of virtue. And that it is teachable, virtue I mean, is said by Chrysippus in book 1 of his *On the Goal* and Cleanthes and Posidonius in their *Protreptics* (F 2 E-K) and Hecaton. It is clear that it is teachable from the fact that bad people become good.

45 But see also Vimercati (2004, p. 39).

46 There is probably a gap in the text here, with several words missing.

47 I follow Dorandi in excising “and they also occur in base people.”

Appropriate Actions

The relationship between Stoicism and the Cynic movement, with its characteristically unorthodox lifestyle, remains vexed throughout the history of Stoicism. In I-97 Apollodorus anticipates an attitude to the Cynics that we will see again in Seneca and Epictetus.

[I-97] Diogenes Laërtius 7.121

And [the wise man] will live the Cynic life, for being a Cynic is a shortcut to virtue, according to Apollodorus in his *Ethics*.

In I-98 Cicero, drawing heavily on Panaetius, sets out a principle of natural social connection among rational beings that underlies all reasoning about appropriate actions relative to others. Typically for Stoics, non-rational animals are completely excluded from such relationships, which are based on shared rationality and discourse. The natural principles mentioned in section 50 are probably to be identified with the natural inclinations underlying each of the virtues (see I-71, I-72, I-76, I-88). The regulation of our responsibilities to others by an appreciation of their closeness to us is an elaboration of the traditional theory of *oikeiōsis* that becomes a key principle for deciding on appropriate actions here and again in Hierocles (VI-41). The developmental account (from mating pair to community to larger political entity) is reminiscent of Aristotle's account in *Politics* 1.2. The distinct emphasis here on social bonding brings into prominence acts of mutual benefit; this reflects the long-standing Stoic focus on beneficence, gratitude and generosity, prominent in the remains of Hecaton's ethical works and the main focus of Seneca's *On Benefits*. Although it is typical of all ancient Stoics to prioritize one's commitments to the political body one is a part of, the particular emphasis here in section 57 on threats to the republic is almost certainly Cicero's own reflection on the behaviour of Julius Caesar, whom Cicero regarded as a tyrant.

[I-98] Cicero *On Duties* 1.50–59

50. The fellowship and community among human beings will be best preserved if we bestow good will upon others in accordance with how close they are to us. But I think we need to look deeper for the natural principles underlying human sharing and community. The first thing is something observed in the community of the entire human race. For what binds it together is reason and discourse, which connect people to each other by way of teaching, learning, sharing, debating and judging. They join us with a kind of natural community and in virtue of them we are as remote as can be from the nature of beasts. We often say that beasts have courage (as in horses and lions), but we don't say that beasts possess justice, fairness and goodness. That's because they lack reason and discourse. 51. The most comprehensive

community among human beings is the one that joins all with all. Here we have to preserve the sharing of all those things which nature created for the common use of humankind, in such a way that things allocated by statute and civil law should be held in possession in accordance with those laws, and everything else should be treated as in the Greek proverb, which holds that all things are shared among friends. The things common to all men are those which fall into the category which Ennius introduces for one context, but which can be transferred to many others. “A man who shows the way in comradely fashion to one who is lost is, as it were, kindling a light from his own candle: though he has given the other man light it still shines for himself.” From this one example Ennius teaches us to bestow even on a complete stranger whatever can be provided without loss to oneself. 52. On this basis the following are shared: we shouldn’t bar others from running water; we should permit someone to take a light from our fire if he wants; we should give honest counsel to someone who is deliberating. These things are useful to the recipients and cause no loss to the giver. Therefore we ought to make use of them and yet always make a contribution from them to shared utility. But since individuals have limited capacity and there is a boundless multitude of people in need, large-scale generosity must be regulated by the limit set by Ennius, when he said “it still shines for himself,” so that we can retain the resources with which to be generous to those who are close to us.

53. Now, the human community has several levels. For as we move away from unlimited community, next in line is the community defined by sharing the same ethnicity, tribe or language – by which people are most closely connected. Next is the community of those who share citizenship. Citizens share many things with each other – the forum, temples, porticoes, streets, statutes and laws, courts, voting rights, not to mention customs and connections and the business and commercial relationships which connect many people with each other. There is a tighter bond of community with one’s relations; starting with that vast community of the human race, we end with this small and restricted connection. 54. For since it is a common feature of all animals that they have a desire to procreate, the first community consists in the mating couple, the next is children, then a single household – everything shared. And this is the foundation of the city, as it were the nursery of the republic. Next you have the linkages between brothers, then between first and second cousins –

they cannot be contained in one household so they go forth to found other households, like colonies. The next step is marriages and the connections which generate even more relationships. This reproduction of offspring is the starting point for republics. For it is blood ties that bind people together with benevolence and affection. 55. It is no small thing to share the memorials of one's ancestors, to have the same religious rituals and to have the same ancestral tombs.

But there is no community more significant or more reliable than that of good men, similar in character, who are connected by familiarity. For the honourableness that we mention so often moves us even when we see it in another, and it makes us friendly to the person in whom it is observed to inhere. 56. And although every virtue attracts us and makes us love the people in whom it is observed to inhere, justice and generosity have the greatest impact. But nothing, really, is more lovable and nothing forms a stronger connection than the similarity of good character; people who have the same enthusiasms and the same inclinations end up being as pleased by the other as each is by himself, and you get the result that Pythagoras looked for in a friendship – you get one out of many.

There is also a very significant bond produced by benefits given and received in reciprocity. Provided they are mutual and appreciated, these benefits are bound into a solid community of the people who participate in them.

57. But when you reflect rationally on all cases, there is no community more important or more dear than the one that each and every one of us has with the republic. Our parents are dear to us, so are our children, our relatives and our friends. But our fatherland embraces all these relationships. Which good man would hesitate to die for his fatherland if it would benefit it? How much more hateful, then, is the monstrous behaviour of those who have scourged the fatherland with all manner of crimes and who are and long have been preoccupied with utterly destroying it!

58. But if there is a competition or comparison as to who has the greatest claim on our responsibility, fatherland and parents come first; we are bound by the enormous benefits they have given to us. Next come children and the rest of the household; they look to us alone and they have no other source of support. Next come the relations with whom we are on good terms; generally our fortune is bound up with theirs too. Hence we owe the essential means of life especially to the people I've just mentioned, but it is especially among friendships that

a shared life and activities, shared counsel, conversation, encouragement, consolation – and sometimes even shared quarrels – are found to thrive most of all. And the most pleasant friendship is the one formed through shared good character.

59. In the assignment of all these responsibilities you have to consider what is most essential to each person and what each person could or could not accomplish without our help. Thus you won't get the same scale of responsibilities from considering relationships as you get from considering circumstances; and there are services that are owed more to one group than to another. For example, you would help your neighbour harvest his crop sooner than your brother or a friend, but if a lawsuit comes up you'd defend a relative or a friend rather than your neighbour. You have to take into account these considerations and others like them when dealing with every responsibility, and we have to form habits by training ourselves, in order that we might become good bookkeepers of our responsibilities, and so that by adding and subtracting we might be able to see what amount is left over. This is how you can see how much is owed to each person.

As is suggested by the remark at the end of I-98 about being a good "bookkeeper" of one's responsibilities, the relative weight in deliberation of various considerations, each of which is an indifferent, is clearly an important factor in reasoning about the appropriate thing to do. In I-99 Cicero is also interested in the delicate question of how one deliberates when different virtues *seem* to point towards different and incompatible actions. This issue is obviously connected with the question of the unity of virtues and with what Epictetus later says about the application of our preconceptions to particular cases (V-22). Stoicism does not allow that genuinely virtuous actions can be incompatible with each other, so it is easier than Cicero thinks to sympathize with Panaetius' decision not to address the issue. Nevertheless, considerations based on each of the four virtues, if taken in isolation from each other, might *seem* to conflict; so a discussion of the procedure to be followed in such cases would not have been pointless.

I-99 and I-100 note only what Panaetius did not cover in the books Cicero relied upon. That *kathēkonta* have to be reasoned out (calculated) in the context of comparative judgements is a view consistent with the general Stoic treatment of appropriate actions, but the details of how this reasoning works may well have been significantly affected by Cicero's presentation.

[I-99] Cicero *On Duties* 1.152

I think I've given a sufficient account of how appropriate actions are derived from those parts of the honourable [the virtues]. There can arise, however, among the very things which are honourable,

a competition and comparison as to which of two honourable things is the more honourable. Panaetius left this topic out of his discussion. For though everything that is honourable derives from those four parts (one focussed on knowledge, another on community, the third on greatness of soul, the fourth on moderation), it is often necessary, when choosing the appropriate action, to compare them with each other.

Panaetius apparently promised a discussion of the relative weighting of various indifferents in calculation of one's responsibilities. Perhaps he decided not to follow through on the grounds that circumstances vary so much that general principles of comparison are impossible to formulate reliably. In the abstract, no doubt, bodily benefits are more important than externals, but deliberations and decisions are never undertaken in the abstract.

[I-100] **Cicero *On Duties* 2.88**

But sometimes we have to compare useful things – this is the fourth topic and it was omitted by Panaetius. For people customarily compare bodily benefits with externals and externals with those of the body, and bodily benefits are compared with each other and externals with externals likewise ...

Panaetius organized his account of deliberation about responsibilities under three headings: whether an action under consideration is honourable or not; whether it is useful or not; and what to do if the honourable and the useful conflict. The third question (conflict between the honourable and the useful) was a traditional problem. The best explanation for the omission is probably none of those suggested by Cicero, but rather (as was held by some, no doubt Stoics, in I-101 section 9) that once one understands what is *truly* useful one sees that a conflict between it and virtue is in fact impossible; on this view, the only genuinely and reliably useful thing is virtuous behaviour itself. Cicero recognizes this as his possible motivation for not completing his discussion as announced, but is adamant that Panaetius had an obligation to do so, by including an analysis of how one should handle an apparent conflict between the useful and the honourable, should one arise. Rutilius Rufus, a Roman aristocrat strongly aligned with Stoicism, was more sympathetic with Panaetius than Cicero was. (See too I-105.)

The omitted issue is what Cicero himself takes on in *On Duties* book 3 and his account of the omission and its significance clearly has the effect of enhancing the originality and importance of Cicero's own discussion. Cicero's analysis in book 3, signalled as his own contribution and not reliant on Panaetius' work, is said to be consistent with Stoic, Peripatetic and Academic philosophies and so its interest for us as evidence for contemporary Stoicism is weakened, though not eliminated. In the course of his discussion, he also gives us valuable evidence about Diogenes and Antipater. See I-104.

[I-101] Cicero *On Duties* 3.7–10

7. So Panaetius, who is without any doubt the most exacting writer on the topic of appropriate actions and whom we have followed quite closely, with a certain amount of correction, set out three kinds of problem on which people generally deliberate and take advice about what is appropriate to do. One is when they are uncertain as to whether what they are considering is honourable or shameful; second is whether it is useful or the opposite; and the third is how one ought to decide whether what appears honourable is in conflict with what seems useful. He gave his account of the first two topics in three books, but though he said he would address the third topic subsequently, he never kept his promise. 8. I am all the more surprised at this because his student Posidonius (F 41c E-K) wrote that Panaetius lived for thirty years after he wrote those three books. I am also surprised that Posidonius only touched briefly on the topic in some notes, especially since he wrote that there was no more important topic in all of philosophy. 9. But I don't at all agree with those who claim that the topic was not omitted by Panaetius but that he deliberately left it out and that it ought not to have been written anyway, since utility could never conflict with the honourable. Here one might have doubts about the second question, whether the topic listed as third by Panaetius in his scheme ought to have been dealt with or simply omitted; but there cannot be any doubt about the former issue, whether it was undertaken by Panaetius but then abandoned. For someone who sets out three topics and deals with two of them must still deal with the third. Moreover, in his third and final book he promises that he will discuss this theme at a later time. 10. Add to this the evidence of Posidonius, a reliable witness; in one of his letters he writes that Publius Rutilius Rufus, a student of Panaetius, used to say that no painter had been found to complete the part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had begun and then abandoned (for the beauty of her face dashed all hopes of representing the rest of her body); similarly, no one had tackled those topics which Panaetius had left out because of the excellence of what he had completed.

[I-102] Cicero *On Duties* 3.33–34

33. I believe that Panaetius would have taken on issues like these if his plan hadn't been interrupted by some chance event or his workload. ...
 34. But we should first of all defend Panaetius on this point, that he

did not say that useful things could ever conflict with the honourable (for that would have been unthinkable for him) but rather that things which *seemed* useful do so. For he often claims that nothing is genuinely useful if it isn't honourable and that there is nothing honourable which is not also useful. He says too that no greater plague could afflict human life than the opinion of those people who separated them.⁴⁸ And so he introduced the idea of an apparent conflict rather than a real one, not so that we might at some point rank utility before the honourable but rather so that we might distinguish them reliably if we ever meet with them. So I will complete this remaining topic with no assistance but rather, as they say, under my own steam. For since Panaetius' day there has been no discussion of this problem, at any rate none that I approve of, in any of the works that I have been able to find.

Panaetius, his student Hecaton of Rhodes, and the Roman philosopher Seneca are the Stoics most strongly associated with highly developed theories of *kathēkonta*, but in fact all Stoics devoted serious attention to the topic which was of central theoretical and practical importance. I-103 to I-106 are Ciceronian evidence and it is hard to determine what is Cicero's contribution and what Panaetius'.

Panaetius' discussion of *kathēkonta* relied heavily on his theory of the different roles (*prosōpa*, which Cicero translates as *personae*) people have. Note that the first role, our rational human nature, reflects Panaetius' systematic emphasis on the importance of reason in differentiating us from animals. This reflects the focus on features unique to a species in determining its proper function, *ergon*; this is a feature of both Plato's and Aristotle's versions of the so-called function argument and it is adopted by Stoicism. Still, Panaetius, as reported by Cicero, seems to have given it more emphasis than other Stoics did. The second role, or factor to take into account in reasoning out one's *kathēkonta* is the individual set of characteristics of a person. In section 115 two other roles, factors to consider in deliberation about the appropriate action, are given: contingent circumstances that affect the context of deliberation and one's own personal decision. As befits their lesser importance, they are given less development by Cicero. One might question the distinction between the second role (personal *characteristics*) and the fourth (personal *decisions*), especially as in the case of Cato the Younger it is unclear how best to construe his decision to act on philosophical principle: as a reflection of his intrinsic abilities and built-in inclinations or of his personal decision to live a certain kind of life. On this compare V-73, especially sections 25–29. Epictetus more than any other later Stoic follows Panaetius in his emphasis on the importance for moral deliberation of roles

⁴⁸ Cf. Cleanthes *SVF* 1.558 (Clement *Strom.* 2.22.131).

and relationships. For earlier anticipations of roles in Stoic discussions of appropriate actions, see IV-40 section 4 (where Seneca suggests that Cleanthes took account of roles); cf. Tieleman (2007, pp. 132–140).

[I-103] Cicero *On Duties* I.105–107, I.110–115

105. In every enquiry into our responsibilities it is helpful to recall by how much human nature is superior to cattle and other animals. They are only aware of pleasure and pursue it with their every effort, while the human mind is nourished by learning and reflection and is always either investigating things or doing things; it is attracted by the delight it takes in hearing and seeing things. Furthermore, if there is a person who is a bit too inclined to pleasures – providing that he isn't classified as a beast, for some human beings are so classified, in name though not literally – and yet is a bit more dignified than that, he will for the sake of modesty conceal and cover up his appetite for pleasure despite his attraction to it. 106. From this we learn that bodily pleasure is not sufficiently worthy of humanity's superior status and that it ought to be held in contempt and rejected; but if someone does grant pleasure some importance, then he should be scrupulous in regulating his enjoyment of it.⁴⁹ And so the nourishment and care for the body should be regulated with reference to health and strength, rather than pleasure. Moreover, if we are willing to think about the excellence and worthiness in our nature, we'll come to understand how shameful it is to dissolve ourselves in luxury and to live amid refined softness and how honourable it is to live economically, with self-control, strictness and sobriety. 107. One must understand that nature has, as it were, dressed us for two roles. One of them is common to us all and is based on the fact that we all have a share in reason and that superiority which we have over all the other animals; from this everything that is honourable and fitting is derived and it is the source of our ability to discover rationally what our responsibilities are. The other role is assigned to each of us individually. For just as there are big differences in our physical abilities (some people, we observe, are fast runners, others are strong enough to be wrestlers, some people are dignified in their appearance while others are charming), there are even greater differences in our mental attributes.

...

49 See I-84 for various positions taken on the value of the indifferent, pleasure.

110. Everyone should retain what is his own, provided that it is not vicious but nevertheless his own; this will make it easier to maintain the kind of fittingness that we are looking for. We should proceed in such a way that we do not struggle against our common nature, but as long as we can retain that we ought to pursue our own individual nature. Thus, even though there may be other pursuits that are more important and better, we should still measure our pursuits by the yardstick of our own nature. For it does no good to fight against nature nor to pursue things which you cannot achieve. And so it becomes more apparent what that fittingness is like, exactly because nothing is fitting “against Minerva’s will,” as they say, that is, when our nature resists us and fights back. 111. If anything at all is fitting, then nothing is more fitting than consistency in one’s life as a whole and in one’s particular actions, and you cannot maintain this if you emulate other people’s nature and neglect your own. Just as we should speak in the language that we know, in order to avoid the justifiable ridicule directed at those who cram in Greek words, so we should avoid introducing any inconsistencies into our actions and our life as a whole. 112. This difference among our natures is so significant that sometimes one person ought to commit suicide while someone else in the same situation should not.⁵⁰ Marcus Cato’s situation was no different from that of the rest who surrendered themselves to Caesar in Africa, was it? And yet perhaps it would have been wrong for the others to kill themselves, because their lives were gentler than his and their characters less fierce. But nature had granted to Cato an unbelievable degree of seriousness, and since he had himself reinforced this with unremitting consistency and had always persisted with his plans and with the policies he had embarked on, he had to die rather than gaze upon the face of the tyrant. 113. Ulysses suffered so much during his endless wanderings; he was a slave to women – if you can call Circe and Calypso women – and in all his conversations with everyone presented himself as easy-going and pleasant to deal with; and when he got home he even put up with the insults of slaves and maid-servants, all so that he might in the end attain his objective. But Ajax, as we know him from the tradition, would have preferred to die a thousand times rather than endure what Ulysses put up with. Each of us should reflect on these examples and then

50 Compare V-73 and I-80.

assess his own capacities and regulate them accordingly; we ought not to want to find out how well other people's traits might benefit us. For what most belongs to each of us is most fitting for each. 114. So let each of us learn his own talents and show himself to be a perceptive judge of his own strengths and weaknesses; otherwise stage actors will turn out to be more sensible than we are. For they don't choose the finest plays to act in, but the ones that suit their talents best. The ones with good voices choose *The Epigoni* and *Medus*; those specializing in gestures choose *Melanippe* and *Clytemnestra*; as I recall, Rupilius chose *Antiope* and quite often Aesopus chose *Ajax*. So, will an actor understand this principle as it applies to the stage and a wise man not see its significance in life? We will work hardest on the tasks for which we are best suited. But if from time to time we are forced to take on things which don't suit our talents, we must still devote all of our care, practice and attention to them, so that even if we cannot do those things fittingly we can at least minimize the unfittingness. And we should not strive as much to attain good outcomes that aren't granted to us as we do to avoid mistakes.

115. Above I mentioned two roles; in addition to them there is a third, the role forced on us by the contingent circumstances of life; there is also a fourth role which we adopt for ourselves by our own decision.

I-104 is Cicero's own development of what he understands as Stoic ideas. He presents (or constructs) a debate between the two great Stoics who confronted Carneades in the second century BCE, Diogenes and Antipater. Much of the debate between them (and Hecaton as well, who follows Diogenes' lead; see **I-105** and **I-106**) turns on decisions about what is situationally appropriate in hard cases; the importance of this aspect of ethical debate was given prominence by Carneades' challenge to the Stoics. See *De republica* 3.29–30, where examples of the shipwrecked men, the sale of an unreliable slave or a defective house are all introduced, as is the confusion of brass for gold; these examples are taken up by Cicero in his discussion and were apparently used by various Stoics as well, including Hecaton. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the casuistry of hard cases was given greater prominence in Stoicism of the late second and first centuries BCE as a direct result of dialectical challenges from Carneades.

The fact that two influential Stoic teachers recommended conflicting maxims for use in deciding hard cases of deliberation about what action is appropriate is an important indication of the flexibility of Stoic accounts of values and deliberation within the boundaries of their general theory. In the debate Cicero sides with

Antipater in arguing for putting full disclosure ahead of personal profit, even when not required by law. Though all agree that what is shameful should not be done, Antipater and Cicero are in effect arguing for an enlarged sense of 'shameful.' Antipater appeals to our awareness of general obligations to other people and suggests that failure to put such obligations first is in effect shameful behaviour: he assimilates concealment of material defects in a house to the sort of behaviour subjected to public execration at Athens. Cicero goes further in supplying a list of abusive epithets that would apply to someone behaving that way. The relationship between what the general public considers shameful and what is shameful in the eyes of thoughtful moral philosophers should perhaps not be taken for granted quite so easily as Antipater and Cicero do; Diogenes' view, that positive law is a proper indicator of what is shameful or forbidden, deserves more thoughtful assessment than Cicero gives it.

In I-105 and I-106 Hecaton took a view closer to Diogenes than to Cicero and Antipater. (It would be tempting to speculate that Panaetius shared his student's views on the matter, but we cannot be confident.) Cicero, an Academic rather than a Stoic, sides with Antipater on these points of moral principle against Diogenes and Hecaton. Some of these issues are discussed again by Seneca in his *On Benefits* where a similar form of deliberation is at issue. Antipater seems to be something of an outlier on such issues, but it is important to remember that the school's doctrines are general principles and that considerable latitude is available in the application of them. Cf. V-73 section 6; also IV-40 and Letter 95 of Seneca. For Hecaton on *kathékonta* see also I-110, larger context at IV-41.

[I-104] **Cicero *On Duties* 3.50–57**

50. But as I said above, cases often come up where utility *appears* to conflict with what is honourable, so we must focus on whether they flatly conflict or whether utility can be combined with the honourable. These issues are of the following type. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a good man has imported a large quantity of grain from Alexandria to Rhodes at a time when the Rhodians are suffering from shortages, hunger and very high grain prices. If the importer knows that quite a few merchants have set sail from Alexandria and has seen the ships laden with grain under sail on the way to Rhodes, should he inform the Rhodians of this fact or should he keep it to himself and sell his own cargo of grain for the highest price possible? We are imagining that he is a wise and good man. Our enquiry is about the deliberations and reflections of a man who, if he deems it shameful, will not conceal the facts from the Rhodians, but who is in doubt about whether it might in fact be shameful.

51. In cases like this the views of Diogenes of Babylon (an important and influential Stoic) and of Antipater (his student and a very sharp

philosopher) usually differ. Antipater thinks that there should be full disclosure so that the buyer is not unaware of anything that the seller knows. Diogenes thinks that the seller has to reveal any defects, to the extent specified by civil law, and otherwise act without deceit, but that since he is selling he of course wants to sell on the best terms possible. "I imported it and put it up for sale. I sell my grain for no more than the other vendors, maybe even for less, when there is a good supply. Who is being wronged here?" 52. On the other side, Antipater's reasoning is as follows. "What's that you say? You are supposed to be concerned for people and serve the interests of human society; you were born on specific terms and have natural principles to obey and follow which prescribe that your utility is general utility and conversely that general utility is your utility. Will you then conceal from people the advantages and opportunities that are available to them?"

Perhaps Diogenes will reply as follows: "Concealment is one thing and silence is something different. I am not concealing something from you if I do not tell you what the nature of the gods is or what the highest good is, and yet knowing these things would be much more useful to you than cheap wheat. But it is not obligatory for me to tell you everything that it is useful for you to hear." 53. "On the contrary," he will reply, "it is obligatory, at least if you bear in mind that human society is connected by nature." And he will reply, "I haven't forgotten that, but surely that society isn't incompatible with private property. If it were, then we would not sell anything; we'd have to give it all away!" You will note that throughout this debate no one is saying, "Although it is shameful, still I'll do it because it is advantageous." Rather, one says that it is advantageous in a way that is not in fact shameful, while on the other side the claim is that it should not be done precisely because it is shameful.

54. Suppose a good man is selling a house because of certain defects which he is aware of and others are not – suppose it is disease-prone but is thought to be healthy, that no one knows that snakes turn up in every room, that it's badly built and likely to fall down – but no one except its owner knows this. I ask you, if the seller does not tell the buyer about these defects and so sells it for more than he thought he would be able to, surely he would be acting unjustly and wrongly. "Yes, he would," says Antipater. "For what counts as 'not showing the way to a man who does not know where he is going' – something punished by public curses at Athens – if not this, to let the buyer rush ahead and get entangled

in a massive fraud because he doesn't know what he's getting into? That's not just failing to show someone the way. It's a case of someone who knows actively misleading another person." 55. Diogenes replies, "He didn't even encourage you to buy, so obviously he didn't force you to, did he? He posted for sale what he did not like and you bought what you did like. If people who advertise a 'good and well-built villa' aren't thought to have misled the public (even if it's neither good nor professionally built), much less so people who haven't praised the house they are selling. When the buyer can make up his own mind, how can there be fraud on the part of the seller? But if one doesn't have to follow through on every explicit claim, do you think we have to follow through on claims *not* made? What could be stupider than for the seller to recite the defects of what he's selling? What could be as ridiculous as for the owner to tell the auctioneer to announce 'disease-ridden house for sale'?"

56. So this shows that in some cases the honourable is defended on one side and on the other side usefulness is discussed in a way that doesn't just make doing what seems useful honourable, it even makes *not* doing it seem shameful. This is the apparent conflict between what is useful and what is honourable. And we need to adjudicate these cases – we didn't set them out just to raise questions about them but to clarify them. 57. So, it doesn't seem that the grain merchant ought to have concealed the facts from the Rhodians nor that the seller of the house should have concealed the facts from buyers. Not every case of keeping silent counts as concealment, but it does when you know something and you want those whose interest it would be to know it to remain ignorant, for the sake of your profit. Who doesn't see what this kind of concealment amounts to and what sort of man carries it out? It is certainly not the work of a candid, straightforward, honest, fair and good man; rather, it is the mark of a cunning, devious, sharp, deceitful, wicked, clever and artful old rogue. It's surely not 'useful' to incur all of these and so many other labels for vice!

[I-105] **Cicero *On Duties* 3.62–64**

62. Quintus Scaevola, son of Publius, once asked the seller of an estate that he wanted to buy to name his price, and the seller did. Scaevola said he thought it was worth more and added a hundred thousand sesterces. We would all agree that this is the mark of a *good* man, but

they say it's not what a *wise* man would do, just as if he had sold it for less than he could have gotten. So this is the disaster: they suppose that some people are good and others are wise, which is why Ennius said that a man is wise in vain if he can't look out for his own interests. And that would be true, *if* Ennius and I agreed on what one's own interests in fact are.

63. I see that Panaetius' student, Hecaton of Rhodes, said in his book *On Appropriate Actions*, dedicated to Quintus Tubero, that a wise person will look out for his private property, but without doing anything contrary to the laws, customs or traditions. For we want to be wealthy not just for ourselves but for our children, our neighbours, our friends and above all for our country. For the prosperity and resources of individuals are the wealth of the state. Hecaton could in no way accept what Scaevola did, as described just now, for he says that for the sake of his own profit he will only refrain from doing what is actually impermissible. So he should be given no great praise or appreciation. 64. But if pretense and dissimulation amount to malicious intent, then there are very few situations where malicious intent is not involved; and if a good man is someone who benefits those whom he can benefit and harms no one, then it certainly isn't easy to find a good man. So it is never useful to do wrong, because it is always shameful, and, because it is always honourable to be a good man, it is always useful too.

[I-106] Cicero *On Duties* 3.89–92

89. Book 6 of Hecaton's work *On Appropriate Actions* is full of questions of this sort: is it the mark of a good man *not* to feed his slaves when the price of grain is extremely high? He debates both sides of the issue, but nevertheless in the final analysis he determines what is appropriate by utility, as he understands it, rather than by human decency. He asks whether, if one has to make a sacrifice at sea, whether one should throw overboard a valuable horse or a cheap slave. In this case financial prudence points in one direction, decency in the other. If a fool grabs a timber from a shipwreck, will a wise man take it away from him if he can? Hecaton says no, because it would be wrong. What? Won't the ship-owner grab what belongs to him? Not at all, any more than he would be willing to throw a passenger overboard on the high seas just because it is his ship; for until the ship arrives at the port to which it was chartered the ship doesn't belong to the owner but to the passengers. 90. What? If there is one timber and two

shipwrecked men, both of them wise, will each one seize the plank for himself or will each yield to the other? Yield, of course, but to the one whose life matters more to himself or to the state. And what if they are equal in those respects? There won't be a competition, but one will yield to the other by drawing lots or by playing odds and evens. What, if a father robs a temple, or tunnels into the state treasury, will his son turn him in to the officials? That would be impious; indeed, he should defend his father if he is charged. So you mean that the fatherland doesn't prevail in all decisions about appropriate actions? Not at all; but it is good for the fatherland to have citizens who are pious to their parents. What, will a son be silent if his father tries to set up a tyranny or betray his country? No, and in fact he will beg his father not to do it. And if that doesn't work, he will accuse him, even threaten him. In the end, if it comes down to the destruction of the fatherland the son will put the fatherland ahead of his father's well-being. 91. He also asks this: if a wise man unwittingly accepts counterfeit coins in place of genuine ones, when he found out would he use them to pay off any debts he might have, instead of using genuine coins? Diogenes says that he would, Antipater says that he wouldn't (and I agree with the latter). If someone is selling wine that has gone off, should he say so? Diogenes says that it isn't necessary, while Antipater says that this is what a good man would do. These are, for the Stoics, like debatable points of law. When selling a slave, should one state his flaws (not those which, if not disclosed, entail the cancellation of the sale under civil law, but flaws like the slave's tendency to tell lies, to gamble, to pilfer or to drink)? One Stoic says that these flaws should be disclosed, the other not. 92. If someone selling gold thinks he is selling brass, will a good man point out to him that it's gold that he is selling or will he buy for a denarius something that is worth a thousand? It should be clear by now what my view is and what the debate is between the philosophers I have mentioned.

Discussion of what is appropriate naturally includes practical advice on important deliberative questions such as those dealing with career choice, marriage, etc. Antipater is the earliest Stoic for whom we have clear evidence of this kind of detailed advice (it is better attested for later figures), but it is likely to have been part of the more popular side of Stoic philosophical teaching from early in the school's history. For Antipater on marriage, see Bonhöffer (1996, pp. 124–129), Reydam-Schils (2005a, pp. 78, 148–149, 156–157) and Deming (2004, pp. 221–229).

One key question about appropriate actions and suitable ways of life was traditionally whether one should marry. Antipater here provides an extended

protreptic to married life which perhaps says more about his sympathy for conventional views about social values than it does about the underlying moral principles. Earlier Stoics were more likely to adopt revisionist views of marriage, influenced by the school's Cynic antecedents. The advice offered in the texts which follow is clearly aimed at members of an economically comfortable social class. It is an important feature of Stoic practices with regard to appropriate action that the advice offered is relativized to the social position of the audience – an example of how “roles” are important in moral deliberation even before Panaetius formalized this factor.

Despite the asymmetrical roles and duties of husband and wife typical in the ancient world, equal and reciprocal consideration is often encouraged by Stoics, for example Musonius (III-27), Hierocles (VI-35, VI-42) and Seneca (IV-40 sections 1–15, 26, IV-41 section 2.18.1). Antipater, however, while praising marriage as an institution, is deeply committed to his culture's preference for asymmetrical relationships in marriage. See also Nussbaum (2002). Like other Stoics and most ancient philosophers, Antipater sees the marital home and the production of children as crucial to the well-being and even survival of the city itself.

In addition to encouraging marriage Antipater provides some strongly worded practical advice on how a marriage should be conducted; even this advice is partly hortatory, since a marriage run properly will be pleasant and so worthwhile, but a badly managed marriage, like any other life activity done thoughtlessly, will be unpleasant and unfulfilling.

[I-107] **Stobaeus *Ecl.* 4.539.5–540.6**

From Antipater *On Living with One's Wife*

First of all, courtship must be conducted not recklessly but very thoughtfully, not with an eye to wealth or imposing nobility or anything else that makes one's jaw drop – not even beauty, by Zeus! For beauty too generally produces arrogance and a tyrannical character. But first of all you should examine the character and temperament of her parents, to see if it is civil, easy to get along with and considerate, as well as temperate and just and in addition serious-minded and guileless⁵¹ – and the other features which are prescribed with respect to the kinds of friends one should acquire. Next, you should also examine her mother, with whom your prospective bride is raised – for usually she will reflect her mother's character. Next, you should investigate whether [the parents] have raised their daughter consistently with their own characters and have not been overwhelmed and distracted from beneficial [child-rearing practices] by an excessive love

51 Accepting the tentative suggestion (*atechnos*) of Hense (given only in his apparatus) for an obviously corrupt text.

for their child. And you should conduct a comprehensive investigation by way of the slaves and freemen (both domestic and outdoor workers), the neighbours and other outsiders who enter the house for convivial engagements or some other reason, either cooks or artisans or seamstresses or other craftspeople. For families allow in people of this sort much more readily and bestow on them important responsibilities and confidence beyond their desert.

[I-108] **Stobaeus** *Ecl.* 4.507.6–512.7

From Antipater *On Marriage*⁵²

The well-born and talented youth, who is also civilized and well socialized, reflecting that a household and life can only be complete with a wife and children – for, like a city, a household is incomplete not just if it is made up of only women but also if it is made up of single men. As a flock is not fine nor a herd thriving without offspring, much more so for a city and a household – the well-born youth has this in mind, and also that since he is by nature social it is necessary to contribute to the growth of his fatherland. For cities can only be preserved if the sons of noble citizens who have the best natures get married in season, as the previous generation fades away like the leaves of a beautiful tree, leaving behind their successors for the fatherland like noble shoots, which will in turn make it bloom and preserve it forever in peak condition. As far as is in their power they keep it immune from attacks by their enemies, with the aim of aiding and protecting their fatherland both while alive and after they have passed away.

They consider it one of the primary and most essential responsibilities to be joined in marriage, hastening to fulfill what suits their nature and, much more, to fulfill what pertains to the preservation and growth of the fatherland, and even more to do what contributes to honouring the gods. For if the family line dies out, who will sacrifice to the gods? Wolves? Or some ox-slaying lions?⁵³

It also turns out that a man with no experience of wedded wife and children will have no taste of the truest, genuine good will. For other forms of affection and family love are like heaps of lentils or similar

52 The text of this excerpt is uncertain and contains many lacunas. I have benefitted from the text and translation of Deming (2004, pp. 222–225). At several points I prefer the text as emended by von Arnim.

53 Sophocles *Philoctetes* 400–401.

granules, mixtures only by juxtaposition, but the love of husband and wife is like total mixture (as of wine with water) – indeed, <while preserving its own nature,> it is totally mixed.⁵⁴ For only husband and wife share not just property and children – which is what is dearest to all men – and their life, but also their bodies.

Here is another way that it makes sense for this to be the most important form of community. Other kinds of community also involve certain distinct forms of diversion, “but these must look to one soul,”⁵⁵ that of the husband; for a woman who is raised by a father and mother who are not thoughtless⁵⁶ consents in this way to set one goal and aim in life, to please him, and since both of their parents willingly yield, the [married couple] bestow the best aspects of good will, the mother to her husband and the father to his wife.

Having had experience of living with a woman, Euripides too took these things into account and set aside misogyny in his writings, saying this: “For a wife is sweetest to her partner in sickness and troubles, if she runs the house well, calming anger <and freeing the soul from despair>. Sweet are the wiles of one’s loved ones.”

And the business of marriage is also an act of heroism. Nowadays in some cities, when combined with other established forms of weakness and anarchy and the inclination to slothful degeneration, getting married seems to be one of the most burdensome undertakings. They think that the bachelor life is godlike, because it grants license to indiscipline and the enjoyment of all kinds of ignoble and petty pleasures, and that the advent of a wife is like the introduction of a police garrison into a city.

It seems that life with a wife strikes some men as unpleasant because they cannot be in charge but are slaves to pleasure; and that because some are entrapped by beauty and some by the dowry, they willingly give some of it to her⁵⁷ as a kind of bribe, without teaching her anything about running a house or increasing its prosperity or about why they got married, not instilling in her proper views about piety to the gods

54 I have accepted the emendation of Deming for the obviously defective text. Other emendations have been proposed, but the general sense is not in doubt. This is a striking use by Antipater of an analogy to a key doctrine in Stoic physics, the theory of total blending. For a similar use of a metaphor from Stoic physics in an appreciation of marriage, see Musonius Rufus’ invocation of *sunteinein te kai sumpnein* in Discourse 13A (Hense 1905, p. 68 lines 16–17). I owe this reference to Chris Atkins.

55 *Medea* 247. 56 Accepting the emendation of von Arnim.

57 Accepting the emendation of von Arnim.

and superstition, nor presenting her with the antidote to self-indulgence and with the ungratifying aspects of pleasure, nor habituating her to look ahead in life and figure out with a sound mind what the future holds and not to be blindly and uncritically optimistic or to believe that she can certainly get what she desires as long as her husband is willing; and not to live only in the present but also for her own part to consider [in each case] where it comes from, how it works, and whether it will preserve and benefit the interests of the whole.

For if one could carry out these and other well-considered instructions derived from the philosophers, a wedded wife would seem to be one of the pleasantest things and the lightest burden.⁵⁸ It is as if someone with only one hand should somehow get another one or as if someone with only one foot should acquire a second one from some other source. Just as this man could much more easily walk where he wants and get or avoid things, so a man who gets married will get ahold of the useful things in life which preserve and benefit. To be sure, instead of two eyes he has four at his disposal, instead of two hands he has four, which together enable him to do more easily what hands do. Thus if one set gets tired, the job could be seen to by the other pair – put generally, he becomes two instead of one and so can more readily get things right in life.

This is why I think⁵⁹ that someone who supposes that taking a wife burdens life and makes it hard to move is like someone who resists acquiring more feet, so that we won't have to drag around too many feet if we have a lot of walking to do, or like someone who criticizes someone who acquires extra hands, on the grounds that he would be hindered by them when he has to do things.

In the same way if someone should acquire another self,⁶⁰ as it were (it makes no difference if it is male or female), he could carry out all his tasks much more nimbly and easily. And this is completely exceptionless for a man who pursues goodness and aspires to a life of leisure for philosophical and literary purposes,⁶¹ for political

58 Accepting the emendation of von Arnim.

59 Deming's and Hense's *an* is not needed alongside the supplement *oimai* suggested by von Arnim.

60 More literally: "acquire someone else like himself," but the allusion to the traditional formula for a friend (another self) is unmistakable. See also Reydam-Schils (2005a, pp. 78 and 148–149).

61 *Peri tous logous* might refer only to philosophical activity, as Deming assumes; but the scope of *logoi* may well be broader and we should not presume that Antipater is addressing himself solely to those with philosophical inclinations.

activities, or for both. For in so far as he has turned his back on household management, he must even more urgently acquire a wife to take over its administration and so free himself from being interrupted to deal with necessities.⁶² The comic poet was right to cut short the lines “he is a scholar, but I think an attentive man who is able to manage a great crowd should get married” by adding, “the inattentive man who desires leisure [needs to get married] even more, so that having a manager he can stroll around without concern.”⁶³

In his work on appropriate actions, Panaetius also provided advice for men in political life. Gellius, a Latin author of the second century CE, comments admiringly on Cicero’s adaptation of this work in his own *On Duties*; it is perhaps surprising that Cicero, constantly involved in political matters at Rome, did not preserve this passage from Panaetius in his own work, especially since he wrote in the context of the upheaval surrounding the assassination of the dictator Julius Caesar. The need for politically active men to protect themselves was violently illustrated by the extra-judicial execution of Cicero himself in the chaotic realignment of power which soon followed.

Analogy with wrestling or other competitive athletics is not unusual in Stoic texts offering practical advice. See *On Benefits* 7.1.3–4, where Seneca cites the Cynic Demetrius with approval; also V-64 sections 22–28.

[I-109] **Aulus Gellius** *Attic Nights* 13.28.1–4

1. We were reading book 2 of those three famous books *On Appropriate Actions* by the philosopher Panaetius, which Cicero emulated with great enthusiasm and effort. 2. We found there many points which conduce to good outcomes and especially one that we ought to keep in mind tenaciously. 3. This is the sense of what he wrote. “The life of men who are active in public affairs and want to be useful to themselves and others involves unexpected troubles and dangers on a frequent, almost daily basis. To avoid them and ward them off, one’s mind must always be prepared and focussed just like those athletes called pancratiasts. 4. For when they are summoned to fight they stand with their arms held high and they protect their head and face by holding out their hands like a fortification. All their limbs are on guard against blows even before a punch is thrown or are ready to inflict blows on the opponent. In the same way, the mind and spirit of a wise man ought at every place and time to be looking ahead for violent and offensive harms; he should be upright, tough, firmly

62 Accepting the emendation of von Arnim. 63 The source of these lines is uncertain.

braced, nimble when things are worrisome, never blinking, never averting his gaze, projecting his plans and thoughts against the blow of fortune and the plots of his enemies like the fighter's hands and arms, so that in no circumstance can a sudden hostile attack catch him unprepared and unprotected."

Unlike Antipater, Hecaton emphasized the reciprocity of obligations in relationships which were usually asymmetrical in ancient society. Deliberation about one's appropriate responsibilities in any social context is to be guided by reasoning and one should expect such actions to be difficult and demanding. Despite the absence of the language of *personae* or *prosōpa* (roles), it is clear that specific roles and relationships (what Epictetus will also call *scheseis*: V-8, V-70, V-71, V-74) are crucial.

[I-110] Seneca *On Benefits* 2.18.1–2

1. Whenever there is a mutual obligation between two people it makes equal demands on both parties. When you've examined the sort of person a father ought to be, you will realize that there remains the equally important task of seeing what the son ought to be like. A husband has his part to play, but the wife's part is just as important. 2. They carry out their duties reciprocally, each as the other expects, and what they need is an even-handed guideline. As Hecaton says, that is not easy, since everything honourable is difficult and so too for what is merely close to honourable. What we need is not mere action but reasoned action. We should go through life under the guidance of reason and everything we do, great and small, should be based on its recommendations.

Seneca (IV-41 sections 3.18–3.22) discusses at length questions about the relationship between slaves and masters, anticipated by Hecaton. We do not know what view Hecaton took on the issue, though in that passage Seneca tells us that he incorporated some Chrysippean material on allegorical interpretation of Greek myths bearing on the topic of benefactions.

[I-111] Seneca *On Benefits* 3.18.1

Still, the question has been raised by some people (Hecaton, for example) whether a slave can give his master a benefit.

Specific recommendations for life activities feature prominently in discussions on appropriate actions, and also in works "On ways of life" (*peri biōn*).

[I-112] Diogenes Laërtius 7.124

And they say that the wise man will pray, asking for good things from the gods, as Posidonius (F 40 E-K) says in book 1 of his *On Appropriate Actions* and Hecaton in book 3 of his *On Paradoxes*.

Hecaton made extensive use of anecdotes about famous philosophers as illustrations and recommendations in his discussion of appropriate actions. Such anecdotes may also have been used in his collection of moralizing anecdotes, the *Chreiai*.

[I-113] Diogenes Laërtius 7.181

Hecaton says that Chrysippus turned to philosophy when his ancestral wealth had been seized by the royal treasury.

[I-114] Seneca *On Benefits* 2.21.4

Hecaton introduced the example of Arcesilaus, though it was clumsy and not to be taken seriously. He says that Arcesilaus declined to receive money offered by a young man who was a minor, for fear that he might offend his penny-pinching father. What did he do that was so praiseworthy? All he did was not to accept stolen goods, since he'd rather not accept the money than to have to return it. What self-control does it take not to accept someone else's property?

[I-115] Diogenes Laërtius 7.2

According to Hecaton and to Apollonius of Tyre in book 1 of his *On Zeno*, Zeno asked the oracle what he should do to live the best life and the god replied that he should bind himself with the dead. On this basis Zeno understood that he should read the books of the ancients.

The Passions

Panaetius, as reported by Seneca in I-116, advances a standard Stoic view of the passions and how to prevent them. The advice offered is pragmatic and compatible with traditional Stoic views on moral psychology. Gellius, however, suggests that Panaetius may have had a more realistic approach to passions by allowing that the ideal agent could be aware of negative experiences but without thereby suffering the kind of reaction constituting a passion. It is not clear from his text what the content of such an awareness would be, possibly a 'preliminary passion' (*propathēia*) that was then not assented to. See Graver (1999). See also IV-45, IV-46 and V-68.

[I-116] Seneca *Letters on Ethics* 116.5–6

A young man asked Panaetius whether the sage would fall in love and his answer seems to me to have been nicely put: "We will see about the sage, but as for you and me, who are still a long way from wisdom, we mustn't run the risk of getting entangled in something that is disturbed, uncontrollable, enslaved to another and cheap in our own

eyes. If we are accepted, we get worked up over the generous response; and if we are rejected, we are enraged by the contempt. Whether a love affair goes well or badly, it does us equal harm; we are seduced by a success and struggle with the setback. So, let's be aware of our own weakness and stay calm. Let's not risk entrusting our weak characters to wine or beauty or flattery or any other thing that sweetly entices us." 6. Panaetius' advice to the youth asking about love is just what I would say about all the passions.

[I-117] Aulus Gellius *Attic Nights* 12.5.10

The wise man can endure and defeat [pain and other dispreferred indifferents], but he cannot completely avoid awareness of them. This kind of *analgēsia* [freedom from pain] and *apatheia* [freedom from passion] has been rejected and discarded not just by my own judgement but also by that of certain more sensible people in the Stoic school, such as Panaetius, a serious and learned man.

In I-118 Hecaton follows a conventional categorization of the passions that goes back to the founder of the school. The connection between hope and fear reported by Seneca is also traditional doctrine; both emotions reflect a mistaken view about what is good and bad and a consequent anxiety about the future. Fear is an attitude to expected bad events, hope an attitude to expected good events.

See Epictetus in V-2 sections 1-3, V-8, V-9, V-32, V-55 sections 1-5, V-62 section 27; what Epictetus emphasizes but is not said by Seneca in I-119 is that the object of one's desires and hopes is the key determinant for whether one reacts with a passion or not. Some things can be the object of desire – true goods. To hope rather than to desire and work for an object is to concede that it is beyond our control, not *epb' hēmin*. And that attitude to a perceived good leaves one vulnerable to the passions, to fear of losing and regret for losing. Seneca draws a slightly different conclusion, which may also have been on Hecaton's mind: that living in the present, as opposed to giving hostages to fortune by aiming far into the future, is essential to tranquillity.

[I-118] Diogenes Laërtius 7.110

Hecaton in book 2 of his *On Passions* and Zeno in his *On Passions* say that there are four top-level categories of passions: pain, fear, desire and pleasure.

[I-119] Seneca *Letters on Ethics* 5.7-8

7. But let me share with you a bit of profit that I made today as well; when reading our Hecaton I found him saying that limiting desires also helps in healing fear. "You will cease to fear," he says, "if you cease

to hope.” You will ask, “how can two such different things be found together?” It’s true, Lucilius. Though they seem to conflict they are connected. Just as the same chain connects the prisoner and the guard, so too these two such different things proceed together. Fear is a consequence of hope. 8. And I don’t wonder that they go together. Both of them belong to a mind in suspense, both belong to someone worried by expectations about the future. The chief cause of each is that we don’t adapt ourselves to current circumstances but project our thoughts far into the future. In this way foresight, which is the greatest good for the human condition, is perverted.

Politics

See also I-109. Early Stoic political theory was perhaps too revisionist and utopian to be of practical use in later periods. Cicero certainly preferred the useful kind of political theory which characterized the Peripatetic tradition from the time of Aristotle. The practical aspect of Panaetius’ political contribution was clearly important and may be connected to his relationships with important political leaders at Rome.

[I-120] Cicero *On the Laws* 3.13–14

[Marcus] The topic of magistracies has some special features which have been investigated carefully by Theophrastus first and then by the Stoic Diogenes. [Atticus] Really? Have these issues been dealt with by Stoics too? [Marcus] Not really, except by the one I just mentioned and then later by Panaetius, a great and exceptionally learned fellow. For the earlier Stoics discussed politics acutely, at the verbal level, but not in a way that is useful for public and civic purposes.