

“economic interest group,” consisting of Dual Executives allied with technically trained managers, might be emerging? Along similar lines, could not a new grouping, composed of scientists versed in politics and politicians trained in science, develop?

No further attention will be devoted here to the conceptual and theoretical issues raised, rather than fully developed, by Fischer in his introduction and conclusion, except to say that, unlike the quantitative core of the book, these sections are marred by a number of contradictory statements, and they tend, moreover, to pursue an uncertain and wavering course. For example, the USSR is described as both a “status quo”-oriented society and as a “revolutionary” one. However, Fischer deserves praise for tackling enormously difficult problems in a highly stimulating fashion. His study is a step in the right direction. It will greatly facilitate the work of the considerable band of innovative young scholars whose efforts may yet transform the style and content of research on Communist systems.

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THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA. By *Robert C. Tucker*. A publication of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969. xi, 240 pp. \$5.95.

In this collection of carefully reasoned and documented essays, Robert Tucker extends the highly original interpretation set forth in his *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (1961) to the phenomena of contemporary Marxism and Communist movements. Marx, he argues, located the source of revolutionary energy in the frustration of man in his capacity as a producer, not consumer. Marx, in Tucker's view, never outgrew his wish to abolish the occupational specialization founded on the division of labor; the liberation of human creativity was his main goal. “The common image of Marx as a prophet of social justice is a false one” (p. 37), Tucker argues; Marx's orientation toward production led him to regard ethical discussions of “distributive justice” as the “ideological nonsense” of “vulgar socialism.” Marxism, according to Tucker's analysis, appeals basically to societies in which modernization has been “arrested” and the class structure has become “bifurcated.” Where modernization has been blocked, the path of revolutionary political change has been taken. Tucker attempts to steer midway between the Kautskyan and Leninist interpretations of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”: on the one hand, it signifies more than the democratic role of a proletarian majority, for it does have a repressive character; on the other hand, its connotation did not include a one-party state. In his most powerful chapter, Tucker argues that “deradicalization” is the fate of all radical movements, for inevitably they adjust themselves to the order that they aimed to transform. In this sense he believes that Mao is right when he regards the Soviet Communists as becoming revisionist. Tucker observes cogently that an intensified verbal allegiance to the alleged ideological goals can go hand in hand with the process of deradicalization.

Has Tucker's analysis, for all its originality, actually succeeded in defining the Marxian revolutionary idea? Marx did not venture to include a demand for abolishing the division of labor in the program which he largely drew up in 1880 for the French socialists, nor did Engels regard the lack of such a demand as a defect in the Erfurt program of 1891. The chief passage in *Capital* which looks to the superseding of occupational specialization is footnoted oddly with a reference to the variety of employments in the Californian frontier, and scarcely has any

bearing for an advanced industrial society (Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, Modern Library edition, New York, 1906, p. 534). When Engels in 1874 polemicized against anarchist autonomists, he emphasized above all industrial discipline. Marxist arguments on the contradiction between the forces of production and the limits of consumption set by the society certainly introduce an exploitation relative to man as a consumer. There seem to be different moods of Marxism, and Tucker fastens rather exclusively on one of them. It seems an exaggeration to say that Marxism foresees an "end of economics"; after all, Engels acknowledged that communist societies might undertake population planning.

It seems, furthermore, that a universalistic ethic of justice lies latent, though crudely suppressed, in Marx's formulations. It is true that Marx states that notions of right can never be higher than the economic structures of the societies in which they arise. But in that case, we might ask, how would Marx have justified his admiration for the hero Spartacus who transcended the morality of the Roman slave society? Tucker has shown a remarkable astuteness in searching for latent meanings of "alienation" in Marx's *Capital*; this method would seem even more warranted with the much more historically significant concept of "justice."

Is it illuminating to regard the communist revolution as essentially one of the underdeveloped countries? The more causal variable, we might argue, is rather the existence of an unemployed, underemployed, or estranged intellectual class. Where such a group exists, be it in a developed or undeveloped country, Marxism will have its potential appeal. Tucker himself in a footnote partially qualifies his own views in the light of the events of France in the spring of 1968. We might also say that modernization is not an intrinsic ingredient in Marxism; had it not been for military reasons and the struggle with the developed nations, Mao, one surmises, would have allowed his own antitechnological bias to prevail. An aversion to technological culture is not uncommon among Marxists, and their intellectual elites are driven to efforts at modernizing their societies by exogenous factors.

Tucker advances a provocative thesis that Marx had a normative as well as a descriptive theory of the state. Though this seems somewhat out of keeping with his discussion of justice, Tucker holds that Marx's view was that "there are *no* conditions under which the state can be adjudged a good state" (p. 85). But this interpretation runs up against the fact that Marx and Engels held that class societies, and presumably therefore their respective states, were historically justified under certain conditions. Tucker also advances the view that small sects remain impervious to the process of deradicalization. Anyone who has ever haunted the halls of the old IWW, or Socialist Labor Party, or even Trotskyist sects will have noted how they evolve their own emotional adjustments of deradicalization.

Some of the new trends in Marxism which Tucker perceives in contemporary movements perhaps too have a classical lineage. The union of nationalism with communism had its forebear in the Paris Commune, while Mao's assertion that power comes out of the barrel of a gun can trace its descent to Engels' view that the revolution would be at hand when the German divisions would be composed of social democratic recruits, even as Christianity triumphed when the Roman legions consisted overwhelmingly of Christians. But then Engels, Marx felt, was sometimes too attracted by the military ingredient in history.

This collection of essays, always searching, and always written with urbanity, are among the most distinguished writings on Marxism which American scholarship has produced.

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