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The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union

The combination of conservative institutions with revolutionary ideas meant that the Republic was the first successful attempt to reconcile the conservative and revolutionary traditions in France. But it also meant that in the twentieth century the forces of change were resisted and obstructed to the point of frustration.

DAVID THOMSON, DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE

The theme of the meeting, "Tradition and Innovation," offers an occasion to talk about serious things.

MIKHAIL ROMM (1962)

Change in the Stalinist system, and stubborn resistance to change, have been the central features of Soviet political life since Stalin's death in 1953. The rival forces of "innovation and tradition," to use the language of the official press, have become "two poles" in Soviet politics and society, which are expressed through "sharp clashes between people standing on both sides of the psychological barrier."¹ Western students of Soviet affairs were slow to perceive this deep-rooted conflict. Accustomed to seeing only one political tradition, and thus only continuity in Soviet history, and to imagining the Soviet Union as a frozen "totalitarian" system, most scholars began to think seriously about change and the large controversies it has engendered only in the mid-1960s.² Although a valuable scholar-

1. A. M. Rumiantsev, "Vstupaiushchemu v mir nauki," *Pravda*, June 8, 1967; "Kogda otstaiut ot vremeni" (editorial), *Pravda*, January 27, 1967; and O. Latsis, "Novoe nado otstaiivat'," *Novyi mir*, 1965, no. 10, p. 255. The theme of innovation versus tradition has been the subject of endless polemics since 1953; it also runs persistently through Soviet fiction, from Vladimir Dudintsev's *Ne khlebom edinym*, published in 1956, to Aleksandr Zinov'ev's *Svetloe budushchee* (Lausanne, 1978).

2. For critical discussion of these habits in Soviet studies, see Stephen F. Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York, 1977), pp. 3-29; Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership* (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 1-9; and William Taubman, "The Change to Change in Communist Systems," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tökés, eds., *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's* (New York, 1974), pp. 369-94.

This essay grows out of a larger project supported at different times by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. I want to acknowledge my gratitude to these institutions. Although I refer to "the Soviet Union" throughout the essay, my discussion really applies to the Russian nation within the multinational union.

ship on the subject now exists,³ it remains inadequate in important respects. Conflict over change is often treated narrowly—either in terms of high Soviet politics and thus apart from society itself or, at another extreme, in terms of avowed dissidents and thus outside the official political system. No less important, many treatments of the subject lack historical dimensions; and quite a few are couched in jargon-ridden or value-laden language that obscures more than it reveals.

I propose to argue that the fundamental division between these “two poles” in Soviet life is best understood as a social and political confrontation between reformism and conservatism in the sense that these terms convey in other countries. In generalizing about different aspects of this great conflict during the quarter of a century since 1953, I shall raise some questions that I cannot answer. My overview of the post-Stalin era should therefore be read also as a proposed agenda for further discussion.

Reformism and Conservatism

The terms “reformist” and “conservative” do not embrace the full diversity of political outlook—ranging from far left to far right—that has emerged so dramatically in the Soviet Union since the 1950s. As in other societies, these terms designate only mainstream, not extremist, attitudes toward the status quo and toward change. Even a spectrum of political outlook inside the Soviet Communist Party, for example, would require at least four categories: authentic democrats, reformers, conservatives, and neo-Stalinist reactionaries.⁴ But while full-fledged democrats and neo-Stalinists may respectively share many reformist and conservative attitudes, the policies of either would mean radicalism in the Soviet context today, not reformism or conservatism. In times of profound crisis, reformism and conservatism usually give rise to extremist trends everywhere and may even grow into their most extreme manifestations—revolution and counter-revolution.⁵ But apart from extraordinary historical moments, reformers and conservatives represent the majority of mainstream antagonists—the friends and foes of change—in the Soviet Union as well as in other countries.

Though most scholars use other words to characterize these antagonists in the Soviet Union,⁶ the terms reformer and conservative are preferable in impor-

3. Among the most interesting studies are Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?,” in Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1969), pp. 1–34; Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), chapter 1; George W. Breslauer, “Khrushchev Reconsidered,” *Problems of Communism*, 25, no. 5 (September–October 1976): 18–33; and George W. Breslauer, *Five Images of the Soviet Future: A Critical Review and Synthesis* (Berkeley, 1978).

4. My categories derive from, but do not fully correspond to, the following firsthand accounts: Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (New York, 1975), chapter 3 and passim; Alexander Yanov, *Detente After Breshnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1977); and Igor Glagolev, “Sovetskoe rukovodstvo: Segodnia i zavtra,” *Russkaia mysl'*, August 31, 1978. Considerable information on trends in the party is available in *Politicheskii dnevnik*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1972–75).

5. Arno J. Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870–1956: An Analytic Framework* (New York, 1971), chapter 2.

6. There are important exceptions: see Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953–63* (Princeton, 1965); Linden,

tant ways. Unlike “functional technocratic modernizer” and similar contrivances, they are not jargonistic or exotic; unlike “liberal and dogmatist” or “revisionist and orthodox,” they do not prejudge or simplify the nature of Soviet reformism and conservatism, which are complex amalgams of opinion and attitudes requiring further analysis rather than restrictive labels. (It is a serious analytical mistake, for example, to insist that real change or reform in the Soviet Union must mean “liberalization” or “democratization” in our sense of these words.) The terms anti-Stalinist and neo-Stalinist are very important, but they identify components within the larger conflict. Above all, archetypal reformers and conservatives are, as even the reticent Soviet press makes clear, “two popular types” in Soviet life, and the universal meaning of reformism and conservatism corresponds fully to the “partisans of the two directions” in the conflicts of the past twenty-five years. Or as the conservative Molotov put it, “there are . . . reforming Communists, and then there are the real Communists.”⁷

Reformism and conservatism, therefore, are concepts that require no special definition for the Soviet context. Both tendencies take on certain national characteristics in diverse countries because they are expressed in the different idioms of their political cultures. (Soviet conservatives today often speak, for example, using a neo-Stalinist or nineteenth-century Slavophile idiom.) Moreover, the full nature of reformism and conservatism everywhere is always historical, changing from one period to another. (Liberalism and conservatism in England, France, and the United States are not the same today as they were earlier in the twentieth century.) But despite these cultural and historical variations, the basic antagonism between reformers and conservatives is similar in different countries, including the Soviet Union.

Reformism is that outlook, and those policies, which seeks through measured change to improve the existing order without fundamentally transforming existing social, political, and economic foundations or going beyond prevailing ideological values. Reformism finds both its discontent and its program, and seeks its political legitimacy and success, within the parameters of the existing order. This distinguishes it from radicalism. The essential reformist argument is that the potential of the existing system and the promise of the established ideology—for example, Marxist socialism in the Soviet Union or liberal democracy in the United States—have not been realized, and that they can and must be ful-

Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, which includes an excellent discussion of this spectrum on pp. 18–21; and Moshe Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates: From Bukharin to the Modern Reformers* (Princeton, 1974).

7. Alexander Yanov, *Essays on Soviet Society*, which appeared as *International Journal of Sociology*, 6, no. 2–3 (Summer–Fall, 1976), especially pp. 75–175; G. Kozlov and M. Rumer, “Tol’ko nachalo (Zametki o khoziaistvennoi reforme),” *Novyi mir*, 1966, no. 11, p. 182; F. Chapchakhov, “Pod vidom gipotezy,” *Literaturnaia gazeta*, August 16, 1972, which is an attack on, and an inadvertent confirmation of, Yanov’s two “types”; and Molotov, quoted in Giuseppe Boffa, *Inside the Khrushchev Era* (New York, 1959), p. 108. The word conservative (*konservator*) is commonly used in the Soviet Union. Various words or expressions are used to express “reformer,” though the English word (*reformist*) is coming into use (see Valentin Turchin, *Inertsiiia strakha* [New York, 1977], p. 5). Soviet writers often use these concepts, with obvious implications for the reader, in analyzing other political societies (see, for example, M. P. Mchedlov, *Evolutsiia sovremennogo katolitsizma* [Moscow, 1966]).

filled. The reformist premise is that change is progress. Unlike the conservative, therefore, the reformer everywhere tends to be agnostic about history and cults of the past. He is opposed to "prejudices inherited from the yesterday of our life," to the "tendency to accept as generally valid many propositions that were appropriate for only one period of our history."⁸

On the other hand, the pivot of conservatism is a deep reverence for the past, a sentimental defense of existing institutions, routines, and orthodoxies which live on from the past, and an abiding fear of change as the harbinger of disorder and of a future that will be worse than the present as well as a sacrilege of the past. Conservatism is often little more than the sum total of inertia, habit, and vested interests. But it can also be a cogent philosophical justification of the status quo as the culmination of everything good in the historical past and thus the only sturdy bridge to the future.⁹ Many conservatives are able to distinguish between stability and immobility, and they do not flatly reject all change. But the conservative insistence that any change be slow and tightly controlled by established authority, based on law and order, and conform to prevailing orthodoxies is usually prohibitive. In the end, conservatives usually prefer cults of the past and those authorities (notably, the armed forces and the political police) which guard order against change, native tradition against "alien" corruption, the present against the future.¹⁰

Authentic reformism and conservatism are always social and political. Both trends are expressed below, in society, in popular sentiments and attitudes, and above, in the middle and higher reaches of the political system, in groups, factions, and parties. And still higher, so to speak, they take the more exalted form of ideological and philosophical propositions.

Both reformism and conservatism have been apparent as antagonists on all three of these levels in the Soviet Union since the 1950s. Although we lack the kind of polling and other survey information available for other countries, we know, for example from firsthand accounts, that profoundly conservative attitudes are widespread among ordinary citizens and officials alike.¹¹ Detailed scholarly studies point out the sustained struggles between reformist and conservative groups inside the high political establishment, including the party itself.¹² And, as we shall see, the ideological and even philosophical dimensions of this quarrel have become particularly evident in recent years. What we do not know, however, and indeed what we barely perceive, is the relationship of these

8. V. Lakshin, "Ivan Denisovich, Ego druz'ia i nedrugi," *Novyi mir*, 1964, no. 1, p. 230; Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy*, p. 41.

9. For the range of factors (fear, self-interest, philosophy) that animate conservative opposition to economic reform in the Soviet Union, for example, see the series of articles by A. Birman in *Novyi mir* between 1965 and 1968, and especially his "Sut' reformy," in *Novyi mir*, 1968, no. 12, pp. 185–204.

10. For a summary of the extensive literature on modern conservatism, see Clinton Rossiter, "Conservatism," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3 (New York, 1968), pp. 290–95.

11. See, for example, Turchin, *Inertsia strakha*; Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy*; Yanov, *Essays on Soviet Society*; Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York, 1970); and note 9 above.

12. In addition to the titles cited in note 6, see Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York, 1969); and H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, 1971).

trends in society below to those in the political apparatus above. Though this is partly a problem of inadequate information, it derives also from the untenable but persistent notion that Soviet party-state officialdom is somehow insulated from society itself. This conception makes no empirical sense in a country where the state employs almost every citizen and the party has eighteen million members. All of the trends in society, even those expressed by dissidents, also exist—however subterraneously—inside political officialdom itself. As one Western scholar has argued, there is, at best, a “soft boundary” between the two.¹³ Once we abandon the commonplace image of a gulf separating political officialdom and society and see them instead, in the imagery of a Soviet dissident, as “upstairs” and “downstairs,”¹⁴ the fuller social dimensions of the political conflict between Soviet reformism and conservatism will at least come into view.

At the level of politics and policy, the conflict between reformism and conservatism derives its scope and intensity from the fact that it is simultaneously a quarrel about the past, the present, and the future. The historical agnosticism of the reformer and the historicism of the conservative are therefore especially antagonistic in a country such as the Soviet Union, where what its citizens call “living history” has been unusually traumatic. Not only the immediate Stalinist past but the remote tsarist past are subjects of fierce controversy. Conservatives bitterly protest the reformist “deheroization” of the past and the view in which “the past, present, and future . . . turn out to be isolated, shut off from each other.” The conservative extols the “continuity of generations”; the reformer replies, “If the children do not criticize the fathers, mankind does not move ahead.” For conservatives, reformist perspectives “distort the past”; for reformers, conservatives “idealize the past” and try “to save the past from the present.”¹⁵

These historical controversies have been an essential part of almost all policy disputes throughout the post-Stalin era. They reflect the political struggle between the forces of reform and conservatism inside Soviet officialdom from 1953 to the present—from an official reformation to a far-reaching conservative reaction.

From Reformism to Conservatism

Because of the unusually despotic nature of his long rule, Stalin’s death unleashed a decade-long triumph of Soviet reformism which was disproportionate to its actual strength in society or officialdom. Virtually every area of Soviet life was affected (and improved). Though bitterly opposed, often contradictory, and ultimately limited, the changes of the 1950s and early 1960s constituted a reformation—within the limits of the authoritarian system—in Soviet politics and society, as indicated by a brief recitation of the most important reforms.

After the end of the kind of personal dictatorship exercised by Stalin for more than twenty years, the Communist Party was restored as the ruling political institution. Twenty-five years of mass terror ceased and the political police, the

13. See Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, pp. 262 and 298.

14. Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR* (Berkeley, 1978), p. 15.

15. *Političeskii dnevnik*, 1:123; Chapchakhov, “Pod vidom gipotezy”; *Političeskii dnevnik*, no. 66 (Moscow: Samizdat, March 1970), p. 36; A. Iakovlev, “Protiv antiistorizma,” *Literaturnaia gazeta*, November 15, 1975.

main agency of Stalin's dictatorship, was brought under control. Millions of prison camp survivors were freed and many who had perished in the terror were legally exonerated, thereby enabling survivors and relatives to regain full citizenship. Many administrative abuses and bureaucratic privileges were curtailed. Educated society began to participate more fully in political and intellectual life. A wide array of economic and welfare reforms were carried out. Major revisions were made in Soviet censorship practices, in the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and in foreign policy. Insofar as this was official reformism, or reform from above, Nikita Khrushchev was its leader, and his overthrow in 1964 marked the beginning of its political defeat.¹⁶ Khrushchev himself was a contradictory figure. His background and career made him the representative of the old as well as the new; and some of his policies, as in certain areas of science, favored conservative forces. But in terms of his overall administration, Khrushchev was, as Russians say, a great reformer (*velikii reformator*).

Nonetheless, Khrushchev and his faction at the top were only part of a much broader reformist movement inside Soviet officialdom. During the decade after 1953, the struggle between the friends and foes of change spread to all areas of policy making—administration and planning, industry and agriculture, science, history, culture, law, family matters, welfare, ideology, and foreign affairs.¹⁷ In each of these areas, reform found notable spokesmen and important allies.¹⁸ Like conservatism, whose adherents ranged from old-line Stalinists to Tory-like moderates, Soviet reformism must be understood as an amalgam of diverse types and motives. It included technocrats in search only of limited change in their special areas as well as authentic democrats; it derived from self-interest as well as idealism. But in relation to the overarching question of change, something akin to two distinct parties—reformist and conservative—took shape within Soviet officialdom and within the Communist Party itself, counterposing rival interests, policies, and ideas over a wide range of issues in all political quarters.¹⁹

Conservatism, as a defense of the inherited Stalinist order, was more fully formed as an ideological and political movement in the years immediately following Stalin's death. By the early 1960s, however, reformers had developed a

16. See Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership*; and Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered."

17. In addition to the titles cited in notes 6 and 12 above, see the sections on the 1950s and 1960s in the following works: Nancy Whittier Heer, *Politics and History in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds., *Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition* (New York, 1967); Peter H. Juviler, *Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR* (New York, 1976); Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development and Social Change* (Berkeley, 1978); Aron Katsenelinboigen, *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning* (White Plains, N.Y., 1978); Timothy McClure, "The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1964-1967," *Problems of Communism*, 16, no. 2 (March-April 1967): 26-43.

18. This included men such as Alexander Tvardovskii in literature, A. Birman, V. G. Venzher, and G. S. Lisichkin in economics, A. M. Rumiantsev and F. M. Burlatskii in the social sciences, M. D. Shargorodskii in law, V. P. Danilov and M. Ia. Gefter in history, and so forth. One *samizdat* writer has suggested that "it would be truer to call the epoch of Khrushchev the epoch of Tvardovskii," because of his editorship of the reformist journal *Novyi mir*.

19. An article in *Pravda* (January 27, 1967) discussed the reformist journal *Novyi mir* and the conservative journal *Oktiabr'* in terms of the "two poles" in Soviet politics. Soviet intellectuals sometimes spoke of them privately in the 1960s as the "organs of our two parties."

characteristic cluster of reformist policies, historical perspectives, and ideological propositions. Most of these were developed, both as critique and program, in opposition to conservative policies, which still drew heavily upon the Stalinist past. There were many shades and forms of reformist ideas by the early 1960s, and they cannot easily be summarized. A few examples must suffice.

Conservatives eulogized the tsarist and Stalinist past selectively, particularly the 1930s when many existing Soviet institutions took shape. Reformers instead rehabilitated the radical intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, the experimentalism of the Soviet 1920s, and the Old Bolsheviks Stalin had purged. While conservatives emphasized the authoritarian strands in Marxism-Leninism, the Stalin cult, and the dangers of revisionism, reformers stressed socialist democracy, Lenin himself, the criminality of Stalin, and the dangers of dogmatism. Against the conservative themes of Russian nationalism, Soviet hegemony in the Communist world, and xenophobia, reformers accented internationalism, different roads to socialism, and access to the West. In contrast to the conservative preference for heavy-handed censorship, reformers promoted varying degrees of cultural and intellectual liberalism. As opposed to the overly centralized Stalinist system of economic planning and administration, with its decades of heavy industrialism, agricultural retardation, waste, and austerity, reformers advocated the market, decentralized initiative, efficiency, consumer goods, and innovation in order to encourage private initiative in the collective system. Against the Stalinist tradition of terror, reformers set the rule of law and due process.²⁰

Soviet reformers won many victories during the Khrushchev years. But reform from above everywhere is always limited in substance and duration and historically has usually been followed by a conservative backlash. This circumstance is partly a result of the nature of reformism, which struggles against the basic inertia of people and institutions on behalf of limited goals. Many adherents of reform are quickly satisfied, many allies are easily unnerved, and many who only tolerated reform are soon driven to oppose further change. All become part of a neoconservative consensus, defenders of the new, reformed status quo, and critics of reformist "excesses." Indeed, this reformist-conservative rhythm is thought to be axiomatic in American and British politics, where Republicans and Tories are expected to alternate with Democrats and Labourites.

The overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964 reflected the swing of the pendulum in Soviet officialdom and possibly in society as well. His fall ushered in—after an interlude of uncertain direction in 1964–65—a far-reaching conservative reaction, which brought an end to major reform and even some counterreform in most areas of Soviet society, from economics and law to historiography, culture, and ideology. Since 1966, and especially since the Soviet overthrow of the reform Communist government in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Brezhnev's administration has been a regime of conservatism, reviving many of the conservative

20. To give a few more cryptic examples of code words in the conflict, reformers and conservatives, respectively, emphasized the following: bureaucratism as the main danger, anarchy as the main danger; the Lenin of 1921–23, the Lenin of 1918–20; the importance of the intelligentsia, the importance of the worker and the soldier; the Twentieth and Twenty-second Party Congresses, the Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Congresses; modernism in art, traditionalism in art; internal problems, external threats; women's rights, the stability of the family; innovation, discipline; renewal of cadres, stability of cadres; social interests, the organic unity of society.

practices noted above as well as the preeminent symbol of the past. Stalin himself. Its antireformist spirit and policies have been expressed in a galaxy of refurbished conservative catch phrases and campaigns—"stability in cadres," "law and order," "the strengthening of organization, discipline, and responsibility in all spheres," "military-heroic patriotism," "developed socialism," "vigilance against bourgeois influences," and more.²¹ In short, the regime has reasserted conservative views on the past, the present, and the future.

The conservative reaction since 1964, though far-reaching, has not meant a restoration of, or return to, Stalinist policies. Conservative attitudes and policies change along with society and politics. Stalinism no longer defines Soviet realities or mainstream Soviet conservatism as it did in the early 1950s. The Brezhnev government reversed some reforms of the Khrushchev years; but, for the most part, it has tempered and administered already accomplished reforms as part of the new status quo, while deploring earlier "excesses" and setting itself against further change. (Republicans and Tories did the same upon returning to office in the United States and England in the 1950s.)

Some ideas and policies once associated with Soviet reformers—consumerism, higher investment in agriculture, welfarism, scientific management, legal proceduralism, détente, repudiation of Stalin's "excesses"—have even been incorporated into the new conservatism. This does not demonstrate a reformist spirit of the Brezhnev government, as some Western observers have thought, because these once reformist ideas have been infused with deeply conservative meaning. "Economic reform," for example, has been an official idea intermittently since 1964; but the original reforms have been stripped of their essentials—the role of the market and decentralization—so that, in the words of one reformer, they have become "purely superficial, partial changes which do not affect the essence of the prereform system. . . ."²² The official repudiation of reform since the mid-1960s is clearly understood by people inside the Soviet Union: "We are ruled not by a Communist or a fascist party and not by a Stalinist party, but by a status quo party."²³

By the late 1960s, the increasingly censorious conservatism of the Brezhnev regime had muted reformist voices, and thus explicit conflict, in many policy areas. At the same time, however, and possibly for this reason, the conflict between reformists and conservatives broke out dramatically in a different way in the official press: in an abstract controversy about the nature of Russia as a historical society. Focusing on philosophical, cultural, and even religious themes, the two rival outlooks have now been openly at odds for more than a decade.²⁴

21. See, for example, *Razvitoe sotsialisticheskoe obshchestvo: Sushchnost', kriterii zrelosti, kritika revizionistskikh kontseptsii* (Moscow, 1973); P. M. Rogachev and M. A. Sverklin, *Patriotizm i obshchestvennyi progress* (Moscow, 1974); and the editorials in *Pravda*, February 5, February 24, and October 17, 1978. For discussion of important aspects of these conservative policies, see T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership: Towards a Self-Stabilizing Oligarchy?," *Soviet Studies*, 22, no. 2 (October 1970): 167–91; T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review*, 37, no. 1 (March 1978): 1–24; and Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered."

22. Quoted in Iu. Subotskii, "Upravlenie, khozraschet, samostoiatel'nost'," *Novyi mir*, 1969, no. 7, p. 265.

23. Lev Kopelev, quoted in the *New York Times*, December 3, 1978, p. 14.

24. The controversy began with the rival journals *Novyi mir* and *Molodaia gvardiia*, but it has since spread to many publications. For an excellent survey and analysis, see

The controversy echoes the split between Westerners and Slavophiles in nineteenth-century Russia, but its real importance is contemporary and intensely political. It is a confrontation, couched now in a philosophical and older Russian idiom, between mainstream contemporary reformism and conservatism. The traditional idiom of the conservatives, with their advocacy of Russia's "eternal values," has become particularly forthright, leading reformers to protest that their ideas are "borrowed, transcribed, taken on hire from the storehouse of conservative literature of the past century."²⁵

This neoconservative philosophy, which, in many respects, is congruent with the policy spirit and Russian nationalism of the Brezhnev administration, has spread throughout the Soviet press (and *samizdat*) and demonstrated remarkable appeal to many segments of the population. Its popularity tends to confirm first-hand evidence that official conservatism is not an artifice of the regime but a reflection of broad and deep currents in Soviet officialdom and society.²⁶ It has become clear that the great reforms of the Khrushchev years derived more from unusual historical circumstances than from the actual political and social strength of reformism in the Soviet Union. For a fuller perspective on the post-Stalin era and on the future, we need, then, at least a brief look at the historical origins of contemporary reformism and conservatism in the Stalinist past.

The Stalinist Roots of Reformism and Conservatism

The first great reform in Soviet history was the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. Intended to replace the extremist practices of the civil war years, NEP quickly grew into a whole series of policies and ideas which Lenin, the father of NEP, called "a reformist approach."²⁷ For four years after Lenin's death in 1924, NEP remained official Soviet policy, with Nikolai Bukharin as its interpreter and great defender. Thus, when Stalin forcibly abolished NEP in 1929, he inadvertently created a historical model for future generations of Communist reformers. Since that time, and especially after 1953, NEP—with its dual economy, concepts of market and plan, cultural diversity, liberal politics, and Leninist legitimacy—has exercised a powerful appeal to anti-Stalinist party reformers everywhere, from Moscow to Eastern and Western Europe. Soviet reformers have revived many NEP economic ideas; reformist

Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Political Significance of Great Russian Nationalism in Brezhnev's USSR With Particular Reference to the 'Pseudo-Slavophiles,'" paper delivered at the AAASS Conference, Washington, D.C., October 1977.

25. Yanov, *Essays on Soviet Society*, p. 124. For similar protests, see A. Dement'ev, "O traditsiakh i narodnosti," *Novyi mir*, 1969, no. 4, pp. 215–35; Iakovlev, "Protiv antiistorizma"; and the running objections in the *samizdat* journal *Politicheskii dnevnik*. Though the idiom is plainly Russian, it is sometimes universally conservative, even Burkean. See, for example, the eulogy of "social authority" and the "continuity of generations" in S. Semanov, *Serditse rodina* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 92–93.

26. See note 11 above.

27. See Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (New York, 1973), pp. 132–38. Soviet reformers have been eager to identify NEP as "the first reform" (see, for example, A. Birman, "Mysli posle plenuma," *Novyi mir*, 1965, no. 12, p. 194).

historians have studied it admiringly; cultural liberals have cited its tolerant censorship; and reform politicians have sought legitimacy in it.²⁸

With the defeat of the Bukharinist opposition (or “right deviation”), the end of NEP, and the onset of Stalin’s revolution from above in 1929, party reformism became the special enemy and victim of Stalinism. There were at least two serious attempts by high officials to initiate reform from above during the Stalin years: the first involved the so-called Kirov group in the Politburo in 1933–34, which proposed to ameliorate the terrible hardships of forcible collectivization and heavy industrialization; the second, in 1947–48, apparently involved similar proposals, by Politburo member Nikolai Voznesenskii and others, for change in economy policy. Both attempts to reform Stalinism came to a horrible end: the great terror of 1936–39, the Leningrad purge of 1949, and Voznesenskii’s execution.²⁹ Nevertheless, the melancholy history of failed reform shows that, even during the worst Stalin years, a reformist impulse had been preserved among high party and state officials. These early strivings toward a “Moscow Spring” (the term used by an insider in 1936) were the official antecedents of Khrushchev’s reformism, as he tacitly acknowledged by associating his de-Stalinization campaign with the Kirov affair and by rehabilitating Voznesenskii. But it also shows that reform from above stood no chance in the conditions of Stalin’s terroristic autocracy and in the face of his personal, adamant hostility.³⁰

And yet, although Stalin martyred reform at every turn, his system and policies were creating the future political and social base of reformism. The historical Stalinism of 1929–53 was an extraordinary composite of dualities. Stalinism began as a radical act of revolution from above and ended as a rigidly conservative social and political system, combining revolutionary traditions with tsarist ones, humanitarian ideas of social justice with terror, radical ideology with traditional social policies, myths of socialist democracy and party rule with the reality of personal dictatorship, modernization with archaic practices, routinized bureaucracy with administrative caprice.

Reformism and conservatism grew out of these dualities after Stalin in two general ways. First, the values and ideas both of reformers and of conservatives had roots in Stalinism; for example, Russian nationalism, terror, and privilege dominated, but their opposites remained part of Stalinist official ideology. The two tendencies were maintained in an uneasy state of latent conflict—as a kind of dual Soviet political culture—by terror and the cult of Stalin.³¹ After Stalin’s death, these currents developed separate political impulses, culminating in the conflicts that occurred between 1953 and 1979, especially the conflict between

28. See, for example, Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, chapter 12 and passim; G. S. Lisichkin, *Plan i rynok* (Moscow, 1966); M. P. Kim, ed., *Novaia ekonomicheskaiia politika: Voprosy teorii i istorii* (Moscow, 1974); and A. Rumiantshev, “Partiia i intelligentsiia,” *Pravda*, February 21, 1965.

29. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, pp. 341–47; Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*, pp. 28–58.

30. This was also the case in foreign policy (see Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, rev. ed. [New York, 1971], chapter 4).

31. For a cultural approach to Stalinism, see Robert C. Tucker, “Stalinism as Revolution From Above,” in Tucker, *Stalinism*, pp. 77–108. For the conservative aspects of Stalinism, see note 33 below.

anti-Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, which, in the 1950s and early 1960s, played a special role in the confrontation between reformers and conservatives. The second way in which the Stalinist system prepared its own reformation was, as Marxists say, dialectical. Stalinism created within itself an alternative model of political rule.³² The agent of potential change was not an activist working class, as Marxist critics of Stalinism had hoped for so long, but Stalin's own political-administrative bureaucracy. Having grown large and powerful under his long rule, the leading strata (*nachal'stvo*) of the party-state bureaucracy gained almost everything—income, privilege, status, and power over those below. But what they lacked was no less important: security of position and, even more, of life. Stalin's terror inflicted one demographic trauma after another. And no one was more vulnerable after 1934 than the party-state *nachal'stvo*.

The history and ethos of Stalinism made the bureaucracy profoundly conservative in most political and social ways.³³ It yearned, however, for one great reform that would free it from the capricious, terroristic regime at the top and allow it to become a real bureaucracy—that is, a conservative structure anchored by political stability, personal security, and predictability. While Stalin lived even the highest officials regarded themselves as “temporary people” and sought protection against the abnormality of the terror in various legalisms.³⁴ But normality in this sense could come only with the demise of the autocrat.

Both reformism and conservatism were already in place, then, when Stalin's death finally came in March 1953. The first words of his heirs, imploring the population to avoid “panic and disarray,” revealed them as fearful conservatives (who always imagine disorder below) in important respects. But fear of retribution from below and another terror from above quickly led them to major reforms, from which others followed: the dismantling and curtailment of Stalin's primary institutions (his Secretariat, the terror system, and the cult) and the restoration of the party dictatorship and collective leadership.³⁵ Restoring the party to political primacy was in itself a major change that had far-reaching ramifications. It proved to be remarkably easy, reformist rather than revolutionary, partly because it promised protection from terror to high officials throughout the system. Indeed, this was the essential reformist meaning of Khrushchev's “secret” speech against Stalin in 1956. For most high officials, this may have been not only popular but sufficient as well.

These circumstances help to explain the success of Khrushchev's initial reforms, even though reformism probably was even then a minority outlook among Soviet officialdom. His successes and rise to power in 1953–58 were based on a kind of reformism, or de-Stalinization, which had broader appeal in the special

32. This is argued by Moshe Lewin in “The Social Background of Stalinism,” in Tucker, *Stalinism*, pp. 133–35.

33. See Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge, 1976); Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York, 1945); Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat* (New York, 1946); and Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York, 1956).

34. Lewin, “The Social Background of Stalinism,” pp. 133–35; and Robert H. McNeal, “The Decisions of the CPSU and the Great Purge,” *Soviet Studies*, 23, no. 2 (October 1971): 177–85. The quote is from Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston and Toronto, 1970), p. 307.

35. For the fearful atmosphere surrounding these decisions, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 315–53.

historical situation. It seems clear that the majority of Soviet officials and elites wanted an end to terror, a diminution of police power, some historical revisionism, relaxation of international tensions, and certain welfare reforms (in pensions, for example) which benefited them as well. They wanted, and got, a thaw—but not a spring.

After 1958, Khrushchev's reformism and renewed de-Stalinization campaign began to mean something different. They came to include quasi-populist policies, or ideas, that impinged directly upon the nature of the central party-state bureaucracy and its relations with society, rather than with the regime above.³⁶ The quiescent conservative majority emerged and began to resist, and Khrushchev became an embattled leader. That he managed to achieve as much as he did after 1958, despite the opposition, many ill-conceived policies, and his personal inadequacies as a reform leader,³⁷ is probably attributable, in part, to the momentum and political appeal of anti-Stalinism. When this cause was spent in the early 1960s, so too were Khrushchev's great reforms.

Conservatism and the Future of Reform

The real obstacle to future reform in the Soviet Union is not this or that institution, group, faction, or leader, but the profound conservatism that seems to dominate them all, from the ordinary family to the Politburo, from local authorities to the state *nachal'stvo*. Arguably, the Soviet Union has become, both downstairs and upstairs, one of the most conservative countries in the world.³⁸ Consequently, real discussion of the prospects for further change must await fuller scholarly study of this political and social conservatism, which manifests itself daily in all areas of life, as a preference for tradition and order and a fear of innovation and disorder.

It may be argued that a system born in revolution and still professing revolutionary ideas cannot be called conservative; but history has witnessed other such transformations, as well as the inner deradicalization of revolutionary ideologies.³⁹ Indeed, the conservative aftermath of a great social revolution may be a kind of historical law.⁴⁰ If so, we might expect this to have been doubly the case in Russia, where revolution from below in 1917 was followed by Stalin's revo-

36. See Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered."

37. For a critical discussion of Khrushchev's inadequacies by two dissident reformers, see Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev: The Years in Power* (New York, 1978).

38. This does not mean that there are no special bastions of Soviet conservatism such as the elites of the KGB, the Komsomol, the trade unions, and the political sector of the army. It does mean, however, that we should not assume that the division between reformers and conservatives is a function of generations. Older people played a major, even leading, role, for example, in the struggles for economic and cultural reform in the 1950s and 1960s. More generally, there is evidence that Soviet youth is no less conservative than its elders. For a discussion of this question, see Walter D. Connor, "Generations and Politics in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, 24, no. 5 (September–October 1975): 20–31.

39. See Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York, 1969), chapter 6.

40. This does not mean that the revolution must be repudiated. Often it is simply reinterpreted in a conservative fashion, as has happened in the Soviet Union and the United States (see Michael Kammen, *A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Historical Imagination* [New York, 1978]).

lution from above in 1929–33. Early Bolsheviks worried that even their own party might end in this way. One warned: “History is full of examples of the transformation of parties of revolution into parties of order. Sometimes the only mementos of a revolutionary party are the watchwords which it has inscribed on public buildings.”⁴¹

In addition, there are many specific and mutually reinforcing sources of Soviet conservatism. Although specialists disagree as to the most important factors in Soviet political life, almost all of these factors have contributed to its conservatism. There is the legacy of tsarist Russia, with its own bureaucratic and conservative traditions. There is the subsequent bureaucratization of Soviet life in the 1930s, which proliferated conservative norms and created a *nomenklatura* class of zealous defenders of position and privilege.⁴² There is, in this connection, the persistent scarcity of goods and services, which redoubles the resistance of vested interests. There is the increasing age of Soviet ruling elites. And there is even the official ideology, the domestic thrust of which, over many years, has turned from creation of a new order to reinforcement of the existing one. Underlying all of these factors is the Soviet historical experience with its particular combination of monumental achievements and mountainous disasters. In sixty years, man-made catastrophes—the first European war, Revolution, civil war, two great famines, forcible collectivization, Stalin’s great terror, World War II, and more—have repeatedly victimized millions of ordinary citizens and officials alike. Out of this experience, which is still autobiographical for many people, have come the joint pillars of today’s Soviet conservatism: a towering pride over the nation’s modernizing and Great-Power achievements, together with an abiding anxiety that the next disaster forever looms and that change is “some sinister Beethovenian knock of fate at the door.”⁴³ This conservatism is simultaneously prideful and fearful, and thus powerful. It appears to influence most segments of the population, even many dissidents, and to be a real bond between upstairs and downstairs and therefore the main obstacle to change.

Much would seem to favor, then, only conservatism in Soviet politics. And yet, as we have seen, this has not been the entire story of the post-Stalin years; nor is it now. Advocates of change, however weak their position and however diverse their reformist aspirations, continue to exist in most policy areas and even to hold responsible positions in lower and middle levels of party-state officialdom.⁴⁴ Indeed, one enduring reform of the post-Stalin years has been a broadening of the political system sufficient to tolerate such people even during a conservative regime. Consequently, some of the general factors favoring a resur-

41. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 186.

42. See Bohdan Harasymiw, “*Nomenklatura*: The Communist Party’s Leadership Recruitment System,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 2, no. 4 (December 1969): 512; and Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles Under Communism* (London, 1978).

43. The phrase is Yanov’s, used in another context (Yanov, *Essays on Soviet Society*, p. 85). The Soviet press sometimes asks, “Where do the conservatives come from?” (see R. Bakhtamov and P. Volin, “Otkuda berutsia konservatory?,” *Literaturnaia gazeta*, September 6, 1967). Although this historical explanation may not be sufficient, it is essential.

44. The sources cited in note 4 relate to the post-Khrushchev period; see also Abraham Brumberg, “A Conversation With Andrei Amalrik,” *Encounter*, no. 48 (June 1977), p. 30. Reform proposals, though of a lesser sort, continue to be expressed by responsible officials in the Soviet press.

gence of official reformism must also be taken into account. Leaving aside the possibility of serious domestic crises, and assuming that Soviet reformers stand a chance only in an international environment of diminishing tensions, three weaknesses of Soviet conservatism should be emphasized, because they point to permanent sources of reformism in the Soviet system.

Like conservatives everywhere, Soviet opponents of change need a usable past in order to justify and defend the status quo. The relevant past, however, includes the criminal history of Stalinism. Soviet conservatives have coped with this problem in two ways since the fall of Khrushchev. They have selectively rehabilitated the Stalinist past, largely in terms of the great Soviet victory over Germany in World War II, without fully rehabilitating Stalin himself.⁴⁵ And they have groped toward a surrogate past in tsarist history. Neither seems to be a durable solution. Historical de-Stalinization, which is a powerful source of political reformism, retains its appeal not only because millions died, but because millions of wartime casualties can be blamed directly on the Stalinist government. As for the tsarist past, though partially rehabilitated under Stalin and of considerable appeal today, its traditions are nonetheless contrary to the ideas of the Russian Revolution, which official conservatives still embrace as the main source of their legitimacy. These two traditions cannot be durably reconciled. Ultimately, they inspire rival currents—conflict not harmony—in political life, as was the case in post-Revolutionary France.⁴⁶

The second conservative weakness and source of reformism is the obvious discrepancy between official ideology and everyday Soviet reality. Except for a small segment of the population, this is not primarily a difference between democratic ideas and dictatorial practices, but something more fundamental. As an official ideology, Soviet communism has come increasingly to mean, in addition to Russian nationalism, consumer goods plus the welfare state. These commitments are exceedingly important to ordinary citizens, middle-class officials, and to the government. They have been the main domestic pledges of the conservative Brezhnev government since the mid-1960s, as well as its most glaring failures.⁴⁷ Though elementary welfare provisions were achieved much earlier, low standards of living, chronic shortages of basic foodstuffs and housing, and the scarcity of other consumer goods remain widespread and intractable problems of everyday Soviet life. As repeatedly expressed ideological commitments to officialdom as well as to society-at-large, these consumer welfare promises cannot be easily withdrawn or forever deferred. They are a relentless threat to Soviet conservatives because they attract constant attention to the inadequacies of the centralized economic system and thus keep meaningful economic reform permanently on the agenda. And, as both reformers and conservatives understand, this kind of eco-

45. See, for example, G. A. Deborin and B. S. Tel'pukhovskii, *Itogi i uroki Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1975).

46. David Thomson, *Democracy in France* (London, 1960).

47. For the importance of this "contract," see George W. Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Welfare-State Authoritarianism," in Karl Ryavec, ed., *Soviet Society and the Communist Party* (Amherst, Mass., 1978), pp. 3–25. Interviews with Soviet émigrés over a thirty-year period suggest the great importance citizens place on the welfare provisions of the Soviet state (see Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* [Cambridge, Mass., 1959], especially chapter 10; and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture: Insights From Jewish Emigres," *Soviet Studies*, 29, no. 4 [October 1977]: 562).

conomic reform, involving decentralization and the market, must have reformist implications in political life as well.⁴⁸

The third factor favoring reform also involves official ideology. The role of Marxism-Leninism, or communism, may have declined in recent years, but it remains the essential framework for discourse and conflict throughout official Soviet politics. No reformist or conservative movement anywhere can be successful if it is estranged from established political norms and culture. Soviet conservatives and reformers must have a Soviet face; they must find inspiration and legitimacy somewhere within historical Marxism-Leninism. Conservatives are trying, as reformers complain, to fill "Marxist formulas" with their own meanings.⁴⁹ But Marxism-Leninism is an unreliable conservative vehicle because it is an ideology, even in its dogmatized version, based upon the very idea, desirability, and inexorability of change. Soviet reformers never miss an opportunity to make this point: "Any apologetics for things as they are is alien to the materialist dialectic. . . . This applies to any particular form society may have assumed at any stage in its development. To search constantly for new and imaginative ways to transform reality—that is the motto of the dialectic."⁵⁰

In this respect, Soviet reformers have an important advantage over their nineteenth-century counterparts in tsarist officialdom, whose experience may be highly relevant.⁵¹ Struggling against a conservative majority of Russian officials in the decades leading up to the major reforms from above in the 1860s, tsarist reformers were seriously hampered by an official ideology thoroughly hostile to the idea of real change. They found it necessary to seek ideological inspiration and legitimacy elsewhere, in suspect "foreign" cultures. Official Soviet reformers do not have this problem, or at least not as acutely. Moreover, they can, and regularly do, point to existing models of Communist reform in Eastern Europe as examples which are Marxist-Leninist and thus fraternal rather than "foreign."⁵²

The experience of official reformers under tsarism suggests another important perspective. The growth of reformist sentiments and "enlightened" officials was a slow, cumulative process. It extended over decades and included many setbacks. During the long winters of reform, such ideas could openly circulate only outside the bureaucracy, among nineteenth-century nonconformists, before

48. Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, chapters 6–9.

49. Iakovlev, "Protiv antiistorizma."

50. P. Kopnin, quoted in Yanov, *Essays on Soviet Society*, p. 76; similarly, see Rumiantshev, "Vstupaiushchemu v mir nauki"; and A. Bovin, "Istina protiv dogmy," *Novyi mir*, 1963, no. 10, pp. 180–87.

51. My comments here are based on a reading of S. Frederick Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830–1870* (Princeton, 1972); Richard S. Wortman, *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness* (Chicago, 1976); and W. Bruce Lincoln, "The Genesis of an 'Enlightened' Bureaucracy in Russia, 1825–1856," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 20, no. 3 (June 1972): 321–30.

52. The connection between East European and Soviet reformers has been very important since 1953. Since the Soviet overthrow of the reform Communist government in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet conservative literature on the dangers of "right-wing revisionism" has grown into a virtual industry aimed implicitly at domestic reformers as well. Nonetheless, reformers continue to make the point (see, for example, P. Volin, "Liudi i ekonomika," *Novyi mir*, 1969, no. 3, pp. 154–68). For the reform movement in East Europe, see Vladimir V. Kusun, "An Overview of East European Reformism," *Soviet Studies*, 28, no. 3 (July 1976): 338–61.

percolating up into the bureaucracy to influence policy. The role of today's Soviet dissidents and their *samizdat* discussions is pertinent to this process. Incapable of effecting reform themselves, since it can come only from above, their real function must be to contribute to the growth of reformist ideas and thus to the "enlightenment" of future officials.⁵³ Viewed in this way, it could be argued that the sudden, escalating reforms of the Khrushchev years were premature—the "enlightenment" process was just beginning among officials—and that the still ongoing conservative reaction is not the end but only a stage in the history of post-Stalin reform.

This perspective raises a final question. Successful reform is always a result of political coalitions, a fact of special importance to Soviet reformers who apparently represent a distinct minority of officials. Unable to draw strength directly from protest movements below, as reformers in other societies have done, and advocating economic policies that threaten many petty administrators and even workers,⁵⁴ Soviet reformers can find allies only among the conservative majority of officials, who have seemed more attracted by neo-Stalinism in recent years. Is this a real possibility?

"The boundary between progressive and conservative runs through each of us," remarked a Czech official during the Prague Spring.⁵⁵ Soviet reformers must appeal to this "progressive" element in moderate conservatives. Historians tell us that conservatives are uncomfortable reformers but that many become reformers to save what they believe is most important in the existing order of things.⁵⁶ There is some evidence that in the 1960s a consensus for change was forming between moderate reformers and moderate conservatives, at least among the party intelligentsia. It seemed to center on commonly perceived problems, such as the degradation of country life, declining labor productivity, drunkenness, the Stalinist past, and the heavy-handed censorship that frustrated conservatives as well as reformers.⁵⁷ The emergence of such a consensus may not yet be in the making, but it is the best, and probably only, hope for reform.

53. This perspective has been adopted by some dissidents (see, for example, Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy*; and, for a more systematic statement, see L. Okunev, "Slovo—tozhe delo," *Politicheskii dnevnik*, no. 68 [Moscow: Samizdat, May 1970]). But many dissidents have lost all hope of reform in recent years and now address their activities and thoughts not to Soviet officialdom but to Western governments.

54. See Karl W. Ryavec, *Implementation of Soviet Economic Reforms* (New York, 1975), pp. 299–300.

55. Quoted in H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, 1976), p. 495.

56. Rossiter, "Conservatism," pp. 292 and 294.

57. For example, journals with different outlooks began to emphasize the same social problems. *Novyi mir* is of particular interest in this connection. Well-known as a kind of reformist community, the journal published, or favorably reviewed, conservative writers such as Efim Dorosh and Vladimir Soloukhin. It also published many newer fiction writers who identified with conservative rural values, but whose writings depicted a postcollectivization countryside in need of reform. The new *samizdat* publications *Pamiat'* and *Poiski*, which include authors of different political outlooks, may be a sign of similar developments among dissidents.