

CHANGING FACES OF POPULISM
IN LATIN AMERICA:
Masks, Makeovers, and Enduring Features*

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POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Michael L. Conniff. (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1999. Pp. 243. \$44.95 cloth, \$22.50 paper.)

POPULIST SEDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ECUADORIAN EXPERIENCE. By Carlos de la Torre. (Athens: Center for International Studies, Ohio University Press, 2000. Pp. 185. \$22.00 paper.)

MIRACULOUS METAMORPHOSES: THE NEOLIBERALIZATION OF LATIN AMERICAN POPULISM. Edited by Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, and Barbara Hogenboom. (London and New York: Zed Books, Palgrave, 2001. Pp. 208. \$65.00 cloth, \$27.50 paper.)

VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA: CLASS, POLARIZATION, AND CONFLICT. Edited by Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Pp. 257. \$49.95 cloth.)

As I am writing this essay, a molded plastic facial mask of gray-bearded Brazilian President Luiz Inácio da Silva looks out over my desk. Does Lula, by winning more than 61 percent of the 2002 Brazilian presidential vote (52 million votes) and having street-vended masks made of his likeness, qualify to be the newest face of neopopulism in Latin America? How would one decide? Although none of the books reviewed below is recent enough to discuss Lula's presidency, and my responses to these queries are already fairly certain, these rhetorical questions nonetheless help to focus my thinking as I review some recent scholarship on populism and "neopopulism" in Latin America.

The four books reviewed make strong and different contributions to the scholarship on the history of populism and neopopulism in Latin

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America. Michael Conniff's edited volume, *Populism in Latin America*, a worthy successor to his 1982 edited volume, remains primarily focused on the classical populism exemplified by leaders such as Juan Perón, although it also includes a discussion of prominent 1990s neopopulists—Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, and Fernando Collor de Mello. In *Miraculous Metamorphoses: The Neoliberalization of Latin American Populism*, edited by Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, and Barbara Hogenboom, the authors offer historically well-grounded analyses of the political economy evolution of various Latin American nations. Regarding the 1990s, this book includes—along with the three aforementioned neopopulists—Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and the post-Pinochet Chilean Socialist Party as “representatives of the new regional political disposition.” The editors call this new model “neoliberal populism” (xii, 11–12).

In *Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience*, Carlos de la Torre situates Ecuadorian classical populist José María Velasco Ibarra in comparative perspective and then adds short-term president Abdalá Bucaram to the list of 1990s neopopulists. Finally, there is Hugo Chávez, the main subject of Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger's edited volume, *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*. Where does the current Venezuelan president belong? Rejecting “ready-made categories” that would link Chávez to Fujimori or to Perón or Fidel Castro, the editors view the Chavista government as “a rather unique and complex phenomenon” (226). Nevertheless, they and chapter author Kenneth Roberts devote some attention to Chávez's relationship to various regional political currents, including classical populism and the contemporary “pattern of personalistic political leadership in Latin America's neoliberal era” (67).

This essay begins with a comparative overview of the contents of the four books. This section compares the range of countries covered and the disciplines represented in these books and summarizes and assesses each book. The second major section of this essay discusses how these books address four questions. First, how do they define populism and neopopulism? Second, do the characterizations and case studies of populism tend to have positive or negative normative connotations? Third, what are neopopulism's effects on democracy? Fourth, what explains the (re)emergence of neopopulism in the 1990s? The final section of this essay suggests areas for further research and concept-building and adds my voice to those who favor settling on a political definition of populism. I conclude by making a modest suggestion about how we might use the populist concept and term more consistently and helpfully.

COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

Both Conniff's and Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom's edited volumes focus on multiple nations, and de la Torre's and Ellner and Hellinger's books deal with individual countries, Ecuador and Venezuela respectively. Six Latin American nations—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico—are examined in both multinational books. Central America makes limited appearances in these volumes (a chapter on Panama in the Conniff volume and one focused mostly on Nicaragua and El Salvador in the Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom book), and the Caribbean is absent (save for passing mentions of Jamaica's Michael Manley in the Conniff book and Cuba's Castro in Ellner and Hellinger's volume).

Among these volumes, there is little overlap among authors. Ellner, author of the Venezuela chapter in the Conniff book, is the only writer to contribute to more than one of the books. Still, there is some conceptual continuity among the four volumes, based especially on references to two mid-1990s seminal articles on neopopulism by Kenneth Roberts (1995) and Kurt Weyland (1996). These two articles are discussed in introductions and in case-study chapters of all four books under review (e.g., the chapter on Peru in Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom). Weyland is also the author of the final comparative chapter in the Conniff book, and Roberts has an early foundational chapter in Ellner and Hellinger's book.

These books are naturally influenced by the disciplines in which the authors are located. Conniff's volume is written mostly by historians, although political scientists, including Weyland, wrote three of the chapters. The Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom volume, on the other hand, is dominated by political science/international relations specialists (along with a couple of economists), and de la Torre is a sociologist. The Ellner and Hellinger volume, edited by an economic historian and political scientist respectively, draws together a diverse mix of social scientists, including an anthropologist. Significantly, economics is a fairly underrepresented scholarly orientation in these four books. Only the Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom volume includes economists among its authors.

Of these four volumes, *Populism in Latin America*, written with "the general reader in mind, especially college students and the intellectually curious" (1), may be the most accessible to the widest readership while maintaining scholarly authority. Supplementing eight country case studies, Conniff provides a superb table summarizing election data from 1901 to 1994 (18–20) and a helpful bibliographic essay at the book's end. The case chapters are succinctly written, framed by clear arguments, and flavored with interesting historical details and images (such as Joel Horowitz's use of political poems and tango lyrics in the

Argentina chapter, Steve Stein's use of song lyrics in the Peru chapter, and photographs throughout). *Populism in Latin America* is also distinguished by its attention to populist leaders at both national and subnational levels (including various Brazilian mayors and governors who never became president). Although the book's primary focus is on populist leaders, chapter authors also provide crucial information on the social conditions, shifting multiclass support bases, discourses, and political parties/movements of these leaders.

The Conniff book divides the history of Latin American populism into three periods: 1900s–1930s “early populism,” 1940s–1960s “heyday,” and late 1970s to the present. This scheme permits the authors to give meaningful attention to early populists such as Argentina's Hipólito Yrigoyen and to prototypical classical populists such as Perón. At the same time, this scheme may result in some imprecision about neopopulism in the catch-all current period, for example, when two recent Peruvian presidents—the 1980s nationalist Alan García and the 1990s neoliberal Fujimori—are initially discussed in the same breath (13). In the end, *Populism in Latin America* chooses to stay much more focused on classical populism than on neopopulism. Although Weyland's comparative chapter offers his breakthrough analysis of 1990s neopopulism, the chapter authors' greater emphasis on historical populism and editor Conniff's relative inattention to neopopulism in his epilogue discussion of new research directions may reduce the conceptual impact of Weyland's chapter.

In partial contrast with *Populism in Latin America*, *Miraculous Metamorphoses* divides Latin American populism into 1930s–1960s “classic populism,” 1970s–1980s “late populism,” and 1980s–1990s “neoliberalization of populism” (2). While these authors also give ample attention to the history of populism, where they differ with *Populism in Latin America* is their greater focus on political economy than on individual leaders and their substantial attention in most chapters (with the partial exception of the Chilean case) to the resurgent or novel political developments of the 1990s. The editors also provide a strong introduction, reviewing their three populist periods, identifying the shifting global and regional political economy contexts, discussing the complex relationship between populism and socialism, classifying three paths toward neoliberal populism (11), and categorizing the existing scholarly literature on populism.

While the authors in *Miraculous Metamorphoses* choose to give less attention to populist leadership styles and rhetoric, they provide cogent political economy analyses of the shifting social-class bases and economic policies of Latin American populist parties and movements. Moreover, starting with the editors' introduction, there is more attention in this volume than in the other books to the regional and

international contexts of these changes (although the Ellner and Hellinger volume occasionally addresses this issue, as in the chapter by Bernard Mommer on Venezuelan oil politics). Jean Carrière's chapter on Ecuador is a particularly fine example of analysis that integrates transnational and domestic factors.

Where *Miraculous Metamorphoses* may fall a bit short is in its light editorial hand. While a few chapters, including the ones on Ecuador by Carrière and on Mexico by Demmers, directly engage the themes emphasized in the editors' introduction, other chapters, including the one on Central America, seem less connected to the editors' central concepts and concerns. The time period coverage is also a bit uneven. Several chapters, including the chapter on Peru by Guiseppe Solfrini, devote substantial attention to the last decade and a half, the chapter on Chile (with a strong analysis of the historical stages of the Socialist Party) has scant discussion of the 1990s, and the chapter on Mexico stops abruptly at the end of Carlos Salinas's term in 1994. A concluding chapter would have fortified this volume. Nonetheless, the analytical and case-study content of this book would make it a valuable component of upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses dealing with Latin American political and economic development.

Populist Seduction in Latin America, the slimmest book in this set, may come closest to being the hidden jewel. Based on the Ecuadorian case and the strongest on Velasco Ibarra's classical populism, de la Torre transcends his case study with three elegantly written conceptual chapters that confront common modernization, Marxist, and structuralist arguments about populism (including those based on crisis, development stages, and "available masses"); draws brief comparisons to Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil; and offers thoughtful reflections on the relationship between populism and democracy. De la Torre's outstanding literature reviews situate his argument, namely that populism is "a form of political incorporation . . . based on weak citizenship rights and strong rhetorical appeals to, and mobilization of, *el pueblo*" (117), within the broader scholarly debates on populism.

In de la Torre's chapter on Velasco, colorful quotations and symbolic contexts give vivid content to the analysis of populist discursive strategies (including the familiar us/them dichotomy; 2000, 65–67). Five tables provide excellent summaries. In the latter half of the book, de la Torre's attention turns to neopopulist Abdalá Bucaram who was elected president in 1996 only to be forced out of office in less than six months. One notable example of Bucaram's use of class, race, and sex-coded symbols—analyzed by de la Torre—was the Ecuadorian leader's dance with his female vice-presidential candidate (89–91). Given Bucaram's short stay in office, one of the questions floated by de la Torre is why some 1990s neopopulists—Menem and Fujimori—were politically

successful, although others—Collor and Bucaram—failed. Significantly, all of these leaders promoted neoliberal economic programs. In the case of Bucaram, de la Torre suggests that the populist leader's challenge to the cultural elite, his ineffective or corrupt programs, and the lack of an extreme economic crisis gave him less opportunity to successfully apply his neopopulist savior rhetoric and programs (100–111).

Given its emphasis on the power of populist rhetoric and its secondary attention to social class analysis, *Populist Seduction in Latin America* begs some questions. What about the neopopulists' loss of support from some labor sectors? How significant is the use of political repression by some neopopulists such as Fujimori, as noted by de la Torre (130)? Finally, what are the differences between old and new populist discourses, especially on the central issue of neoliberal policy transformations (a topic that de la Torre never directly addresses in his discussion of Bucaram's rhetoric)? How have 1990s neopopulists sold (or, in the case of Bucaram, tried to sell) neoliberalism? What symbols are most effective for that sale? Whatever its gaps, for anyone wishing for a succinct and theoretically sophisticated concept-building analysis of populist rhetoric and leadership style based on a fascinating lesser-known case study, this book should be on your shelf.

The most recently published book in this set, *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era*, provides anyone with an interest in Venezuelan politics an impressive multi-faceted analysis of the period since the disturbances in Venezuela in February 1989. While comparativists are well aware of the significance of the period between 1988 and 1990 for political transition in Latin America and in the world, in the scholarship on neopopulism, this book represents a departure, just as its subject represents a departure, in two respects. First, this book is much more focused on the current era than are any of the others in this review. Second, Chávez, unlike other famous neopopulists of the 1990s, is not a neoliberal populist. A would-be coup maker in the early 1990s, Chávez was elected president on a nationalist platform in the late 1990s (near the time Menem and Fujimori were leaving power). While Julia Buxton argues that Chávez in power has pursued a moderate heterodox economic program (123–37), his nationalist rhetoric echoes classical populism (67, 70) more than it does the language of Menem or Fujimori, and he has slowed down the privatization drive of the 1990s (23–24). Indeed, if one considers recently elected early twenty-first century presidents in Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil, Venezuela may suggest the possibility of new political models emerging in contemporary Latin America, models that resurrect nationalism and, less certainly, social democracy. As editor Ellner asks: "Does the transformation of Venezuela's political landscape under Chávez foretell a new pattern of social struggle for the rest of Latin America?" (24).

A collection of snappy, well-written chapters (on themes such as economic policy, civil-military relations, oil politics, state reform, state-labor relations, and civil society) bracketed by clearly argued introductory and concluding chapters, *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era* distinguishes itself through a focus on socioeconomic (vs. political-institutional) explanations of recent Venezuelan political transformations. To the editors' credit, the book also includes a helpful overview of post-1945 history (chap. 2 by Hellinger) and ample attention to the new Venezuelan constitution, especially in the chapters on state reform by Angel Álvarez, on the military by Deborah Norden, on Chávez's movement by Margarita López Maya, and on civil society by María Pilar García-Guadilla.

Although this volume is mildly comparative (24–25, 40, 67–68, 216–217, and 226), it is naturally a product of country specialists. While it offers an impressive range and depth that only such one country-focused efforts can provide (though an acronyms page would help), one sometimes wishes for a little less assertion of Chávez's uniqueness and more comparative analysis. While Chávez may not be Perón or Fujimori or Castro, to which of these leaders is he closest? In what respects? Could Chávez be the neopopulist face of this decade just as Menem was for the 1990s? Whatever its limits, this book is a valuable and measured discussion of the dramatic developments in 1990s Venezuela and is sure to appeal to any reader interested in the national leader who, at the time of this writing, is facing a possible recall based on a provision included in the new national constitution that he promoted.

To conclude this overview, let me note several examples of the contrasting ways that (neo)populism and (neo)populist leaders have been classified across these volumes. First, while Paul Drake in *Populism in Latin America* finds little populism in 1990s Chile, Fernández and his fellow *Miraculous Metamorphoses* editors categorize the Chilean Socialist Party as a populist movement (a label on which Drake would agree for the Chilean Socialists of the 1930s and 1940s, but not for the Socialists of the 1960s and 1970s and after) that was transformed by neoliberalism in the 1990s. Second, regarding Brazil's Cardoso, Conniff finds no hint of populism, while Karla Lemanski-Valente makes Cardoso (who, like Fujimori and Menem, benefited from a constitutional change that allowed for his own reelection) the central case study of her *Miraculous Metamorphoses* chapter. Finally, while Jorge Basurto in *Populism in Latin America* presents Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as the leading neopopulist in post-1988 Mexico competing against the anti-populist Carlos Salinas, scholars such as Demmers have included Salinas, Cárdenas's nemesis, as a major figure among 1990s neopopulists. These conflicting classifications underscore the need to settle on a clearer definition of (neo)populism.

DEFINITIONS OF POPULISM AND NEOPOPULISM

In *Populism in Latin America*, Conniff offers a multi-faceted but essentially political definition of traditional populism that is nicely reduced to a tidy equation, “populism = leader \leftrightarrow charismatic bond + elections \leftrightarrow followers” (4–7). Later, Conniff suggests that what is distinctive about populist movements is their multiclass makeup (14). This definition of populism would seem to apply well to the 1990s neopopulists. As it happens, however, some of Conniff’s chapter authors continue identifying populism with an elite-challenging, economic-nationalist policy project. Drake, for example, offers a three-part definition of populism based on personalistic leadership, a multiclass support base, and an economic-nationalist policy approach (63). Most of the 1990s leaders labeled neopopulist, such as Fujimori and Menem, would only fit the first two of Drake’s three attributes. The dramatic 1990s policy makeovers in Peru, Brazil, and Argentina lead Weyland to adopt a strictly political definition of populism based on personalistic leadership style and institution-like political mobilization, omitting economic policy (172–74). This definition encompasses both classical and new populists.

The central question, then, is whether or not economic nationalism is essential in the definition of populism. While Weyland says no and finds various “affinities between neopopulism and neoliberalism” in the 1990s (181–89), not all students of populism follow this lead. Basurto, for example, argues that in the 1990s “neoliberalism and neopopulism remained antithetical to each other” (Conniff, 95). In *Miraculous Metamorphoses*, the editors contrast Weyland’s political definition favorably with economic definitions of populism offered by both liberal and *dependentista* economists (and they also summarize a number of scholars, including Drake, whose definition falls between the political and economic poles [3–4]). Similar to Conniff’s volume, however, many of the Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom chapter authors continue to emphasize policy content in their discussions of (classical) populism. This begs the question of how to classify properly the dominant 1990s political economy models in Argentina, Peru, Mexico, and elsewhere.

Although de la Torre emphasizes the ideological ambiguity of populism (x), in his conclusion he offers a clear definition of populism that is basically consistent with Weyland’s political definition. For de la Torre, the four features of populism are: an us/them discourse, a savior leader, a coalition of emergent elites with masses, and a relationship with democracy that emphasizes inclusion but not liberal procedures (140–41). In *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era*, by contrast, the editors do not seek to define populism (with Ellner rejecting “application of the caudillo-masses model” [178]), although some of the authors quote or use the populist term in descriptions of Chávez.

Addressing the dominant 1990s trend, Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom refer to the “mix of neoliberalism and presidentialism” that has produced a “neoliberal populism [that] considers it essential to reconcile the state and the economy with transnational capital in order to take part in globalization” and that “is perceived as a means to ensure populists their political legitimacy, by preventing the economic inefficiencies of prior state interventionism” (xi–xii). This definition includes socioeconomic policy content for the purpose of distinguishing neoliberal populism from classical populism. This practice of classifying different forms of populism based on policy differences seems relatively satisfactory and is consistent with Weyland’s base-line political definition of populism. In my conclusion, I will propose that “populist” and “neopopulist” be used as adjectives to describe, where appropriate, the personalistic political leadership approaches and the fluid multiclass coalitions that have been used to advance different kinds of grand policy-reform agendas. Following this practice, Menemism would be termed “neopopulist liberalism,” and Chávismo might best be labeled “neopopulist nationalism.”

NORMATIVE CONNOTATIONS

Discussions of populism and populists, as all social science debates, are value-laden. In his preface, de la Torre asserts: “in Latin America, populism is generally viewed in negative terms (ix).” Among scholars of populism, this would seem an overstatement. Among the authors in this review, some lament populism, and others celebrate it. For example, while Horowitz (in Conniff) blames historical Peronism for “seemingly unbridgeable chasms in today’s society” (23), Basurto credits *Cardenismo* for “mak[ing] the masses winners in the political game” (75). While Miguel Teubal (in Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom) paints a fairly positive picture of classical populism in Argentina, Lemanski-Valente criticizes the clientelistic element of Brazilian populism and commends the less populist rhetoric of Cardoso (96). Conniff characterizes populism as a generally democratic force, although his case study of Brazil also notes the support that some populist leaders (competing with each other) provided for the 1964 military coup (62).

Regarding Ecuadorian populism, Carrière (in Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom) scornfully characterizes Velasco Ibarra’s populist style as “ruthless” and “ineffective” (134), and Ximena Sosa Buchholz (in Conniff) calls both Velasco and Bucaram “authoritarian” (155). These are sterner assessments than the one offered by de la Torre who emphasizes that “populist politicians have been successful in incarnating the demands of those at the bottom of society for symbolic and material dignity” (xii) and argues that both populist rationality and populism

are democratizing forces (20–21, 26–27, 78–79). Still, de la Torre insists that he is not “writing an apology for populism.” Rather, he asserts that populism has both authoritarian and democratic features and, quoting Carlos Franco, “that those who want to transcend populism should start by accepting it” (119).

EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY

Assessments of populism have typically come from two different directions. For advocates of market capitalism, classical populists were viewed with disdain, but neopopulist liberals of the 1990s were viewed largely favorably on economic grounds. This market economics perspective is largely absent in these volumes. For advocates of democracy, by contrast, both paleopopulism and neopopulism are judged by their impacts on democracy. The four books reviewed in this essay are all concerned with the populism/democracy relationship. Reflecting the discussion of normative differences, some authors see populism as advancing democracy, while others see it as abetting undemocratic practice. Regarding 1990s trends, Demmers depicts Salinas’s political economy model in Mexico as neocorporatist and neopopulist rather than democratic and argues that economic neoliberalism generated a new kind of populist leadership and did not advance democracy (although there exists an unfortunate absence of discussion of Zedillo’s reforms) (173–74). Weyland notes both democracy-inhibiting and democracy-supportive tendencies of neopopulism (Conniff, 189–90).

Most of the authors in *Venezuelan Politics* address, at least indirectly, the mixed and sometimes unexpected effects of *Chavismo* on democracy. In his chapter on state-labor relations, for example, Ellner argues that while Chávez has failed to take control over organized labor, his movement has forced a renewed CTV (the main Venezuelan labor confederation) to become more democratic (178). In her chapter on civil society (that includes a helpful overview of 1958 to the present), María Pilar García-Guadilla wonders whether new constitutional provisions for participatory and representative democracy will “encourage new forms of participation by social groups” or “facilitate manipulation” (187–94). In the conclusion to her personal anthropological and data-rich analysis of the Chávez phenomenon (including descriptions of four television soap-opera characters who are said to represent Venezuelan anxieties), Márquez notes a contradiction between Chávez’s paternalism and participatory democracy (212). Finally, in their concluding assessment of the current state of Venezuelan society, Ellner and Hellinger reject both the Nasser-style “authoritarian nationalist” and Fujimori-style “neopopulist” labels (216–17) for Chávez, as well as the “barbarism/modernity dichotomy” (224). They argue that while Chávez

deserves more praise than he receives (220–22), one of the major obstacles to Venezuelan democracy is the lack of organization of the “marginalized poor” (219–20).

In my view, to assess populism’s impact on democracy, it is first necessary to identify different attributes of democracy—popular sovereignty, political equality, and political liberty, for example—and then discuss the effects of populism and neopopulism on these different attributes in specific historical contexts. As Conniff notes, classical populism advanced the democratic franchise and fair elections (17, 60–62), although populist leaders themselves sometimes acted anti-democratically (21). It is also important to remember, as de la Torre emphasizes, that populism has always challenged attempts by elites to construct hollow “exclusionary” democracies (87) and has put special emphasis on the noisy participation of ordinary people, who throughout Latin America remain without full citizenship rights in the public sphere (118).

CAUSES

Whatever the normative judgments of populism or conclusions about its effects on democracy, scholars of populism have a shared interest in explaining its emergence and reemergence. Regarding causation, Conniff argues that historically there were “sociopolitical conditions highly favorable to the rise of populist leadership” even while there is no “direct causality” (9). Drake, on the other hand, identifies factors that he believes explain why populism has never been a dominant force in Chile (63–64). Given the classical populism emphasis of the Conniff book, little explicit discussion is evident in the case-study chapters of the conditions explaining the rise of neopopulism. As a comparativist, Weyland speaks most directly to the subject, arguing that the economic policies and political repression of the military governments created a large, politically unorganized, and urban informal sector that became part of the multiclass support base of 1990s neopopulist leaders in Peru, Brazil, and Argentina (176–77). Along supportive lines, Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom identify economic conditions—namely the debt crisis and political conditions, especially the growth of the urban informal sector—which they argue resulted in the neoliberalization of populism (9–10). Chapter authors such as Teubal on Argentina, Solfrini on Peru, and Carrière on Ecuador provide especially strong analyses of the causes of the 1990s transformations, including the impacts of the international economic system and the inadequacies of both classical populist and leftist traditions and alternatives.

What explains the emergence of Chavismo and its departure from the neopopulist liberalism of the 1990s? Ellner and Hellinger point persuasively to socioeconomic causes to explain the Venezuelan

transformation. While political support from the informal sector appears to be a similarity between Chávez and other neopopulist leaders, Roberts offers a well-supported argument that in the 1990s Venezuelan political cleavages became much more closely aligned with social-class cleavages. According to Roberts, this is different than the pattern in the rest of Latin America, including the Peronists in Argentina and the Socialists in Chile (55–62). This development may help to explain, or at least illuminate, the departure of Chávez from other 1990s Latin American neopopulists.

CONCLUSIONS

Let me conclude this essay with some suggestions for further research and the use of the populist concept. Building on these excellent books and other recent studies, we need further analysis of the last fifteen years' neopopulism. First, if classical populism achieved mass incorporation, what has neopopulism achieved? Mass manipulation? Or are the poor autonomous, as de la Torre insists (96–97)? Second, why did some 1990s neopopulist liberal leaders succeed in sustaining their popularity when administering austere policies (e.g., Menem and Fujimori), and others failed (e.g., Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela)? Finally, since both Menem and Fujimori ended their final terms with extremely low popularity, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost executive power in Mexico, what can we make of this model's durability? Demmers's chapter nicely outlines the political consequences of neoliberal reform and helps to explain Salinas's effective political adjustments as well as to foreshadow the eventual erosion of PRI dominance (166–73). Teubal correctly anticipates the economic meltdown in Argentina (53). So, perhaps the era of neopopulist liberalism has already ended?

Regarding other areas for research, one of the interesting comparative themes running through discussions of populism is the impact of collective identities, such as social class, race/ethnicity, and gender. In *Populism in Latin America*, Stein's chapter on Peru provides strong class and race analysis of the emergence of populism in 1930s Peru (98–106), and William Robinson notes Panamanian populist Arnulfo Arias's use of anti-immigrant xenophobia (164). Conniff is also correct to call for more study of gender and populism in his epilogue. What is somewhat underdeveloped in these volumes (except for de la Torre) is the extension of class, race/ethnicity, and gender analysis until the 1990s period. What, for example, is the symbolic significance of the Asian- and Middle-Eastern family origins of prominent neopopulists in Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador? Regarding social class, what are the real effects of the informal sector on political outcomes?

Another interesting question is the relationship between populism and the Left. The Demmers's volume (and Ellner's chapter in Conniff) is most concerned with this question and sees both affinities and disconnects between socialism and classical populism (6–9). Solfrini's chapter on Peru cites the crisis of the Left (stemming in part from their relative neglect of the informal sector) as a major factor in the rise of Fujimori's neopopulist liberalism (108, 120–23), and Kees Biekart's chapter on Central America analyzes the "double defeat" of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and the Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in the 1990s (194–98). Authors such as Conniff and Drake, in contrast with Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom, draw sharp lines between socialism and populism (59, 71). For them, democratic leftists such as Allende and Lula, given their rhetoric and organizational bases, are not populists.

Finally, other topics that call for more attention are neopopulist political discourses (to match the valuable studies of classical populist discourses), constitution making and constitution revising by neopopulists (to build on Ellner and Hellinger's excellent start on this subject for Venezuela), and the role of international factors and actors (to further develop the explanatory framework suggested by Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom). On this final point, there is the question of how foreign economic policies in the North affect political trends in the South. Demmers, Fernández, and Hogenboom speculate about how the current European "third way" could better address the economic concerns of nations in the South (16–17).

In the end, perhaps what is most pressing for this research program on populism and neopopulism is more consensus on concepts and terminology. To start with the basics, what makes a leader a populist (or a neopopulist)? Conniff insists populists must be elected. So, which elected leaders are not populists? Horowitz wonders about Argentina's Yrigoyen, "whether his conduct can be called populist or simply popular" (24). In contemporary times, why is Brazil's Cardoso not included as quickly as Menem or Fujimori on the list of neopopulists, although all three had their national constitutions changed to permit reelections and depended on multiclass support bases? The answer, following the political definition of populism, would be Cardoso's leadership style (less verticalist) and his rhetoric (less grandiose and salvific).

If we can agree that the populist designation derives, first, from a verticalist and personalist leadership style and rhetoric and, second, from a multiclass following, we are left with the question of whether to include any economic policy content in the definition. Following Weyland (who further developed his definition of populism in a 2001 article), I suggest that students of populism settle on a political definition of this concept that excludes specific economic policy content. With

this baseline, I favor a modification of the term's common word-form usage. Specifically, I suggest that students of populism choose more often to use the adjective "populist" to modify nouns such as liberalism or nationalism or social democracy (rather than the other way around).

Reducing the use of "populism" as a noun (and also being more careful about the use of neo- as a prefix, as de la Torre advises [114]) would have several benefits. First, it would correct current naming contradictions. Thus, following this practice, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas would be a populist nationalist (consistent with Basurto in Conniff, 84–87) competing with the (neo)populist liberal Salinas (consistent with Demmers). Similarly, consistent with Stein's analysis of the similar political styles of García and Fujimori (115), the two Peruvian leaders could be distinguished by calling the former a populist nationalist and the latter a populist (or authoritarian) liberal. Second, this practice would have the advantage of drawing attention to leaders and movements with clear populist leadership styles and strategies, as well as multiclass support bases, without insisting that "populism" defines their whole project. This concurs with Horowitz's statement (in Conniff), for example, that "while traditional populism ceases to be possible" in neoliberal times, Menem still has a populist "political style" (41–42).

Third, the practice of using "populist" as an adjective has the advantage of putting economic policy approaches (nationalism, liberalism, socialism, etc.) at the center of classification and analysis. Finally, perhaps conceptual clarification and consistent usage would have the added advantage of helping the Latin American populist research program to cross regional borders. How relevant, for example, is the current scholarship on populism in Latin America to the study of populism in Russia? Is there any cross-fertilization at all? If this conversation is not happening, it seems a good time to start it.

So, what about Lula? Referring back to the 1994 Brazilian election, Conniff asserts that neither Cardoso nor Lula "could even remotely be called populists." Rather, Conniff identifies Lula with "democratic socialism" (59). While this may be true, given his multiclass support base with strong organized and unorganized working-class elements, Lula would seem to fit clearly one part of the populist definition. In terms of leadership style and strategy, however, it is probably too early to decide whether Lula is a neopopulist. Up to this point, Lula is not known for his us/them rhetoric or his verticalist decision-making. But how surprising would it be if Lula eventually draws on the deep traditions of populist leadership style and rhetoric to try to advance a social democratic project? In that event, we could debate whether or not to call Lula a populist social democrat as we continue asking whether his is the new face of Latin American politics in the twenty-first century.

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