

materialisation' can make any difference here. The question is, *could* God do something to a body (or to a door) which would make it possible for the body to go through the door? I see no reason for clearly saying No to that question. But I am far from clear that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is supposed to take us beyond this kind of point, into the bizarre realms of speculation about (for example) whether a man who dies with a sprained Achilles tendon will be resurrected with a sprained or a healed one. Are

we here not in danger of simply using the doctrine for a purpose it was not designed to carry out? If so, it is no wonder that, having asked a silly question, we get a silly answer. I don't think it is mere evasion to say that Keat's 'negative capability', i.e. the rejection of an 'irritable reaching after fact and reason' needs to come in here, as well as his doctrine of 'soul-making' which is an important element both of Hick's and Badham's thought about the after-life.

BRIAN WICKER

**EZEKIEL AMONG THE PROPHETS**, by Keith W. Carley. *SCM Press (Studies in Biblical Theology)*, London. 1975. 112pp. £2.80.

This little monograph, stemming from a doctorate thesis of 1968, examines the connection of Ezekiel to previous prophetic tradition, chiefly that betraying the influence of the Northern kingdom of Israel, and especially the movement which we see in Elijah and Elisha. The author, now a lecturer in Papua, New Guinea, works chiefly by following up expressions which are found frequently in Ezekiel and occur also in striking contexts in the sources. Thus Ezekiel is connected to pre-classical prophecy by such expressions as "the hand of Yahweh was upon me", "that you may know that I am Yahweh", "setting his face towards...". Connections with other major streams of Old Testament tradition are also discussed: to Hosea he is linked by some special uses of the prostitute theme (which occurs also in Isaiah and Jeremiah), to Deuteronomy by a number of minor themes and expressions. The link with Jeremiah is considerably stronger, and here the author has an interesting hint on the development of the

new heart theme: in Jeremiah Yahweh promises to write a new Law on their hearts, but by Ezekiel their irreformability is such that it will need a new heart and a new spirit.

There is little that is new or exciting in this book. The author seems to rely on studies already published, rather than trying out new ideas of his own. He does not seem to have any particular thesis which he is passionately anxious to prove. Much of the book is routine thesis material, on which the author has nothing to say (e.g. the section on the ecstatic element in prophecy in the Introduction). What he does say is mostly unexceptionable (though he is distressingly willing to postulate a claim for the miraculous in the accounts of Elijah running before the chariot of Ahab and the translocation of Ezekiel to Jerusalem), but it should have been possible to write a book both more profound and more interesting theologically on this topic.

HENRY WANSBROUGH

**IMAGINATION**, by Mary Warnock, *Faber and Faber*, London. 1976. 213pp. £6.50.

A writer who begins an investigation into 'imagination' with Hume and Kant risks the same fate as Conrad's Captain MacWhirr, whose investigation of the typhoon produced the general conclusion that it was 'a damned awkward circumstance'. Inevitably, so expert a witness as the author of the *Ancient Mariner* and of the *Biographia Literaria*, if measured by the standards of Hume and Kant, will be dismissed as 'not a professional philosopher'. He has no tools to do philosophy with. Mrs Warnock shows Coleridge the door, and it is Wordsworth who is preferred.

Now it is true that Coleridge was guilty of writing that 'philosophy begins in wonder'. It is also true that Wordsworth was the better poet, and might be regarded, therefore, as the more reliable witness. The snag is that abundant evidence exists to prove that Wordsworth owed the *intellectual* foundation of his vision to Coleridge. Not for nothing has he been facetiously referred to as Coleridge's masterpiece.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that half the book is taken up in reaching the main track-

"Up to now (p 141), we have been assuming, as Hume and Kant assumed, that the exercise of the imagination, whenever it occurs, in some way or other entails the forming of mental images....our next task must be to question our assumptions... is it possible that there can be such a thing as an image, in the way we have taken for granted?"

The conclusions reached, although of limited scope, are admirable:-  
The function of imagination is to detach both artist and spectator 'from the world, in order to think of certain objects in the

world in a new way, as signifying something else.' But how is this different from Coleridge's view that imagination 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate'? The unwanted witness, who has been shown out of one door, appears to have re-entered by another (heavily disguised, it seems, as Jean Paul Sartre).

For an ascent of Parnassus, Hume and Kant are unsuitable guides. The signposts are inherently ambiguous; and although philosophy may not begin in wonder, imagination certainly must.

'O Lady! We receive but what we give.'

JOHN COULSON

**THE TRIAL OF BEYERS NAUDE, Christian Witness and the Rule of Law.** Edited by the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva. Preface by Lord Ramsey of Canterbury, Introduction by Sir Robert Birley, Legal background by Professor A.N. Allott. Search Press, London, in conjunction with Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1976. 188pp.

The Christian Institute, under the directorship of Dr Beyers Naude, is perhaps the prickliest thorn in the sensitive flesh of the South African government. For not only does it denounce apartheid, but it also expresses its criticism in the same kind of language in which the ideology is justified. Other forms of protest can easily be disposed of as being inspired by ungodly principles, alien and hostile to the Afrikaner faith. But Beyers Naude's testimony is really an embarrassment as it shows that true Calvinism itself opposes the injustices which his fellow believers refuse to acknowledge. So the Prime Minister, Vorster, possibly encouraged by his successes in international politics, decided to list the Christian Institute among the organisations which in his opinion were inimical to the State, and Parliament instructed the President to set up a commission of inquiry. Beyers Naude was duly summoned to appear, but he refused to take the oath on the grounds that the proceedings were held in secret and that he had good reason to suspect that from the start the Inquiry was intent upon making the work of the Institute impossible. The State then took Beyers Naude to court, and produced as sole witness the secretary of the commission, who attested that the director had indeed refused to take the oath. From him the Defence Counsel extracted the admission that the commission had not even bothered to consider the reasons for refusal, which Beyers Naude had presented in a written statement. But the trial mainly

concentrated on the defendant's own witness. What he had to say was the preaching of the Gospel, which cannot remain hidden for secrecy would be against the Word of God. His testimony shows further that the Afrikaans Churches consistently failed to implement the decisions taken at the ecumenical synods in which they had participated, and which had clear implications for the social and political life of South Africa. If then Beyers Naude is asked to explain before the Commission the aims of the Institute which should be common and practical knowledge for all Afrikaners, this can only suggest dishonesty on the part of those who will act according to the recommendations of the Commission. The case went through several appeals, and in the process it was narrowed down to the purely technical question as to whether the Commission was properly constituted. This gives us a very good idea of the functioning of the law in South African society. There is a highly treasured appearance of justice, but the judges carefully avoid becoming involved in the merits of the Law. Technical loopholes will not deter the government, which can always rely on its unrestricted legislative power to enforce its doctrine.

On 30 May 1975 the Christian Institute was declared an 'Affected Organisation', which means that it can no longer receive funds from abroad. This may curtail some of its activities, but on the other hand it may also make it less susceptible to the accusation that it is unpatriotic.

ROB VAN DER HART