

Prof. Hankey's finding of 'tension', 'incongruity', imperfect success, and so on, in Thomas's reconciliation (cf. pp. 91, 113, 134, 144, 147, 149, 156, 157) is a hermeneutical problem of his own making, caused by his precipitately imposing a proclean interpretation on a resisting text: a figure centred on self-knowing (ambiguously entailing some kind of intellectual movement) on a metaphysics of being. Whatever references Thomas may have made to 'rediens in essentiam suam' (p. 142; but cf. 1a 14, 2 ad 1—not quoted!—on this as a 'modum loquendi'), he saw it as a way of expressing subsistence in being: Thomas's authentic conception is that of *ipsum esse subsistens*. The use of Proclus's *Elementatio* which Prof. Hankey finds in Thomas's *Summa* is in the *Expositio* of it by Berthold of Moosburg, presently being edited by L. Sturlese. A. de Libera has written that 'Berthold conceived of the *Elementatio* as a true living organism, capable of assimilating, interpreting, filtering all the texts and all the teachings of tradition' (*Introduction à la mystique rhénane d'Albert à Maître Eckhart*, Paris, 1984, p. 338).

Yet there are sign-posts indicating the right direction: to a 'neoplatonized Aristotle' (pp. 144–5), and to a Neoplatonism that needs modifying in its Christian use (p. 30, and cf. p. 153). And the argument achieves some plausibility by evoking resonances from thinkers closer to Thomas: all, in their different Neoplatonisms, having a discernable family likeness.

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PERSONS AND PERSONALITY, edited by Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillett. *Basil Blackwell*, Oxford. 1987. Pp viii + 222. £19.50.

The papers in this volume come from the Ian Ramsey Centre, which was established to foster 'interdisciplinary study of both ethical problems arising from scientific and medical research and practice and the underlying philosophical and theological issues'— matters of much interest and concern to the late Bishop Ian Ramsey especially during the time he was Nolloth Professor at Oriel College, Oxford. Some of the papers, given at a 24-hour workshop on 'Person and Values', are accompanied by abbreviated versions of ensuing discussions; the others, given at open seminars at the centre, stand alone. The collection contains much to interest philosophers, psychologists and theologians, but also reaches out to areas of medical, legal and literary concern. It deserves to enjoy a wide readership.

Two questions, as old as Aristotle, may be raised about any kind of thing. First, what is it made of? Putting it roughly, we want to know about the materials and, maybe, the construction. Secondly, what is it to be that sort of thing—what makes a thing the kind of thing it is? I may tell you that a clock is made of bits of metal formed into little cog wheels geared together, without your being any the wiser as to what it is for such construction to be a clock. The latter question is addressed when I explain that a clock is an artifice for telling the time, and of course that does not tell you much about the stuff and structure of clocks.

Some of the central issues raised in the early chapters of this volume could be helpfully viewed in the light of these two questions applied to the case of persons. Peter Atkins's paper on 'Purposeless People' centres very much on issues primarily relevant to the first type of question; we are told about the stuff and structure of the sorts of individuals that we recognise as persons. A person is a body, an organised collection of limbs and organs, which are themselves made of cells, molecules, atoms, and so on. For an explanation of the way things work we should turn to the various relevant disciplines—biology, biochemistry, chemistry and physics. Thus we are offered a boldly materialist account of the origin and make-up of persons.

But what of the second type of question—the question as to what it is for a given individual to be a person? Atkins does not seem to recognise this as a distinct question. In his view everything of interest will be fully explained in the particular sciences. The second question merges with the first, with the result that his materialist account of the stuff and structure of bodies appears in the guise of an austere materialist account of what it is to be a

person. Not surprisingly, questions about purpose and value, not to speak of theological issues, are given short shrift.

Richard Swinburne, who thinks that Atkins's story leaves out of account something that is crucially important about persons, can also be viewed as primarily concerned, in his chapter on 'The Structure of the Soul', with the first type of question; but he differs from Atkins over the point that the stuff and structure of persons is purely material. We are so in part but, Swinburne argues, there is another crucially important part which is immaterial; we each have a soul which could survive our physical demise. A person is part physical and part non-physical, both parts being structured. But that does not answer our second question—it does not tell us what it is to be person. That this question is not answered becomes clear when Swinburne agrees that some higher animals have souls, but without conceding that they are persons. So, though Swinburne's main interest here is to show that persons consist of soul as well as body he is aware that there is another dimension of enquiry—that we can still ask what it is for a particular embodied soul to be a person rather than, say, a dog. Of course, that is not to say that a physicalist could not possibly recognise, and leave a place for, the same question, which means that we are left with the further problem as to what constraints an adequate answer to the second type of question puts on what is to count as a satisfactory answer to the first. Does a proper understanding of what it is to be a person require a physicalist account of our make-up, or does it rather imply a dualist soul/body structure?

Swinburne argues for the latter option but Wiggins, writing on 'The Person as Object of Science', favours the former. Adopting Strawson's distinction between matter-involving and consciousness-involving predicates (M-predicate/P-predicate) he takes it that 'we know that without the M-processes that scientists describe, life and consciousness would not exist at all'. So Wiggins's view as to what is defective in Atkins's physical account must differ from Swinburne's. Wiggins's discussion centres on the second of our two initial questions; the focus is on asking what it is to be a person. What he argues is that, whereas persons considered as materially structured individuals are appropriate objects of scientific enquiry and explanation, no such account can tell us what it is to be a person—to be a subject of consciousness and value. Neither are the predicates that will help elucidate our concept of what it is to be a person reducible to predicates that 'pull their weight in some physical theory or science of matter'. Rather, 'what sustains the idea of a person is the idea of interpretation and the innumerable P-properties of human beings that the process of interpretation forces one to assume one can project upon others'. Furthermore, this idea cannot be construed as a definition since 'there is no clear limit to what concerns and capacities and perceptions and feelings ... we shall have to credit our fellows with if we are to make sense of them'. This obviously gives a very different account from Swinburne's of the dimension that is missing in Atkins's physicalist story (though, as was hinted, there is much on which both Wiggins and Swinburne might agree).

Grant Gillett, in 'Reasoning about Persons', takes issue with Derek Parfit over the status of persons as individuals. The question is: are persons necessarily discreet individuals such that there is no question of one merging into another, or of one person becoming two, or of there being a relation of psychological continuity and connectedness without personal identity. The issues are fascinating. Parfit, with great ingenuity, tries to throw doubt on everyday assumptions about identity; with Gillett, though not with all the contributors, the attempt fails.

There is a rich mine of material for philosophical reflection in the five chapters touched upon here, but for good measure there are also substantial chapters on legal, medical, psychological, literary and theological issues by, respectively, Richard Tur, William Fulford, Anthony Storr, Anthony Nuttall, John MacQuarrie, Adrian Thatcher and Kallistos Ware. Thatcher's contribution is particularly interesting for its anti-dualist interpretation of the Christian Biblical view of man. Space does not permit comment on several illuminating contributions included in the discussions.

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