

topics include Denis Shaw (geography), Maureen Perrie (the Revolution), R. W. Davies (politics, industrialization), M. V. Glenny (foreign policy), Moshe Lewin (Communist Party), David Lane (social classes in a Marxist schema), N. J. Dunstan (education), R. Amann (science and technology), T. J. Grayson (the factory), R. E. F. Smith (farms), and G. S. Smith (literature and art). All authors except one are from the University of Birmingham in England. The book includes a number of excellent photos and maps, contributed by Dr. Shaw.

The book has several drawbacks as a text for beginning students, none serious but all deserving the attention of a potential user. A number of important topics, such as the judicial system, are omitted. The book's brevity is commendable, however, and it gives the instructor ample freedom to add a pet interest, be it a novel, a film, or a special treatise. The vocabulary is mildly British; in the chapter on education, Dr. Dunstan writes of forms not grades, of streaming not tracking. Students who are only mildly literate or sophisticated will be puzzled. Chapter bibliographies emphasize British sources, many not readily available in libraries in the United States. This is unfortunate, because the bibliography is a useful pedagogical aid.

The availability of this text should nudge academics to offer a broad survey of contemporary Soviet affairs to students whose majors allow few electives. The Soviet Union is not only an important country but also a challenge to our established order and ideology. Although its aspirations and unresolved problems often resemble our own, its methods stir up controversy among Marxists and non-Marxists alike. This book encourages that controversy but encourages a judgment based on fact.

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THE SOVIET STATE. 2nd ed. By *Ellsworth Raymond*. Introduction by *Stanley W. Page*. New York: New York University Press, 1978 [1968]. xviii, 462 pp. + 8 pp. plates. \$15.00.

Professor Ellsworth Raymond adorns the second edition of his textbook, *The Soviet State*, with vivid anecdotes and memorable portraits. But for all its color, the work deserves caveats. Without a dominant focus, it appears arbitrary, disjointed, and superficial. No integrating theme sustains the reader through the successive chapters on geography, ideology, history, government, economy, and foreign policy. Moreover, in the absence of a limiting principle, there seems to be no justification for excluding anything from the book. In addition, *The Soviet State* is unscholarly. On the one hand, it slights the general issue of how one can know about Soviet society. On the other, when postulating particular interpretations of Soviet reality, it scrimps on documentation. For example, the average chapter has but one textual footnote; and tabular footnotes, when present, tend to be overly general (such as, "Source: *Moscow News*, 1976").

The effect of such practices can be illustrated with respect to the one area where Raymond could have made his greatest contribution to knowledge: in chapter nineteen, in which he contends that military considerations outweigh all other considerations in the economy, he also argues that Soviet industry is mobilized for future war. Although he refrains from analyzing the war contingencies for which this mobilization may be intended or from making recommendations for a U.S. response, he does provide many details of this "little known" peacetime mobilization. Thus, he describes the attachment of military personnel to each economic organization, specialized war production colleges for military and civilian personnel, and dual civilian and military (Jekyll and Hyde) production capabilities at industrial enterprises. While all of this may be true, one hesitates to take it seriously, given the absence of supporting evidence. Where Raymond postulates industrial mobilization, he should have documented it.

Finally, certain inaccuracies should be pointed out. It is untrue that "several candidates have usually been defeated in each election to the USSR Supreme Soviet." Although allegedly "now omitted from Soviet history books," there is a two-page article on the Bullitt Mission in 1919 in both the 1960 and 1971 editions of *Diplomaticheskii slovar'*. Finally, since 1965, comrades' courts have not possessed the power "to exile a person from his or her city or village for several years."

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BEYOND DÉTENTE: TOWARD AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Paul Eidelberg. La Salle, Ill.: Sherwood Sugden & Company, 1977. xvi, 255 pp. \$12.95.

PEACE ENDANGERED: THE REALITY OF DÉTENTE. By R. J. Rummel. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976. x, 189 pp. \$10.00.

The authors of these two books share a pessimistic view of the world. Both are convinced that America's drift toward military weakness, when contrasted to the build-up of Soviet power, has destroyed this country's will and reduced its interest in confronting the expansion of Soviet influence around the globe. The central issue facing the country, writes Paul Eidelberg, is the further "decline of the United States as a free and independent nation confident in the justice of its cause" (p. ii). For Eidelberg, the failure of U.S. policy lies in its moralism and pragmatism, one excessively sentimental, the other excessively calculating. He asserts that both approaches have placed the nation at the mercy of the ruthless by emphasizing the avoidance of war. To promote liberty while averting armed conflict, Eidelberg advocates an approach which he terms a tough-minded policy of magnanimity. Such a formulation, he hopes, will avoid the moral relativism of the past by recognizing the reality of enemy behavior. The author has gone to considerable effort to uncover the foundations of his views in the writings of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.

Accepting without question the notion that the USSR seeks the destruction of all non-Communist governments in the world, Eidelberg reserves his strongest criticism for American intellectuals and officials who have refused to take the Soviet danger seriously. He considers the recognition of the Soviet government in 1933 a serious blunder because it led to a paralysis of will. He condemns the moral relativism that permitted Franklin D. Roosevelt to recognize both the German and the Russian governments, even after he saw that both were aggressors. But the author never makes clear what the breaking of diplomatic relations with either Berlin or Moscow would have achieved. Even Nikita Khrushchev's goals, he believes, were based on the principles of the Communist Manifesto, although the Kremlin could pursue them by means short of war. Thus, for the Soviets, peaceful coexistence meant diplomatic and economic war. Eidelberg blames the Soviets for the war in Vietnam, for OPEC's pricing policies, and for the Afro-Asian majorities in the United Nations. He condemns détente because it permitted the Soviets to gain on every front—in manpower and weapons, on land and on sea. He considers détente to be a war to the finish. "In short," he writes, "far from being a policy of peace, 'détente' is a policy of appeasement which cannot but enfeeble the forces of liberty while strengthening the forces of tyranny, thereby fostering international tension and violence on the one hand, and increasing the likelihood of nuclear war on the other" (p. 124).

Pointing to Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, Eidelberg asserts that détente has destroyed the will of the United States to protect the world against Soviet encroachments. In order to coexist without accepting or condoning Soviet behavior, the author advocates building strength in Europe and Japan, nego-