

own rather earthly, limited concept of Body for his and then subtilise and mysticise it to meet the requirements of dogma. That is the way of cheap theology; and if we would avoid that way, this is the kind of book that many of us probably need.

RICHARD KEHOE, O.P.

RELIGION, SCIENCE AND HUMAN CRISIS. By Francis L. K. Hsu. (Routledge and Kegan Paul; 14s.)

Dr Hsu describes the basic problem of this book as being to decide on 'the nature of the relationship on the one hand, and the distinction on the other, between magic and science in human culture'. Roughly two-thirds of the volume is devoted to a detailed survey of the behaviour of the inhabitants of a town in the Yunnan Province of China in face of a cholera epidemic. It tells us of the prayer-meetings they held, the ceremonies they performed and what it cost them to perform them, and also what was their attitude to modern medical treatment. The latter part of the book sets these facts in the wider context of anthropological studies in various parts of the world and discusses at some length the new hoodoo of Western civilisation in a place like Chicago where magic has to be dressed like science. But what do all these facts mean? Throughout the discussion the reader is aware of a pathetic contrast between the care with which information is assembled and the lack of penetration with which it is interpreted, between the precision of the data and the vagueness of the thought that is brought to bear upon it. A great deal of space is given to the criticism of Malinowski's distinctions between magic, science and religion, but nothing very constructive appears to be put in their place. One feels it is a case of people who live in glass houses. After what he has said, has a writer who can conclude his book with the inept remarks about religion which appear on page 133 any right to be taken with complete seriousness?

A.S.

THE EXISTENTIALIST REVOLT. By Kurt F. Reinhardt. (Bruce Publishing Company; \$3.50.)

REASON AND ANTI-REASON IN OUR TIME. By Karl Jaspers. (S.C.M. Press; 7s. 6d.)

To classify certain philosophers as existentialist seems to be one of the simplifications by abstract thought that they have protested against. We think of them as a dissenting sect, because we have come to consider philosophy as something that deals with a set of problems, and chiefly with the problem of knowledge. The great European tradition that began with Socrates preferred to see it as a way of life, a reflection on the whole of our experience. Surely it is here that these philosophers belong, by their concerns if not always by their conclusions; and if this is so

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