

A weakness in the text is her view of sin as a flaw in knowledge rather than a flaw in the will. "I propose instead that sin originates in lack of sufficient believable unconditional love." (p.83) She rejects the idea that we can sin by preferring our will to God's, or rather sees our choice as arising from existential fear, and the need to preserve the self. The way out is to be really convinced that someone else is sustaining you: 'If you can really believe that someone else *is* sustaining you, then all the self-defence operations which result in sins are going to evaporate, because they are no longer needed. It is at the moment when you perceive this truth and really accept it, ...that *salvation* takes place...If the convincing gesture is "dying for you," then that gesture can be used because it convinces the sinner of the love. It is the love and the conviction of being loved that is salvific' (p.84). This seems to turn the cross into one myth among many rather than the myth become fact that is the turning point of history.

Later she says we should contemplate the mystery of the divine love directed to us as transcendent selves. She wants us to lose our descriptions of ourselves: 'I belong to such a culture, such a religious tradition...and even if these have been transcended, we are left with our sense of personality and with our ideas of how God-world relation is structured: our psychology and our theology. These are much harder to "unknow," and many people hold that we are not to give up identifying with them at all' (p.92).

She agrees with the nineteenth-century Hindu saint Sri Ramakrishna that God can be conceived as dualist (the gulf between creator and creature in the Abrahamic religions) and nondualistic (the Eastern religions). I am left wondering if it is my lack of mystical experience that makes these two ideas seem so contradictory and paradoxical. The Trinitarian conception of God, unity in diversity, gives us identity as individuals in communion with each other and with God. This is far from what she calls the nondualistic conception of God. Theology and psychology seem to be inextricably linked.

Her concluding chapter calls us to transform the world collectively, recognising that Jesus prayed for us as individuals, that when we are converted we strengthen our brothers and sisters and become as one as the Trinity is one. Overall, it is a book which speaks in the current language of therapy to explain religious practice to a culture which has lost touch with religious language.

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MIND, METAPHYSICS AND VALUE IN THE THOMISTIC AND ANALYTICAL TRADITIONS edited by J.Haldane, *University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2002, Pp. x + 225, \$ 45.00 hbk.*

This book contains a collection of essays mostly by writers in England and Scotland, which establish links between Aquinas and contemporary analytic philosophy. As Haldane acknowledges, the contributors build on the pioneering work of Anscombe, Geach and Kenny. The essays,

however, are of varying quality. Quite outstanding for its clarity, pleasing style and depth of analysis is the first essay by Fergus Kerr OP. He starts with Kenny's observation that Aquinas disagreed with his contemporaries over the same four points that Wittgenstein did with the logical positivists. Kerr agrees with Kenny that Aquinas had no problem about how one gets from the public to the private sphere, but differs from Kenny by holding that Aquinas had to argue for his position against the Platonists. For Aquinas, the mind is not transparent to itself, whereas Platonists thought that we have the same sort of knowledge of our minds as God has of his. Kerr then connects Aquinas's philosophy with his theology by applying this topic to Aquinas's discussion of Christ's knowledge, at the same time noting that Wittgenstein kept philosophy and theology apart.

The second essay, by David Braine, picks up the theme of Plato and shows how Aquinas frees us from Plato and the British empiricists, who have in common that what we directly know is not things but ideas, although they meant different things by ideas. For Aquinas, *species* (likenesses) are not what we know but that *by which* we know real objects. Braine is good on the difference between Aquinas and Brentano on intention. The relation of the mind to the body is taken up by Richard Cross in the next essay, but he seems to me to misinterpret Aquinas on the soul in a way that renders his conclusions unproven. For instance, Aquinas nearly always talks about *powers* of the soul, not properties. This difference is crucial today when it is common to deny the soul and say that the body has certain properties which make it living. Would one call the mind a property? Aquinas does not say that the soul is a part of the body (p.49) but of the composite human being; nor that the soul is a physical property (p.47).

Haldane's wide-ranging essay provides useful comment on contemporary philosophy in Britain and America, thus illustrating a remark in his introduction about the value of the history of philosophy for helping us to preserve the insights of the past and notice the prejudices of our time. He thinks that the analytic tradition is about to be overtaken, just as Aristotelian philosophy was in the 16th century, through being too narrow. He notes that interest in Wittgenstein and his disciples has waned as the naturalistic, scientific outlook of leading American philosophers (Searle, Quine, Davidson) has become dominant. As an example of the failure of analytic philosophy, Haldane takes the attack now being mounted against physicalism when it has failed to explain the mental.

In the same vein, Stefan Cuypers, the only Continental scholar represented in this collection, calls analytical philosophy 'bankrupt' because naturalistic and reductive theories are unable to provide an adequate account of human action. For this, Cuypers directs us back to Aquinas's theory of free will. In Cuypers' view, the will is not only an efficient but also final cause of action: God is the cause of willing in us as the end of all willing is the good. Jonathan Jacobs, from America, presents a realist account of concepts against Quine and Kripke. Our concepts conform with the world because the intelligible features of the world enable

us to make them. Jacobs joins those who now point out that Aristotle's concept of form is congenial to modern science.

The later essays are not so easy to read, with the exception of the final one by Martin Stone. Christopher Hughes could have made lighter work of God's knowledge of future contingents by introducing the distinction between true *de re* and *de dicto*, which Anscombe made the focal point of her review of the new Blackfriars translation of the *Summa Theologiae*, edited by Thomas Gilby OP, in the *Times Literary Supplement* (see her *Collected Papers* I,153). But Stone provides a fine closing essay with a useful and readable survey of the current views about St Thomas's theory of natural law. In Stone's view, the debate cannot be settled because texts in Aquinas support both sides, the naturalistic and the anti-naturalistic. He suggests that the role of reason and will is the key to a solution: 'reason is the measure of will' (I-II q.19 a.4). Also reason is the rule of virtuous acts, not nature (I-II q.54 a.3). The ultimate criterion of morality, however, is not reason but the eternal law.

This collection of essays provides much to whet the appetite of those who like thinking about the questions of contemporary philosophy. But I doubt whether the sort of logical analysis that some of these essays contain makes Aquinas as attractive as Kenny and Geach have done. I also wonder whether this approach to Aquinas will carry with it many on the Continent who are more interested in him as a theologian. But I shall be returning to some of these essays.

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THE WAY OF A PILGRIM: ANNOTATED AND EXPLAINED translated and annotated by Gleb Pokrovsky, *DLT*, London, 2003. Pp. xvi + 138, £9.95 pbk.

When the first Orthodox émigrés arrived in the West in the late 19th century, few of them can have imagined that they had come as missionaries. But for many Westerners disenchanted with both with their inherited forms of Christianity and with secular liberalism, a new Christian vista was opened with the translation of some of the Orthodox spiritual classics, perhaps most notable among which is *The Way of a Pilgrim*. First published anonymously in Russia in 1881, it was a literary fruit of the great popular spiritual revival in 19th-century Russia, rooted in the liberation of the serfs. The protagonist of *The Way of a Pilgrim* is a simple peasant, who hears at the Liturgy one day St. Paul's words, "Pray without ceasing" (1 Thess.5.17): captivated, he leaves everything and becomes a *strannik*, or wandering pilgrim, a common sight in 19th-century Russia. With the guidance of a *starets* (monastic spiritual father), and supporting himself mainly by begging, he is initiated into the Jesus Prayer, until it passes from his lips to his mind and to his heart, and he himself becomes a spiritual teacher to those whom he encounters along the way. One of the most encouraging features of the story – which perhaps accounts for its popularity – is that it shows how people in all walks of life, not just monks