

THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF MAGISTRACY: A STUDY
OF CONSTANTINUS, HENRY VIII, AND
JOHN F. KENNEDY

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As we move in this study from Constantius to Henry VIII to John Fitzgerald Kennedy we move in Christian doctrine from heresy to orthodoxy to "American" Catholicism, and in Church-State relations from domination to manipulation to separation or from a form of Caesaro-Papism to Lay State regalism to Lay State separatism of the American type. An important key to understanding these shifts or changes is to be found in a study of the Magistrate's theological conception of the magistrate's office.

Constantius

The year 337, which marks the death of Constantine and the beginning of Constantius' rule as one of three Augusti, saw the Church in a developing stage theologically. A generation earlier it reflected the ideas of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, and Lucian. Shaken by the Arian dispute, the Church, through the Council of Nicea in 325, authored a creed which affirmed that Jesus Christ, the Son, was of one substance with the Father (*homoousion to patri*) and anathematized any one who said of the Son that "there was when he was not."¹ This creed, directed against a subordinist Christology, represented, substantially, the views of the west and was assented to by the majority of the eastern bishops, though it was, in fact, unacceptable to some in the east.² From 325 to 337, the period of Eusebian reaction, endeavors were made to reconcile the dissenters with the Creed and to eradicate the episcopal defenders of the Creed.³

Turning back a few years we note that in 303 Christianity was still an illegal religion and the Church was suffering its severest persecution by the State. The battle of Milvian bridge (312), with its legendary *in hoc signo victor eris (touto nika)* has long been recognized as marking a turning point in the relationship of the Christian Church to the State.⁴ The imperial shift from paganism to Christianity produced among Christians, especially among the clergy, a tolerance and even a welcome of State manipulation and domination of the Church.⁵ That tolerance and welcome, so evident at the imperially convoked and State-financed Council of Nicea, began to wane in subsequent years. Indeed, the Church began to fear that obedience to the emperor was to be had at the cost of perverting the faith. In 337 the Church, like an adopted child, was endeavoring to find its place in the household of the State.

Politically, this year saw the empire divided with Constantine II ruling the west, Constans ruling Italy, Africa, and Greece, and Constantius ruling the Danube region and the east. This was, basically, a revival of Diocletian's theory of rule, but with the authority lodged in one family in the hope of preserving unity. Three years later Constantine II lost his life in attempting to subdue Constans. In 350 Constans was assassinated and Constantius became sole emperor, though he was faced for a time with a usurper in the west.⁶

The Roman empire had long regarded religion as an aspect of State concern and control. Little distinction was made between the sacred and the secular. Christianity had simply replaced paganism as the cement of empire and the State lent its political and financial support to the Church.

Such was the situation, in brief, when Constantius began his rule as an *Augustus*.

He was raised as a Christian, received schooling in the Christian Scriptures and teachings, and undoubtedly understood far better than his father the rival theologies of Arius, Athanasius, and their supporters.⁷

The imperial shift from paganism to Christianity, mentioned above, marks also a shift from pagan theories of monarchy to Christian theological concepts of magistracy. The theory of monarchy which Constantine inherited was passed on to Constantius with the addition of a Christian veneer. Constantius took this theory of monarchy with its religious and political elements and its loosely fitted pagan and Christian elements and molded it, by virtue of a more acute understanding of Christian doctrine, into a Christian theological concept of magistracy.

The theory of monarchy which Constantine inherited contained three elements, according to Glanville Downey.⁸ The first element was the concept of the principate under which the princeps had *imperium* by which he controlled the armed forces, and tribunician power, by which he controlled legislation. The second element was the concept of the quasi-divinity of the Emperor. During the third century, largely due to the deteriorating economic and military situation, a series of military Emperors came to power. These Emperors needed more authority; as a result the old Sun-cult of Syria was introduced by Aurelian (270-275) as an official Roman State Cult—*Sol Invictus*. Regarded as the highest of the gods, the Sun-god not only endowed the Emperor with special authority, but contributed much to the development of the quasi-divinity of the Emperor. Professor Downey notes that "the imperial mints issued coins of Aurelian with the inscription 'born lord and God' (*Dominus et deus natus*). K. M.

Setton says this is the beginning of the doctrine of the divine right of kings in the Roman empire.⁹ The third element was the Emperor's divine *comes*, a guardian companion and adviser.¹⁰ Each private individual had his *genius* or *numen* or *daimon*, a spiritual or better part which aided him. The Emperor's *comes* or *daimon* was, however, far more powerful than any ordinary citizen's *daimon*. Constantine had had as his tutelary deity Apollo,¹¹ but in the gradual development of his espousal of Christianity he increasingly sensed that the Christian's God bestowed on him all that authority and power and special favor which were involved in the theory of monarchy which he had inherited.

Moreover, as Constantine, in time, brought the empire under a unified political rule he was eager to have Christianity united, for unity of religion must be as real as political unity if success were to crown the imperial rule.¹² Though deeply involved in the Arian struggle there is some doubt that he understood its theology clearly.¹³ On the other hand he understood very clearly the element of disunity involved. The imperial actions taken reveal that unity rather than doctrinal exactitude characterized the desire of Constantine.

Constantius inherited all this and, because of his Christian training, the State's favor of Christianity, the State's increased involvement in theological confessions, and the State's apparent need for Christian as well as political unity, he was deeply interested in having a Christian theology which would support him in the role he desired as emperor. Arianism, which had gained increasing influence at court, particularly after the transference of the capital from Old Rome to New Rome or Constantinople in 330, provided the theological undergirding which Constantius desired.¹⁴

Theologically, Arianism advocated a subordinist Christology. Jesus, the Son, was divine but not eternal. The Father had no beginning but of the Son it was said, "there was a time when he was not."¹⁵ The submission of the Son to the Father was supported by several Scriptural passages, including Jesus' prayer prior to his betrayal, "not my will, but thine, be done" (Lk. 22:42).

Supplementing this was a second element. The apostles, including Paul, had been commissioned by Christ and it was widely held that the bishops, as successors to the apostles, were also commissioned by Christ. Ignatius, bishop by Antioch (d. ca. 115), believed he was directly commissioned by God, not by apostolic succession of office;¹⁶ but since he referred to Jesus as God it is difficult to assert that he distinguished between the Father and the Son with respect to the derivation of the bishop's office.¹⁷

This distinction was made by the Arianized Constantius who be-

lieved that he was the representative of God the Father. He drew this idea from such pagan concepts as the *Sol-Invictus* and the *Logometes* and from such Christian sources as Paul's remarks in Romans 13: 1-5, and the words attributed to Peter in I Peter 2: 13-17. The bishops, he agreed, were the representatives of the Son and in good Arian fashion he could thus make the following assumptions. As the Son is subordinate to the Father, so the bishops are subordinate to the Emperor and so the Church is subordinate to the State. Constantius' theological concept of magistracy was thus undergirded by a low Christology rooted in Arian subordinationism.¹⁸

Theoretically this concept should have produced unity both in Empire and in Church, for Constantius, like his father, wanted Christianity to be a unifying force. That the imperial concept did not produce unity is evident from the reactions of the Catholic clergy and the Christ-loving laity.¹⁹

Constantius, more than any other Roman Emperor, endeavored to dominate the Christian Church, both in doctrine and in ecclesiastical affairs. Absolute monarchy, secured by inheritance and force of arms, combined with a subordinist Christology to produce an extreme form of Caesaro-Papism.²⁰ In an age when ecclesiastical doctrines and forms were but modestly developed, when as yet there had been no extensive discussion of the two natures of Christ, when the religious and secular were still united, when, within the Church, ecclesiastical affairs were not markedly distinguished from spiritual affairs, when the acceptance of Christianity by the magistrate was a comparatively new feature, when the Church was pleased to have, after severe trials, the imperial favor, and when the Church was struggling to find a new and satisfactory theory of Church-State relations, it is easy to understand that Christian theological concepts of magistracy would be direct and unrefined. Such was the case with Constantius. His pagan concept of absolute monarchy and his pagan and Christian belief that the powers that be are instituted by God were readily adapted to his subordinist and simple Christology to produce a unique theological concept of magistracy whereby the magistrate or the State could dominate not only the temporal affairs of men, but the Church's polity as well as its doctrine.

Henry VIII

Eleven and a half centuries after Constantius Henry VIII was king of England. Theologically, western Christendom had followed in the Catholic train. The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 and the Chalcedon Creed of 451 had established basic affirmations about the Triune God which were still upheld in 1509. A subordinist Christology was no longer possible for a Christian magistrate.

Rome presented to the western world a theological and ecclesiastical monocracy which, in spite of sporadic challenges and some modification, was yet very powerful. The notable modification, for our present concern, was the dual share in ecclesiastical authority which the pope and king had in the English Church.²¹

The attitude of the Church toward the State was, basically, clericalism, which Joseph Lecler has described as "the tendency of the Church or spiritual society to meddle in secular affairs with a view to making the State authority a mere instrument of its own design."²² The Church advocated the ancient Gelasian doctrine of two powers, but unlike Gelasius who located these powers separately *in mundo* the Church, in Henry's day, located these powers together *in Ecclesia*.

Politically, England was at the forefront of nationalism's trend. The Englishman's loyalty was to England and its king, not to the Empire and its emperors. The papacy, also involved in nationalism's trend as well as in international politics, could elicit spiritual loyalty from Englishmen but not political loyalty. Because English kings were semi-ecclesiastical persons by virtue of being, alone of laymen, anointed with the oil of chrism for their office,²³ Englishmen's ecclesiastical loyalty was divided between the pope and the king. Henry VIII did not inaugurate these tendencies; he recognized them and utilized them.

A. G. Pollard opens his excellent study of Henry VIII by saying, "In the whole range of English history there is no monarch whose character has been more variously depicted by contemporaries or more strenuously debated by posterity."²⁴ Henry exhibited a rare combination of control and dependency, of tyranny and popularity. Certainly no English ruler was more successful in manipulating the Church in England.

The centuries from Constantius to Henry VIII witnessed the expression of numerous theories of monarchy and numerous theological concepts of magistracy. Studies by George Williams,²⁵ Ernest Kantorowicz,²⁶ Joseph Lecler,²⁷ and others have identified many of the elements of these theories and concepts. The present study endeavors to identify the elements which contributed to Henry VIII's theological concept of magistracy. These elements cannot be sharply divided between the political and the theological for neither the middle ages, which provide the background for Henry's concepts, nor the sixteenth century evidenced any sharp separation of political and theological ideas.

The elements which contributed to Henry VIII's theological concept of magistracy are three-fold: (1) the factors which justified his kingship, (2) the historic rights of English sovereigns and the cir-

cumstances of Henry's reign, and (3) the theological explanations of his kingship.

1. The elements which justified his kingship are:
 - a. King by divine right.
 - b. King by might and law.
 - c. King by ecclesiastical approbation.
2. The historic rights of English sovereigns and the circumstances of Henry's reign include:
 - a. The King's authority over property.
 - b. The King's prerogative over appointments.
3. The theological explanations of his kingship are:
 - a. The King's Two Bodies.
 - b. The King's reflection of Christ.
 - c. The King's distinction between spiritual and ecclesiastical affairs.

1. a. King by divine right

The liturgical or Davidic idea of kingship with its oil of unction or chrism which had combined with the Merovingian and Carolingian idea of the king as Melchizedek to form the medieval concept of Christological kingship gradually subsided in the late middle ages to a place of secondary importance, while the concept of divine right kingship re-emerged to a position of first importance.²⁸

Fourth century divine right kingship had not been associated with the oil of chrism. Constantine and Constantius had not been baptized until near death and neither was anointed as a Christian king.²⁹ Constantius' famous retort, "Let whatsoever I will, be that esteemed a canon,"³⁰ was not spoken as a priest or as a representative of the bishops but as a representative of God the Father.

Ernst Kantorowicz, having in mind Henry VIII, writes, "The religious strand within political theory was certainly strong during the age of the Reformation when the divine right of secular powers was most emphatically proclaimed and when the words of St. Paul 'there is no power but of God' achieved a previously quite unknown importance with regard to the subjection of the ecclesiastical spheres to the temporal."³¹

Henrician kingship contains both the fourth century concept of divine right kingship and the medieval concept of Christological kingship. The former was primarily used to justify his kingship; the latter was primarily used to explain his role as king. Combined, they supported his sovereign rights.

M. W. Patterson wrote:

In 1512 Parliament passed an Act abolishing benefit of clergy for all clerks in minor orders who were guilty of robbery and murder. This Act was to be in force till a new Parliament met. Shortly before the ex-

piry of the Act the Abbot of Winchcombe violently attacked it in a sermon at Paul's Cross (1515), as infringing the law of God. Thereupon the King held a council, at which the matter was discussed before him. The abbot of Winchcombe took one side, and Dr. Standish, the warden of the Grey Friars of London, the other. . . . Convocation, towards the end of the year, summoned Standish before it, and demanded a clear answer as to whether, in his opinion, lay judges were entitled to summon clerks before their judgment seat, and whether papal decrees were not binding, if contrary to the usage of the land. Standish immediately appealed to the King. The King summoned another council attended by the judges, and the judges decided that Convocation, by questioning the action of a royal councillor, had rendered itself liable to the penalties of *praemunire*.³²

Cardinal Wolsey asked that the case be referred to the Pope. Henry replied, saying, "By the permission and ordinance of God we are king of England; and the kings in times past had never any superior but God alone. Therefore know you well that we will maintain the right of our crown, and of our temporal jurisdiction as well in this, and in all other points, in as ample a manner as any of our progenitors have done before our time."³³ Wolsey got down on his knees and said the Church had no intention of questioning Henry's prerogative.³⁴ The entire situation reveals that Henry, in 1515, believed he was King by divine approbation, supreme in authority over temporal and many ecclesiastical affairs and that this concept had prevailed for years. Cardinal Wolsey and Convocation humbly acknowledged the King's authority and historic prerogatives. This concept did not change throughout Henry's reign; it was asserted prior to and apart from his divorce proceedings and the documentation in support of this concept is abundant throughout his reign.

1. b. King by might and law

Henry VIII's claim to the English crown rested on four elements:

1. military victory and might, 2. acclaim by the soldiers and populace, 3. Parliamentary support, and 4. ability to govern with a firm hand.³⁵ Henry VIII inherited these elements and while he added a claim to the title by inheritance, which claim was virtually unchallenged, he reflected the Tudorian conviction that they were *De facto* magistrates.³⁶ Henry's popularity is widely attested. Michelet wrote, "Le Nouveau Messie est le Roi,"³⁷ and a Venetian contemporary said that Henry did "not seem a person of this world but descended from heaven."³⁸ Parliament gave him unusual support, even to the point of subserviency.³⁹

1. c. King by ecclesiastical approbation

In 1509 the marriage of Henry VIII and Catherine was solemnized by William Warham, the Archbishop of Canterbury. A week later Warham placed the crown on Henry's head.⁴⁰ The approbation of the Church was official and whole-hearted.

For several years this approbation was clearly evident and in 1521 Henry was given, by the Pope, the title "Defender of the Faith."⁴¹ When, some thirteen years later, the Pope excommunicated Henry,⁴² the Church in England continued to support him. In 1531 the Conventions of Canterbury and York stated, "We acknowledge His Majesty to be the singular protector, only and supreme lord, and, as far as the law of Christ will allow, supreme head of the English Church and Clergy."⁴³ Some bishops, notes Wakeman, objected, saying, "the words 'supreme head of the English Church' were ambiguous, and might be held to imply a spiritual power in the king. To meet this objection Henry wrote personal letters to them repudiating any such meaning."⁴⁴

Henry's distinction between affairs spiritual and affairs ecclesiastical, together with his denial of authority over affairs spiritual, encouraged the approbation of the English Church. The elimination, after 1534, of one of the two authorities in matters ecclesiastical, and that the alien or foreign one, did not greatly disturb the English clergy.⁴⁵ Indeed, a single authority, and that one English, had some merit.

2. The historic rights of English sovereigns

a. The King's authority over property

When Henry VIII became King he was well aware of the historic rights of English sovereigns. Several statutes and laws referred to the King's authority over property. The statute of Provisors of 1351 illustrates this. It stated that the King and his nobles were the only legitimate lords of English property, that the King, as "advowee paramount immediate," was the source of all English property and he alone could dispense it.⁴⁶

b. The King's prerogatives over appointments

English sovereigns had long controlled, either directly or indirectly, a wide variety of titles, offices, and posts. Such words as "certain suitable persons shall be appointed by the King"⁴⁷ were present in several statutes and laws. With reference to ecclesiastical establishments and appointments the statute of Carlisle of 1307 said that, "monasteries, priories and other religious houses were founded . . . by the king and his progenitors."⁴⁸ This same statute, by kingly authority, placed monetary and property restrictions on the personnel connected with these houses. The Statute of Provisors of 1351 claimed that the Church of England was founded by Edward I and his progenitors. The Second Statute of Praemunire of 1393 said that the translation of bishops by the Pope without the King's consent was illegal and always had been illegal. To this the lords spiritual as well as the lords temporal assented.⁴⁹

The Act in Restraint of Appeals of 1533 and the Ecclesiastical Appointment Act of 1534 affirm clearly and emphatically the King's inherent and historic prerogatives in matters of matrimony, divorce, tithes, oblations, obventions, and ecclesiastic appointments within the realm.⁵⁰

The recognition by the Convocations of Canterbury and York of Henry as "Supreme Head" and the Supremacy Act of 1534 did not produce a new head over affairs ecclesiastical; it simply eliminated the pope's share in this headship. Pollard notes this "change from a dual to a sole control," adding that "the Church had been governed by a partnership between King and Pope," and what Henry did "was to eject his foreign partner."⁵¹ No longer did he share his historical prerogatives in ecclesiastical matters.

3. The theological explanations of his kingship

a. The King's two bodies

Ernst Kantorowicz observes that the practice of using theological definitions to describe the nature of kingship was prevalent from Merovingian times onward, "just as . . . in the early centuries of the Christian era the imperial political terminology and the imperial ceremonial had been adapted to the needs of the Church."⁵² While several theological equations are identifiable in the Europe of Henry's day the concept of the King's Two Bodies, which Kantorowicz has so ably discussed, seems not to have arisen until the Wars of the Roses and was primarily applied to Tudorian kingship.⁵³

The King's Two Bodies are his body natural and his body politic. The former lives only as long as the particular King lives; the latter lives on in the King's successor. Moreover, according to Plowden's *Reports* the King's body politic was not only "more ample and large" than the body natural, it contained "certain truly mysterious forces which reduced, or removed, the imperfections of the human nature."⁵⁴ Here we ought also to note the concept that the King's coronation was a kind of royal baptism which not only purified the King but also the whole kingdom. "This is the secularization of the purging power of the sacraments,"⁵⁵ says Kantorowicz. He then goes on to say "The body politic of kingship appears as a likeness of the 'holy spirites and angels,' because it represents, like the angels, the Immutable within Time."⁵⁶ Here we may recall II Samuel 14: 17, 20.

b. The King's reflection of Christ

Connected with the concept of the King's "body politic," virtually without discrimination, is the concept of the "mystical body." Theologically, in the Middle Ages, Church and Christian society formed a *corpus mysticum* with Christ at the head.⁵⁷ With Henry VIII, Christ's Two Natures were reflected in the King's Two Bodies. Henry

was orthodox about the Trinity and orthodox about the Two Natures. He saw himself as the representative of Christ in his human nature as head of the Church and as representative of Christ in his divine nature as head of the State. This is the Christological aspect of Henrician kingship referred to earlier. "Royalty," says Kantorowicz, "was actually expounded in terms of Christological definitions."⁵⁸ As Christ has two natures so the King had two bodies, united and cooperating.

Influential on Henry's theological concept of magistracy was yet another strand—that which came from the Norman Anonymous. Here the King was seen as a twin person, human and divine, a *Christus*, that is, a God-man. Old Testament Kings were foreshadowers of Christ. New-Covenant Kings were shadows or imitators of Christ—*christomimetes*. There was an essential difference, however, between the celestial Christ, anointed in eternity, and his terrestrial antitype. "Christ was king and *Christus* by his very nature, whereas his deputy on earth was king and *Christus* by grace only . . . the Spirit 'leaped' into the terrestrial king at the moment of his consecration to make him 'another man' (*alius vir*) and transfigured him in time."⁵⁹

c. The King's distinction between spiritual and ecclesiastical affairs

George Williams' excellent study of the Norman Anonymous maintains that "The Anonymous knows very well . . . that the king bestows neither ordination nor the sacerdotal power on a bishop but only the dominion and tutelage of the church and the power of governing the people of God, for the bishop's sacerdotal-sacrificial competence comes to him only in Apostolic succession."⁶⁰ In a footnote Williams points out that canonical definitions of a later age made clear the distinctions between the power of jurisdiction, divided between *jurisdictio fori*, external ecclesiastical matters, and *potestas poli*, matters of penance, and the power of ordination. Williams writes, "The Anonymous . . . may be said to have preempted for the king the *jurisdictio fori* and to have seriously undercut the significance of the *potestas poli* and the *potestas ordinis*."⁶¹

This thinking found its fruition in Henry VIII who lived in an age which saw national and ecclesiastical interests dominating the spiritual, even in the case of the head of the Papal States. Henry shared the Middle Ages concept that the spiritual power was supra-national and that its center was in the Pope, but Henry also shared with many the view that this spiritual power had been subjected by ecclesiastical and political interests. The papacy, in Henry's day, was entangled in international politics and often subject to the will of the Spanish Emperor or the French King.⁶² Henry could justify his control of ecclesiastical affairs not only on historic grounds, but in order

that the welfare of England might be served. An English ecclesiastical head conjoined with the English political head could work for the welfare of the English people. Thus Henry's nationalism influenced his attitude toward ecclesiastical affairs.

Professor Constant writes, "Henry, in the words of Chapuys, was Pope in England, but only from the point of view of jurisdiction. He never claimed Orders, which would have given him the right to administer the Sacraments . . . Henry, of his own authority, chose the channels through which spiritual benefits reach the soul, but never pretended to be one of these channels."⁶³ In another passage Constant says that a royal document issued "when the Act of Supremacy was being debated in Parliament expressly declared, in order to explain its scope, that by his title of Supreme Head of the Church the King had no intention of assuming any of the spiritual powers given by the Gospel to the ministers of religion. Henry VIII always denied all claim to this power."⁶⁴ From the outset of his reign Henry distinguished clearly between ecclesiastical and spiritual affairs.

Optatus had characterized the rule of Constantius by saying "the Church is in the Empire."⁶⁵ Ambrose of Milan voiced the Catholic reaction to this concept when he said, "The Emperor is in the Church."⁶⁶ The popes of the high Middle Ages modified Ambrose's concept to assert that the Empire is in the Church (e.g., Gregory VII, Innocent III, Boniface VIII).⁶⁷ Henry reverted to the Ambrosian concept, but modified it by distinguishing between affairs spiritual and affairs ecclesiastical. To Henry, the Emperor (King, Magistrate) is in the Church in spiritual matters. Henry also reverted to the concept expressed by Optatus, holding that the Church, in ecclesiastical affairs, is in the Empire, i.e., subject to the Magistrate.

The elements which justified Henry's kingship, especially his belief in the divine right and authority of the King, his nationalism, his knowledge and use of the historic rights of English sovereigns with reference to property, establishments and appointments—both secular and ecclesiastical, and the theological explanations of his kingship in its several aspects produced, in Henry, a theological concept of magistracy whereby he could manipulate and control the temporal affairs of Englishmen and the ecclesiastical affairs of the English Catholic Church.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Clifton Olmstead writes, "That complex and diversified phenomenon known as 'American Religion' is a product of the cultural heritage of Old Europe adapted and molded in the crucible of the American physical environment. The heritage is not only British but Eu-

ropean, even Asian, not only of the sixteenth and seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but of twenty-five hundred years."⁶⁸

The *Handbook of Denominations in the United States* simply begins to reveal the great variety of theologies and ecclesiastical polities in the United States.⁶⁹ The attitudes taken toward the State by the many religious groups are as varied as the number of groups and probably more so. Yet there is a widespread feeling among religious groups and among America's citizens that the United States is not only fair in its official attitude toward organized and unorganized religion, but is fundamentally sympathetic toward religion. A great majority of persons in public office are themselves religious to some degree. The "Church," using this word in its broadest context, senses a "personal" relationship with the State.

The first Amendment to the Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . ."⁷⁰ Somewhat earlier the Declaration of Independence spoke of a people assuming the powers to "which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them," and, while governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," the governed bear a relationship not only to one another but to "their Creator" and to the "laws of nature's God." Appeal was made to "the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions" and "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence" the signers, and those they represented, mutually pledged to each other their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor.⁷¹ The coinage of the United States affirms that "in God we trust," the pledge of allegiance declares the citizen's loyalty to the "one nation under God" and the Supreme Court asserted that this is "a Christian country."⁷² Oaths in court-rooms and for high public office are taken with hands on the Christian Bible. Most Church property is tax free and chaplains are paid by the government for service in a variety of places. Christian and Jewish chapels, together with their furnishings, are financed from public funds.⁷³ These and other features spell out a clearly sympathetic and encouraging attitude by the State toward religion, and especially toward the Christian and Jewish religions. Broadly speaking this is the picture which faced John F. Kennedy when he took the presidential oath of office, with his left hand resting on a Kennedy family Bible.

Unlike the Roman imperial office or the English kingly office which rested on inheritance or force or both, the United States presidential office is elective, resting on the choice of the electorate and their electors. Innumerable factors affect the choice of a President; the ability to garner political support and sufficient votes is curious-

ly complicated. The victorious Presidents, themselves, have not been able to identify all the factors which produced election victories. The victory of John F. Kennedy is no exception. This does not prevent us, however, from identifying some of the elements which have contributed to Mr. Kennedy's theological concept of magistracy.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the second son of Rose and Joseph P. Kennedy, was born in Boston, Massachusetts, into a Roman Catholic family of Irish lineage.⁷⁴ His grandfathers had struggled from low on the economic ladder to positions of modest wealth. Both had been politicians and the maternal grandfather, John F. Fitzgerald, was once mayor of Boston. A comparable rise in the social ladder brought both grandfathers into the class of "lace curtain" Irish. "But the acid test of respectability in East Boston," writes J. B. Burns, "was a man's standing in his church, and both politicians were devout and loyal members of their parishes."⁷⁵ John F. Fitzgerald, who lost a U. S. senatorial race to Henry Cabot Lodge in 1916, learned that to win state-wide office, one needed "the support of liberals and reformers. . . The Roman Catholic Church, frowning on many . . . reforms, helped cut the Irish off from Protestant reformers, and from the whole Western liberal heritage of civil liberty, tolerance, intellectual freedom, social equality, and philosophical rationalism and pragmatism."⁷⁶

The grandmothers shared the ambitions of their husbands with the result that the oldest son of Patrick Kennedy, Joseph Patrick Kennedy, was sent to Harvard with the class of 1912. Joseph's "popularity and athletic prowess," says Burns, "helped him get elected to the undergraduate societies Dicky, Delta Upsilon, and Hasty Pudding, but he never made the so-called best clubs. He revered some of the great teachers at Harvard—men like Bliss Perry and Charles Copeland—and felt flattered when 'Copey' dropped by his room and invited him to his famous readings."⁷⁷ Two years after graduation Joseph married Rose Fitzgerald. Joseph liked sports, politics, and literature but decided that money could help him get what he wanted—faster. The story of his accumulation of great wealth, of his service to the federal government in curbing stock market abuses, and of his ambassadorship to the Court of St. James is amazing. Joseph P. Kennedy has remained loyal to the Roman Catholic Church and his personal friendship with high ranking prelates, including Cardinal Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII, evidences this. Amidst all this outward success he was often annoyed because people labeled him an Irishman. He is reported to have said, "I was born here. My children were born here. What . . . do I have to do to be an American?"⁷⁸

Several elements are evident in this biographical material. The Patrick Kennedys and the John Fitzgeralds wanted to rise above the

“shanty Irish” status. Politics and business success were the means chosen to accomplish this rise. Loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church aided political success in Boston and preserved the ties with the past when national and cultural ties had been severed. Social and political success outside Boston, however, called for wider horizons socially, politically, and religiously, a broader concern for social reforms, an appreciation of the Puritan heritage. Americanization, in Boston, meant closer ties with the old line “Yankees” and this involved schooling at Puritan-founded Harvard. With Joseph P. Kennedy the process of achieving social and cultural success was not only accelerated but has been markedly successful. The acquisition of an “American Heritage” has meant the increasing appreciation of Harvardian and, indirectly, Puritan concepts.⁷⁹

All of this John Fitzgerald Kennedy inherited. His own life has evidenced a unique fruition to the quest of his parents and grandparents. Though raised in a loyal and devout Catholic home, he was sent with the exception of part of one year to non-Catholic public and private schools and to Harvard College. He says he never experienced in his schooling any unpleasant episodes due to his religion. Elected as a Harvard overseer and recipient of an honorary degree from Harvard,⁸⁰ he has consistently supported the freedom of conscience for which Harvard is famous.

Some illustrations of Mr. Kennedy’s views on religion and the issue of the separation of Church and State will set the stage for an analysis of his theological concept of magistracy. When he became, in 1956, a strong possibility for the presidential nomination his religion became a key political issue. Many Americans believed that the “American way,” says Burns, “turned on the maintenance of an open, free and mixed society, on the maintenance, in short, of pluralism.”⁸¹ The question was, “what did Senator Kennedy believe?” Let his own words testify for him.

“I have always been impressed in my study of American history by the fact that this country has been singularly blessed in its ability to take the best of all religions and cultures—not merely tolerating differences but building a new and richer life upon them. I firmly believe that our religious and cultural pluralism has been over the years one of our principal sources of strength. . . .”⁸²

“. . . it is my firm belief that there should be separation of church and state as we understand it in the United States—that is, that both church and state should be free to operate, without interference from each other, in their respective areas of jurisdiction.”⁸³

“The Pope speaks as the head of the Catholic Church. My faith is a personal matter . . . it is impossible that my obligation as one

sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution could be changed in any manner by anything the Pope had to say or do. What Church I go to on Sunday, what dogma of the Catholic church I believe is my business, and whatever faith any other American has is his business.”⁸⁴

“Whatever one’s religion in his private life may be, for the office holder nothing takes precedence over his oath to uphold the Constitution and all its parts—including the First Amendment and the strict separation of church and state. . . .”⁸⁵

“. . . when any man . . . takes the oath of office of President . . . he puts his hand on the Bible and raises his other hand to God. . . . And if he breaks his oath, he is not only committing a crime against the Constitution, . . . he is committing a sin against God.”⁸⁶

“. . . what kind of a church I believe in . . . should be important only to me. . . .

“I believe in an America . . . where no Catholic prelate would tell the President, should he be a Catholic, how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote—where no church or church school is granted any public funds or political preference. . .

“I believe in an America that is officially neither Catholic, Protestant or Jewish . . . where religious liberty is so indivisible that an act against one church is treated as an act against all.

“. . . I believe, in an America where religious intolerance will someday end . . . where Catholics, Protestants and Jews . . . will . . . promote instead the American ideal of brotherhood.

“. . . judge me on the basis of my fourteen years in the Congress—on my declared stands against an ambassador to the Vatican, against unconstitutional aid to parochial schools, . . . do not judge me on the basis of . . . statements of Catholic Church leaders, usually in other countries, frequently in other centuries and rarely relevant to any situation here. . . .

“Whatever issue may come before me as President . . . on birth control, divorce, censorship, gambling, or any other subject—I will make my decision . . . in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be in the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates.”⁸⁷

“. . . as I do not accept the right of an . . . ecclesiastical official, to tell me what I shall do in the sphere of my public responsibility as an elected official, I do not also propose to ask Cardinal Cushing to ask the Vatican to take some action.

“. . . the view point I have expressed tonight . . . represents the opinion of the overwhelming majority of American Catholics . . . and I believe I stated it in the tradition of the American Catholics, away back all the way to Bishop John Carroll. . . . This is the position I take

with the American Catholic Church in the United States, with which I am associated.”⁸⁸

Mr. Kennedy’s inaugural address, which, interestingly, is the only presidential inaugural address to include a specific reference in its introduction to the “reverend clergy,” is not more religious than many other inaugural addresses. It has, however, some significant phrases pertinent to the present study. “For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago . . . the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God. We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that . . . revolution. . . . With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly be our own.”⁸⁹

The Gelasian concept of the two powers, located separately *in mundo* is recovered in John F. Kennedy. So also is the Ambrosian maxim that the Emperor is in the Church. So also is the Pauline concept of Romans 13: 1,2, but not as Constantius or Henry VIII interpreted these verses; there is no sense of divine right magistracy. There is, however, not only a belief that the magisterial authority derives from God, but a genuinely Christian conception that the temporal affairs of men are a concern of God and that a magistrate of a Christian or a Judaeo-Christian nation must be about his Father’s business. In this sense there is a recovery of the *Christus* image in the magistrate by virtue of inspiration and calling. There is no anointing aspect to the inauguration ceremonial, no priestly or Melchizedekian aspect and no Royal magistracy.

Perhaps all of this could be said of any President of the United States, yet John F. Kennedy has clearly distinguished between his responsibility as federal office holder (Congress and the Presidency) and as private citizen. His oath as President is sacred and obligates him to uphold the Constitution even at the possible expense of violation of the wishes of his Church. He would only feel obliged to resign from the presidential office if it violated his conscience, a situation which he thinks is virtually impossible. Nevertheless, there is, here, a distinction, not between ecclesiastical and spiritual affairs, but between public affairs and private conscience, with the latter taking precedence.

This liberty of conscience is a product of Puritan and Harvardian thought. Such thought is rooted in Calvin’s triadic concept of society. According to this concept, Christian society is a reflection of Christ’s three offices of Prophet, Priest, and King, with the equation being:

Prophet-University, Priest-Church, King-State. As each office of Christ is autonomous, one not superior to another and all three cooperating, so the University, the Church and the State are autonomous, equal in dignity and cooperating.⁹⁰

The dual concept of society, Church, and State, reflecting the spiritual and the temporal as under Constantius, or reflecting the two natures of Christ, divine and human, as under Henry VIII is still very much in evidence in America and elsewhere. But the triadic concept is uniquely evident in New England Puritan and Harvardian thought and provides the firmest basis for the autonomy of the University.

When Senator McCarthy held hearings in Boston and endeavored to pressurize Harvard University to conform to his views of Americanism, President Nathan Marsh Pusey resisted, falling back on the triadic concept and the autonomy of the University in our (Christian) society. John F. Kennedy supported President Pusey. Mr. Kennedy's federal aid to education proposals have been accompanied by assurances that the federal government will not dictate policies of colleges to which it gives financial aid.⁹¹ As a senator Mr. Kennedy opposed the disclaimer affidavits required of college students who participated in federal loans for education.⁹²

At the same time that Mr. Kennedy supports liberty of conscience and the autonomy of the University he supports cooperation among University, Church and State. University and Church do and should receive aid from the State and, at the same time, render aid and service to the State.⁹³

Whereas the *laos* gradually merged with the *demos* in the late fourth and fifth centuries,⁹⁴ and from the eighth through the seventeenth centuries, in Europe, was almost identical with the *demos*, the period from the Enlightenment onwards has seen a gradual separation of the *laos* from the *demos*. John F. Kennedy not only recognizes this separation but also the voluntary aspect of this separation and upholds the voluntariness. Moreover, the Magistrate is elected by the will of the *demos* to carry on God's work on earth.

The elements which form his theological concept of magistracy include (1) liberty of conscience, (2) a triadic concept of society, which he reflects but does not spell out specifically, (3) a firm belief in the value of the separation of Church and State, (4) a revival of Gelasian thought, (5) a reassertion of the Ambrosian maxim, (6) a private, voluntary loyalty to his Church, and (7) a Christian conviction that the affairs of men are the concern of God, that in carrying out his public duties he is being about the Father's business, and thus is a reflection of the *Christus*.

John F. Kennedy may be styled a Reformation bred American Catholic, which is close to the description he uses of himself when he refers to "the American Catholic Church in the United States, with which I am associated."⁹⁵ His New England Puritan and Harvardian heritage and his own sense of having an American heritage rooted in the religious strands which contributed to this American heritage have produced a theological concept of magistracy which may be described as Lay state separatism of the American type.⁹⁶ This is evidenced in his own historic evaluation of his position just prior to taking the oath of office as President of the United States. To the Massachusetts State Legislature he said, on January 9, 1961:

"But I am not come here to bid farewell to Massachusetts. For forty-three years, whether I was in London, Washington, the South Pacific or elsewhere, this has been my home; and, God willing, wherever I serve, it will always remain my home.

"It was here my grandparents were born; it is here I hope my grandchildren will be born.

". . . the common threads woven by the Pilgrim and the Puritan, . . . the Yankee and the immigrant—will not be and could not be forgotten in the Nation's Executive Mansion. They are an indelible part of my life, my convictions, my view of the past, my hopes for the future. . . .

". . . I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set . . . on the flagship *Arbella* 331 years ago, . . . 'We must always consider,' he said, 'that we shall be as a city upon a hill—the eyes of all people are upon us.'

"Courage, judgment, integrity, dedication—these are the historic qualities of the Bay Colony and the Bay State. . . . And these are the historic qualities which, with God's help, this son of Massachusetts hopes will characterize our government's conduct in the four stormy years that lie ahead. Humbly I ask His help in this undertaking; but aware that on earth His will is worked by men, I ask your help and your prayers as I embark on this new and solemn journey."⁹⁷

In sum we can say that Constantius believed he was the *vox dei* to the people in both temporal and spiritual matters. Henry VIII believed he was the *vox christi* to the people in temporal and ecclesiastical matters. John F. Kennedy believes he is the *vox populi* to the people in temporal matters alone.

Constantius' theology was, to most Christians of his day, heterodox or heretical. Henry VIII's theology was orthodox or catholic, even in the eyes of the Pope, though Henry's ecclesiology was heretical. John F. Kennedy's theology is catholic, in keeping with the pronouncements of the American Catholic bishops, and it is private so that it is beyond public assessment.

It is evident that a magistrate's theological concept of magistracy has depended to a great extent upon his personal religious beliefs. It is further evident that a magistrate's theological concept of magistracy has had a significant effect upon Church-State relations, upon

Christian doctrine—particularly ecclesiastical, upon the citizen's and/or the Christian's attitude toward the Church and the State and upon the strength of the Church's spiritual program.

Two questions remain: (1) is a magistrate's theological concept of magistracy more dependent upon his concern for the temporal sphere or for the spiritual sphere? (2) does a magistrate's theological concept of magistracy depend upon the existing theology and the vulnerability of the Church to the temporal manipulation?

1. Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiae*, I, 8.
2. Eusebius, *Vita Constantini*, III, 23; Athanasius, *Historia Arianorum*, 4-7.
3. Socrates, *Hist. Ec.*, I, 23.
4. Eusebius, *Vita Const.*, I, 28.
5. Cf. Hans Lietzmann, *From Constantine to Julian*, trans. by B. L. Woolf (N. Y., 1950), caps. 3, 4; A. H. M. Jones, *Constantine and the Conversion of Europe* (London, 1948).
6. H. Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-183, 211; *Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. I, ed. H. M. Gwatkin, J. P. Whitney (N. Y., 1911), 55-59.
7. Otto Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergang d. ant. Welt* (Berlin, 1897-1920), 4, 393f.; H. Schiller, *Geschichte des römischen kaiserreichs* (Berlin, 1872), 2, 245-249, *Ammianus Marcellinus*, 21, 16., H. Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 183f.
8. Glanville Downey, "Theory of Monarchy," a lecture given at a seminar at Harvard University, Feb. 16, 1951.
9. K. M. Setton, *Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century* (N. Y., 1941), p. 25, n. 28.
10. A. D. Nock, "The Emperor's Divine Comes," *Journal of Roman Studies*, 37 (1947), 102-116.
11. G. Downey, *op. cit.*
12. A. H. M. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-258.
13. W. Walker, *A History of the Christian Church*, rev. ed. (N. Y., 1959), pp. 109.
14. G. H. Williams, "Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century," *Church History*, XX, No. 3, pp. 3-26.
15. Socrates, *Hist. Ec.*, I, 5.
16. H. Chadwick, "The Silence of Bishops in Ignatius," *Harvard Theological Review*, XLIII (1950) No. 2.
17. Ignatius, *Eph.*, intro., XVIII; Rom. III; Smyr. I; Mag. I, VI.
18. Williams, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 21-25.
19. Cf. Socrates, *Hist. Ec.*, II, 16, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 37, C. J. Speel, *An Inquiry Into Communal Authority in the Ancient Church, With Particular Emphasis Upon the Laity*, Ph. D. Thesis, Harvard Univ., 1955, ch. VI.
20. J. Lecler, *The Two Sovereignties* (N.Y., 1952), esp. ch. VI; Williams, *op. cit.*; Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, ch. 8.
21. A. F. Pollard, *Henry VIII* (London, 1913), pp. 326-328.
22. Joseph Lecler, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
23. G. Constant. *The Reformation in England, I, The English Schism, Henry VIII (1509-1547)*, trans. by R. E. Scantlebury (N. Y., 1940), 123; E. H. Kantorowicz, *The Kings Two Bodies* (Princeton, 1957) pp. 43-48; G. H. Williams, *The Norman Anonymous of 1100 A. D.* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).
24. Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
25. Williams, *Norman Anonymous*.
26. Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*
27. Lecler, *op. cit.*
28. Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 59ff.
29. Socrates, *Hist. Ec.*, I, XXXIX; II, XLVII; Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 136, 235.
30. Williams, "Christology," p. 3.; Athanasius, *Historia Arianorum*, p. 33.
31. Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
32. M. W. Patterson, *A History of the Church of England* (N. Y., 1909), pp. 206, 207.
33. J. S. Brewer, ed. *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII*, vol II, part I (London, 1864); J. Gairdner, *The English Church* (London, 1902), pp. 43-47; Charles Knight, *History of England*, vol. II (London, 1893), 278.
34. Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
35. Pollard, *op. cit.*, chs. I, II; G. B. Adams and H. M. Stephens, *Select Documents of English Constitutional History* (N. Y., 1904), documents 134-137; J. D. Mackie, *The Early Tudors* (London, 1952). ch. III.
36. Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 13.
37. J. Michelet, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1879), p. 301; cited by Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
38. Cited by Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 35f.
39. Cf. Pollard, *op. cit.*, ch. X; Mackie, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-351, 363; Adams and Stephens, *op. cit.*, documents 144-155.

40. Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV, 5774.
41. G. Constant, *The Reformation in England*, I (N. Y., 1934), 33f.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
43. *Statutes of the Realm*, 22 Henry VIII, ch. XVI, ch. XVI, pp. 335f.; D. Wilkins, *Concilia Magna Britannica* (London, 1737), III, 724-726.
44. H. C. Wakeman, *An Introduction to the History of the Church of England*, (London, 1927), p. 206.
45. Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 326f.
46. Adams and Stephens, *op. cit.*, document 71.
47. *Ibid.*, document 50.
48. *Ibid.*, document 98.
49. *Ibid.*, documents 145, 146.
50. Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 326f.
51. Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
52. Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 13 and esp. note 13.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 12, note 9.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 15f. and 193f.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
59. *The Norman Anonymous*, MGH, LdL., 665, 2f.; Williams, *Norman Anonymous*, pp. 163f.; Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
60. Williams, *Norman Anonymous*, pp. 188f.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 188, note 638.
62. Cf. G. Constant, *Reformation in England; Henry VIII* (London, 1936); J. D. Mackie, *Early Tudors* (Oxford, 1952); Pollard, *op. cit.*, chs. IV, VIII.
63. Constant, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Optatus, *Against Parmenian The Donatist*, Bk. III, Eng. trans. by O. R. Vassall-Phillips (London, 1917), cited by G. H. Williams, "Christology," note 31.
66. Cf. Williams, "Christology," p. 9 and note 31.
67. Cf. W. Walker, *A History of the Christian Church*, rev. ed. (N. Y., 1959) pp. 172f., 258f., 261f.; H. Bettenson, *Documents of the Christian Church* (London, 1947), pp. 157-163.
68. C. E. Olmstead, *History of Religion in United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1960), p. 1.
69. F. S. Mead, *Handbook of Denominations in the United States* (N. Y., 1961).
70. *The Constitution of the United States of America*, E. S. Corwin, ed. (U. S. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1953), p. 757.
71. *Declaration of Independance*. A unique edition, in ten languages, is edited by J. D. Hollo (N. Y., 1955).
72. "Ours is a Christian country, but Christianity is not established by law, and the genius of our institution requires that the church and state should be kept separate." Melvin V. Easley, 52 N. C. 356, 360. See also *State v. Hallock*, 16 New. 373, 374. Vidal v. Girard, 43 U. S. (2How.) 198, ILL. Ed. 205. Mohney v. Cook, 26 Pa. (2 cases) 342, 347, 67 Am. Dec. 419; *Words and Phrases*, Permanent Edition, 1658 to date vol. 7 (St. Paul, Minn., 1952), 186f. See also W. A. Blakely, edit., *American State Papers*, 4th rev. edit. (Washington, 1949), p. 558f., case of "The Church of the Holy Trinity v. the United States."
73. Chapels at military posts are examples.
74. J. M. Burns, *John Kennedy: A Political Profile* (N. Y., 1959), ch. 1.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
78. F. Knebel, "John F. Kennedy," quoting John Fenton in the *New York Times*, in E. Severeid, ed., *Candidates 1960* (N. Y., 1959), p. 191.
79. T. H. White, *The Making of the President* (N. Y., 1961), p. 246.
80. Burns, *op. cit.*, pp. 183, 222; Knebel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 181f.
81. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
83. *Ibid.*
84. Statement made to Martin Agronsky, N.B.C., Interview, December, 1957, in Burns, *op. cit.* pp. 230f.
85. F. Knebel, "Democratic Forecast: A Catholic in 1960," *Look*, Mar. 3, 1959, p. 17.
86. From a W. Virginia telecast, quoted by T. H. White, *op. cit.*, pp. 107f.
87. Statement made Sept. 12, 1960, in Houston, Texas; *U. S. News and World Report*, pp. 49; 74-78; Sept. 26, 1960.
88. *Ibid.*, answer given to a question.
89. John W. Gardner, editor, *To Turn the Tide* (N. Y., 1962), pp. 6f.
90. Cf. G. H. Williams, "Church, Commonwealth, and College," in *The Harvard Divinity School, Its Place In Harvard University and in American Culture*, G. H. W., ed. (Boston, 1954), pp. 295f.
91. F. Knebel, *op. cit.*; Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
92. *Congressional Digest*, 39; 111-115, April, 1960. Address made June 29, 1959.
93. Burns, *op. cit.*, pp. 226f. J. F. Kennedy's address at the University of Notre Dame.
94. G. H. Williams, "Christology and Church-State Relations in the IV Century," *Church History*, XX, Dec. 4, 1951, 11f.
95. *Vide supra*, note 88.
96. Lecler, *op. cit.*, ch. VIII.
97. Gardner, *op. cit.*, pp. 3f.