

useful supplement to Boss's book in this area. Her conclusion is that dozens of key words (and hence, concepts) of science were stabilized in the Russian language *before* Lomonosov. She shows, for example, that the Newtonian idea of "gravity" was familiar in Russian, and the terminology to describe it was surprisingly widespread and uniform, before 1740. Her conclusions contradict Boss's more traditional comments on this subject in his appendix, "Gravitation and Language."

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THE THREE EMPRESSES: CATHERINE I, ANNE AND ELIZABETH OF RUSSIA. By *Philip Longworth*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. xi, 242 pp. \$7.95.

Popular history can perform a valid function for both the specialist and the generalist. To the available published sources, mostly secondary, the author brings scholarly judgment, producing a work whose justification lies not in its originality but in the synthesis it offers those who choose not to pursue the topic further.

Longworth has enjoyed success with previous ventures into this genre: his Suvorov biography put to excellent use recently published materials, and his Cossack survey provided a convenient if controversial overview of a complex subject. In both instances the themes were manageable, the sources abundant and of reasonably high quality. Lacking similar advantages in the present study, Longworth compensates by relying on superficial diplomatic and travel accounts to present three essays of roughly equal length describing Catherine I, Anne, and Elizabeth—"a sot, a sadist, and a nymphomaniac" (to cite the introduction). Exposed to this framework—so frequently reserved for the fourth empress, Catherine II—the unsuspecting reader will logically assume that Russia sank to the depths of degradation in the post-Petrine era, and lose sight of its economic and military achievements. The reader may find the end product entertaining; he will not, however, find it particularly enlightening.

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ENDURANCE AND ENDEAVOUR: RUSSIAN HISTORY, 1812–1971. By *J. N. Westwood*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1973. viii, 472 pp. \$16.00.

This is a systematic historical account, stretching from 1812 to the period of "Stalin's Heirs." It is a solid but uninspired narrative of the important events, issues, and facts of 159 years of Russia's history. The author's purpose, however, is somewhat difficult to grasp. If it was to prepare a college textbook for use in this country, he must be criticized for failing to employ the pedagogically useful devices of numerous subheadings, charts, and photographs. If he intended to provide a survey of the latest scholarly knowledge in the field, presenting new insights and syntheses, it must be said that he falls short of the mark.

Both the style of writing and the manner of analysis are disturbing to this reviewer. Although the facts are accurate, the genteel style makes all people and

events seem moderate and calm. Nicholas I was a dutiful and sincere man; the February Revolution of 1917 is presented as a painless, orderly, and dull series of events; and the Bolshevik seizure of power, October 24–26, is detailed in a single paragraph. This stylistic blandness carries over into Professor Westwood's interpretation of events. One seeks for penetrating analyses of the significance of the events described, but in vain, for the stolid descriptions glide over the surface, revealing little awareness on the part of the author of the profound depths beneath.

A case in point is the following typical paragraph, which is all the author has to say about the quality of Russian soldiers and the impact of the Soviet presence in Eastern and Central Europe in 1944–45: "The common soldier tended to be of great endurance and stolidity. Individuals at times of isolation often demonstrated a certain cunning and initiative but on the whole the soldiers fought bravely and intelligently only when well-led. In the final stages of the war, when the Red Army advanced into Europe, tales were spread of how Russian soldiers relieved the local population of their watches, and how no female between 8 and 80 was safe. But if, after four years fighting a barbarous enemy, the Red soldier could be accused of nothing worse than rape and watchstealing, then he was a relatively benevolent conqueror" (p. 343).

For this reviewer, Russia's history is a matter of hope and passion, desperate struggle to solve insoluble problems, and tragedy. Here all these are obscured by a genteel style and superficial analysis.

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THE EUROPEAN PENTARCHY AND THE CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822. By *Irby C. Nichols, Jr.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. xiii, 363 pp. 49.50 Dglds., paper.

In this first book-length monograph on the Congress of Verona, Professor Nichols has devoted about a fifth of his space to the genesis of the congress (February 1821 to October 1822), some two hundred pages to the congress, and another fifth to the problems in historiography and interpretation. His focus throughout is on British diplomacy, and the bulk of his research is based on British and French archives; he did not consult the governmental archives of Vienna, Berlin, or Leningrad.

The tsar and diplomats at Verona debated questions of the slave trade, Black Sea commerce, Latin American independence movements, the Russian boundaries in the Western hemisphere, and—most urgently—the current revolts in Spain, Italy, and Greece. Nichols handles this complex narrative with clarity, wit, and control, but one wishes for the probings of the statesmen's political conceptions which were shown, for example, in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted's *Foreign Ministers of Alexander I*, a work which was not consulted.

Nichols's principal thesis, though not new, is well demonstrated: Chateaubriand boasted that the French expedition of 1823 was his war, not the Alliance's; and so it was, despite the wishes of Austria, Prussia, Britain, and even Villèle, the French premier.

For Slavists, the book suffers from an antiquated view of Russian diplomacy and the tsar's character. Nichols notes that one of the "prominent myths of modern Russia" is that Alexander I plotted hostilities against the Turks after the Greek