Central Asia. The unofficial trade after the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 turns out to have been larger than the official trade. The Dzhungars and Khalkhas played a more significant role in Sino-Russian relations than earlier writers have assigned to them; they had much to do with the course of events culminating in the settlement of 1689. Aleksandrov sees the mission of Spafarii-Milescu to Pekin in 1675–76 not as a failure but as a useful effort serving to alert and inform Russian and Manchu alike concerning the intentions and determination of the other. Golovin, the Russian representative at Nerchinsk, had military authority to defend Nerchinsk and Albazin, not just plenipotentiary diplomatic power. The settlement at Nerchinsk negotiated by him had its positive side for Russia: the ambiguities of the territorial delimitation opened the way to future negotiations on the Sino-Russian boundary; and by retaining Trans-Baikalia, even though losing Cis-Amuria, the Russians checked Manchu expansion into eastern Siberia.

This able work is flawed somewhat by its ex parte pleading, stemming from a desire to reaffirm the Soviet Union's historical claim to the left bank of the Amur. Thus the Russian conquest of eastern Siberia is characterized as annexation and peaceful settlement, producing progressive economic development and benefits for the natives. (Would Aleksandrov so characterize the European presence in the New World?) The Manchu dynasty is presented as having no jurisdiction over Trans-Baikalia or Cis-Amuria; it only raided these regions and did not develop them. Its policy, unlike that of the Russians, was aggressive, and at Nerchinsk it carried out military blackmail. Its actions constituted aggrandizement, not the preservation of a long-standing empire. Nor does Aleksandrov appreciate the threat in the minds of the Manchus posed by the presence of the Russians on the Amur. He seems unwilling to admit that the Sino-Russian conflict grew out of a collision of *two* imperialisms, and not to have grasped the difficulties of adjusting to each other that were felt by the representatives of two different international systems—China with its tributary states and Russia as one of several equals in the European state system.

There is no bibliography or index.

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THE RUSSIAN SECRET POLICE: MUSCOVITE, IMPERIAL RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLITICAL SECURITY OPERATIONS. By *Ronald Hingley*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. xiii, 313 pp. $7.50.

Oxford's distinguished Chekhov scholar here makes the most extensive of his several forays into the writing of popular history. *The Russian Secret Police* does not purport to add to research, but it represents a brisk and well-organized summation of a wide body of secondary material in Russian and other languages. Hingley writes succinctly, and his descriptions are enlivened by a gift for wry insight. Who else has noted that the pages substituted for the Beria biography in *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* include a photograph of "two dead whales and several dead walruses on an ice flow"? The book deserves a good reception from the general reader of Russian history, for whom it was presumably intended.

The question of continuity between tsarist and Soviet Russia underlies the whole book. Almost half of it is devoted to the pre-October period, and the conclusion reconsiders the question of continuity in retrospect. Hingley sensibly notes

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that one of the links between the old and new political police is the lessons that Lenin and Dzerzhinsky, as experienced quarries of the Okhrana, passed on to the Cheka. On a broader scale of analysis, however, Hingley is less persuasive, citing the old explanation of Russian autocracy as a reaction to the size and diversity of the empire. But through several centuries the use of the secret police against the Great Russian core of the population has greatly outweighed its application to national minorities or in Siberian Russian life. Hingley's own narrative seems to sustain the conclusion that this institution was developed at the center as a reaction to problems right there, such as the Decembrist uprising, and was only later extended in any strength to the periphery.

The problem is complicated because Hingley is far from wishing to assert that the continuity of police repression is fairly steady over the past hundred years. He is sharply anti-Communist, and is at pains to show how much more limited, and often humane, tsarist political police action was, compared to Soviet. He sees the Russian Revolution as a basic interruption of historical continuity, and the zest and penetration of the book increases appreciably after this point. The problem of Russian continuity and Soviet peculiarity remains far from settled at the end.

If *The Russian Secret Police* is stronger on narrative than analysis, the chief events associated with this institution are well told: the Third Section against the intellectuals, the struggle with the *narodnik* terrorists, the careers of Zubatov, Azef, and Malinovsky, the rise of the Cheka, the Great Purges, the fate of Beria, and finally the repression of the contemporary intellectuals. Hingley has read the secondary literature judiciously, but one may differ with him on this or that point. Has he given enough attention to recent Soviet research, based on newly discovered archival materials, concerning the assassination of Stolypin? Is it really clear that the Seventeenth Party Congress demoted Stalin from command of the secretariat? Can we accept without query Orlov's lurid account of K. V. Pauker's re-enactment of the execution of Zinoviev? Does not Svetlana Alliluyeva's reference to her father's anxiety when she was once alone with Beria support the rumors (evidently unknown to her) that the police chief indulged a Lolita complex? Hingley's suggestion that Stalin was worried about a political plot using Svetlana as a hostage seems farfetched. In citing the glorification of the Cheka and Dzerzhinsky on the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution, Hingley seems unaware that this process had started on a large scale in the early sixties, evidently to counteract "unhealthy" interpretations of the anti-Stalin campaign.

Opinions are bound to differ about many problems in the history of such a covert institution. Taken as a whole, this is a competent account and a welcome addition to the growing list of surveys of selected themes in Russian history.

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THE CHURCH REFORM OF PETER THE GREAT. By *James Cracraft.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971. xii, 336 pp. $13.50.

This work traces Peter the Great's ecclesiastical reforms from their inception at the close of the seventeenth century to the end of his reign in 1725. Biographical sketches of Peter and Feofan Prokopovich draw attention to their place within

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