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doi:10.1017/S0017383522000055

## ‘STEALING’ VICTORY AT GAUGAMELA: THE MANIPULATION OF TIME IN ARRIAN’S NARRATIVE\*

There are numerous historical reconstructions of the lead-up to the Battle of Gaugamela, albeit often as a short prelude to the battle itself. The focus tends to be historical reality, with the extant sources blended to produce a probable sequence of events. Such narratives have their place, but the process masks the details provided by specific sources. This article analyses Arrian’s representation of events to understand his narrative better. Particular attention is paid to his chronological ‘mistake’, specifically the loss of a day which is usually just corrected by commentators. I suggest that this was not an error at all, but a deliberate construct. I show that Arrian manipulates ‘narrative time’ by using the night in order to blur historical time, and how this creates a framework within which Arrian carefully constructs his Alexander–Parmenio exchanges. The construct of the adviser, the use of night imagery, and the select use of terminology (*kleptein*) are utilized by Arrian in order to maintain his heroic image of Alexander and to conceal any strategies of deception.

**Keywords:** Alexander, Arrian, *Anabasis*, Parmenio, Gaugamela, night battles, narrative time, chronology

It does not come as a surprise that descriptions, discussions, and analyses of Alexander’s actions at Gaugamela abound. Most focus on the order of battle, the tactics, and how Alexander managed to defeat Darius against the odds. Less attention is given to the lead-up to the battle, at least as a subject worthy of analysis in its own right. What

\* Select parts of this article were presented at the Australasian Society for Classical Studies (ASCS) Conference, held at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 28–31 January 2020. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers and my colleague, Assoc. Prof. Victor Parker, for their advice and comments. Of course, any mistakes remain my responsibility.

we tend to have are summary descriptions, followed by the battle analysis and/or an assessment of the source material, all in order to justify a particular reconstruction of the battle. Certainly, such discussions have their place, but there is more to be done, especially with regard to literary themes and narrative construction.<sup>1</sup> In this article my focus is on Arrian's account of the ten or eleven days between Alexander's crossing of the Tigris River and the Battle of Gaugamela.<sup>2</sup> I will concentrate on his presentation of the material, not in order to provide a reconstruction of the historical events (although some historical analysis and source comparison will still be necessary), but in order to identify Arrian's literary techniques. In this context, any historical analysis will be incidental to my exploration of the literary themes.

Let us begin with what Arrian presents.<sup>3</sup> We are informed that, four days after crossing the Tigris, Alexander learns the location of the Persian army from some captured scouts. He immediately calls a halt for four days. With a well-rested army, he sets out at night, advancing towards Darius' position, the plan being to attack at dawn. At a distance of some 60 stades Alexander begins to fan his army out into battle formation. Darius is still unsighted, but as Alexander comes over the crest of a hill he sees Darius' forces. The sight gives him pause; he orders a halt and summons his commanders for a council. Most of his officers want to attack immediately as planned, but Parmenio is more circumspect, arguing that they should stop and scout ahead for hidden obstacles. Alexander agrees with Parmenio, and tells his army to rest while he inspects the terrain. Upon his return he summons his commanders to another council, where he gives a short speech and orders further rest before they advance to battle. What occurs next is of special interest. Arrian records that, when Alexander withdraws, Parmenio goes to him and suggests that they should undertake a night attack. Alexander retorts that he will not steal a victory, and that Darius' defeat must be open and without stratagem. Meanwhile Darius, expecting Alexander to attack, keeps his army standing to all

<sup>1</sup> For reconstructions of the battle, see, e.g., A. M. Devine, 'The Battle of Gaugamela: A Tactical and Source-Critical Study', *AncW* 13 (1986), 87–115; G. T. Griffith, 'Alexander's Generalship at Gaugamela', *JHS* 67 (1947), 77–89; A. R. Burn, 'Notes on Alexander's Campaigns, 332–330', *JHS* 72 (1952), 81–91; J. F. C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London, 1960); E. W. Marsden, *The Campaign of Gaugamela* (Liverpool, 1964); N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great. King, Commander and Statesman* (London, 1981), 137–48; A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* (Cambridge, 1988), 74–85.

<sup>2</sup> Beginning at Arr. *Anab.* 3.7.5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.7.5–3.11.2.

night. The attack, however, comes when Alexander is ready the next day, or perhaps the day after – Arrian is (deliberately) vague at this point.

My interest in this narrative is with what Arrian chooses to include (and omit), and the literary tools used. The characterization of Parmenio and his role as a wise adviser, as well as Arrian's use of an authorial voice, are important components in this discussion, as will become clear. It is, however, the chronological framework within which all these actors and events are represented that needs more immediate attention. The chronology is fundamental to Arrian's narrative, anchoring the actors and events as we move towards the battle. Yet it is readily apparent that Arrian's narrative time diverges from real time. It appears that he makes his chronology imprecise, in part by strongly emphasizing the night, and events at night, with the effect that a full day is lost from his account.

### **Arrian's blurring of time**

The lead-up to as well as the date of the Battle of Gaugamela are anchored by an eclipse of the moon on 20 September 331 BCE. Plutarch records that Alexander defeated Darius eleven days after the eclipse, and Babylonian sources confirm 1 October 331 BCE as the date of the battle.<sup>4</sup> Arrian, too, notes the eclipse, and then works through a chronology that demonstrates he had access to a detailed account of events. This should not surprise. Arrian's record is what Hidber labels a 'march narrative'. We chronologically follow Alexander on his expedition, the passage of time punctuated by a series of stops, marches, and battles.<sup>5</sup> Key events, such as Gaugamela, tend to be anchored quite precisely, and to be fair Arrian does not disappoint. The eclipse is mentioned; thereafter four days' march, contact with Darius' scouts, and four days' rest at a base camp are all specifically detailed. We are also given a time for the army's departure from base

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 31.8, and *Cam.* 19.5. See E. Badian, 'Agis III: Revisions and Reflections', in *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great* (Abingdon, 2012), 338–64, esp. 350–1 and n. 38. The Babylonian texts referred to are in A. J. Sachs (ed.), *Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia. Vol. 1: Diaries from 652 BC to 262 BC*, completed and edited H. Hunger (Vienna, 1988), 176 ff., esp. p. 179. All dates are BCE unless specified otherwise.

<sup>5</sup> T. Hidber, 'Arrian', in I. J. F. de Jong and R. Nünlist (eds.) *Time in Ancient Greek Literature* (Leiden, 2007), 185.

camp (the second watch), and a location, or a point, when Alexander moved into battle array (60 stades from Darius' army). The inclusion of these details indicate that the intended dawn attack had been carefully planned, with timing a key consideration. This shows that Arrian had access to a source with precise information, and he clearly made use of it – up to a point.

The problem with Arrian's narrative is that there is a day missing between the eclipse and the battle itself. The eight days immediately following the eclipse are accounted for, bringing us to 29 September. Arrian then has Alexander set out that night in order to attack Darius at dawn the next day, which would be 30 September. However, we know that the battle occurred on 1 October, meaning that there is a full day missing. For most reconstructions this chronological anomaly is inconsequential, and solutions are suggested that 'correct' Arrian's historical account.<sup>6</sup> None of this, however, helps us. A more pertinent question is why Arrian presents events as he does. In particular, why does he lose chronological precision in the days immediately before the attack, specifically from the point of the night advance to the battle itself?<sup>7</sup> Considering that he almost certainly has the actual chronological details, it appears probable that he is deliberately obscuring time at this point in his narrative.

This is not just idle speculation. The development of a 'narrative time' that obscures 'real time' is a way for Arrian to influence the reader's focus and to make additional observations, even if it is done indirectly. Consider how he juxtaposes time with space, or more specifically location, in order to add another dimension to his historical reconstruction. Darius, we learn, had chosen the location of the battle, a wide open plain that he further levelled to give his forces maximum advantage.<sup>8</sup> The mistakes at Issus were not going to be repeated. With this choice made, Alexander can only control *when* the battle will occur, and this variable is used to best advantage.<sup>9</sup> Arrian, we can see, plays

<sup>6</sup> Brunt adds a day for sacrifices after the eclipse, while other commentators tend to insert an additional day and night during the final advance, following Curtius (4.10.8). See A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander I. Books I–III* (Oxford, 1980), 288; P. A. Brunt, 'Appendix VIII', in P. A. Brunt (trans.), *Arrian. Anabasis of Alexander Books I–IV* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), i.491–2.

<sup>7</sup> See comments and references in Bosworth (n. 6), 288, 294.

<sup>8</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.7.

<sup>9</sup> Alexander also attempts to gain some control over the battle's location by advancing to the right, heading off the ground prepared for the chariots (Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.2). This does not change my point: Alexander's rightward advance is about tactics; the battlefield site was Darius' selection.

with this detail. In his narrative, the chronological uncertainty immediately preceding the battle is a literary echo of the uncertainty around when the attack would come (from Darius' perspective). Moreover, Arrian's manipulation of time enables particular character portrayals to be presented. Alexander, for example, appears in control. There is time for him to sleep, so Arrian has him well rested and refreshed, just like his army. Darius, however, has to wait. Fearing a night attack, he keeps his army standing to, and so allusions to Xenophon and Persian paranoia can be made. This association was certainly known to Arrian, and I suspect anticipated.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, while Arrian explicitly notes the fear and tension the delay causes to Darius' army, Alexander is not presented (in any direct way) as the cause. Rather, in Arrian's account this delay is portrayed as a decision taken by Darius, so the consequences are his to bear. It seems that Arrian is constructing a particular literary image here, as we would be naive to believe that Alexander was unaware of any effects that his delay was causing.

As part of this literary construct we must also consider that, on the eve of the battle itself, Arrian places a strong emphasis on the night. While it is true that Arrian, Curtius, and Plutarch all indicate that a night battle was considered, it is Arrian's account that is by far the most detailed, with an extensive authorial assessment of Alexander's decision to reject a nocturnal engagement. Arrian, too, is the only source to have Alexander advance to a position overlooking Darius' army at night. Why did he do this? Certainly, it may have been historical, but I suspect that there is another explanation. To begin with, we know that Alexander was not opposed to using the night to achieve his military goals: many commentators point to his crossing of the Hydaspes and his attack on Porus as evidence of this. But it can be shown that Arrian uses the night for literary purposes more often than on just this one occasion. Consider, for example, how Alexander crosses the Danube at night, using deception, to attack the Getae at dawn.<sup>11</sup>

A more direct parallel is the use of a path to turn the Persian Gates. Here Alexander travels by night, putting himself in an advantageous position to attack the Persians. It is interesting that, in narrating this episode, Arrian is again vague with regard to chronology, implying that the manoeuvre took a single night, while Curtius explicitly states

<sup>10</sup> Xen. *An.* 3.4.34–35. Note too Bosworth (n. 6), 297; Bosworth (n. 1), 81.

<sup>11</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.4.1 ff. For the Getae, see *ibid.*, 1.3.2.

that it took two nights (and a day).<sup>12</sup> The blurring of time both at the Persian Gates and just before Gaugamela enables Arrian to present an account that emphasizes the tactics and leadership of Alexander, while minimizing specific details of fact expected when utilizing a chronological framework. Where, for example, did the army camp during the Persian Gate manoeuvre, and how did they remain concealed during (Curtius') day? Here the blurring of time undertaken by Arrian enables the story to flow. Dramatic tension is developed by emphasizing particular character traits and/or events, while at the same time obscuring others.

In the lead-up to Gaugamela, Arrian explicitly uses this narrative technique to construct a particular presentation of Alexander. We know, and Arrian knew, that Alexander was a successful military leader who employed 'deception' on numerous occasions, including use of the night to gain a tactical advantage. Nevertheless, on the eve of Gaugamela, Alexander expressly excluded the deception associated with the night. The perception of how he won this encounter with Darius was as important as the victory itself. Arrian was aware of the stance that Alexander had taken, and supported his strategic reasoning both through authorial comment and through the blurring of time (or more specifically how he constructed 'narrative time'). His focus is a series of sequential events: Alexander advances, scouts, prepares battle plans; he rests, and then attacks. As we have noted, the avoidance of any clear chronological details immediately preceding the attack helps obscure the fact that he controlled the time of the battle. Therefore, our interpretation actually suggests that Alexander used deception to its maximum benefit and that Arrian deliberately obscured the strategy, an observation to which we will return.

### Parmenio's advice

We now need to turn our attention to the well-established tradition of Parmenio providing advice to Alexander.<sup>13</sup> Whether the exchanges are

<sup>12</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.1–9; Curtius 5.4.17–23; Bosworth (n. 6), 328; Bosworth (n. 1), 90–1. Note too, Xerxes' manoeuvre at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.215–18), when he traversed a path at night so as to turn the pass.

<sup>13</sup> The scholarship on these exchanges is extensive. Any review must begin with Badian, who suggests that Alexander's frequent rejection of Parmenio's advice indicates factional politics at work: so E. Badian, 'The Death of Parmenio', *TAPA* 91 (1960), 324–38. However, not all of

historical or not, it is clear that each Alexander historian has the flexibility to use the motifs for his own purposes, selectively including or excluding episodes as best suits his narrative. Arrian, therefore, may have an obligation to present Parmenio giving advice, but he also has a lot of flexibility in how the respective characters are portrayed.<sup>14</sup> This, in turn, suggests that the literary role of the exchanges is of the utmost importance, with individual historians using them to develop specific themes.

In Arrian's telling, there are three key exchanges between Parmenio and Alexander at Gaugamela. The first occurs after the night march, when Darius' army has just come into view. At a distance of 30 stades Alexander pauses and seeks advice: should they advance at once or establish a camp and reassess the situation? Parmenio counsels delay in order for the terrain to be surveyed and the enemy's disposition to be assessed, and Alexander agrees.<sup>15</sup> There are several observations to be made here, not least Alexander's agreement since Parmenio's advice is normally rejected. This anomaly is commonly noted;<sup>16</sup> however, what have been overlooked are the consequences of this decision. In accepting Parmenio's advice, Alexander is actually changing his battle plan. Arrian clearly states that Alexander set off the previous evening with the intention of attacking at dawn,<sup>17</sup> but he now delays instead. Perhaps the reality was that the size of the force which Darius had gathered necessitated further consideration. Regardless, Arrian presents the change of plan through the 'wise adviser' motif.<sup>18</sup> This could be to allow any deception associated with a delay to be attributable to Parmenio, but I suspect there is another intention. In a twist from the Herodotean model, this exchange is set up not to warn or advise Alexander, but rather to reinforce the ability of the adviser,

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Parmenio's advice is 'dismissed': note, e.g., Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1–4 (Lyncestian Alexander) and *ibid.*, 3.9.3–4 (surveying enemy and ground pre-Gaugamela). A good, more recent, introduction to Parmenio as adviser is E. Carney, 'Artifice and Alexander History', in A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford, 2000), 263–85. For links to Herodotus' wise adviser, see J. D. Chaplin, 'Conversations in History: Arrian and Herodotus, Parmenio and Alexander', *GRBS* 51 (2011), 613–33. Fundamental to the wise adviser motif is R. Lattimore, 'The Wise Adviser in Herodotus', *CP* 34 (1939), 24–35.

<sup>14</sup> See Carney (n. 13); Chaplin (n. 13), 623.

<sup>15</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.9.3–4.

<sup>16</sup> See, e.g., Chaplin (n. 13), 624–6; Carney (n. 13), 264–73.

<sup>17</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.9.2: 'So taking his force at night he led them off about the second watch, in order to engage the barbarians at dawn.' Note also the Herodotean echo (cf. Hdt. 6.112).

<sup>18</sup> See Chaplin (n. 13); Lattimore (n. 13).

that is Parmenio. In other words, Arrian uses the motif to suggest that Parmenio's advice has merit, a point normally implicit in the motif itself but here made explicit by Alexander's agreement. In this way, Parmenio's military ability and experience are brought to the fore and reinforced.

The same is true of the third exchange during the battle: that is, the message which Parmenio sends requiring assistance. Arrian does not use this episode to undermine Parmenio. Rather, he reports that Alexander takes the necessary action, responding in a matter-of-fact way.<sup>19</sup> The hostile tradition (towards Parmenio) that is evident, for example, in Plutarch and Curtius is not reinforced; rather it is directly and deliberately omitted.<sup>20</sup> In its place, once again, Arrian presents Parmenio as an experienced and capable commander, who recognizes a problem and does what is required to help ensure victory. It seems that, at Gaugamela, Arrian wants Parmenio to be seen as a competent and loyal general.

There is still one exchange at Gaugamela left, and it is this episode that is of the most interest. On this occasion Alexander rejects Parmenio's advice of launching a night attack. His reason is clear: 'to steal [*kleptein*] the victory is dishonourable'.<sup>21</sup> Here the language that Arrian chooses – in particular, the choice of *kleptein* – is revealing. Wheeler uses Xenophon, Plato, and Thucydides to demonstrate that *kleptein*, when used in a military context, incorporates deception. His discussion is wide-ranging, but it is clear that deception and concealment are both deemed to be necessary tactics for a good general, and there is a link to night attacks.<sup>22</sup>

This recognition has implications with regard to Arrian's presentation of the Parmenio–Alexander exchanges, where his selective use of terminology suggests that there is more to the account.<sup>23</sup> Specifically,

<sup>19</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.15.1.

<sup>20</sup> Compare Arrian's account to Curtius 14.6.3 and Plut. *Alex.* 33.6–7. Note also comments in Bosworth (n. 6), 310.

<sup>21</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.2.

<sup>22</sup> E. L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery* (Leiden, 1988), 32: 'Xenophon and Plato stress that the good general must have the traits of a thief (*kleptes*) [e.g. Xen, *Cyr.* 1.6.27, *Mag. eq.* 5.2.7; etc.]... For Thucydides stratagems are *klemmata* and have the greatest fame in war [e.g. Thuc. 5.9.5]. Moreover, *klope*...often is used for surprise attacks, especially a surprise by night.'

<sup>23</sup> In most of the exchanges across our sources, Parmenio's advice tends to be treated as erroneous. More recent analysis suggests that this is an overly simplistic view and we should consider how the exchanges add to Alexander's heroic imagery, as in Carney (n. 13), 273; or that we need to go beyond the exchange itself to see how the author (here Arrian) develops the consequences of the



on the eve of Gaugamela, Arrian is not undermining Parmenio's tactical suggestions or ability. Rather, it appears that he is using Parmenio to indicate the breadth of factors that Alexander was juggling. This is reinforced by Arrian's choice of language, in particular his use of *kleptein*. This verb is, in fact, used only twice in the *Anabasis*: once here, when Alexander refuses to steal a victory at night, and once more at the Hydaspes, when he explicitly does the opposite and uses the cover of the night to deceive and distort.<sup>24</sup> It is not unreasonable to assume that the unique repetition of *kleptein* links the events, in a sense equating Parmenio's suggestion and Alexander's much later action. We also learn that deception, as Parmenio advocated, is an effective military tool that can (and often does) produce the desired victory. In other words, Parmenio's rejected advice (at Gaugamela) is later demonstrated to have been a realistic alternative and valuable tactic (at the Hydaspes). Parmenio's reputation as a military commander is therefore not being undermined. Rather, Arrian's literary constructs suggest the opposite.

At Gaugamela, the length of the authorial comment itself gives another reason for pause. If a night attack were irrational, then Parmenio could be criticized far more harshly and directly. This does not occur. In fact, Arrian's comments at this point mention, but do not emphasize, the dangers of a night attack; rather, he seems to accept that such military actions can and do occur. In this Arrian is demonstrably correct, for we have numerous accounts of night battles in antiquity.<sup>25</sup> We also know that Alexander himself made use of the night and did attack at night, another point that Arrian explicitly makes in his comment. Night attacks, he argues, are risky, not impossible.<sup>26</sup> This statement is immediately followed by the observation that Alexander did take risks, just not on this occasion.

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exchange, as in Chaplin (n. 13), 625. Chaplin is correct, I think, that in exploring the space between word and deed we may better understand the author's intention. That is at the crux of our analysis.

<sup>24</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 5.10.3: 'So he [Alexander] intended to steal the passage across [/ to slip across secretly] as follows' (κλέψαι οὖν ἐπενόει τὴν διάβασιν ὅδε πρώτων).

<sup>25</sup> See W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War. Part II* (Berkeley, CA, 1974), 156–89. *Contra*, Bosworth (n. 6), 296, doubts that an experienced general would advise such an attack.

<sup>26</sup> Remember, too, that Arrian was an experienced military commander: see Bosworth (n. 6), 2–3.

**Arrian's narrative: an interpretation**

If night battles were a reality and Alexander was demonstrably capable of exploiting the night to his advantage, then Parmenio's advice must be accepted as a realistic alternative, and one promoted by an experienced general. Why, then, was his advice not accepted? Arrian's focus is one of perception, picking up on a tradition, on which Polybius comments, that night operations are equated with ambushes, deceit, and tricks.<sup>27</sup> In Arrian's own words, Alexander was more concerned that an attack delivered by stealth, at night, would grant Darius an excuse not to admit inferiority should he be defeated. Curtius emphasizes the same point in relation to Alexander's own views at Gaugamela, as does Plutarch.<sup>28</sup> Clearly we have a tradition that was widely known, which at least explains why it had to be included. Moreover, Arrian was not going to criticize Alexander's decisions overtly at what was a significant victory, nor would we expect him to undermine his hero. But even here we have to give the historian more credit, as he still manages to use literary motifs to suggest that there could be more to consider. After all, advocating for Alexander's long-term strategic plans does not in itself criticize the tactical suggestions of an experienced general. In fact, if we are correct, then Parmenio did not get the military tactics wrong, but what he did not consider was Alexander's campaign strategy. Alexander needed a victory, but it also had to be as open and transparent as possible. Parmenio's focus was to get the victory first.

In Arrian's narrative, therefore, Parmenio is presented as a capable general. By developing Parmenio's character in this way, Arrian is rejecting the widely adopted tradition derived from Callisthenes.<sup>29</sup> Even when Arrian has Alexander reject Parmenio's advice (the possible night battle), it is for more far-reaching campaign objectives and it is due to the specific circumstances at Gaugamela. To underscore this point, Arrian goes on to show that Alexander will and does use the type of tactics that Parmenio advises at a later time and place, at the Hydaspes. The repetition of *kleptein* makes this connection abundantly

<sup>27</sup> Polyb. 4.8.11.

<sup>28</sup> Curt. 4.13.3–10; Plut. *Alex.* 31.10 ff. The popularity of the anecdote is noted by Bosworth (n. 6), 295–6.

<sup>29</sup> Introduced with *legomenon* ('they say') at Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.1. For this and a probable connection to Callisthenes, see Bosworth (n. 6), 20–1, 295–6; L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (Oxford, 1960), 47.

clear. The implications of this interpretation are broad. I am suggesting that Arrian may have identified problems with Callisthenes' criticisms and, as a result, without undermining his hero, he uses literary constructs to redeem Parmenio and to provide a correction to the historical record.

It is also important to recognize that the two pre-battle exchanges between Parmenio and Alexander are intertwined with Arrian's 'blurring of time'. The first exchange occurs when Alexander has advanced to a point 30 stades from Darius. As Alexander had set out at night with the intention of attacking at dawn, this strongly suggests that the meeting took place while it was still dark. However, Arrian then has Alexander agreeing with Parmenio and undertaking a thorough survey of the terrain. For this to be done we would expect that there would be no issues with visibility; in other words, the scouting must have been done in daylight. Arrian, however, makes no mention of time and chronology at this point. Rather, his double timeframe of dark enough for a pre-emptive strike and light enough for a thorough survey is deliberately obscured as the focus shifts to his representation of both Alexander and Parmenio. In Arrian's narrative, Alexander is able to accept Parmenio's suggestion regarding reconnaissance, thereby establishing Parmenio as a potential source of sagacious advice. This episode is an important precursor to their second meeting, which occurs shortly after the scouts return. It is at the second meeting that the proposed night attack is rejected. As a result of this exchange, Arrian's Alexander is presented as more admirable because he chooses, correctly, to turn down advice which is both provided by an established good source and advocates an action that embraces an acceptable stratagem. In Arrian's account, it is the rejection of the stratagem that is clearly the focus: it is more important to his narrative than the historical representation of time.

In an ironic twist, Arrian, having championed Alexander's desire for an open victory, then has to obscure some deceptive tactics. Having scouted the prepared battleground and knowing that Darius believed that the loss at Issus was a result of the terrain, Alexander is sure that he will not face any immediate attack. As a result, he uses deception, playing on time – or, more specifically, the possibility of a night attack and the associated Persian fear of such an attack. As we have seen, Alexander delays, and in doing so keeps the Persian army standing to, expecting an onslaught. Playing on that possibility, he allows his own army to rest, while the Persians are worn down and fatigued by

the need to be constantly alert. It is clear that, after condemning a night attack as deceptive, Arrian could not now openly condone related trickery. Instead his narrative seems to telescope time and events in order to suggest a more immediate attack. We learn about what Alexander does, not when he does it. This subtle shift in focus disguises how Alexander manipulates Persian fears, tires them by leaving them standing for long periods uncertain about what is happening, and then attacks at the point in time which he deems most advantageous. None of Alexander's actions are bad tactical moves, and I am not trying to judge any of these decisions; what is evident, however, is that they run counter to the image for which Arrian has Alexander advocating: that the battle needs to be an open and fair fight.<sup>30</sup> Arrian maintains the heroic imagery through the considered concealment, and, as we have recognized, the chronology is blurred. Moreover, in this context, perhaps his emphasis on 'the night' also has a symbolic meaning — darkness itself hides and obscures.

Where does this leave us? Much work has been done on Arrian's sources and historical narrative, but our knowledge of his literary techniques is perhaps not as complete. Gaining further insights into his use of *topoi*, literary allusions, and terminology, his influences, and his methods will give us a better understanding of Arrian's methodology and, by extension, of the historical narrative. Of course, as Lattimore observed many years ago in relation to the Herodotean motif of the wise adviser: 'The regular occurrence of the wise adviser is illuminating to the student of Herodotus as a writer; but, by reason of this very regularity, at his appearance the historian must proceed with care.'<sup>31</sup> We find ourselves in a similar place. Arrian undoubtedly uses the motif of the wise adviser to reinforce the heroic character of Alexander, who hears the advice, makes his own decision, and then succeeds regardless of whether or not he took the advice. However, Arrian also uses the advice motif to redeem the character of Parmenio, by demonstrating that the advice which was rejected was not in and of itself deficient. At Gaugamela, Alexander's criteria and vision simply compel a different choice. The result is that we have literary manipulation in the account that must distort the historical narrative, distortion that is demonstrably evident in Arrian's chronology. While this recognition gives us pause, it also gives us greater understanding of Arrian the

<sup>30</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.2; note too Bosworth (n. 6), 296.

<sup>31</sup> Lattimore (n. 13), 35.

writer and of his literary constructs, and thus a way to develop further our analysis of the *Anabasis*. Ultimately, in relation to the lead-up to Gaugamela, these literary constructs enable us to account for Arrian's missing day, and to do so without having to add in hypothetical camps and delays.

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