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## REVIEW ESSAYS

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### BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT: Alternative Approaches to an Increasingly Complex Field\*

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- THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: ITS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.* By WERNER BAER. (Columbus, Ohio: Grid Publishing, 1979. Pp. 239. \$7.95.)
- ESTADO, ACUMULAÇÃO E COLONIALISMO INTERNO; CONTRADIÇÕES NORDESTE/SUDESTE, 1960–1977.* By YVES CHALOULT. (Petrópolis, Brazil: Editôra Vozes, 1978. Pp. 150.)
- EXPLORING BRAZILIAN BUREAUCRACY: PERFORMANCE AND PATHOLOGY.* By ROBERT T. DALAND. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981. Pp. 455. \$15.75.)
- BRAZIL: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS.* By PETER FLYNN. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. 564. \$12.50.)
- THE POLITICS OF POPULATION IN BRAZIL: ELITE AMBIVALENCE AND PUBLIC DEMAND.* By PETER MCDONOUGH AND AMAURY DESOUZA. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. Pp. 178. \$19.95.)
- POPULATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL, 1800 TO THE PRESENT.* By THOMAS W. MERRICK AND DOUGLAS H. GRAHAM. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. 385. \$22.50.)
- ELEGIA PARA UMA RE(LI)GIÃO; SUDENE, NORDESTE. PLANEJAMENTO E CONFLITO DE CLASSES.* By FRANCISCO DE OLIVEIRA. (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Paz e Terra, 1977. Pp. 137.)
- THE BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY.* By WILLIAM G. TYLER. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981. Pp. 153.)

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Recent works on the politics of Brazilian development point to yet another process of reevaluation in this field, as the weakening of the "Brazilian miracle" since the mid- and late-1970s suggests the existence of a significant and long-lasting pattern.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, nineteen years of military dictatorship in Latin America's largest country have led to the synthesis of a political and socioeconomic system that has evoked a broad spectrum of critical analysis, from the now "classic" works of E. Bradford Burns, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, John W. F. Dulles, Albert Fishlow, Celso Furtado, Albert O. Hirschman, Octávio Ianni, Helio Jaguaribe, Riordan Roett, Philippe Schmitter, Ronald Schneider, Thomas E. Skidmore, Nelson Werneck Sodré, and Alfred Stepan, among others, to an exciting new genre of Brazilian social science works, some of which have benefitted directly from the withdrawal of censorship subsequent to the *abertura*. Nevertheless, the complexities of *o sistema brasileiro* are reflected in the plethora of fundamental controversies that arise among the many analyses of Brazilian development. Even the recent excellent works of Werner Baer, Yves Chaloult, Robert Daland, Peter Flynn, Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza, Thomas Merrick and Douglas Graham, Francisco de Oliveira, and William Tyler, while appearing to start from fundamental assumptions that are frequently in substantial agreement, ultimately pursue radically different modes of analysis that generally follow three major, relatively innovative themes in the field. The increasing importance of class, population, and institutional analyses of one or another type, approaches that have traditionally been eschewed by many "Brazilianists,"<sup>2</sup> suggests that *os sistemas brasileiros*, indeed *as realidades brasileiras*, might better describe the Brazilian milieu.

Two of the books considered here examine population policies and planning. This topic is a peculiarly enigmatic feature of the Brazilian development process for many North American and European observers. Despite the unparalleled growth of the Brazilian population since the nineteenth century, and the striking (and apparently growing) disparities among national socioeconomic groups, Brazilian authorities have consistently manifested either apathetic or pronatalist positions, the latter sometimes armed with sophisticated arguments regarding the positive economic contributions of a rapidly expanding labor force. The two works, *Population and Economic Development, 1800 to the Present* and *The Politics of Population in Brazil*, clarify this question from two very different approaches. Thomas W. Merrick and Douglas H. Graham explain the inapplicability of neo-Malthusian interpretations of Brazilian development, concluding that the immediate problems of large socioeconomic disparities and serious shortcomings in urban infrastructure, social services, education, and housing may not be directly attributable to the condition of rapid population growth.<sup>3</sup> The size of the country and the positive economic effects of a large, mobile labor force have

apparently made positive contributions to the unique conditions of Brazilian development. Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza explore Brazilian elite and public opinion in an attempt to clarify the origins of national population policy. Their observation that in Brazil, this kind of question cannot be easily located on a conventional left-right political scale, especially in elite opinion, provides a partial explanation of the political confusion that has surrounded the topic since the late 1960s. Furthermore, they hint at the likely future of the question with their surprising revelation that most elites, including the Catholic Church hierarchy, maintain a “pragmatic” position vis-à-vis the subject, generally regarding it as “negotiable; it does not [appear to the elites to] cut to the core of the authoritarian political system, even if decisions on population policy have tremendous consequences for future generations” (p. 119).

McDonough and DeSouza have adopted an interesting, if somewhat problematic, approach in attempting to determine the approximate ranking of population questions on the “political agendas” of Brazilian elite and public sectors (from sample survey and interview research conducted during the Médici presidency, 1969–74).<sup>4</sup> Although elite opinion is undeniably important in the Brazilian sistema, the authors’ choice of the most authoritarian of the post-1964 regimes as the setting of a sample survey—particularly on a political question—is somewhat surprising. The authors conclude that the question is of little interest to most elite sectors and, in fact, “does not compete very successfully for a place on the agenda of the Brazilian elites” (p. 31). Their conclusion perhaps constitutes something of a reply to this objection (that is, the question is not a burning political one and therefore is not likely to evoke distorted responses in a highly authoritarian setting), but it raises in turn a new range of problems. Is this type of opinion analysis reliable on topics of low respondent interest?<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, is the omission of military officers from the elite sample a serious shortcoming, given the high military profile during the Médici regime?<sup>6</sup> The authors argue that other elite sectors are convinced that military elite opinion did not differ appreciably from the norm on this topic, although this assurance may not satisfy more scientifically inclined readers (pp. 102, 147n).<sup>7</sup>

McDonough and DeSouza have nevertheless contributed an important perspective to the analysis of population policy in Brazil. The book is divided into three basic studies: an analysis of elite opinion on population questions,<sup>8</sup> an analysis of public opinion,<sup>9</sup> and a useful verification of elite perceptions of (other) elite and public opinions on population questions. This last section uncovers several interesting results, including a lower accuracy rating of intralite perceptions (that is, the perceptions of elites in one sector vis-à-vis the opinions of those in another) on the question of birth control than on “more political” ques-

tions such as income redistribution, and a relatively high rate of accuracy of the “conservative” elites’ perceptions of public opinion on population questions. In their analysis of public opinion, the authors discovered that there was a much more defined view of birth control, although one that tended to steer away from the largely abstract justifications of elite opinion (for example, economic development and national power) in its focus on questions of family planning, welfare, and individual rights. The majority of the Brazilian public during the Médici regime appears to have favored some kind of antinatalist policy, with devout, elderly males being the least disposed, and young women the most disposed toward policies of population control. The authors conclude that “birth control is clearly a women’s issue in Brazil” (pp. 91–93).

Merrick and Graham have produced a major contribution to the literature of Brazilian development with their thorough statistical and comparative analytical study of the economic effects of long-term, rapid population growth in Brazil.<sup>10</sup> Their documentation and exploration of the history and effects of the growth of the Brazilian population from roughly 3.3 million in 1800 to nearly 120 million in 1979 underscores the complexity, controversy, and vital importance of historical data analysis.<sup>11</sup> Among their numerous conclusions, Merrick and Graham stress the centrality of institutions in conditioning the effects of rapid population increases.<sup>12</sup> A central theme of the work is the interaction between public policy and demographic transformation. Brazil is a unique model in this regard, and the authors focus on the extensive, complex literature of Brazilian economic and demographic development in several broad topical areas.<sup>13</sup> They call into question a number of commonly held perceptions of Brazilian development, concluding for example that urban migration is not a direct “cause” of urban poverty in Brazil—in fact, urban migrants have competed relatively successfully for jobs and have contributed to the economic infrastructure. The high number of migrant poor corresponds in ratio to the high percentage of total migrants in the urban population, but statistically migrants are no more likely to be unemployed than are native urban dwellers. At another level of analysis, the authors conclude that the momentum of the present process of population increase in Brazil is such that, even with a major policy shift to an antinatalist position in the near future, the Brazilian population will not stabilize soon. “We do not know for certain whether Brazil’s stable population will be 300 million or 600 million, but it is clear that it will be several times the present total and that planning for the task of educating, employing, housing—not to mention feeding—these two or three ‘other Brazils’ is urgently needed” (p. 299). The authors’ research techniques range from sophisticated interpretations of Brazilian census data to careful survey research, although the work is preeminently oriented toward the task of policy problem-solving at perhaps its highest

level: the clarification of fundamental demographic phenomena. It is an indispensable contribution to the analysis of public policy and the development process in one of the world's fastest growing countries. All four authors apparently agree that the singular Brazilian population expansion can and should be related to modifications in national public policy. Population growth is obviously a major determinant of the Brazilian development process, although apparently not according to the simplistically derogatory formulae espoused in the past.

The uniqueness of Brazil's demographic patterns, moreover, does not alter the basic fact, well documented in Merrick and Graham's book, that Brazilian economic development is fundamentally capitalist, albeit representative of national and international capitalist relations that have been molded by the special circumstances of Brazilian resources and history. Werner Baer and William G. Tyler, both of whom are well-known analysts of the Brazilian economy, provide new insights into the patterns of post-1964 Brazilian development, many of which have only recently been defined with any degree of clarity. The increasing importance of state institutions in the economic development process is one such pattern that figures prominently in both works. Tyler observes that "the government has emerged as the dominant single force in the economy" (p. 30),<sup>14</sup> although as Baer notes, this kind of state involvement in Brazil "is only beginning to receive attention" (p. 100).<sup>15</sup> Baer characterizes the proliferation of state involvement in the economy as essentially an ad hoc process, and hence as "multifaceted" and lacking in central coordination and communication between specific state institutions. He stresses, moreover, that Brazilian state capitalism probably will have to continue to grow in order to remain efficient,<sup>16</sup> and it would therefore appear likely that massive state interventions in the Brazilian economy will continue, despite recent well publicized presidential moves toward *desestatização*.<sup>17</sup>

Baer's book offers a comprehensive overview of the historical development and fundamental questions of state capitalism in Brazil and therefore touches upon a number of topics raised by the other works mentioned in this review. His straightforward account of the historical and economic origins of import-substitution industrialization, in the early pages of the work, is reminiscent in some respects of the arguments of Celso Furtado (whom Baer cites). It is argued that it was federal government support of coffee prices in the 1930s that provided the important stimulus to the national industrial production of consumer goods,<sup>18</sup> although Baer observes that Brazilian industrialization evinced "mild" elements of import substitution even before the First World War.<sup>19</sup> His careful review of the history of policy planning points repeatedly to the almost unintentional accretion of state involvement in the economy. The second part of his book deals effectively with "con-

temporary issues" of Brazilian economic development, including trade and foreign investment, the growing public sector, inflation, regional economic disparities, and agricultural development, all of which recall in some respect the massive intervention of the state in Brazilian capitalism. Baer's work is refreshingly succinct, straightforward, and intelligible considering the extent of its documentation and the complexity of its subject. He is, moreover, unusually open to a number of approaches in his analysis of Brazilian economic development. He outlines three credible hypotheses regarding the explanation of resource allocation in the contemporary Brazilian capitalist state: first, that market forces ultimately determine allocation and the specific mode of development. State planning, in this view, only exists to resolve the problems caused by sectoral bottlenecks and capital shortages. Second, state policies are hypothesized merely to serve "the interests of the foreign and national industrialists and [are] largely controlled by them" (pp. 154–55).<sup>20</sup> Third, and perhaps most novel of the three, technocrats and "military entrepreneurs" are hypothesized to have taken control of state policy for their own benefit. It is a credit to the depth of Baer's work that his comprehensive analysis illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of all three of these possible interpretations, while underscoring the formative influence of market forces on public policy in the 1970s (p. 110).

Tyler advocates a qualified variant of the market-forces approach, although the technical, if somewhat disparate, chapters of his book likewise offer important insights into other dimensions and interpretations of the Brazilian development process.<sup>21</sup> He reconciles his emphasis on the importance of state institutions in economic development with his market-forces approach by maintaining that "the activist role of the Brazilian government in the economy is not inconsistent with the strengthening of markets and the private sector" (p. 13). His analysis of the government industrial-protection policies, moreover, substantiates Baer's contention that state intervention in the Brazilian economy has been characteristically ad hoc: "It almost appears as though the structure of protection is random, worked out haphazardly through producer access and influence in the decision-making process over time. Once embedded, protective instruments take on an inertia of their own, making it difficult to remove them despite changing circumstances" (p. 20). Tyler's research reflects a commanding grasp of the data and the prominent problems in the field, doubtlessly aided by his position with the Brazilian Planning Secretariat. His foci in separate chapters on the Brazilian capital goods sector (1975–79), the problems of small and medium-size businesses in Brazil, and problems of technical efficiency in Brazilian industry, although important or even crucial in some respects, provide useful examples of the specificity that is both possible and necessary in North American studies of the problems of world develop-

ment.<sup>22</sup> Tyler's work is (as the Lexington social science editions advertise themselves) a "state-of-the-art" economic interpretation of a complex and highly institutionalized system. As Celso Furtado argues, "a experiência brasileira põe em evidência a necessidade de estudos aprofundados do processo de industrialização nas condições do subdesenvolvimento."<sup>23</sup>

The institutional approach to the analysis of Brazilian economic development is perhaps paradigmatically expressed in methodological evaluations of the national bureaucracy, which is arguably the linchpin for the success of any government undertaking. Robert T. Daland, whose analyses of Brazilian public administration are well known to students of both Brazilian politics and comparative public-policy analysis,<sup>24</sup> has produced a comprehensive and insightful study that differs in some important respects from his earlier evaluations.<sup>25</sup> *Exploring Brazilian Bureaucracy: Performance and Pathology* breaks new ground in its well-documented conclusion that Brazilian bureaucracy is "a prime example of a major revolution in institution-building through continuous evolution and change" (p. 70). The core of this change, according to Daland, is the innovative "center-periphery" administrative system of agency interpenetration that at times "makes the hierarchy seem almost irrelevant" (p. 82). The "nesting" of key decision-making "control points" in rival ministries, or in the *autarquias*, has created the kind of checks-and-balances system necessary for the central authority to assert control over the largely autonomous "traditional bureaucracy."<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the creation of the *empresas públicas* to provide greater administrative flexibility and to ensure the "nationalization" of certain key industries has had a major conditioning effect on the bureaucratic, if not the national economic, system, as is stressed by other works mentioned in this review. Thus Daland makes the observation, albeit a fundamentally qualified one, that "the United States may have to learn from Brazil rather than vice versa insofar as administrative technology is concerned" (p. 105n).

These qualifications, in fact, embody a major theme of Daland's book: Brazilian bureaucracy evinces a chronic pathology that ultimately impedes its ability to perform as it should. This pathology is both tied to the past and difficult to define;<sup>27</sup> for as Daland admits, the limited presence of certain pathologies, such as corruption, may be tolerable (or even necessary in the short run) in effective administrative behavior (p. 205). He lists proceduralism, decision-making bottlenecks, vertical aloofness, and horizontal aloofness as the fundamental components of the Brazilian bureaucratic pathology, although political patronage, the abuses of consultancy, and outright corruption are also mentioned. His use of a questionnaire-response category, which he labels "development orientation" (particularly as it occurs among the sample interview re-

sponses of top-level bureaucrats), uncovers the presence of what appear to be major impediments in this important area.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the maintenance of traditional bureaucratic entities and practices is seen to create a drag on the whole system. "It appears that the Brazilian bureaucracy is indeed becoming increasingly the motor for economic development—but the motor is towing a very large anchor since only minimal resources have been allocated to management modernization" (p. 432). He prescribes the adoption of a new seven-point strategy to upgrade bureaucratic professionalism (particularly at executive levels) and to stimulate administrative innovation: "government is not a science, and until it is, the experimental approach is the best guarantee of finding proper answers" (p. 425).

If Daland's book has any noteworthy shortcomings, they might be the relatively dated period of focus (1969–72) and an apparent ambiguity in his anticipation of the potential for change within the Brazilian bureaucracy. On the first score, Daland should be given the benefit of the doubt:<sup>29</sup> his argument that the Brazilian bureaucracy remains deeply influenced by the past is probably sufficient justification for generalizing from a past presidency, one for which the data is largely available and to which the scrutiny of hindsight can be applied.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the Médici presidency was, as already noted, a period of exaggerated authoritarianism in Brazil, and this characteristic intensified the importance of the bureaucracy.<sup>31</sup> Having thus agreed up to a point with the appropriateness of Daland's chronological focus, it should still be added that considerable administrative change has apparently occurred since 1972, and he may need to reevaluate his findings in the light of his own (unfortunately undocumented) observation that "by 1976 it is obvious that a new administrative order is emerging" (p. 380). Second, his relative ambiguity in assessing Brazil's potential for administrative reform is likewise justifiable. The juxtaposition of enthusiastic new experiments with passive and tradition-bound agencies, the economic desperation instilled by the oil crisis,<sup>32</sup> and the tendency toward ad hoc adoption of administrative change all add to the enormous complexity of the situation. Daland expresses his positive appraisal of the new center-periphery model of administrative development, but reminds the reader that this model "was never fully conceptualized. Rather it grew in response to imperatives of the situation, and does not exist system-wide. Thus it is only an incipient model" (pp. 104–5n).

A central theme of the final three works by Yves Chaloult, Peter Flynn, and Francisco de Oliveira is the utility, or even necessity, of considering class conflict to be the force majeure of Brazilian development, while maintaining that analyses of Brazilian institutional development and Brazilian policy formation are the most academically fruitful enterprises. Although only Oliveira's work focuses directly on a specific



case of class competition as the central mode of analysis, the two other works make basic assumptions as to its ultimate importance.<sup>33</sup> Flynn's broad historical and political analysis of modern Brazil, for example, states that the utility of the class-analysis approach is one of the principal arguments of the book.<sup>34</sup> Chaloult, in a direct reference to Oliveira's book, observes that his approach is fundamentally different from Oliveira's,<sup>35</sup> taking some pains to clarify that his "abordagem, que se propõe também a discutir as consequências das mencionadas relações [das classes], não se opõe à primeira [de Oliveira] mas, pelo contrário, complementa e é complementada por esta abordagem."<sup>36</sup>

Chaloult regards internal colonialism and internal dependency to be the primary theoretical devices of heuristic value in his analysis, although there is significant reference to class conflict in both the introductory and concluding chapters.<sup>37</sup> Chaloult convincingly demonstrates the magnitude of the disparity between Northeast and Southeast Brazil, and the growing reliance of the Northeast upon the budgetary policy of the state, particularly its special development programs. Nevertheless, although his analysis repeatedly indicates that certain (largely unspecified) interests in the Southeast must be benefitting directly at the expense of *nordestinos*, this argument is difficult to verify at the level of discrete regions. The core of his theoretical argument, the literature of internal dependency and internal colonialism, does not appear to be amenable to the quantitative tests that Chaloult employs. The reader must inevitably ask a question that is analogous to one that has been frequently directed at the *dependentistas*. What are the wider implications within Brazil, a country that already evinces striking disparities in income deciles in virtually all regions, of the condition of "regional dependency"? Theoretically, at least, all regions are controlled by the same federal government, subject to the tactics of the same public and private corporations, and are ultimately affected by the same "national" variables, including the wider notion of national dependency. Thus the contention that one region might be "exploiting" another, an appealing and logical conclusion from Chaloult's data, leaves unspecified precisely who it is within such regions that is benefitting or being exploited.<sup>38</sup> Rather, his analysis is generally limited to economic and government "outputs," and frequently he appears to be oblivious to Oliveira's warning that "o conflito de classes . . . aparece sob as roupagens de conflitos regionais ou dos 'desequilíbrios regionais' . . ."<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, Chaloult points in a final paragraph to the central importance of "a contração de não participação, da grande maioria da população, nas decisões importantes no que se refere à Nação, tendo em vista a centralização e a verticalização do poder aos níveis econômicos, políticos, sociais e culturais" (p. 142).<sup>40</sup>

Oliveira's work suggests an interesting combination of ap-

proaches. Although his detailed identification of class and corporate interests in the Brazilian Northeast reveals the historical antecedents of an increasingly transformed development process, Oliveira is likewise concerned with tracing the development of public policy vis-à-vis the region. In the latter enterprise, he is perhaps most thorough in his analysis of the SUDENE (the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast), an agency in which he once served as the "substitute superintendent."<sup>41</sup> His analysis of the SUDENE is somewhat reminiscent of the work of Celso Furtado, the first superintendent and "pai da SUDENE." Oliveira's interest in the political and economic dimensions of underdevelopment likewise recalls the arguments of the dependistas, as well as the extensive literature that deals with the "failure" of the SUDENE, 1961–64.<sup>42</sup> Oliveira argues that the SUDENE prior to 1964 constituted a "flank attack" by the southern bourgeoisie upon the growing strength of the "classes populares" (p. 113). He regards the SUDENE after 1964 as "muito mais o resultado da forma de resolução do conflito de classes em escala nacional do que regional" (pp. 124–25).

Oliveira's association with the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP) serves to clarify the way in which he uses a number of terms, including "associate-dependent development" and "estado-burguesia."<sup>43</sup> This clarification allows him to avoid the basic problem encountered by Chaloult, who calls upon the extensive literature of internal colonialism and then fails to locate his own position explicitly within it. Oliveira contends that "o Estado que fica no Nordeste é um estado imobilista, do ponto de vista das relações entre as classes 'regionais', ainda que do ponto de vista da acumulação à escala nacional operasse francamente, reiterando os termos de reprodução da economia industrial" (p. 94), which helps to explain the problem encountered by Chaloult—the paradox of ever-increasing government support to a region that slips ever further behind the rest of the country in its share of national development. This aspect is tied to what is perhaps Oliveira's strongest contention: that the very definition of "region" is dialectically linked to the reproduction of capital, and therefore to "uma forma especial da luta de classes, onde o econômico e o político se fusionam e assumem uma forma especial de aparecer no produto social e nos pressupostos da reposição" (p. 29). Thus Oliveira disputes the validity of the conventional definition of "the Northeast region,"<sup>44</sup> a definition that appears to cause problems in a number of analyses of development, including that of Chaloult. Oliveira is able to direct attention instead to the political and economic theory of national development.

Peter Flynn's book represents an extensive political and historical survey of this national public policy of development, beginning with the historical roots in the military coup of 1889, and ending with the presi-

dency of General Geisel and its implications for the future. The work is something of an interpretive magnum opus, and as such should be regarded as being distinct in many respects from most of the other books in this review, despite its focus on many of the same general problems. It places great weight on the role of multinational corporations in shaping the character of Brazilian development, for example,<sup>45</sup> and on the dynamics of Brazilian economic development, although it directs its focus (in marked contrast to the other books in review) to an analysis of the national politics of Brazil. Indeed, Flynn's work might be criticized for its occasional overreliance on a largely unspecified, somewhat mystifying "political factor." Flynn turns frequently to this factor to explain fundamental social, economic, and political change in Brazil. He notes, for example, that the economic collapse of the federal government prior to the 1964 coup was precipitated by the "political factor" because "current interpretations of the political situation produced a disastrous lack of confidence, which gave Goulart's government no chance of survival" (p. 257).<sup>46</sup> Politics and political struggle indisputably are central aspects of the process of Brazilian development; *personalismo*, often verging on messianism, has long been recognized as being deeply inscribed upon the Brazilian "national character." Hence it frequently appears that "political solutions" harbor greater promise in the Brazilian system than they might in other national systems.<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, it must be argued that it is nearly always difficult to "unpack" a discrete political factor from the nexus of socioeconomic and political change. Furthermore, such an endeavor is susceptible to something like mystification of the basic dynamics of change. Flynn has no intention of engaging in mystification, of course, and the extent of his historical analysis more than compensates for the minor confusion that may be produced occasionally by the work's more abstract speculations. In sum, Flynn's book constitutes a unique presentation of an immense and complex historical period, and as such frequently turns its focus to the kinds of problems addressed in narrower studies within the literature of Brazilian development. It is particularly noteworthy in its attempt to "reanalyze" the complex nature of Brazilian political and socioeconomic development through a historical analysis that is constantly probing the dynamics of Brazilian institutions and the effect, or lack of effect, of class struggle in the largest Latin American country. Class analysis, although methodologically difficult, promises to add an important new perspective to the chronic problems of Brazilian development, and hence it is experiencing a nascent popularity with a new generation of *brasilianistas*.

Brazil is, as all of these analyses of its development imply, a special case among the developing nations of the world. So fortunate in resources and geographical location as to be a veritable "heartland" (as military strategists like to refer to it), the country is nevertheless beset by

perplexing development problems. Immense regional and individual income disparities, persistent development nemeses such as the droughts of the Northeast, and the national economic tendency toward pronounced “boom-bust” cycles are only some of the better-known barriers to national economic prosperity. Thus the tendency of works like those of Baer, Chalout, Daland, Flynn, McDonough and DeSouza, Merrick and Graham, Oliveira, and Tyler to adopt a similar theme—the Brazilian socioeconomic and political development process—while employing radically different approaches, should not be surprising. It is, instead, a matter of some interest that these and many other contemporary works as well seem generally to agree on the underlying importance of employing promising new perspectives such as class, population, or institutional analysis as fundamental approaches to understanding development in Brazil. *O país tropical* has, after all, long been described as a country where historical (and especially demographic) statistics are largely uninformative, where institutions are unstable, and where class conflict is eclipsed by *jeitinho*. These works suggest the need to revise that assessment.

#### NOTES

1. A concise analysis of the factors that have contributed to this tendency can be found in Paul Singer, *A Crise do “Milagre”*; *Interpretação Crítica da Economia Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977).
2. Alfred Stepan notes that “the very absence of strong political institutions in a country such as Brazil has meant that all major actors attempt to co-opt the military as an additional supportive force in the pursuit of their political goals.” Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 61.
3. They argue that “the structure of the Brazilian economy would have been different with a different rate of population growth, but it is most difficult to demonstrate how much better or worse it would have been.” Merrick and Graham, pp. 294–95.
4. McDonough’s comprehensive study of the Brazilian elites during this same period appeared in *LARR* 16, No. 1 (1981):79–106.
5. An excellent essay that explores attitude reliability (and attitude mutability over relatively short time frames) is: Philip E. Converse, “Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue,” *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. Edward R. Tufte (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 168–89. Converse stresses that reliable attitudes evince strong and self-motivated interest (that is, apart from the interest engendered by the interviewer) on the part of the subject. “Non-attitudes,” on the other hand, are lightly held views and are therefore likely to change drastically over relatively short periods of time. According to Converse, they cannot be measured with any degree of reliability.
6. Flynn notes that after the 1968 crackdown, the military “more clearly than ever before . . . were seen, and perceived themselves, as masters of the country.” Flynn, p. 438. Furthermore, Thomas G. Sanders, in an article written in 1971, argued that Brazil during the Médici regime “seems to be well into a stage of ambiguity representing a transition between concerted opposition and the gradual expansion of public support of and institutions for communicating information on the limitation of births.” Sanders, “The Politics of Population in Brazil,” *American Universities Field Staff Reports*,

- East Coast South American Series, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1971), p. 1. The opinion of the military hierarchy might well have tended to direct elite opinion in such circumstances.
7. Furthermore, they assert that "birth control is an issue [sic] for which serious interest-misunderstanding is comparatively rare" (p. 104).
  8. From a sample of 269 respondents, which represents a 41 percent response from the 656-member target sample.
  9. From 1,314 interviews conducted exclusively in southeast and southern Brazil.
  10. The bibliographical dimension of the work is, in itself, a major interpretive study.
  11. Preliminary data from the 1980 census revealed an unexpectedly low total of 119,024,600. *Folha de São Paulo*, 19 December 1980, p.1.
  12. Examples include the effects of policies of manumission of slaves (p. 52) and the critical need—based upon industrial infrastructural requirements—for immigrant expertise in the late nineteenth century that tended to offset many of the negative consequences that might have resulted in the area of domestic employment from their massive influx into Brazil (p. 112).
  13. The work includes major studies of long-term population trends, slavery, immigration, regional population redistribution, the demographic structure of the labor force, rural-urban migration, urban poverty, fertility and mortality, population and development planning, and the future of population growth in Brazil.
  14. Tyler notes that "the public sector, including government enterprises, has accounted for over 50 percent of total capital formation in Brazil in recent years" (p. 40).
  15. Baer adds that "state enterprises dominate in steel, mining and petrochemicals. They control over 80% of power generating capacity and most of the public utilities. It has been estimated that in 1974, for the 100 largest firms (in value of assets), 74 percent of the combined assets belonged to state enterprises. Similarly state banks play a dominant role in the financial system. Of the fifty largest banks (in terms of deposits), state banks accounted for about 56% of total deposits in 1974 and about 65 percent of loans to the private sector" (p. 100).
  16. Baer hypothesizes that only dynamic, innovative (and hence growing) firms can hope to attract and retain qualified personnel (p. 156).
  17. It has recently been reported that the government intends to sell about 100 of the 564 state-owned firms to the private sector, although the larger policy ramifications of this move remain unclear. *Latin America Weekly Report* WR-81-29 (24 July 1981):2-3.
  18. The argument is that "the higher aggregate demand resulting from the defense of the coffee sector drew more investment into the industrial sector than was attracted away by opportunities in the coffee sector" (Baer, p. 45).
  19. He insists that this early import substitution did not lead to "industrialization" (p. 48).
  20. This second view is most closely associated with the dependentistas.
  21. Three of the four chapters have been published previously as research papers, and although all four deal with problems of Brazilian industry, all but the first chapter tend to focus on relatively specific questions. Tyler observes that "if there is a central, underlying theme discernible in the separate chapters, it could be expressed as: the observed vitality of the industrial economy has been conditioned by market forces, as sometimes modified and distorted, however, by government policies" (p. xvii).
  22. Tyler's occasional policy recommendations underscore the practicality of such specificity. See, for example, his comments regarding the advisability of restructuring government financing programs for small businesses, pp. 96-99.
  23. Furtado, *Análise do 'Modelo' Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1972), p. 8.
  24. E.g., Daland, *Brazilian Planning: Development, Politics and Administration* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1967), and Daland, "Attitudes toward Change among Brazilian Bureaucrats," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 4, No. 2 (August, 1972): 167-203.
  25. His earlier thesis was that "forces internal and external to Brazil have combined to utilize the classical model of bureaucracy as the pattern for structuring developmental planning and administration, and that this model fails to satisfy basic requirements of the Brazilian political culture for identifiable reasons." *Brazilian Plan-*

- ning, p. 10. Although this theme is not entirely absent from his latest work (see p. 362, where Daland analyzes the problems of Vargas's bureaucracy largely from this perspective), it appears to have been dropped as a major hypothesis.
26. Daland stresses the importance of new institutional arrangements, such as the *grupos de trabalho*, in linking center and periphery bureaucracies.
  27. Daland repeatedly stresses that "the 'normal' patterns of administrative culture and administrative behavior in Brazil are deeply buried in the history and culture of the society and will not easily be changed" (pp. 431–32).
  28. Daland discovered, for example, that of 325 top-level administrators surveyed, 60 percent "agreed that, in resolving administrative problems, it is better to use methods already proven by experience" (p. 213).
  29. That is, regarding the continued applicability of his generalizations and conclusions, all of which are posed in the present tense.
  30. It should be noted, on the other hand, that many of Daland's own observations tend to contradict this static impression of Brazilian bureaucracy, reinforcing instead the view that it is engaged in a rapid process of change (e.g., Daland, p. ix).
  31. Daland observes, in reference to this period, that "for the first time in Brazilian history, the government has both the motivation to create an effective, high performance civil bureaucracy, and the power to do so without fear of political disaster from any direction" (p. 262). These conditions would appear to have changed to some extent since 1971.
  32. A major modification to the system that unfortunately does not receive very much consideration in the book.
  33. Oliveira stresses the importance of the competition between the "indigenous" northeast Brazilian bourgeoisie (sugar wealth) and the cotton-cattle producing *latifundiários* of the *sertão* (with their close ties to international and south-central Brazilian interests). He also analyzes the part played by the rural and (admittedly nascent) urban proletariat of the Northeast. Noting that "na região atrasada [do Nordeste] . . . os conflitos de classe tomam a feição mais próxima da que se tem chamado de 'Clássica'," he concludes that the task of the investigation is not to label specific class interests as "classical" or "non-classical," but rather to discover "determinantes da conduta dos homens e das classes sociais que formam e a que pertencem" (p. 96).
  34. See Flynn's statement: "The principal argument of this book has been that the *coup* of 1964 and the regime to which it gave birth can only be understood in terms of the relations between social classes, the contending interests of those classes, and sometimes fractions of classes, and the way in which the process of competing interests finds expression in the change from 'Old Republic' to *Estado Novo*, in the party system after 1945, and finally in the *coup* of 1964" (p. 519).
  35. In direct reference to Oliveira's book, Chaloult says that his approach "vizualiza as *relações atuais* entre Estado e regiões, estudando, por exemplo, as políticas do Estado face as regiões . . ." (p. 16). (Emphasis in the original.)
  36. Chaloult, p. 16.
  37. This careful and well-documented work is a revision and up-dating of his doctoral dissertation: *Regional Differentials and the Role of the State: Economic-Political Relationships between the Northeast and Southeast of Brazil*, Diss. Cornell, 1976 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Latin American Studies Program, Dissertation Series No. 70, 1977). Among the substantive additions to the present publication are precisely these brief references to the importance of the analysis of class conflict.
  38. Such identification would constitute a difficult enterprise: an analysis of the Northeastern elite, for example, would tend to disclose a significant level of interest sharing with elites of other regions. A report in *Veja* notes, for example, that Governor Tarcísio Burty of Paraíba has said that "já fui procurado por um grande industrial nordestino . . . que me disse achar muito melhor o governo aplicar em regiões desenvolvidas, triplicar o investimento e, com as sobras, ajudar o nordeste." *Veja* 654 (18 March 1981):54.
  39. Oliveira, p. 113.
  40. This paragraph does not appear in his dissertation.
  41. This book, as the title indicates, is an elegy to his own past efforts, to his deceased

- wife, and to what he regards as the demise after 1964, if not the original futility, of the development program of the SUDENE.
42. Dimensions of this "failure," including the conflict of the agency with U.S. foreign policy, are discussed in Riordan Roett's *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), and Joe Page's *The Revolution That Never Was; Northeast Brazil, 1955–1964* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972).
  43. Both of these expressions have been defined and explored in their wider theoretical implications in the works of other members of CEBRAP, notably Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
  44. This explains the title of the work, a clever reminder that "regionalism" can be, at least in some respects, a kind of "article of faith."
  45. Flynn comments that "the question of the role of multinational or transnational corporations in Brazil's economy and politics was, and still remains, the most hotly debated and far-reaching issue of national politics" (pp. 488–89).
  46. Obviously Flynn does not mean to say that the "current interpretations" were sufficient, in and of themselves, to topple the government, although his failure to define his use of the term *political* more clearly relegates the precise nature of this analysis to the imagination.
  47. This tendency might explain the tenure of Getúlio Vargas, a figure for whom Flynn expresses admiration.