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International Organization

David Strang

European Political Expansion

Leah Haus

The East European Countries and GATT

Giulio M. Gallarotti

The Limits of International Organization

Herman Schwartz

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The Foreign Policy of a Declining Power

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Articles

Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: realist and institutional accounts *David Strang* 143

The East European countries and GATT: the role of realism, mercantilism, and regime theory in explaining East–West trade negotiations *Leah Haus* 163

The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international relations *Giulio M. Gallarotti* 183

Can orthodox stabilization and adjustment work? Lessons from New Zealand, 1984–90 *Herman Schwartz* 221

Review essay

The foreign policy of a declining power *Timothy J. McKeown* 257

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Abstracts

Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: realist and institutional accounts

by David Strang

The global expansion of the European state system suggests strong connections between political “life chances” and international status. Polities recognized as sovereign within the Western international community are much less likely than unrecognized polities to be colonized and are much less likely than dependencies to merge or dissolve. These variations in stability are difficult to understand through balance-of-power politics. They may be more plausibly explained through the institutional structure of the state system and, in particular, the organization of the system as a community of mutual recognition. Sovereign members of this community are treated in fundamentally different ways than are those seen as outside Western state society or as the dependent possessions of sovereign states.

The East European countries and GATT: the role of realism, mercantilism, and regime theory in explaining East–West trade negotiations

by Leah Haus

The international political economy literature on regimes has focused on relations among the industrialized Western countries. Despite the increasing participation of East European countries in international economic organizations, the literature has neglected the subject of East–West economic relations. To redress this void in the literature, this article assesses the extent to which and the conditions under which realism, mercantilism, and regime theory help explain the Western positions toward negotiations between East European countries and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It argues that a thorough explanation requires drawing on insights from all three modes of analysis: realism provides a useful starting point and sets the context, while mercantilism and regime theory enrich the explanation in circumstances in which political issues concerning security subside and trade policy issues surface.

The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international relations

by Giulio M. Gallarotti

Contributors to the literature on international organization (IO) have traditionally been overly optimistic about the ability of multilateral management to stabilize in-

ternational relations and have tended to ignore the destabilizing effects of IO. While recent revisionist scholarship has acknowledged both the potential for organizational failure and the conditionality of management, it has tended to focus on how IO fails within specific issue-areas and institutions. This article offers a typology of the inherent (systematic) failures of IO across issue-areas and institutions and thereby seeks to bridge the gaps in our understanding of why many different institutions and managerial schemes have adverse effects. It argues that IO is prone to failure (1) when it attempts to manage complex, tightly coupled systems of relations and issues; (2) when it serves as a substitute either for more substantive and long-term resolutions to international problems or for responsible domestic or foreign policy; (3) when it intensifies international disputes; and (4) when it generates moral hazard. In offering a general theoretical approach to understanding the destabilizing effects of IO, the analysis is intended to serve both as a focal point for understanding critical approaches to the study of IO and as an alternative rationale for eliminating the excesses of multilateral management.

Can orthodox stabilization and adjustment work? Lessons from New Zealand, 1984–90

by Herman Schwartz

Most debate about the efficacy of orthodox stabilization programs, such as those of the International Monetary Fund, has been fruitless. First, rarely are these programs fully implemented or sustained for long periods. Second, defenders and critics of the programs hold differing premises about the nature of capitalist economies. The debate is therefore not about the appropriate balance of supply- and demand-side measures but, rather, about what sort of supply- and demand-side measures will address the supply- and demand-side problems that each group perceives. The results of an orthodox stabilization program which incorporated demand- and supply-side elements and which was fully implemented and sustained by the New Zealand government from 1984 to 1990 reveal the limits to orthodox programs. New Zealand, a primary product exporter, suffers from a structural imbalance of payments and from an external debt burden equal in scale to that of the Latin American and other highly indebted less developed countries (LDCs), but it does not have the serious supply-side constraints on growth that critics claim typify underdeveloped economies. This makes New Zealand an appropriate test of the typical orthodox stabilization program. Despite the fact that its administrative capacity, political will, domestic support, and access to external resources were far in excess of those of the typical would-be LDC stabilizer, New Zealand achieved only a precarious macroeconomic and international payments stability. Moreover, as the case of New Zealand demonstrates, inflation control and financial liberalization policy components of orthodox plans have contradictory consequences for payments balance. This suggests that long-term stabilization, in New Zealand and elsewhere, cannot be achieved solely by internal reforms.