

- 1555 Livy, Venice
 1555 Livy, *Decades*, Paris
 1566 Cicero, *Opera*, Paris
 1568 *Chronologia in Livii Historia*, Frankfurt, 1568
 1576 Cicero, *Opera*, Lyon, 1576
 1577 Cicero, *Ad Familiares*
- 1580 Horace, *Opera*, Basil
 1588 Livy, Frankfurt
 *1596 *Epictetus et Cebes*, Cologne
 1618 Cicero, *Opera*, Hamburg
 *1633 Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Lyon
- 1642 Horace and Juvenal, Paris
 *1659 Epictetus, n. p.
 1671 Cicero, *Epistolae Omnes et de Officiis*, Amsterdam
- 1687 Cicero, *Orationes*, Paris
 *1689 Seneca, *Tragoediae*, Lyon
 1691 Cicero, *De Officiis*, Amsterdam
 1691 Horace, *Oeuvres*, Paris
 1699 Cicero, *Opera*, Amsterdam

I shall offer a few observations. The number of titles is small, although the number of volumes (especially in "opera," and especially of the prolific Cicero) increase the number of titles many times over. Every title was printed abroad, and thus the evidence supplements that in the short title catalogues, a matter that should particularly interest Professor Williams. Tacitus is missing altogether, as is Marcus Aurelius. Epictetus appears twice (1596, 1659). The amiable Boethius appears once (1633), and that much-touted Stoic, Seneca, but once and late (1689). On the other hand, Livy appears in four editions before 1596 and none thereafter. Horace appears three times well spread over the period (1580, 1642, 1691). Cicero appears eight times, as early as 1566 and as late as 1699, and in that much-talked-of "Stoic" period between 1580 and 1640, when Seneca is absent. There are also three entries with neither place nor date given: Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*; Cicero, three orations (in French); and Horace, ed. Heinsius.

The "Waller library" formally validates the proposition made in my article with books purchased from the continent. In addition, I have been collecting a great deal of other information not yet ready for publication based on certain college libraries at Oxford and Cambridge and with a wider representation of classical authors. I do not think that Professor Freehafer would feel that the new evidence I have given settles everything, and I agree. But he must assent to what I have termed the "formal" validation of my earlier contentions and statistics. And there some will find a rub, because statistics are soulless, contrary to the spirit of the humanities, we are told. In all candor I think that objection rather silly. We can use all the

help we can get in understanding the past. And if we are concerned with classical writers and their impact on England, I do not think that we should imagine ourselves superior to classicists. Epigraphy, numismatics, paleography, computers for archaeological finds—these are basic tools of classicists. Speaking of whom, I shall add that it was a classicist, not I, who said Seneca's style was Asian rather than Attic, and for some reason the rejoinders ignored such facts in my article. And none of them has yet dared question that Cicero's Stoic writings were vastly more popular than Seneca's. Certainly I feel no hostility to the idea of Stoicism or to Seneca, as my *Cavalier Mode from Jonson to Cotton* should show. And I do hope that scholars of such distinction as Professors Williams and Freehafer will provide us with their original work on this general topic, as I hope to return to it myself at a later time. But *hic satis*.

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A Theme with Variations

To the Editor:

In his recent article in *PMLA* (86, Oct. 1971, 924–39), Oskar Seidlin convincingly argues that Mynheer Peepkorn in Thomas Mann's *Der Zauberberg* represents a synthesis between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the divine and the earthly, *caritas* and *eros*, and that he is not simply a blasphemous old fool. Although I would agree with Seidlin on his view of Peepkorn, the fact that Thomas Mann, great Ironist though he may have been, chose to symbolize the union between the noumenal and the phenomenal in such a highly controversial figure allows us at least to question whether this synthesis is, in fact, the author's final word on the matter.

And indeed, the attempt to bridge the gap between the natural and the supernatural represented by Peepkorn is followed immediately by yet another, even more questionable attempt called "Fragwürdigstes" (p. 907)¹: the occultist experiments engendered by Dr. Krokowski's lectures in which "auf einmal solche Rätsel dem Auge der Zuhörer erschimmerten wie das des Verhältnisses der Materie zum Psychischen . . ." (p. 908).

It turns out that the synthesis incorporated by Peepkorn is only one in a long series of probes into possible relations between the physical and the spiritual, beginning in highly conventional terms in the very first pages of the novel, continuing to include not only the figure of Peepkorn and the dubious occultist experiments, but also most other scenes and figures in the novel, and ending with the very last paragraph of the work.

At the very beginning of the novel we find the theme stated in its most traditional form. Hans Castorp's trek up the mountain hearkens back to a long tradition of similar passages in Western literature, the paradigm of which is Petrarch's ascent of Mont Ventoux. Petrarch's account and other descriptions falling within the same tradition all hinge on the expectation that at a given moment physical elevation will lead to spiritual elevation. Hans Castorp sets out with the intention of not becoming emotionally involved: "Er hatte nicht beabsichtigt, diese Reise sonderlich wichtig zu nehmen, sich innerlich auf sie einzulassen" (p. 12); imperceptively, however, the elevation of his body starts to have an influence on his spirit: "Dieses Emporgehobenwerden in Regionen, wo er noch nie geatmet . . . —es fing an ihn zu erregen . . ." (p. 13). The language begins to be ambiguous; the words used can apply to physical as well as to mental events.

It is characteristic of Thomas Mann's subtle art that allusions to Petrarch permeate the passage, while at the same time several ironic twists are introduced: Hans Castorp, like Petrarch, takes along a book on his journey, but where Petrarch had brought *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, Hans Castorp carries *Ocean Steamships*. It is surely no accident that the title Thomas Mann has chosen for his hero's book alludes to the transformation of water into steam, of a material entity into an immaterial one.

From these first pages on, the dialectic between the physical and the spiritual pervades the entire novel. A few examples of the various guises in which it appears will follow.

We find it, for example, in the binary opposition between Hofrat Behrens and Dr. Krokowski. The former, clothed in white, heals the body; the latter, clothed in black, delves into the recesses of the mind. The characterizations are worked out into the finest details: Behrens, for instance, never says "Gesegnete Mahlzeit," but always "Gesegnete Nahrungsaufnahme." We begin to recognize the significance of the expression when Hans Castorp remarks: "Aber Nahrungsaufnahme ist ja die reine Physiologie, und dazu Segen zu wünschen, das ist doch ein höhnisches Gerede" (p. 246). By contrast, Dr. Krokowski, "im Unterschiede von [seinem] verehrten Chef," upholds the exact opposite attitude: ". . . Das Organische ist immer sekundär . . ." (p. 268). His lectures lead to the psychosomatic observation: ". . . alle Krankheit [ist] verwandelte Liebe . . ." (p. 181), and the entire relationship between Hans Castorp and Clawdia Chauchat may be seen as an exploration of this hypothesis.

As might be expected, Settembrini and Naphta offer us two additional, mutually exclusive views of the relation between mind and matter. Settembrini denies the

actual existence of two separate entities: "'Die Natur,' sagte Settembrini . . . 'hat Ihren Geist durchaus nicht nötig. Sie ist selber Geist'" (p. 519); any opposition between the two has its origin in man and is without empirical foundation, though Settembrini is aware of the fact that he himself also gets caught in the intricacies and contradictions of the conventional way of talking (pp. 348–50). Naphta, on the other hand, finds the antithesis between body and soul the moving principle of the universe: "Der Dualismus, die Antithese, das ist das bewegende, das leidenschaftliche, das dialektische, das geistreiche Prinzip. Die Welt feindlich gespalten sehen, das ist Geist. Aller Monismus ist langweilig!" (p. 520).

Most of the other characters in the novel are also intrigued by this dualism and speculate about the nature of the link between body and soul. Behrens, of course, looks for an explanation in physiology exclusively: in connection with the phenomenon of blushing, where the influence of the mind on the body is most easily observed, he explains: ". . . das ist sozusagen mysteriös, besonders da es sich um psychische Einwirkung handelt. Wir nehmen an, daß Verbindungen zwischen der Großhirnrinde und dem Gefäßzentrum im Kopfmark bestehen" (p. 367).

In his own scientific studies, Hans Castorp himself explores yet another variation of the connection between the material and the immaterial. His investigations descend, as it were, along the great chain of being, in the hope of finding the exact spot where the material passes into the immaterial: "Allein beim chemischen Molekül angekommen, fand man sich bereits in der Nähe eines Abgrundes, der weit mysteriöser gähnte als der zwischen dem Materiellen und dem Nichtmateriellen. . . . Das Problem einer anderen Urzeugung, weit rätselhafter und abenteuerlicher noch als die organische, warf sich auf: der Urzeugung des Stoffes aus dem Unstofflichen" (pp. 394–95).

These few examples must suffice to show that not just Mynheer Peeperkorn, but each one of the other major characters as well, represents a meditation on the mystery of mind and matter. But the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal is explored in the novel not only by means of the characters, but also in various other ways. We have already called attention to the topos of the ascent up the mountain and to the occultist experiments. Seidlin, in turn, has exhaustively analyzed the function of the numbers three, four, and seven, which permeate the novel. Just as pervasive, however, and even more obvious is Thomas Mann's preoccupation with time. Whereas the "numbers game" is uncovered for the first time by Seidlin, the theme of time has frequently been commented upon; and yet it has not been pointed out so far that this theme also represents an attempt to find

the link between the material and the immaterial. Time is an immaterial phenomenon that manifests itself only in material guises. One passage from the many must suffice: "Was ist Zeit? Ein Geheimnis, —wesenlos und allmächtig. Eine Bedingung der Erscheinungswelt, eine Bewegung, verkoppelt und vermenget dem Dasein der Körper im Raum und ihrer Bewegung. Wäre aber keine Zeit, wenn keine Bewegung wäre? Keine Bewegung wenn keine Zeit? Frage nur!" (p. 479).

And yet, in spite of all the speculations about the nature of the link between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the mind and the spirit, it cannot be said that the novel comes to a conclusion about the matter: neither the Incarnation represented by Peepkorn, nor the physiological explanation put forth by Behrens, neither the scientific investigation carried out by Hans Castorp, nor the occultist experiments inspired by Dr. Krokowski, neither the cabalistic "numbers game," nor the reflections about the nature of time lead to definite answers. Each of these probings is marked by the appearance of words like "mysteriös" and "Mysterium" (often used, as Seidlin has pointed out, in connection with Peepkorn), "Rätsel" and "rätselhaft," "Geheimnis" and "geheimnisvoll," and we have no indication that the question was any less enigmatic to Thomas Mann himself than to his characters. In the last paragraph of the novel, in a characteristic reversal situation analyzed so well by Seidlin, the entire development of the novel is, in fact, reversed; the paragraph calls into question the very notion that the secret can ever be solved, the link between body and spirit, *eros* and *caritas*, ever be discovered. The fact that carnal indulgence once gave rise to a dream of love is no guarantee that this can ever happen again: "Abenteuer im Fleische und Geist . . . ließen dich im Geist überleben, was du im Fleische wohl kaum überleben sollst. Augenblicke kamen, wo dir aus Tod und Körperunzucht ahnungsvoll und regierenderweise ein Traum von Liebe erwuchs. Wird aus diesem Weltfest des Todes, auch aus der schlimmen Fieberbrunst, die rings den regnerischen Abendhimmel entzündet, einmal die Liebe steigen?" (p. 994).

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Note

¹ All quotations are taken from *Gesammelte Werke in zwölf Bänden*, III (*Der Zauberberg*), (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1960).

The Case of *The Merchant of Venice* Reopened

To the Editor:

Sylvan Barnet's "Prodigality and Time in *The Merchant of Venice*" (87, Jan. 1972, 26-30) attempts to

argue a case with a lawyer's persuasiveness rather than with a scholar's judiciousness. As the jury who are asked to render judgment, we are entitled to some cross-examination; unless our questions are answered convincingly, then we as jurors must adjudge Barnet's case as *non probata*.

1. Is there any convincing proof that Shakespeare was aware of the existence of those medieval and Renaissance writers who argued that "profitable activities must—if they are to be lawful—involve a risk, or, to put it a little differently, be at God's disposal; second, that unlike living creatures, which indeed grow in the course of nature if God wills, metal cannot grow merely by the passage of time" (p. 29)? After all, the existence of nondramatic literature and philosophy does not automatically mean that playwrights are either aware of or influenced by the intellectual and moral directions of their philosophical predecessors or contemporaries.

2. Granting for the sake of argument that Shakespeare was aware of such writings as Thomas Wilson's *A Discourse upon Usury*, are we to assume that Shakespeare was more influenced by that work than he was by the dictates of Elizabethan conventions? Didn't these conventions dictate that the hero (Bassanio) would happily resolve whatever problems he faced—or, more accurate, that these problems would be resolved for him without his having to lift his gentlemanly finger? Didn't convention also dictate that the villain—in this case, the Jew—had either to get his comeuppance or be converted to a way of life acceptable to the majority of Elizabethans? Here, of course, Shylock gets both his comeuppance and is also forced to convert to Christianity. In other words, can Barnet convince us that it was the moral superiority of Bassanio's way of life that brought felicity to him, and that it was Shylock's immoral selling of time, "which belongs to God" (p. 29) (I thought that everything belonged to God, not just time; I am relieved to learn that God's monopoly has finally been challenged), that brought grief to Shylock.

3. If indeed, as Barnet argues, profitable activities must involve risk to be morally acceptable, what precisely does Bassanio risk when he "elects to 'hazard all' upon an impulse" (p. 28)? After all, it is Antonio's money that he uses to finance his journey to Belmont to woo Portia and it is Antonio's pound of flesh that prompts Shylock to lend the 3,000 ducats. Is Shakespeare being ironic when he has Bassanio "hazard all" on the lead casket—or is Barnet being ironic when he argues that Bassanio was molded in the image of the courageous adventurer?

4. Did Bassanio really win his blessings because he had implicit faith in the "ripping of time" and did not rely on reasoning (p. 28)? Barnet claims that "The