

Like many Soviet dissertations, this one is quite dull to read. Andrushchenko was no literary stylist, and the dissertation genre evidently brought out the worst in him. His prose is stolid, without flair or humor. Considerable repetition occurs, and true to his love for archives, the author greatly overuses quotations from sources. Worse still, he lets his material overwhelm him, so that he treats insignificant episodes in absurd detail. If my own experience is any guide, even scholars working on the same subject will find Andrushchenko's forest difficult to discern amidst the profusion of timber and underbrush. The publishers have served the late author badly, too. There are several obvious errors in dates. In many cases archival citations are provided for materials that have lately been published: for example, Pugachev's interrogations, which R. V. Ovchinnikov edited for *Voprosy istorii* in 1966. The omission of maps is inexcusable in such a detailed work.

This monograph exhibits, in short, something of the best and the worst in recent Soviet professional historical scholarship.

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AUTOCRATIC POLITICS IN A NATIONAL CRISIS: THE IMPERIAL
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND PUGACHEV'S REVOLT, 1773-1775.

By *John T. Alexander*. Russian and East European Series, vol. 38. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, for the International Affairs Center, 1969. xii, 346 pp. \$8.50, paper.

The significance of the great peasant revolt under the leadership of Emelian Pugachev, 1773-74, for both the social and the institutional development of imperial Russia, can hardly be exaggerated. It was the last of the "great" peasant wars; it goaded Catherine II into reforming the provincial administration by granting a greater participatory role to the upper classes; and last, but not least, the revolt fostered new attitudes toward the peasantry on the part of the educated elite, and led to the creation of a new image of the Russian people in literature and thought. It is therefore a source of amazement that the relevant documents have not yet been properly published and that there still is no adequate history of the revolt itself. Despite the great attraction that this subject might have offered Soviet historians, ideological and political circumstances have so far conspired to prevent the publication of a comprehensive synthesis, even within the Marxist explanatory framework. We have a mass of disparate detail, but not even a clear and reliable chronicle of the major events and aspects of the revolt. Needless to say, there is virtually nothing in Western languages, except for short résumés or sensational popularizations.

Under the circumstances, Mr. Alexander's book is very welcome indeed. As its title indicates, the focus is on the government's reaction to the revolt and on the measures taken to quell it and to deal with the institutional weaknesses laid bare by Pugachev's initial successes. In this, his avowed aim, Alexander has done a very creditable job. His documentation is impressive in its completeness and breadth: he has read all the published sources and also rummaged in archives in the Soviet Union and England (the bibliography is excellent and very useful). Unfortunately, the archives have yielded only a few details that merely add a touch of concrete vividness to a picture otherwise adequately suggested by published sources.

Alexander makes several interesting observations. He agrees with the conclusion reached by the investigating commissions that there was no foreign intrigue or collusion behind Pugachev's rising. He shows that Catherine contemplated tactics

of military and diplomatic retreat in the last stages of the war with Turkey out of a desire to free her hands to deal with Pugachev. But Alexander's own evidence does not indicate that *in fact* the revolt affected the outcome of the war and negotiations for the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. He notes that in order to deal with the serious crisis of the revolt (and the stalemate on the Danube), Catherine brought about changes at court. To rid herself of the Orlov-Chernyshev faction she made G. A. Potemkin her favorite and enlisted the help of Nikita Panin. Although this suggestion is not unwarranted, the evidence available is not conclusive. The empress did, of course, take into account the relative strength of court factions, but I personally do not think that Catherine depended so completely on their support as Alexander tries to prove. In fact, his interpretation rests on his belief that there existed a diarchy of autocrat and nobility and that Catherine's government was the tool or puppet of the gentry. (Alexander also puts much stress on the very doubtful assumption that Panin actively worked for a limitation of the autocracy.) This was hardly the case, and Alexander takes for granted that which has yet to be proven.

The chronicle of the government's concrete reactions to the revolt is interesting, lively, and persuasive. But we are not given a satisfactory picture of the causes that gave rise to the rebellion or of the forces that helped to shape its course and character. Admittedly, such considerations are beyond Alexander's narrow subject. But by failing to give an adequate picture of the background, he raises at times more questions than he realizes. For example, noting the problem of communicating with the peasantry (pp. 95–96), he does not seem aware of the nature of the conceptions of political authority that lay at its root. He follows too uncritically Soviet (and radical) historiography in downgrading Catherine's statesmanship; his own evidence points to a different impression. There are a few minor blemishes: for example, he refers to the Republic of Ragusa as that of Dubrovnik; the reference to the quotation on page 110 is incorrectly cited, and why leave in French a phrase that in the original was italicized to indicate quotation marks?; the use of *ibid.* in the notes is very confusing. Unfortunately, too, Indiana University Press has served Alexander very poorly. Apparently at the Press they believe that students and scholars need not buy books and that libraries may be charged any price—how else are we to explain that a shoddily produced book should be sold at \$8.50?

In its limited purpose of accounting for the concrete responses of the imperial government to the Pugachev revolt, Alexander's book succeeds very well and will be of great value to students. But the dynamic forces behind the peasant and Cossack revolts and their effect on Russian life and culture still need elucidating. The field remains open for the analytically minded with a firm grasp of the conditions and processes underlying Russian reality in the eighteenth century.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1800–1860. By William L. Blackwell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. ix, 484 pp. \$12.50.

This is a work of intermediate synthesis and as such deserves a warm welcome. It is one of those relatively scarce works that, unlike the monograph, deal with a large topic or time span about which a great many monographs and sources have already been published, and that, unlike the general text or essay, provide full scholarly documentation. Blackwell's book may be considered as virtually a com-