

generalizations comparable to those of the sciences?' This, the author mentions by the way, is a thought after forty years in the field.

I believe that leading anthropologists could, without losing their academic integrity, at least put forward some generalized hypotheses to assist those labouring in the field of sociology and social ethics. I remember getting my first structural idea of the reasons for the movement to socialization of modern man in a lecture on the landed Tikopia contrasted with the hunter Andamanese Islanders. The landed people could insure themselves and their 'social welfare' by individual ownership and heredity. The semi-nomadic men, as the modern industrial worker, used things more in common, needing, in their insecurity, a wider basis of life insurance. For the first time I began to demoralize the property question in its social components.

In this book one finds insights of a different kind. For instance the culture patterns described in the Sudan and East Africa are so like those in South Africa as to give one a tremendous sense of the unity of African culture south of the Sahara, the more surprising because of the great break in language unity from the Bantu line southwards. Yet in this tip of the African migrations one seems to find, historically, a more marked move to great centralized chieftaincies, even before the white man had intervened. This could be because of the influence of what Oliver and Fage call the Sudanic kingdoms spreading south from upper Egypt, passed by the Bantu in their migration south. But since the pattern jumps a whole host

of less organized tribes between, it is easier to associate the Zulu kingdom of Shaka, and others, with overcrowding in the tip of Africa when the migrations reached it. Here one might begin to look for another law.

The illustration of such social laws, if they exist, from outside the modern controversial atmosphere, from phenomena prefiguring such developments as U.N.O. and the welfare state right back in the roots of human culture, seems to be a contribution the anthropologist could make, at least as a sideline. Dr Evans-Pritchard says he should perhaps consider himself more an ethnographer than an anthropologist. Yet the only other generalized essay in the book, that on the position of women in primitive society contrasted with that in modern societies, while it does perhaps contain more statements one would like to see further evidenced than in the case of the other studies, is extremely interesting and provocative of thought. It may be that, as the data grows, we are due for a further evolutionary synthesis in anthropology, more careful than the first one. It is such an intensely human subject as handled by the author that one cannot help hoping this will be the case.

The reviewer must frankly confess to a moral and social-ethical interest in the book, rather than that of the professional anthropologist. But perhaps this is a useful reflection in a line slightly different from that in which it will have been reviewed elsewhere.

F. Synnott, O.P.

SUPERIORITY AND SOCIAL INTEREST by Alfred Adler, edited by Heinz L. Ansbacher and Rowena Ansbacher. *Routledge and Kegan Paul, 45s.*

Alfred Adler formed one of the trio with Freud and Jung who are the fathers of modern dynamic psychology. Like Freud he was of Jewish origin and was born in the city of Vienna. He joined Freud's circle in 1902 but ultimately broke with him some eight years later. Adler's departure was followed by that of Jung, Stekel, Rank and others, leaving orthodox Freudian

psychology to-day very much a minority group. The differences which led to the rifts are a combination of theory and the incompatibility of personalities. Psychoanalysis was in some ways a new faith which demanded absolute obedience to the founder. Not many could accept the authoritarian ways of Freud and departed.

Now all the major figures are dead and atten-

tion is given to their discoveries rather than their personality differences. Adler is famous for his emphasis on the feelings of inferiority which produce a style of life organized to protect the individual from the real or imaginary threat that his feelings of inferiority evoke in him. This orientation meant that the central core of the personality was found in the ego, man's conscious awareness of himself and the resultant interaction between himself and others. This removed the importance of the unconscious on which Freud placed so much emphasis. The trend towards a greater appreciation of the importance of the ego is seen in the majority of recent advances in dynamic psychology and Adler's contributions are receiving a belated but rightful recognition.

For Adler the goal of Individual Psychology which is the name he gave to his movement is to help the patient overcome his various feelings of

inferiority present in his way of life and thus reintroduce him into a satisfactory relationship with his fellow human beings. It is a positive goal with optimistic expectations about man's capacity to achieve this and of society in general to rise above the limitations imposed by selfishness, isolation and aggression. In this sense he was much more optimistic about human relationships than Freud.

Adler was basically a humanist but unlike Freud had no theoretical objections to religion which helped man to achieve the socializing goals of improved human relationships.

The book contains twenty-one papers by Adler of variable quality and there is inevitably a great deal of repetition in the contents. They are, however, an invaluable source for any one concerned with the original thinking and works of this great psychologist.

J. Dominian

EDUCATION AND VALUES by G. H. Bantock. *Faber and Faber, 25s.*

18+ UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Edited by Marjorie Reeves). *Faber and Faber, 25s.*

Professor Bantock is concerned to remind the teacher from various points of view that he is 'inescapably involved in the world of values'. He is critical of the increasing precision about educational means, not in itself but in so far as it seems to imply increasing vagueness about purposes. He is adept at ferreting out covert value judgments in those whose writing is allegedly empirical, and of reminding them of the danger of converting factual into value statements. Here his training in linguistic analysis serves him well. Yet he is deeply distrustful of the 'rationalist' who 'is a great enemy of waste, under which heading he is inclined to include aspects of social life which fail to fit in with the narrow range of his morality'. He is critical of much educational sociology, of much 'progressive' educational thought and of modern educational research in general in these terms. When he comes to discuss value and purpose he relies largely on the literary intelligence, the educated

sensibility and the insights into the 'manalive' this gives. Besides the analytic and sceptical there is the tradition of 'rootedness' and acceptance, the tradition of authority, represented by Newman, Arnold, Eliot, Lawrence, Leavis. Professor Bantock rightly stresses for instance, how T. S. Eliot in *Notes Towards a Definition of Culture* appreciates a dimension in 'culture' which the anthropologist misses; just as Henry James, sees a dimension to the individual, which is beyond the psychologist. This 'rich complexity' of individual and social life, is available only, in Lawrence's phrase, to 'the flow of our sympathetic consciousness'. Professor Bantock sees, though I am doubtful about this, a reconciliation between the literary and empirical approaches in Schultz's concept of *Verstehen*, the construction of *homunculi*, human models, scientific in their relevance, adequacy, logical consistency and compatibility, yet literary in their human sensitivity.