

# Emotional (security) communities: the significance of emotion norms in inter-allied conflict management

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**Abstract.** What do *Al-Qaeda*, Human Rights Watch, and NATO have in common? They can all be understood as emotional communities. Emotional communities are ‘groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions’. This article develops a conceptual framework for a particular type of emotional community in world politics: a security community. It is argued that emotion norms – the expression of appropriate emotions in a given situation – stabilise a security community during inter-allied conflict. The argument is illustrated by an empirical case study of NATO’s military intervention in Libya in 2011. The article shows how the conceptualisation of security communities as emotional communities has significant implications for the study of regional peace and security.

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## Introduction

Emotional communities are all around us, whether we take a church congregation, supporters of a particular sports team, or the profession of medical doctors. What links these communities conceptually is a collective understanding of its basic emotional appraisals and their appropriate expression. In a church congregation, members share ‘good’ emotions of charity and compassion while trying to overcome ‘bad’ emotions like greed or selfishness.<sup>1</sup> Supporters of Manchester United are united in

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<sup>1</sup> It should be pointed out that the appraisal of a particular emotion as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ is solely determined by the members of the emotional community and may thus vary from community to community. For example, transnational criminal networks like the Mafia may perhaps not automatically label ‘greed’ as a strictly negative emotion.

their common (and often lively) expression of adoration and admiration for their team, and (sometimes violent) show of distaste for rivalling teams. In the American Medical Association, members share a professional understanding that it is appropriate to suppress emotions like caring or compassion in order to separate themselves from the emotional suffering of their patients.<sup>2</sup>

In world politics, human rights activists form transnational advocacy networks because they are emotionally moved by human stories of suffering and distress and, in turn, use the same logic to move other people and governments to action.<sup>3</sup> *Al-Qaeda* is an emotional community in which its members glorify and mourn martyrdom and are united by their expression of (violent) anger and hatred against Western liberal values. The members of the European Union (EU) share an emotional history of grief and trauma rooted in the destructive effects of two major wars.<sup>4</sup> It is argued that all of these social groups can be understood as emotional communities, that is, ‘groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions’.<sup>5</sup>

Emotional communities have been studied, in one form or another, in History, Psychology, and Sociology. To my knowledge, however, its usage in International Relations (IR) remains void. This article invites the reader to view world politics as a set of parallel and often overlapping emotional communities. Specifically, this article deals with the emotional foundations of inter-allied conflict management by studying one particular type of emotional community: a (pluralistic) security community.<sup>6</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) typically serves as a textbook example of a security community, whereby a security community is considered to be ‘a group which has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with “reasonable” certainty over a “long” period of time’.<sup>7</sup>

The main argument raised here is that emotion norms stabilise security communities during inter-allied conflict. Emotion norms emerge from behavioural confirmation or disconfirmation and guide people to display emotions to fit a socially defined situation.<sup>8</sup> For example, the loss of human lives on 11 September 2001 is a situation

<sup>2</sup> Allen C. Smith and Sherryl Kleinman, ‘Managing Emotions in Medical School: Students’ Contacts with the Living and the Dead’, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52 (1989), pp. 56–69.

<sup>3</sup> Karin Fierke, *Political Self Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>4</sup> Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, ‘Emotional Reconciliation Reconstituting Identity and Community after Trauma’, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11:3 (2008), pp. 385–403; Stephan Stetter, Carlo Masala, and Marina Karbowski (eds), *Was die EU im Innersten zusammenhält. Debatten zur Legitimität und Effektivität Internationalen Regierens* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichtenman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>7</sup> Deutsch *et al.*, *Community*, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Mary R. Rose, Janice Nadler, and Jim Clark, ‘Appropriately Upset? Emotion Norms and Perceptions of Crime Victims’, *Law and Human Behavior*, 30 (2006), pp. 203–19; David R. Heise and Cassandra Calhan, ‘Emotion Norms in Interpersonal Events’, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58 (1995), pp. 223–40; Arlie R. Hochschild, ‘Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 85 (1979), pp. 551–75.

where grief and sorrow are appropriate. Understanding security communities as emotional (security) communities that are guided by collectively shared emotion norms furthers our knowledge about the internal mechanisms within these groups and contributes to a wider debate in IR about the sociological and emotional foundation of world politics.<sup>9</sup>

A number of researchers have studied the role of emotions, affect, and feelings in IR.<sup>10</sup> Emotions have been traditionally regarded in the social sciences as confused (often violent) bodily motions that prevent any self-reflection about one's conduct.<sup>11</sup> Cognitivist theory argues instead that the expression of emotions is a moral act that is based on a cognitive appraisal of 'good' and 'bad'.<sup>12</sup> Norbert Elias, for example, acknowledges that rational forms of social behaviour may account for much in world politics.<sup>13</sup> However, he argues that analysing rational behaviour and thought processes in isolation or as a mechanism that is meant to control drives and affects is bound to remain static and incomplete. Rationalist conceptions like interests are only one manifestation of behaviour in world politics among many. What matters, according to Elias, are the balances and conflicts (the figurations) between interests and emotions. Building on Elias, Thomas J. Scheff and Erving Goffman argue in a similar way that overemphasis of self-control and self-awareness tends to neglect the emotional basis of human behaviour.<sup>14</sup> Thus, far from being peripheral or unknowable, emotions form an integral part of social and cultural development. Building on this line of research, this article defines emotions as moral judgments that reflect an intellectual appraisal of present expectations and past experience rather than energetic impulses and passions.

The article is structured into three parts. First, it explains the concept of emotional community. Second, it develops a conceptual framework for a particular type

<sup>9</sup> Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, 'Differentiation Theory: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16:3 (2010), pp. 315–37; Andrew Linklater, 'Process Sociology and International Relations', *Sociological Review*, 59:1 (2011), pp. 48–64.

<sup>10</sup> Ty Solomon, 'I wasn't angry, because I couldn't believe it was happening': Affect and discourse in response to 9/11', *Review of International Studies*, 38 (2012), pp. 907–28; Janice Bially Mattern, 'A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations', in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds), *International Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 63–86; Lucile Eznack, 'Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships', *Security Studies*, 20:2 (2011), pp. 238–65; Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics. Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jonathan Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs', *International Organization*, 64:1 (2010), pp. 1–31; Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Fear No More. Emotions and World Politics', *Review of International Studies*, 34 (2008), pp. 115–35; Andrew Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:2 (2006), pp. 197–222.

<sup>11</sup> Charles Darwin, *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* (London: John Murray, 1872); Sigmund Freud, *The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (New York, NY: Liveright, 1966).

<sup>12</sup> Toni Erskine and Richard Ned Lebow, *Tragedy and International Relations* (London: Palgrave, 2012); Fierke, *Sacrifice*; Linklater, *Harm*; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); see also Magda B. Arnold, *Emotions and Personality* (New York, NY: Cassell, 1960); Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (Cambridge: Hackett, 1993); Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1728/2002).

<sup>13</sup> Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

<sup>14</sup> Thomas J. Scheff, *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to Face Behavior* (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1967).

of emotional community in IR, namely a (pluralistic) security community. In this context, the article distinguishes between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ emotion norms of an emotional (security) community. Third, this conceptual framework is applied empirically to the case of transatlantic conflict over NATO’s military intervention in Libya in 2011. The case study shows how emotion norms stabilised the community on the inside as well as on the outside during a period of inter-allied conflict. The article concludes with some general implications for the study of world politics and outlines a tentative agenda for further research.

### **Emotion norms and community**

The concept of emotional community was originally developed by Barbara Rosenwein.<sup>15</sup> Rosenwein looks at how emotional communities formed and vanished during the Early Middle Ages and shows how these communities emotionally linked together a particular group of actors through the expression of a particular set of collectively shared emotions. Related to this is Gandhi’s conceptualisation of how affective communities forged strong bonds among marginalised groups united against imperialism.<sup>16</sup> Emotion norms, on the other hand, are a primary concern of the sociology of emotions. Arlie R. Hochschild, for example, develops the idea of ‘feeling rules’ that determine what emotions are considered to be good or bad in a given social group.<sup>17</sup> William M. Reddy argues that emotional expressions such as emotional talk and gestures are ‘performative speech acts’ that possess a transformative character in social relationships.<sup>18</sup> Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns introduce ‘emotionology’ as a useful term to capture collective emotional standards in social groups as opposed to individual emotional experience.<sup>19</sup> Connecting emotions to the study of peace, G. M. White shows that emotion norms play an important role in resolving conflict peacefully within communities, for example in South Pacific cultures.<sup>20</sup> What these approaches all have in common is that they treat emotions as moral judgments about proper behaviour. They claim that the vast and loose array of ambivalent and inconsistent emotions can be managed and controlled through institutionalised and inter-subjectively shared emotional guidelines and conventions that can be learnt and expressed according to a given social situation.<sup>21</sup> In sum, they treat emotion norms

<sup>15</sup> Rosenwein, *Communities*.

<sup>16</sup> Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

<sup>17</sup> Hochschild, ‘Emotion’.

<sup>18</sup> William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>19</sup> Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, ‘Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards’, *American Historical Review*, 90:4 (1985), pp. 813–36.

<sup>20</sup> G. M. White, ‘Moral Discourse and the Rhetoric of Emotions’, in C. A. Lutz and L. Abu-Lughod (eds), *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 46–68.

<sup>21</sup> Nussbaum, *Upheavals*; Dylan Evans, *Emotion: The Science of Sentiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); C. R. Harris, ‘Cardiovascular Responses of Embarrassment and Effects of Emotional Suppression in a Social Setting’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81 (2001), pp. 886–97; W. G. Parrot and R. Harré, ‘Embarrassment and the Threat to Character’, in R. Harré and W. G. Parrot (eds), *The Emotions* (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 39–56; R. C. Solomon, ‘The Philosophy of Emotion’, in M. Lewis and J. M. Haviland (eds), *Handbook of Emotions* (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 1993), pp. 3–15.

as contributing to establishing and maintaining social ties and stability among members of a particular group.

An emotional community rests on shared ‘fundamental assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression’ that can be methodologically traced through similar emotional styles and discourse.<sup>22</sup> Emotion norms thus provide the emotional fingerprint that makes one emotional community distinguishable from other emotional communities. Similar emotional styles and discourse do not necessarily require similar or even identical interests.<sup>23</sup> The members of an emotional community may (and often do) disagree on a variety of issues. What remains important is that, in resolving their conflicts, members follow the use and expression of properly agreed emotion norms, for example, when and how anger is an acceptable form of emotional expression. In such communities emotions do not ‘float freely’ but are managed by its members in a way that makes them more reliable.<sup>24</sup> Emotional communities thus limit the availability of particular emotional expressions in a given situation and their impact on proper behaviour. Finally, emotional communities may overlap and some members may be part of several emotional communities at the same time.<sup>25</sup> The following sections of this article deal with one particular type of emotional community in world politics, namely a (pluralistic) security community.

### The conceptual foundations of emotional (security) communities

The obvious challenge is to isolate the conditions under which an emotional (security) community operates. To answer this challenge the article builds deductively from what we know about security communities based on the literature and compare these findings with what has emerged from the study of emotions in IR.

Building in part on Émile Durkheim’s work on rituals as well as Goffman’s interaction order, it is argued that most social groups and individuals in international politics actively seek the company of emotionally like-minded others and are thus in principle able to form emotional communities.<sup>26</sup> For example, international diplomacy can be viewed as a broad emotional community based on a commonly agreed emotion norm (norm of emotional restraint) and performed to produce symbolic meanings and to establish social hierarchy, status, and power. Furthermore, according to Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan, the presence of emotional bonds among members of a social group generates collective meaning and identity.<sup>27</sup> The presence of emotional bonds – ‘a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties, of “we-feeling”, trust and mutual consideration’ – also plays a significant role in a security community.<sup>28</sup> A number of IR scholars have recently widened the concept of interstate

<sup>22</sup> Rosenwein, *Communities*, p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Kevin Lewis, Marco Gonzalez, and Jason Kaufman, ‘Social Selection and Peer Influence in an Online Social Network’, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 109 (2012), pp. 68–72.

<sup>24</sup> Helena Flam, ‘Emotional “Man”: I. The Emotional “Man” and the Problem of Collective Action’, *International Sociology*, 5:1 (1990), pp. 39–56.

<sup>25</sup> Rosenwein, *Communities*, pp. 109, 199.

<sup>26</sup> Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1995 [orig. pub. 1912]); Goffman, *Ritual*.

<sup>27</sup> Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (eds), *The International Handbook of Violence Research* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003).

<sup>28</sup> Deutsch *et al.*, *Community*, p. 17.

trust by exploring its emotional basis.<sup>29</sup> Linking their work to the study of security communities, it is further argued that emotional bonds contribute to mutual identification and trust in a security community.

Based on what we already know about the role of emotions in IR and insights generated from the study of emotion norms and emotional community, two tentative assumptions will be made about the conceptual framework of emotional (security) communities. First, members are able to recognise the positive moral character and benevolent behaviour of significant Others. Eliot R. Smith shows how community members identify and admire the emotional character of fellow members and imitate them in their own behaviour, internalise group-level emotions, and share these collective emotions in their dealings with the outside world.<sup>30</sup> Similar processes can be witnessed in a security community. In a security community, members have established intergovernmental and people-to-people-ties with open channels of communication that help them to respond to and manage each other's needs and communicate appropriate emotions to defuse the destructive potential of inter-member conflict.

Second, the consolidation of a security community rests not exclusively on the self-perpetuating role of 'positive' emotions but also on the stabilising function of 'negative' emotions.<sup>31</sup> Agents sanction the emotional indifference or non-conformity of fellow members through emotional mechanisms that seek to erase the sources of discord (for example, expression of anger, stigmatisation, consensus-building negotiations, persuasion). Such negative emotional reactions do not necessarily herald the disintegration of the security community but often signal closeness among its members and display their emotional attachment to the community as opposed to behaving indifferent.<sup>32</sup>

Based on these tentative assumptions, it is argued that emotion norms provide an affective glue that helps security community members stick together and that contributes to stabilise the social order within these communities. The following subsections will further elaborate on these assumptions by outlining three conditions for emotional (security) communities.

### *Rituals and symbols*

In a security community, the mutual experience and communication of shared emotions can be said to create feelings of mutual belonging and contributes to an affectionate state of solidarity. The social locus for sharing these feelings is the performance of solidarity rituals. A ritual is understood as 'the performance of more or less invariant

<sup>29</sup> Torsten Michel, 'Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 18:1 (2012), pp. 1–22; B. C. Rathbun, 'Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations', *International Organization*, 65:2 (2011), pp. 243–73; Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Trust Building Between Enemies in the Nuclear Age*, unpublished manuscript (2007), available at: {<http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/research/research-centres-and-institutes/ddmi/research/nuclear-worlds/publication-sontrust/>} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>30</sup> Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, 'Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence For Four Conceptual Criteria', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93 (2007), pp. 431–46.

<sup>31</sup> Eznack, 'Crises'; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>32</sup> Eznack, 'Crises', p. 247.

sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers'.<sup>33</sup> Rituals involve the physical assembly of the members of a social group, their awareness and focus on a common object or action, and the sharing of similar emotions through their expression and discourse toward these objects or action.<sup>34</sup> Such symbolic rituals produce so called 'high-order meanings' that lead to mutual identification between Self and Other.<sup>35</sup>

Rituals thus function as mechanisms to synchronise individual emotional states, to define social roles and status, commit members to future actions and sharpen the boundaries between insiders and outsiders.<sup>36</sup> This takes place through properly performed and standardised verbal and gestural emotional expressions that ultimately draw the community members closer together. Rituals are thus fundamental to maintaining stable emotional communities because they make members aware of their membership. Durkheim describes this process: 'It is no longer a single individual speaking, rather it is a group incarnate and personified.'<sup>37</sup> When we look at the concept of security community, similar mechanisms can be found there as well. These involve shared experience and communication, mutual understanding and trust, a sense of 'we-ness', and a sense of boundary toward outsiders.<sup>38</sup> Symbolic rituals in a security community (for example, NATO summits, joint military exercises, or commemorating events) create high-order meanings necessary to maintain social order and collective identity.

Symbolism plays an important part in these rituals. Symbols may be defined as 'orders to recall something from memory'.<sup>39</sup> Deutsch underlines the importance of symbols in a security community: 'By noting which symbols are frequently associated with each other, we may learn something about the context in which political messages are perceived, remembered, and recalled on later occasions'.<sup>40</sup> Symbols contribute to identify political meanings in a given situation. Empirically, symbols are traceable in different forms such as abstract symbols (words, ideas, slogans), pictorial symbols (codes of arms, flags), personal or human symbols (heroes, leaders, saints, prophets), or symbolic places (capital cities, historic sites, national shrines, centers of pilgrimage).<sup>41</sup>

Second, symbols perform a representational function by designating a certain group to form collective emotional memories and experiences. In other words, symbols are meaningless unless people grow emotionally attached to them. For example, what it means to be an American evokes a certain conceptual idea of 'we-feeling' only among those that can emotionally relate to it. Those that identify themselves as 'Americans' share a distinct pattern of collective emotional attachment that is manifested in recurring rituals such as Fourth of July celebrations, presidential

<sup>33</sup> Roy A. Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>34</sup> Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 22.

<sup>35</sup> Rappaport, *Ritual*, p. 71.

<sup>36</sup> Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1970), p. 21; David I. Kertzer, *Rituals, Politics, and Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Durkheim, *Elementary*, p. 129.

<sup>38</sup> Deutsch *et al.*, *Community*; Adler and Barnett, *Communities*.

<sup>39</sup> Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key. A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957 [orig. pub. 1942]), p. x.

<sup>40</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, *Tides Among Nations* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1979), p. 201.

<sup>41</sup> Deutsch, *Tides*, p. 202.

inaugurations, and the pledge of allegiance as well as worshipping places and objects with symbolic significance such as the Declaration of Independence or the Lincoln Memorial.<sup>42</sup> More negative examples that show that the process of binding people together often works in tandem with pernicious representations of Others include the Nazi efforts to install collective emotions through a variety of resentment and hate strategies and the extensive use of collective symbols and rituals.

Symbols play an important role in solidarity rituals at the intergovernmental and transnational level such as speeches, summits, ceremonies, youth exchanges or festivals that contribute to maintaining an emotional community. In a Durkheimian sense, the symbolic meaning of a particular object or person acts as a prism that concentrates the particular emotional ‘colors’ of individual group members into a collective bundle of shared emotional meanings. In a security community ‘individuals are reminded of what values the group sanctions, how they are able to orient emotionally to those values, and what the consequences will be if they are violated’.<sup>43</sup> In this sense, symbolic rituals reaffirm existing emotion norms by reducing the complexity of emotional expressions and by managing emotional expressions and communication.

### *Knowledge and power*

Conceptualising security communities as emotional communities does not render questions of power irrelevant. Members exercise power over outsiders through selective membership as well as over insiders by expressing ‘negative’ emotions such as anger in cases of non-compliance. Power, of course, derives not only from material sources such as military force, size of a country’s population and territory, its economic performance, and natural resources but also from non-material sources such as human resources and organising skills, ideas, knowledge, access to and processing of information, social experience, and political institutions as well as history and culture.<sup>44</sup> Deutsch and his associates refer to the former kind as ‘power’ while they term the latter kind ‘responsiveness’.<sup>45</sup> Adler makes a similar distinction between the material resources to accomplish certain goals (power) and the authority to define collective meanings and practices (knowledge).<sup>46</sup> While both material and non-material sources of power are important in a security community, scholars studying the subject agree that knowledge (understood as creating shared meanings) plays a crucial role in a security community.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Robert N. Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, *Daedalus*, 96 (1967), pp. 1–21.

<sup>43</sup> Sally Planalp, *Communicating Emotions. Social, Moral, and Cultural Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 157.

<sup>44</sup> Janice Bially Mattern, ‘Power in Realist-Constructivist Research’, *International Studies Review*, 6:2 (2004), pp. 343–46; Richard Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines’, *International Organization*, 52:3 (1998), pp. 613–44.

<sup>45</sup> Deutsch *et al.*, *Community*, p. 40.

<sup>46</sup> Emanuel Adler, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, *Millennium* 26:2 (1997), pp. 249–77, esp. p. 335.

<sup>47</sup> Michael Cox, ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantica’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 11:2 (2005), pp. 203–33; Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:1 (2006), pp. 119–27; Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst, ‘Security Communities and the Habitus of Restraint. Germany and the United States on Iraq’, *Review of International Studies*, 33 (2007), pp. 285–305; Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse (eds), *The End of the West? Crises and Change in the Atlantic Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Veronica M. Kitchen, ‘Argument and Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community’, *Security Dialogue*, 40:1 (2009), pp. 95–114.



Understanding security communities as emotional communities points to the epistemological centrality of emotional knowledge. Emotional knowledge is an agent's ability to cognitively and morally categorise emotional expressions and to emotionally connect these affective categories to Others' identities based on experience over time.<sup>48</sup> In other words, members have to be able to *know* what it means to be angry, ashamed, or happy in order to understand its social implications and evoke appropriate emotional reactions toward others within a particular social situation based on previous experience and moral judgments.<sup>49</sup> For example, anger can be interpreted as destructive to close relationships because one may have experienced the destructive nature of anger in previous relationships. At the same time, anger may be perceived as displaying the closeness of a relationship based on a very different emotional experience.

Emotional knowledge is based on intersubjective learning, that is, the habituated establishment and recurring exchange of emotions that shape the identities of social actors. One member communicates emotions to other members who then give emotional feedback and, in turn, receive emotional feedback on their part, and so on. Through this perpetuating process of emotional socialisation, members of an emotional (security) community can enter a stage of understanding by building a common emotional history together which contributes to the establishment of shared meanings and even trust.<sup>50</sup> In sum, emotional knowledge is about orientation and meaning. It is the accumulation of memories, founding myths, experiences, and symbolic patterns that enables members to make sense of the world around them within an emotionally shared reality.<sup>51</sup>

Process sociology has shown how emotional knowledge forms part of asymmetries of power and status in which 'established' groups secure the compliance of outsiders.<sup>52</sup> Insiders maintain and reproduce a particular self-image of social superiority *vis-à-vis* outsiders based on group charisma and emotional knowledge (feeling of social superiority/pride). At the same time, established groups persuade outsiders to internalise feelings of social inferiority (shame) through emotional rigidity, stigmatisation, and by placing the contact of insiders with outsiders under a taboo. Accordingly, contact with outsiders is associated with negative feelings. Through these figuration processes, 'inside' groups exercise and maintain a power asymmetry that is rooted in emotional knowledge.<sup>53</sup>

Inside an emotional (security) community, members are not treated as approximate equals but are woven together in asymmetrical power relationships. The self-image of the established group is formed based on the minority of its 'best' members (core group). This core group performs a norm building function and exercises power over potential or actual norm breakers through control and stigmatisation.<sup>54</sup> Members can only participate in an emotional community by complying with certain emotional

<sup>48</sup> Ute Frevert, *Emotions in History – Lost and Found* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011).

<sup>49</sup> Planalp, *Emotions*, p. 33.

<sup>50</sup> Keith Oatley and Jennifer M. Jenkins, *Understanding Emotions* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996), p. 181.

<sup>51</sup> Antonio Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind. Constructing the Conscious Brain* (New York, NY: Pantheon, 2010).

<sup>52</sup> Elias, *Process*; Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems* (London: Frank Cass, 1965).

<sup>53</sup> Elias and Scotson, *Established*, pp. 8, 12.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 42.

patterns of affect control. Members who do not comply by siding with or showing sympathy toward outsider groups will risk losing their power and status within the 'inside' group. In other words, the core group is able to teach and enforce emotion norms. The notion of a core group corresponds nicely with Deutsch's notion of 'cores of strength' within a security community. Security communities develop around cores of strength that possess material and moral authority due to their superior material power, international legitimacy, and acquired norms and practices.<sup>55</sup> In the transatlantic (emotional) security community, it seems fair to suggest that the US forms such a core.

In sum, processes of emotional socialisation involving power and status are constantly present in an emotional (security) community and reproduced through knowledge: less superior members assimilate in relation to more powerful core groups, rivalling other members for status and power, shaping and reshaping their emotional experience and group charisma, or responding in ways that satisfy other members.<sup>56</sup> Hence, emotional knowledge and power are interwoven: communicating and transferring emotional knowledge within and between groups constitutes and maintains power relationships.

### *Collective identification and trust*

Ritualised and symbolic interaction generates emotional knowledge and understanding. However, the ability to recognise *that*, *how*, and *what* the other is feeling is still a long way from feeling *with* another agent. Without the ability to emotionally connect with others, mutual understanding as the basis of interstate trust remains sketchy at best. The presence of shared emotions may simply be a coinciding event. For example, two political leaders may laugh about the same joke or pick up an infectious smile. Even though this feeling *along* with each other may lead to sympathy, it does not generate collective action based on empathy.<sup>57</sup> In other words, simply responding to the emotions of others is not to be mistaken for responsiveness in a security community. In the former case, the Self simply picks up the emotions of the Other by making it their own. In the latter case, the Self identifies *with* the Other by feeling exactly the same kind of emotions. Empathy thus requires sharing the same emotions by 'placing oneself psychologically in that other person's circumstance'.<sup>58</sup> Feelings of empathy can also be found in a security community. Take for example, the emotional solidarity expressed within the transatlantic security community in the aftermath of 9/11. When the United States faced a collective trauma on 11 September 2001, NATO members expressed spontaneous and sincere positive emotions. 200,000 took the streets of Berlin to show their solidarity with the United States. In Britain, the US National Anthem was played during the change of guard in front of Buckingham Palace.

<sup>55</sup> Deutsch *et al.*, *Community*, p. 28; Emanuel Adler, 'The Change of Change: Peaceful Transitions of Power in the Multilateral Age', in Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foong Khong (eds), *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order* (New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 138–58, esp. p. 147.

<sup>56</sup> Elias, *Process*.

<sup>57</sup> Planalp, *Emotions*, p. 55.

<sup>58</sup> R. S. Lazarus, *Emotion and Adaptation* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 287.

In a mature (pluralistic) security community like NATO, members will be more inclined to share their emotions with each other simply because they trust each other. Community members will then tend to express similar emotions in a given situation. Michel's conception of trust is helpful here. He distinguishes between trust as an emotive disposition, which precedes cooperative behaviour, on the one hand, and strategic trust, on the other hand (which he calls 'reliance'), which follows from cooperative behaviour.<sup>59</sup> A similar account is presented by Booth and Wheeler who distinguish between functional 'trust-as-predictability' and emotional 'trust-as-bond'.<sup>60</sup> The latter conception of trust thus represents an emotive and moralistic disposition: 'Trust emerges here as a moralistic disposition which guides and influences behavior by structuring our engagement with the world'.<sup>61</sup> This conception of trust-as-bond mirrors the main argument about the binding role of emotions in an emotional security community. Since trust-as-bond is based on normative rather than strategic cooperation, harming strategic trust (reliance) will result in mere disappointment without questioning the meaning of action. The loss of emotive trust, on the contrary, will generate feelings of betrayal, which shake the foundations of community. In other words, a perceived betrayal by members of the emotional (security) community would result in much deeper and intense emotions (anger) than feelings of disagreement or disappointment (I will return to this point below). In sum, the link between trust and the idea of an emotional connection among members of an emotional (security) community is based on a member's moral judgment of the overall integrity and character of a particular other member expressed through the empathetic sharing of emotion norms.

### *Counterarguments and alternative explanations*

This degree of mutual identification and trust in an emotional (security) community requires norms about acceptable and appropriate emotional expressions that will be specified in the following section. Prior to this, it seems necessary to engage with possible counterarguments and alternative explanations in order to lay out explicitly the specific contributions of emotions as explanatory factors in a security community.

Janice Bially Mattern, for example, argues persuasively that identity can be a source of order in security communities during crises. According to her argument, member states can use language power or representational force to repair or recreate a broken-down identity. By representational force, Bially Mattern means 'a forceful but non-physical form of power exercised through language' that leaves a victim with the non-choice between suffering and compliance.<sup>62</sup> In this sense, Bially Mattern offers a similar analysis yet entirely different explanation of security communities in crises. To be fair, Bially Mattern does not deny that identity also includes emotional bonds. Yet, her analysis centers on configurations of sociolinguistic identity in which a

<sup>59</sup> Torsten Michel, 'Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 0:0 (2012), pp. 1–22, esp. p. 18.

<sup>60</sup> Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 229.

<sup>61</sup> Michel, 'Time', p. 18.

<sup>62</sup> Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics. Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), pp. 95–6.

security community is stabilised during crises through the strategic use of forceful language or ‘linguistic guns’.<sup>63</sup>

The argument in this article, on the contrary, revolves around configurations of socioemotional identity in which a security community is stabilised during crises through the expression of appropriate emotions in a given situation. While it is true that such emotions can be expressed through discourse, identity in an emotional security community is not represented *by* language but by the emotion norms communicated *through* language. In this sense, the article views identity not as a socio-linguistic but instead as a socioemotional construct.

Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot argue that security communities are ‘communities of practice as they tacitly practice peaceful change’ through background knowledge or habitus.<sup>64</sup> These authors view practices as the natural and self-evident way of solving inter-state disputes in a security community at the exclusion of violent practices. From this perspective, the non-representational dimension of trust as one of the key constitutive factors of a security community derives directly from common practices and thus becomes the habitus or background knowledge of this community. Pouliot goes even further to argue that practices are the ‘engine of social action’ and constitute peace as a social reality in a security community being thus prior to instrumental rationality, norm compliance, or communicative action.<sup>65</sup>

The logic of practice as articulated by Adler and Pouliot, however, does not grant emotions the role of a separate explanatory factor in analysing security communities. In fact, in his earlier work, Adler explicitly states: ‘To grasp the process by which mutual responsiveness develops in pluralistic security communities, we must understand community *not* as a matter of feelings, emotions, and affection, but as a cognitive process through which common identities are created’.<sup>66</sup> Also, the logic of practice emphasises the non-representational dimension of trust in a security community. By contrast, the concept of emotional (security) community finds itself within the ‘representational bias’ pointed out by Pouliot as opposed to the logic of practice because the concept of emotional (security) community stresses the importance of collective emotional standards and norms, which it defines as representations of prior moral judgments.<sup>67</sup>

Ted Hopf uses the security community concept to illustrate how the logic of habit predominates among a particular group of states. His conception differs somewhat from Adler’s and Pouliot’s account: ‘A security community of habit is less reflective, purposive, agential, and normative than a security community of practice.’<sup>68</sup> Hopf treats emotions and habits as almost interchangeable concepts and argues that, ‘security community members expectations are also reinforced by habits of affect . . .

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 97.

<sup>64</sup> Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations. The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), p. 17; Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality. A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’, *International Organization*, 62:2 (2008), pp. 257–88; see also Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, ‘When Security Community Meets Balance of Power. Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance’, *Review of International Studies*, 35:1 (2009), pp. 59–84; Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds), *International Practices* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

<sup>65</sup> Pouliot, *Logic*, pp. 278–9.

<sup>66</sup> Adler, *Imagined*, p. 263, emphasis added.

<sup>67</sup> Pouliot, ‘Logic’, p. 260.

<sup>68</sup> Ted Hopf, ‘The Logic of Habit in International Relations’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 16:4 (2010), pp. 539–61, esp. p. 553.

that blocks reflective consideration of one's responses to their actions, ensuring a reinforcing spiral of amity'.<sup>69</sup> According to Hopf, habitualised emotions of amity thus make a security community more stable.

At first glance, Hopf's assumptions appear to be similar to the dynamics occurring in emotional (security) communities. There are, however, a number of important distinctions to be made that clearly separate emotion norms from emotional habits. First of all, the logic of habit (similar to the logic of practice) assumes that security communities are 'not to be based on trust'.<sup>70</sup> By contrast, trust (based on mutual identification) constitutes one of three conditions of emotional security communities outlined above. Second, emotional communities are based on collective learning. The logic of habit, on the contrary, is 'the antithesis of learning' because learning requires a reflectiveness denied by habit.<sup>71</sup> Third, and for the same reason, the logic of habit excludes any form of 'moral calculations'.<sup>72</sup> In this article, it is argued instead that, in emotional security communities the expression of emotions is a moral act that is based on a cognitive appraisal of 'good' and 'bad'. More precisely, the article defines emotions as moral judgments that reflect an intellectual appraisal of present expectations and past experience. Such moral appraisals and judgments presuppose a reflectiveness that stands in contrast to both the logic of practice as well as the logic of habit, which emphasise 'automatic perceptions, attitudes and responses'.<sup>73</sup> Finally, the logics of habit and practice fundamentally depart from the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness 'by stressing that the actions of actors in the world are often not the product of deliberate calculation of any sort, instrumental or normative'.<sup>74</sup> While emotional security communities also depart from the logic of consequence, they can still be said to operate within the logic of appropriateness by stressing the role of emotion norms.

Finally, Lucille Eznack argues persuasively that affect influences inter-allied relations and explains how affects during a situation of crisis can be viewed as 'signals of strength' rather than heralding the demise of that cooperative relationship. She illustrates her point by using the cases of Britain and the United States during the Suez crisis in 1956 as well as of France and the United States during the Iraq crisis in 2003 and by contrasting these bilateral cases to the relationship between Turkey and the United States in 2003.<sup>75</sup> Eznack's argument shares some commonalities with my own argument in the sense that we both view affect and emotions to be essential for understanding why crises occur among allies in general and within NATO in particular, and focus on political leaders as the affective embodiment of such interstate relationships. Moreover, Eznack identifies norm violations as a mechanism that triggers strong emotional reactions and concludes that such reactions contribute to repairing the 'relational culture' among close allies.<sup>76</sup>

Apart from these commonalities, however, there are a number of important distinctions to be made. The most important difference lies in the relationship between

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 540.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 553.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Hopf, 'Logic', p. 544.

<sup>75</sup> Eznack, 'Crises'.

<sup>76</sup> Eznack, 'Crises', p. 244.

norms and emotions. Eznack reasons that emotions function as catalysts that intensify and ‘exacerbate’ reactions to prior norm violations of appropriate social behaviour within an alliance.<sup>77</sup> My own argument takes a fundamentally different approach by understanding emotions as configurations that form a constitutive element of an emotional (security) community. In this sense, whereas Eznack emphasises the socio-behavioural dimension of affect in an alliance (‘norms of appropriate *behavior*’), my argument focuses on the socioemotional dimension of a security community (‘norms of appropriate *emotions*’).

### **Inside/outside emotion norms**

Based on what we know about security communities, the emotions expressed within such communities can be expected to differ from those expressed towards outsiders.<sup>78</sup> The emotion norms of a security community can thus best be viewed through the prism of the inside/outside dualism.<sup>79</sup>

It is argued that inside a security community, members value and encourage emotions that emphasise the norm of amity like empathy, pride, gratitude, grief, honor, respect, compassion, or sympathy. At the same time, they tend to discourage or show restraint toward emotional expressions that stress the norm of enmity such as fear, anger, disgust, hatred, jealousy, and rage. Outside the security community, members collectively express emotions that are compatible with the norm of enmity, such as anger or fear, toward those non-members that are perceived as threatening or incompatible with the community’s ‘way of life’. What is of importance to the argument developed here is that a combination of particular emotional expressions (and their meaning) directed inwards, and reserved exclusively for the members of the emotional community, on the one hand, and particular emotional expressions directed outwards, on the other hand, contribute to the consolidation and stability of the community. For example, the transatlantic security community is built on the consensus that an attack on one member is an attack against all. In the event of an outside attack against a community member, all members expect each other to react with the appropriate emotional expression (sympathy with the ‘attacked’/anger at the ‘attacker’). In the case of 9/11, for example, such collective emotions were immediately mobilised to be in tune with the social situation. Based on this inside/outside dualism, the emotion norms of an emotional (security) community are categorised here as amity (inside) and enmity (outside).

#### *Inside emotion norm: amity*

Amity produces durable bonds, reliability, and trust in at least three ways. First, it assures a ‘distinctive way of life’ and a sense of belonging that sets the community apart from other areas and regions including the one they previously inhabited.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Eznack, ‘Crises’, pp. 240, 248; also Lucile Eznack, *Crises in the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 32–6.

<sup>78</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Communities*.

<sup>79</sup> Linklater, *Harm*; J. Barbalet (ed.), *Emotions and Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

<sup>80</sup> Deutsch *et al.*, *Community*, p. 48.

The development of such a way of life is, of course, closely related to the social construction of a collective identity, a sense of community or 'we-feeling' in a security community.<sup>81</sup> Second, amity encourages community members to respond to each other's needs, messages, and behaviour in a way that enables members to resolve their conflicts peacefully. Finally, through processes of learning the emotional expressions of community members align in a way that enables them to predict one another's intentions and, ultimately, to overcome feelings of uncertainty. This alignment of individually expressed emotions creates a background condition for peaceful interaction by developing shared meaning. In an emotional (security) community, members feel secure through an intensified emotional state of connectedness and belonging: They 'lose their selves in the others'.<sup>82</sup> In sum, the norm of amity performs important functions within an emotional (security) community: It encourages mutual commitment, responsiveness, and predictability and thus contributes to the stabilisation of collective identification and mutual trust.

Amity among members of an emotional (security) community is expressed through collective feelings of empathy, pride, guilt, gratitude, grief, honor, respect, compassion, or sympathy. However, as pointed out above, in case certain members display emotional indifference or non-conformity, one would expect other members to react with anger or dislike. Such expressions of 'negative' emotions within a security community are perfectly compatible with the norm of amity because they carry a fundamentally different meaning than the outside emotion norm of enmity described below. Members, due to the emotional knowledge established over time, are able to differentiate between both meanings. While the former kind of anger is meant to increase the gap between insiders and outsiders the latter kind signals closeness and emotional attachment to the community in order to repair an internal state of crisis.<sup>83</sup>

Shame constitutes the corresponding feeling to anger in an emotional (security) community. It signals the presence of a moral trespass and a threatened bond. Shame and embarrassment indicate dissatisfaction with one's impression in the eyes of other members based on a negative response.<sup>84</sup> Thus, shame in response to anger monitors and regulates the degree of unity and division within the community: Once shame is acknowledged social bonds can be repaired. Denial of shame, however, results in further alienation and division.<sup>85</sup>

### *Outside emotions norm: enmity*

Enmity also builds trust among members of an emotional security community by setting insiders apart from outsiders and thereby generating internal cohesion. Disconnecting insiders from outsiders is an act of identity building necessary for developing and maintaining a security community.<sup>86</sup> In an emotional (security) community,

<sup>81</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Communities*, p. 46.

<sup>82</sup> Flam, 'Emotional', p. 48; see also Scheff, *Revenge*, p. 51.

<sup>83</sup> Lucile Eznack, *Anger toward friends vs. anger toward enemies. How affective dispositions affect states' emotional reactions to each other's behavior*, Paper prepared for the 53rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego (1–4 April 2012).

<sup>84</sup> Goffman, *Ritual*; Elias, *Process*.

<sup>85</sup> Scheff, *Revenge*, pp. 32, 53.

<sup>86</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Communities*, p. 38.

amity and enmity are two sides of the same coin. Collective identification in a security community cannot be treated in isolation but can only be fully understood if viewed as an emotional construction of a (or multiple) shared Other(s). Such a shared Other must not exclusively be defined in strictly military terms such as an outside military threat but contains a much broader concept based on regime type (for example, democracy vs. non-democracy), cultural or religious differences (for example, Occident vs. Orient), and/or spatial concepts (for example, the Atlantic area vs. the Pacific rim). Thus, the norm of enmity must not primarily be defined in terms of material or physical coercion but rather in terms of a perceived risk or harm to the distinctive 'way of life' of an emotional (security) community.

It is certainly not suggested that all non-members are considered a threat in the sense that they threaten the physical survival of the inside group. It does emphasise, however, that such inside/outside figurations sharpen the boundaries between insiders and outsiders. This is particularly the case in crisis situation (such as the Libya intervention) when members of an emotional (security) community become locked into an insider-outsider dualism that is hard to disrupt and leaves little room for differentiation.<sup>87</sup> Neither does this figuration negate the possibility of new members to join. It does suggest, however, that these new members will enter the community not as approximate equals but as members with inferior status and power *vis-à-vis* established members. Underlying this power asymmetry are fears of losing identity and social cohesion on behalf of the core group.

Enmity toward outsiders is expressed through collective feelings of fear, anger, jealousy, envy, rage, dislike, hate, bravery, or courage. As laid out above, the emotional knowledge generated within an emotional (security) community helps members to distinguish between, for example, anger expressed by community members towards insiders (amity) and anger expressed by community members toward outsiders (enmity).

Building on the argument raised in the beginning, the following case study is meant to illustrate how emotion norms stabilised the transatlantic security community by diffusing the potentially damaging effects of inter-member conflict. The case study is chosen because the vote in the UNSC on Resolution 1973 represents a recent yet understudied case of transatlantic conflict management. Similar arguments could be made about other transatlantic conflicts like the Iraq crisis in 2003 or the Suez crisis in 1956. Any of these conflicts provides a formidable case study to demonstrate the presence of emotions in a security community since such situations tend to produce extreme emotional expressions that can be empirically traced and documented by the researcher.

### **Case study: transatlantic conflict over the Libyan intervention in 2011**

NATO's military intervention against Libya in 2011 produced a number of serious conflicts within the transatlantic security community. Most notable among these conflicts was the push for greater military engagement in Libya by France and Britain as well as the refusal by Turkey to hand over command to NATO. The most serious

<sup>87</sup> Linklater, *Harm*; Norbert Elias, *Involvement and Detachment. Contributions to the Sociology of Knowledge* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).



conflict within the transatlantic security community, however, arose over the abstaining vote on Resolution 1973 by Germany in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). UN Resolution 1973 authorised the use of military force to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. Since the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle had previously even insisted to oppose the resolution (but was eventually persuaded by German diplomats to abstain), the vote was perceived as a 'no' by France, Great Britain, and the US. It was the first time that Germany had not sided with its fellow transatlantic community members in the UNSC on a major security issue. This provoked fears on both sides of the Atlantic of German 'nationalist calculations' and a 'non-aligned foreign policy'.<sup>88</sup> The German vote thus can be said to have had a destabilising effect on the transatlantic security community with the potential to provoke a serious crisis.

The stabilising effects of emotion norms in the transatlantic security community will be empirically traced here on the inside as well as on the outside. Accordingly, the case study is structured into two parts. First, the presence and effects of the inside emotion norm of amity will be shown by looking at how relevant community members reacted to Germany's abstention in the UNSC. Second, the case study will switch perspective by looking at how the outside emotion norm of enmity expressed by the same community members toward the Gaddafi regime equally stabilised the security community. In doing so, the case study design applies the conceptual framework of inside/outside emotion norms developed above. The empirical analysis will only look at the main parties involved in the conflict, namely Britain, France, Germany, and the US who are NATO member states and were also members of the UNSC in 2011. In addition, the analysis will focus on elite discourse among political leaders. Political leaders are defined here as 'responsible decision-makers' having a political mandate in one form or another which includes heads of state, heads of governments, cabinet members, and other elected representatives.<sup>89</sup> Since political leaders are publicly mandated representatives of their respective state one would expect them to internalise (at least to a significant extent) the emotion norms of the emotional (security) community.<sup>90</sup>

It is fair to suggest that many political leaders may simply not show their 'true' emotions unless it is politically opportune. Thus, the emotional expressions (or lack thereof) on the surface may not necessarily reflect what these individuals feel underneath. Obviously, it is impossible to look into the heads of political decision-makers – be it interests, ideas, or emotions and this article is no exception to that. Even though these limitations are real they do not make the empirical analysis irrelevant. The main task of this article is to show that emotions have a binding role in social arrangements at different levels of world politics. It is thus less interested in emotional patterns *within* individual political leaders but more inclined to trace emotional patterns *between* individual political leaders and the societies they represent. This conception can be based on Elias concept of 'figuration': 'The social fabric and its historical change are not chaotic but possess, even in phases of greatest unrest and disorder, a clear pattern and structure. To investigate the totality . . . does not mean to study each individual process within it. It means first of all to discover the basic

<sup>88</sup> 'The Unadventurous Eagle', *The Economist* (12 May 2011).

<sup>89</sup> Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

<sup>90</sup> Eznack, 'Crises', p. 242.

structures which give all the individual processes . . . their direction and their specific stamp.<sup>91</sup> A similar argument can be found in the concept of emotionology cited above, which distinguishes the collective emotional standards from personal emotional experiences.<sup>92</sup>

### *Amity*

The decision for military intervention in Libya was controversial among NATO members from the very start. With France and Britain actively pushing for military enforcement of a no-fly zone to protect the Libyan opposition, the United States and Germany (along with others) remained at first sceptical of fighting another war in the region. In March 2011, however, the US changed its position when it became clear that a humanitarian crisis in the city of Benghazi was imminent. In addition, the Arab League came out in support of a no-fly zone, and Security Council veto powers China and Russia signalled that they would not block a UN resolution to authorise the use of military force. Germany, in contrast to its NATO allies in the UNSC, held on to its position not to become a war party in Northern Africa opting instead for more far-reaching economic and financial sanctions against the Gaddafi regime.

The German abstention in the UNSC on March 17 must have been a shock to political leaders in France, Britain, and the US because Germany could have supported the resolution without automatically having to contribute troops. The symbolic meaning of the abstaining vote thus proved to be much more destabilising than the material lack of German military capabilities. As an important member of the transatlantic security community, Germany had, for the first time, openly sided with non-members like China, Russia, Brazil, and India in the UNSC on a significant security issue leaving France, Britain, and the US isolated. What shook the community's foundation was thus less Germany's refusal to participate in the military intervention – many NATO member countries chose not to participate militarily – but Germany's refusal to offer political and moral support for the mission. As a result, Germany's symbolic move was interpreted as an open display of emotional indifference, an undermining of solidarity and trust or, bluntly speaking, as 'a stab in the back'.

In defending its position, Germany was quick to point out that its decision to abstain on UN Resolution 1973 was not to be mistaken with indifference or even sympathy for the Gaddafi regime.<sup>93</sup> Instead, Germany portrayed its decision as a rational choice, a process of logical reasoning, a 'difficult evaluation process . . . of weighing up the pros and cons'.<sup>94</sup> The underlying emotional motives of the German decision-making process – the 'concerns and fears about the consequences of a military operation' based on Germany's 'painful experience' in the past – were, at least initially, sidelined in public declarations and speeches.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Elias, *Process*, p. 400.

<sup>92</sup> Stearns and Stearns, *Emotionology*, p. 813.

<sup>93</sup> Angela Merkel, *Press Statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel on Current Developments in Libya* (18 March 2011).

<sup>94</sup> Guido Westerwelle, *Statement by the German Foreign Minister in the German Bundestag on UN Security Council Resolution 1973* (18 March 2011).

<sup>95</sup> Westerwelle, *Statement*.

Disappointed by the emotional indifference expressed by Germany, NATO members could hardly conceal their anger at the German government. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé was rather polite when he said that, 'I would have liked to see us accompanied by Germany.' Anonymous voices in the French diplomatic service spoke more bluntly of a German 'mistake with unpredictable political consequences' and a 'crisis' within NATO. Echoing French diplomats, the French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote 'the German government is lacking solidarity or any maturity'. The French magazine *Le Parisien* even quoted a French diplomat who directly attacked the German Chancellor: 'Our relationship is getting markedly colder ... Angela Merkel will have to pay for this!' These statements clearly reveal that French policy-makers no longer viewed Germany as an equal and instead attempted to coerce and seek revenge.<sup>96</sup> This notion is further substantiated by *Le Figaro*, which cites another French diplomat who calls the German UNSC abstention 'a severe blow to the Franco-German friendship'. Another statement by the French foreign minister Alain Juppé even conveys the threat not to cooperate with Germany in the future: 'The common security and defense policy of Europe? It is dead!'<sup>97</sup>

In a meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Brussels, Alain Juppé, supported by his Danish colleague, Lene Espersen, confronted Guido Westerwelle directly with this anger stating that 'if we had not intervened there would have probably been a bloodbath in Benghazi'. In NATO headquarters, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen openly accused the German NATO representative of violating group solidarity. In response, the German representative interrupted the NATO meeting by leaving the room.<sup>98</sup> But Rasmussen went on to link his anger at Germany directly to the transatlantic norm of amity: 'Obviously some of those allies and partners carrying the heavy burden start to ask whether it would be possible to broaden the participation a bit ... That is also the essence of our alliance: that allies that actually have the necessary assets at their disposal, also contribute those assets, based the principle of solidarity.'<sup>99</sup>

As pointed out above, in an emotional (security) community, such meetings represent ritualised performances symbolising solidarity and their abrupt disruption undermines social cohesion and trust among its members. Accordingly, members of the House of Commons spoke of 'obstruction' and 'cowardice' while British Prime Minister David Cameron did not even attempt to defend Germany against such accusations.<sup>100</sup> In Washington, President Barack Obama wrapped his anger into a not so subtle verbal side blow against Germany: 'Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.'<sup>101</sup>

<sup>96</sup> 'Setback for Franco-German Relations', *SpiegelOnline* (24 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/setback-for-franco-german-relations-paris-and-berlin-at-odds-over-libya-operation-a-752992.html>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>97</sup> 'France Plays Hawks, Germany Demurs', *The Guardian* (24 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/france-hawk-germany-demurs-libya-europe>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>98</sup> 'Libya Crisis Leaves Berlin Isolated', *SpiegelOnline* (28 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-serious-mistake-of-historic-dimensions-libya-crisis-leaves-berlin-isolated-a753498.html>} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>99</sup> 'NATO Pushes Allies on Libya', *Army Times* (8 June 2011), available at: {<http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-nato-pushes-allies-for-more-libya-involvement-060811>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>100</sup> David Cameron, *Prime Minister Statement to the House of Commons Following the UN Security Council Adoption of Resolution 1973 on Lybia* (18 March 2011); Sebastian Borger, 'London kritisiert Berlin wegen Enthaltung', *Der Standard* (19 March 2011).

<sup>101</sup> Barack H. Obama, *Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya* (28 March 2011).

Setting Germany apart from the rest of the group, Obama left out Germany when he spoke of ‘our close allies’.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, in April 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose Berlin of all places as the venue for making clear just how angry American leaders were at Germany. In front of her predominantly German audience, Clinton evoked emotions of shame and embarrassment: ‘The world did not wait for another Srebrenica in a place called Benghazi.’<sup>103</sup> Subsequently, at a NATO meeting on 8 June, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates linked the American anger to the transatlantic norm of amity by demanding German solidarity as ‘a matter of fairness in an alliance built on the principle of shared burdens’.<sup>104</sup> In a similar way, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé criticised Germany for undermining allied solidarity when he argued that ‘NATO must play its full role, and it is not doing so sufficiently’.<sup>105</sup> Finally, in a joint declaration by state leaders Obama, Sarkozy, and Cameron published simultaneously in the *International Herald Tribune* (New York), *Le Figaro* (Paris), and the *Times* (London), they hardly hid their collective anger at the German norm violation of amity by calling the German lack of solidarity in Libya ‘an unconscionable betrayal’ and that opposition to the Gaddafi regime needed to ‘begin with a genuine end to violence, marked by deeds not words’.<sup>106</sup> Consequently, French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, and British Foreign Minister William Hague argued in similar ways.<sup>107</sup> Such allied finger pointing reveals high levels of collective stigmatisation and emotional rigidity against the German norm breakers by equating abstention in the UN Security Council with ‘betrayal’.

In addition to these direct expressions of anger against Germany, there were also more subtle forms of passive anger.<sup>108</sup> For example, at the G8 Summit in the French seaside resort of Deauville in May, the leaders of the G8 met in a seaside restaurant to discuss the Arab reform movement and other regional issues. When the Libyan military intervention came on the table, the five parties involved in the air campaign – Canada, Britain, France, Italy, and the US – continued the meeting without German Chancellor Angela Merkel.<sup>109</sup> It is hard to imagine that the disruption of such an

<sup>102</sup> Obama, *Remarks*.

<sup>103</sup> ‘United in Mutual Annoyance’, *SpiegelOnline* (6 June 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/united-in-mutual-annoyance-what-s-gone-wrong-with-german-us-relations-a-766826.html>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>104</sup> ‘Gates Presses Allies To Do More Against Libya’, *Army Times* (8 June 2011), available at: {<http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-gates-presses-allies-to-do-more-against-libya-060811>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>105</sup> ‘France and Britain Say NATO Is Not Fulfilling Its Role In Libya’, *Deutsche Welle* (12 April 2011), available at: {<http://www.dw.de/france-and-britain-say-nato-not-fulfilling-its-role-in-libya/a-14980521-1>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>106</sup> Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicholas Sarkozy, ‘Libya’s Pathway to Peace’, *International Herald Tribune* (14 April 2011), available at: {<http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/10324-document-obama-cameron-a-sarkozy-say-nato-attacks-will-continue-until-gaddafi-goes.html>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>107</sup> ‘France, UK Say NATO Falling Short On Libya’, *CBS News* (12 April 2011), available at: {[http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202\\_162-20053078.html](http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20053078.html)} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>108</sup> Passive anger is a ‘deliberate and masked way of expressing covert feelings of anger’ by, for example, giving someone the cold shoulder, deprive or exclude someone from something they value, or simply avoiding someone. Jody E. Long, Nicholas James Long, and Signe Whitson, *The Angry Smile: The Psychology of Passive Aggressive Behavior* (Austin, TX: Pro-Ed, 2008), p. 12.

<sup>109</sup> Peter Müller, ‘Kriegsrat ohne Kanzlerin’, *SpiegelOnline* (27 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/g-8-gipfel-in-deauville-kriegsrat-ohne-kanzlerin-a-765366.html>} accessed 4 November 2012.

important symbolic ritual at the G8 summit by physically excluding one member would not have resulted in any emotional impact on German political leaders.

Indeed, German political leaders began to publicly express solidarity toward Britain, France, and the US by complying with the emotion norm of amity. When Angela Merkel addressed fellow party members in the German Bundestag, she wished the allies success and conceded that the decision to abstain on Resolution 1973 had been made ‘with a heavy heart’.<sup>110</sup> In various speeches and remarks by members of the German cabinet in the following days and weeks, an emotional pattern emerged that stressed the norm of amity by expressing ‘gratitude’, ‘honor’, and ‘respect’ *vis-à-vis* other security community members.<sup>111</sup> German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle underlined that: ‘We respect and understand those partners ... who ... came to a different conclusion than we did. We understand those who, for honourable motives, chose to support international military intervention in Libya.’<sup>112</sup>

Up to this point, the overall performance by Britain, France, and the US can be viewed as sanctioning the emotional non-conformity of Germany. This performance was arguably intended to provoke feelings of shame – an acknowledgement that Germany had violated the inside emotion norm of the transatlantic security community. Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, for example, wrote in a contribution to a German national newspaper that he felt ‘nothing but shame for the failure of our government’.<sup>113</sup> Other members of the German political elite reacted in similar emotional ways. Former German Chief of Staff and former head of NATO’s military planning committee, Klaus Naumann, echoed Joschka Fischer by stating: ‘I am ashamed of the position of my country.’ In the German media, Richard Herzinger, an influential journalist writing in the conservative newspaper *Die Welt*, criticised ‘the shameful way that Germany emerged as the party seeking to delay action’ and the liberal German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* published a headline calling the Libya intervention ‘A German shame’.

Feelings of collective shame among German political elites were not, however, confined to inactive policymakers like Joschka Fischer. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, a prominent member of the German Bundestag, shouted in a parliamentary debate on Libya: ‘I think it’s a shame that the federal government, as a member of the UN Security Council, abstained in this situation.’ The head of the oppositional Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel, followed suit depicting the vote in the UNSC as ‘simply undignified’. Omid Nouripour, defence spokesperson of the Green Party in the German Bundestag, also found allied anger over the German vote in the UNSC understandable: ‘This was a disgrace!’ But even in her own party, Merkel faced the repercussions of allied anger expressed, for example, by her German parliamentary spokesperson for foreign policy, Philipp Mißfelder, the chairperson of the foreign relations committee in the European Parliament, Elmar Brok, as well as Ruprecht Polenz, head of the foreign relations committee in the German Bundestag, who

<sup>110</sup> Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles, ‘Berlin lässt seine Verbündeten alleine kämpfen’, *Spiegel Online* (18 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/libyen-einsatz-berlin-laest-seine-verbuendeten-alleine-kaempfen-a-751673.html>} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>111</sup> ‘Merkel Praises NATO for Libya Campaign’, *The Local* (18 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.thelocal.de/national/20110827-37221.html>} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>112</sup> Guido Westerwelle, ‘Interview with German Foreign Minister’, *SpiegelOnline* (21 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/Spiegel-interview-with-german-foreign-minister-gadhafi-must-go-ther-s-no-question-a-752164.html>} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>113</sup> Joschka Fischer, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik – eine Farce’, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (24 March 2011).

all feared that Germany had lost its previous status and trustworthiness among members of the transatlantic security community as a result of the UN vote.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, a usually calm and collected Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Energy and also a fellow party member of Angela Merkel, responded to a question on Libya at a press conference in a very emotional way: 'In Berlin, they can say what they want, to the point of embarrassment!'<sup>115</sup>

Feelings of shame and embarrassment are usually equated with inferior status. In an emotional (security) community, it means the loss of 'love and respect of those whose approval matters' and it is this type of appraisal that can lead to social conformity.<sup>116</sup> As pointed out above, acknowledging feelings of shame can lead to reconciliation and community-building while denial of shame leads to further isolation.<sup>117</sup> In the Libyan case, it can be tentatively argued that German political leaders indeed felt shame resulting from the emotional expression of anger and disappointment expressed by important community members. As a result, Germany became emotionally disconnected from the rest of the group. In order to regain its previous status within the community, Germany, at least implicitly, acknowledged feelings of shame by conforming to the inside emotion norm of amity, thus expressing feelings of gratitude, honor, and respect toward its fellow members. In addition to the feelings of collective shame cited above, Angela Merkel's statement that she was 'saddened' by the political discussions among NATO members following the UN Security Council vote points into this direction.<sup>118</sup> When it did, arguably, the door for reconciliation opened again.

This process of transatlantic reconciliation – following Germany's reaffirmation of solidarity and symbolically underscored by the decision to step up its military surveillance in Afghanistan to disburden NATO members involved in the air campaign over Libya – was embedded into a series of community-building symbolic rituals. On 14 April, the NATO ministers of foreign affairs held their meeting in Berlin (of all places) to issue a joint statement on Libya that included a reaffirmation of NATO unity and solidarity. On 7 June, Barack Obama awarded the German Chancellor with the Presidential Medal of Freedom – the highest civilian award in the US<sup>119</sup> – and granted her the first state dinner for a European head of state during his presidential term. This public expression of mutual gratitude, honor, and respect – a 'unity reviving ceremony'<sup>120</sup> – was accompanied by highly emotional remarks by the US President and the German Chancellor that ushered an aura of intimacy between

<sup>114</sup> 'Koalition der Kämpfer', *SpiegelOnline* (22 March 2011), available at: {<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/militaereinsatz-in-libyen-koalition-der-kaempfer-a-752488.html>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>115</sup> 'Westerwelle vollzieht Kehrtwende bei Nato-Militäreinsatz', *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (28 August 2011), available at: {<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-deutschen-und-der-krieg-in-libyen-westerwelle-vollzieht-kehrtwende-bei-nato-militaereinsatz-1.1135764>} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>116</sup> Elias, *Process*, pp. 414–15.

<sup>117</sup> Hutchison and Bleiker, *Reconciliation*; Scheff, *Revenge*.

<sup>118</sup> Ulrike Guérot, *Germany in Europe: Angela's Walk of Shame*, The European Council on Foreign Relations (24 March 2011), available at: {[http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/germany\\_in\\_europe\\_angelas\\_walk\\_of\\_shame](http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/germany_in_europe_angelas_walk_of_shame)} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>119</sup> The Presidential Medal of Freedom is awarded to individuals that have made 'an especially meritorious contribution to the security or national interests of the United States, world peace, cultural or other significant public or private endeavors' (EO 9586). Recipients include Mother Teresa, Lech Walesa, and Stephen Hawking.

<sup>120</sup> Flam, 'Emotional', p. 49.

both political leaders. In his remarks, Barack Obama underlined the degree of emotional identification between both leaders by stating that, 'it is our joint will that this NATO mission is successful . . . we have one heart of allies that beats with the other allies'.<sup>121</sup> Angela Merkel, on her part, stressed collective 'pride' of the German-American heritage, and 'gratitude' for the US role in World War II. On several other occasions during her remarks, she emphasised the metaphor of transatlantic 'friendship' and linked it to her own personal emotional experience:

Without the United States of America, I would in all probably not be able to stand here before you today. Overcoming the Cold War required courage from the people of Central and Eastern Europe and what was then the German Democratic Republic, but it also required the steadfastness of Western partner over many decades when many had long lost hope of integration of the two Germanys and Europe.<sup>122</sup>

The day before the award ceremony, Barack Obama gave an interview to a German newspaper (his first interview with a German print media since his inauguration) in which he talked about his personal 'feelings' for his 'friend' Angela Merkel. In tune with the German Chancellor, the US President appeared eager to stress the emotion norm of amity expressing 'respect', 'gratitude', 'admiration', and feelings of 'trust'.<sup>123</sup>

In sum, Germany's decision to abstain on UN Resolution 1973 was interpreted by Britain, France, and the US as an open display of emotional indifference and thus, a violation of the community's inside emotion norm of amity. Britain, France, and the US sanctioned the non-conformity of Germany through the expression of anger and by setting it apart from the rest of the group. This appears to have produced feelings of shame and embarrassment on the German side accompanied by a loss of power and status within NATO. In order to regain its previous status within the community German political leaders publicly expressed emotions that reaffirmed the norm of amity, which led to a process of reconciliation. It can thus be reasonably claimed that in the Libyan case the emotion norm of amity stabilised the emotional (security) community and contributed to a ritualised process of reconciliation on the inside.

### *Enmity*

The Libyan intervention was accompanied by recurring public emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and even outright hate toward the Gaddafi regime by NATO's political leaders. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, depicted the Libyan leader as

a ruthless dictator that has no conscience and will destroy anyone or anything in his way. If Qaddafi does not go, he will just make trouble. That is just his nature. There are some creatures that are like that.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>121</sup> Angela Merkel and Barack H. Obama, *Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel in a Joint Press Conference*, Washington, DC (7 June 2011).

<sup>122</sup> Merkel and Obama, *Remarks*.

<sup>123</sup> Barack H. Obama, 'Interview with President Obama', *Der Tagesspiegel* (5 June 2011).

<sup>124</sup> Quoted in Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, 'As U.N. Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role Is Unclear', *New York Times* (17 March 2011).

Barack Obama described Muammar Gaddafi as a ‘murderer’ and a ‘terrorist’ whom he found to be involved in ‘brutal repression’ and exercising a ‘grip of fear’. In a joint statement, David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy spoke of the ‘violent dictatorship’ of ‘Qadhafi’s war machine’.<sup>125</sup> Likewise, Angela Merkel and Guido Westerwelle made it clear in various public statements that Germany regarded Gaddafi as an illegitimate leader who ‘has to go’.<sup>126</sup> More forcefully, Guido Westerwelle underlined ‘the brutality of the Libyan regime’ and stated that ‘I denounce and condemn the horrendous violations of human rights committed by the Libyan regime . . . We stand against this dictator’.<sup>127</sup> His fellow party member and German minister for economics, Phillip Rösler, publicly referred to ‘Gaddafi’s homicide units’.<sup>128</sup> Echoing French, British, and American leaders, Angela Merkel called Gaddafi a ‘despot’ whose ‘disgraceful deeds . . . shall not remain unpunished’ and whose death made her feel ‘relieved and very happy’.<sup>129</sup> The German president, Christian Wulff, used even more drastic words to describe the Libyan leader: ‘This is state terrorism. This is obviously the kind of act that can be described as psychopathic’.<sup>130</sup> All of these emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and even hate also reappeared in the joint statement on Libya by the NATO ministers of foreign affairs in Berlin cited above. At this meeting, the NATO Secretary General spoke of a ‘desire for freedom’ and contrasted his emotional statement against ‘Gaddafi’s brutal and systematic attacks’.<sup>131</sup>

In addition to these emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and hate NATO political leaders also frequently stressed emotions like courage and bravery when speaking about NATO’s military effort in Libya in general and NATO soldiers in particular. For example, on 14 April NATO ministers of foreign affairs paid ‘tribute to the skill, bravery and professionalism of our men and women in uniform carrying out this difficult task’.<sup>132</sup> Barack Obama equally praised the ‘brave pilots that have executed their mission with skill and extraordinary bravery’.<sup>133</sup> David Cameron stated that the military intervention was undertaken ‘with some fantastic allies and some very brave other countries’.<sup>134</sup> Bravery and courage are essentially emotional expressions of fear: if one is not afraid of someone or something one does not have to feel brave or courageous. Thus, in the Libyan case, NATO members reaffirmed

<sup>125</sup> David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, *Joint Statement by the French President and the British Prime Minister* (28 March 2011).

<sup>126</sup> Merkel and Obama, *Remarks*; Guido Westerwelle, ‘Westerwelle lobt Nato-Einsatz jetzt doch’, *Die Zeit Online* (27 August 2011), available at: {<http://www.zeit.de/politik/Deutschland/2011-08/westerwelle-nato-einsatz/komplettansicht>} accessed 4 November 2012.

<sup>127</sup> Guido Westerwelle, *Speech at the UN Human Rights Council*, Geneva (28 February 2011).

<sup>128</sup> ‘Später Respekt für Nato-Einsatz’, *FocusOnline* (27 August 2011), available at: {[http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen/militaerisches-eingreifen-in-libyen-spaeter-respekt-fuer-nato-einsatz\\_aid\\_659482.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen/militaerisches-eingreifen-in-libyen-spaeter-respekt-fuer-nato-einsatz_aid_659482.html)} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>129</sup> ‘Merkel fordert Gaddafi zum Rücktritt auf’, *FocusOnline* (27 February 2011), available at: {[http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen-merkel-fordert-gaddafi-zum-ruecktritt-auf\\_aid\\_603850.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen-merkel-fordert-gaddafi-zum-ruecktritt-auf_aid_603850.html)} accessed 14 March 2013; Angela Merkel, *Press Statement*, Berlin (20 October 2011).

<sup>130</sup> ‘Wulff nennt Gaddafi einen Psychopathen’, *FocusOnline* (24 February 2011), available at: {[http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/krise-in-libyen-wulff-nennt-gaddafi-einen-psychopathen\\_aid\\_603237.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/krise-in-libyen-wulff-nennt-gaddafi-einen-psychopathen_aid_603237.html)} accessed 14 March 2013.

<sup>131</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General at the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Libya Partners at Berlin* (14 April 2011).

<sup>132</sup> NATO, *Statement on Libya Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO contributors in Berlin to Operation Unified Protector* (14 April 2011).

<sup>133</sup> Barack H. Obama, *Presidential Statement on Libya* (22 August 2011).

<sup>134</sup> David Cameron, *Libya Statement in Full* (18 March 2011).



the community's outside emotion norm of enmity in two ways: first, by finding a threatening Other that all members could focus their emotions on; second, by framing the military effort in terms of morally acceptable expressions of fear such as bravery or courage. In sum, by sharing these emotional expressions towards an outsider, the members of the transatlantic security community were able to maintain mutual trust and collective identity by setting themselves emotionally apart from the Gaddafi regime and thereby generating internal cohesion.

In sum, the expression of anger and fear toward an emotionally shared Other can be said to have generated internal relief and social cohesion through processes of emotional identification on the outside.<sup>135</sup> The collective adherence to the outside emotion norm of enmity can be said to have contributed to the stabilisation of the community during a time of internal conflict by strengthening a sense of belonging and togetherness against a common outside foe. It energised the community and provided its members with a collective sense of power: 'Together we can make a difference. Together we can change the world.'<sup>136</sup> As a consequence, it can be tentatively claimed that the confirmation of the outside emotion norm of enmity contributed to the stabilisation of the transatlantic emotional (security) community that included a symbolic process of emotionally disconnecting insiders from outsiders. In the end, transatlantic conflict over the German abstention in the UNSC was at least in part mitigated through the synchronised expression of appropriate emotion norms on the inside as well as on the outside.

## Conclusion

While many groups in world politics can be understood as emotional communities this article developed a conceptual framework of inside/outside emotion norms for a particular type of emotional community, namely a security community. The argument raised here was that emotion norms stabilise emotional (security) communities during inter-allied conflict. This argument was illustrated by an empirical case study of transatlantic conflict management during the Libyan intervention in 2011. This article concludes by describing some general implications as well as outlining a tentative agenda for further research.

First, it shows that political leaders use emotional language and expressions to communicate their intentions *vis-à-vis* insiders and outsiders. In this sense, state representatives employ a vocabulary of emotional discourse accompanied by symbolic interaction to frame regional peace and to stabilise this peace system during times of internal conflict.

Second, the study implies that violent conflict can at least in part be mitigated through the strengthening of emotional bonds. This supports the argument that the institutionalisation of emotion norms contributes to stable order in world politics. The study of international security in general and security communities in particular could thus benefit from taking emotion norms into account. Moreover, it could also

<sup>135</sup> Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 34.

<sup>136</sup> Flam, 'Emotional', p. 49.

be insightful to study emotion norms in other areas of world politics such as trade negotiations or climate change.

Third, the study contributes to theoretical debates in IR by outlining the importance of emotional knowledge for transforming regional security politics. Specifically, it adds an important perspective to the social construction of security communities that has previously been neglected.<sup>137</sup> The perception of membership in a security community, the sense of ‘we-ness’ and belonging, should also be understood as a matter of feelings, emotions, and affection. Such a perspective does not deny the fact that collective identities are forged through cognitive processes but argues that emotions *are* cognitive processes, that is, moral judgments made on the basis of emotional appraisals and experience. If emotion norms can change an actor’s perception, emotion norms should be equally able to transform social relationships and arguably contribute to the way actors perceive and construct regional security.

In the end, this article represents a first step to systematically investigate the causal logics and mechanisms involved in the development of emotional communities in world politics. The findings in this article demonstrate that by understanding security communities as emotional (security) communities we gain a better understanding of how these communities are maintained during times of inter-member conflict. Further research needs to be conducted to develop more empirical cases of emotional communities in world politics. Specifically, researchers could show how emotion norms help non-state actors like human rights groups to maintain social cohesion. Also, scholars need to investigate under what circumstances emotion norms can be unlearned, which could explain the failure or disintegration of previous emotional communities.<sup>138</sup> These examples outline a wide and promising research agenda to further investigate the emotional foundations of world politics.

<sup>137</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Communities*.

<sup>138</sup> On norms being ‘unlearned’ see, for example, Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, ‘Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 18:4 (2012), pp. 719–42.