

he (Jesus Christ) was the only person who ever came across our blessed Lady without being the better for it.'

IVO THOMAS, O.P.

THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS AND THE ORIGINALITY OF CHRIST. By Geoffrey Graystone, S.M. (Sheed and Ward; 8s. 6d.)

It was in the nature of things and inevitable that sooner or later, someone, unanchored in the certainties of Catholic faith, would take the Dead Sea scrolls as evidence of the origins of Christianity, as explaining the very teaching of Christ himself. And sure enough, this has come about. Presumably, too, to the end of time there will be a sort of mind that seeks to 'explain' the dawn of our religion, or even perhaps, with a certain naïvety, thinks to have explained it. Father Graystone's little book does in part cope with such attitudes. It is made up of articles published in the *Irish Theological Quarterly*; and now in book form these articles will be accessible to a larger public. In four chapters we are told the story of the scrolls, of points of contact with the New Testament, of the clear-cut dissimilarities, and finally we are given a critical appraisal of Edmund Wilson's *The Scrolls from the Dead Sea*. The whole is written with ease, and presents us with plenty of facts. There are excellent notes and references at the end—and, of course, the inevitable last-minute 'additional notes', for there are always new developments in the subject of the scrolls.

Can we hope that Father Graystone will some day provide us with a collection of Qumrân texts, with notes? The texts handled and surveyed in this book are tantalizing morsels. We would welcome much fuller citations, a sort of Qumrân anthology in English. Then too the texts could speak for themselves, and we could rest a little from apologetic preoccupations and abandon, e.g., appeals to the 'candid reader' (p. 96). For surely our first assumption is that all are candid.

ROLAND POTTER, O.P.

ST AUGUSTINE: THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE. Translated and annotated by Mark Pontifex, O.S.B. *Ancient Christian Writers*, Vol. XXII. (Longmans; 25s.)

We owe Dom Mark Pontifex our gratitude for his competent and civilized translation of one of the most important of St Augustine's treatises. Although it was written at the beginning of his life as a Christian, the *de Libero Arbitrio* exhibits all St Augustine's characteristic preoccupations, and serves excellently as an introduction to the study of the greatest of the Fathers. It is perhaps with this general intention of promoting Augustinian studies that Dom Mark has compiled his notes, but the result is not always happy. Too often the impression is given of

being introduced to the study of 'problems of interpretation' rather than to the living thought of the text before us. Dom Mark does indeed offer a detailed analysis of the 'argument' of the three Books, together with an enumeration of the chief questions discussed, but he never really attempts to release the central apprehension which illuminates the whole, and without which the treatise falls apart into a series of well-worn Augustinian topics. It is truly remarkable that he nowhere discusses his own translation of *liberum arbitrium* as 'free choice'. The translation is surely correct; but since Dom Mark regularly speaks of 'free will' in his Introduction and Notes, we are bound to suspect that he sees no important difference of emphasis here. Thus he warns us in his Introduction not to expect in the treatise 'a discussion of the kind which a modern book on free will would contain—an analysis of the psychological circumstances in which choice is exercised', determinism and so on. Instead, it is 'the problem of evil' with which the work deals (pp. 13-14).

Was St Augustine merely misleading us then in giving his work the title *de Libero Arbitrio*? The answer to this question should point to that central and unifying apprehension of which we have spoken: very roughly, an apprehension of the intrinsic dynamism of the spirit. The context of St Augustine's discussions of *liberum arbitrium*, here and elsewhere, is such as to allow him to speak indifferently of *liberum arbitrium*, *voluntas*, *amor*, *caritas*, *delectatio*, just as St Bernard could later speak of *liberum arbitrium* as *consensus*. This is only possible because the language is being used to register an immediately apprehended spiritual experience; self-apprehension is not yet mediated (or, as is too often the case, merely blocked) by a psychology which is continuous with a cosmology. It is in this sort of psychological context that 'free will' is appropriately discussed: but St Augustine's thinking is 'phenomenological' (Gilson), a 'spiritualism' (Cayré); and it is a law of the spirit that it has the same consistency as its ingredients. The change of sense can be noted in the first uses of 'free will' in thirteenth-century England: at the beginning of the century it has the sense of 'unconstrained choice', by the end of the century it already has the sense of a *power*, alongside other powers of the soul. For St Augustine, free choice was not a distinct power of the soul, but the fine point of the spirit, 'live and lancing like the blowpipe flame' (Hopkins is speaking of a 'fine delight' here, the sense of Augustine's *delectatio*): the topics attracted into mutual relevance in the treatise are so many explorations of the range of movement of this spirit.

It is only if we understand that for St Augustine *voluntas* is intrinsically movement, spontaneity, and not what is currently understood by 'will'—something needing actuation—that we can follow the turning

of his thought; and only then, perhaps, appreciate the greatness of St Thomas's speculative achievement as an interpreter of St Augustine in developing an ontology capable of supporting so profoundly spiritual a phenomenology.

CORNELIUS ERNST, O.P.

ESSAYS IN CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS. Selected and edited by Professor Antony Flew. (Macmillan; 18s.)

Professor Flew admits with disarming frankness that most of the papers collected in this volume are available in "the least inaccessible philosophical journals", and it is not his fault that the blurb-writer has altered this to "certain inaccessible philosophical journals". It is often useful, he tells us, to have a second copy of an article, and those who can pay eighteen shillings for the luxury will certainly find that this book contains some of the duplicates they want.

Five out of the twelve are important papers by Strawson, Daitz, Warnock, Toulmin and Urmson respectively; three might well have been omitted, notably Professor Flew's own, which though interesting enough is really just another conducted tour of contemporary philosophy. It can safely be said that no one who needs to read this article would dream of buying the book. It appears to me, incidentally, that Professor Flew makes an unwarranted fuss about the 'Argument of the Paradigm Case'. (If the meaning of a word—e.g. "freedom", "causality" etc.—can be taught by reference to paradigm cases, then no argument can show that there are no cases of whatever it is.) This pattern of argument is surely at least as old as Dr Johnson's comment on Berkeley. The paper called *What is Explanation?* which is uncomfortably sandwiched between Warnock's brilliant criticism of the metaphysical techniques of Quine, and Urmson's patient examination of the limitations of the paradigm case argument for value words, is not one of which many people will need a spare copy. The author, having rejected two simple-minded accounts of explanation (it is telling the purpose, and it is showing that an event is unsurprising and ordinary), produces his own account: "To explain an event is simply to bring it under a law". This serves very well to show what contemporary English philosophers do not do. The whole tendency—as shown e.g. by most of the papers in this book—is away from such simple sweeping accounts ("the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification" etc. etc.) and towards a painstaking and subtle analysis of the multitudinous ways in which words like "explanation" are used. Peter Herbst's paper on *The Nature of Facts* is an attack on the notion that statements are about facts or refer to facts. What he has to say is sound enough, but by now,