The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere

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In April 1793, France was waging war both inside and outside its borders. Over the previous year, the French government had taken up arms against Austria, Sardinia, Prussia, Great Britain, Holland and Spain. In its first seizure of new territory since the Revolution began in 1789, it had recently annexed the previously Austrian region we now call Belgium. Revolutionaries had dissolved the French monarchy in September 1792, then guillotined former king Louis XVI in January 1793. If France spawned violence in victory, it redoubled domestic bloodshed in defeat; a major French loss to Austrian forces at Neerwinden on 18 March 1793, followed by the defection of General Dumouriez, precipitated both a call for expanded military recruitment and a great struggle for control of the revolutionary state. April saw the formation of the Committee of Public Safety, fearsome instrument of organizational combat. France's domestic battle was to culminate in a Jacobin seizure of power.

Contestation concerned the character of revolutionary government and its executors, but for ordinary French people it also concerned citizenship, identity and military service. It took place against a background of manhood suffrage and expanding conscription. The Constitution instituted during the fall of 1792 had eliminated the previous distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens, between independent, substantial, male adult taxpayers and other presumably impoverished, dependent, criminal, or homeless (hence non-voting) adult males; it had done so largely on the ground that men who were liable for military service should also have the right to elect members of the government for which they risked their lives. The regulations of 1792 still excluded vagabonds, criminals and servants, but wage-earners lacking property now qualified, so long as they took the required oath to defend nation and Constitution.

Militias had undergone a similar popularization. Under the old regime civic militias (often called *gardes bourgeoises*) generally enrolled substantial members of urban corporations and excluded the propertyless. The militias that formed widely in 1789, and then became units of the National Guard, did not expand their membership's scope greatly beyond the old regime. The regularization of 1790 restricted membership to active citizens. Indeed it nearly equated active citizenship and militia membership by requiring enrollment for the National Guard (though not actual service) as a condition of active citizenship. But in 1792 and 1793 National Guard units opened their ranks much more widely to proletarians; the government needed the support of all patriotic adult males against its many enemies, domestic and foreign.

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Despite that recent equation of political participation with military service, in March 1793 the Republic's call for a great levy of troops to face the expanded demands of war had touched off widespread resistance. The greatest anti-Republican rising formed in the western region that became known collectively as the Vendée, a name drawn from one of the half-dozen western *départements* that divided lethally between self-declared revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. But the south also produced extensive struggles over military conscription during the spring of 1793. In Languedoc, sharp divisions between Protestants and Catholics as well as between city and country people emerged in response to military conscription. Protestants and city-dwellers (the two categories overlapped considerably) more often supported the revolutionary regime. Even among urbanites, however, draft resistance flourished. "However old their incorporation into the French royal domain", remarks Gérard Cholvy, "from 1792 onward between the banks of the Rhône and the base of Canigou southern populations seem to have felt a powerful repugnance to defending the national soil."[1] During the revolutionary Years VII to XIII, for example, almost every *département* south of a line from La Rochelle to Lyon listed 30 per cent or more of its conscripts as missing through desertion or failure to report, while above that line only Morbihan, Vendée, Vienne, and Nièvre reached those proportions.[2]

Seysses illustrates popular resistance to military service, hence contestation concerning the terms of citizenship. The village of Seysses lay about 17 kilometers south-west of Toulouse, capital of the Haute-Garonne *département*. On 8 April 1793 the people of Seysses were scheduled to choose military recruits for the contingent assigned them by a decree of 19 March. On the 8th, Jean Sautet of Seysses complained to the attorney-general (*procureur-général-syndic*) of the *département* that on the previous day he was waiting for confession by the village's constitutional priest when in the village street appeared a large mob (*attroupement*) "of citizens armed with sabres, guns, and other weapons who were shouting publicly that they should kill all the patriots. When the curé went out to send them away, they continued, shouting even louder that since by means of conscription [the government] was exposing citizens to the risk of death people should exterminate the patriots."[3] (Strictly speaking, the government was not yet "conscripting" soldiers, but following the model of the old-regime national militia by requiring each locality to supply its quota of troops through voluntary enlistment,

[1] Gérard Cholvy, "Recrutement militaire et mentalités languedociennes au XIXème siècle. Essai d'interprétation", in Université Paul Valéry, *Recrutement, Mentalités, Sociétés* (Montpellier, 1974), p. 305. Mount Canigou stands at the Pyrenees' very southern end, on the Spanish frontier.

[2] Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters. The Army and French Society during the Revolution and the Empire* (New York, 1989), p. 2.

[3] Archives Municipales, Toulouse [hereafter AMT], 2/I/33.

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public election, drawing of lots among single able-bodied men, or other means; it still allowed, furthermore, the purchase of replacements. "Patriots", in the [not always complimentary] jargon of 1793, meant active supporters and beneficiaries of the revolutionary regime; in a nice irony, patriots often called their enemies, however plebeian, "aristocrats".) Similar events, with the additional fillip of objections to the new taxes levied in support of military levies, occurred in Toulouse, St Sulpice, Cadours, and the district of Muret.[4] In Seysses, Sautet blamed the gathering on "refractory priests or émigrés who remain hidden around Seysses, the self-confidence they lend to enemies of public welfare, and the opportunity [the regime's enemies] have so far been given to abuse the arms they bear".[5] The *département*'s governing council commissioned its member Citizen Goulard to proceed to Seysses with a detachment of at least two hundred National Guards, search for weapons, arrest refractory priests, émigrés, the "authors and instigators of the riot", and other suspicious persons the municipal officers or constitutional priest might identify, then bring them back to jail in Toulouse – all this at the expense of Seysses' residents.[6]

The characteristic little French incident from 1793 recalls pressing questions about citizenship, identity and social history: the revolutionaries in our story self-consciously addressed each other as "citizen" and insisted on military service as a test of citizenship. Their opponents declared that "patriots" had invented obligations upright men should reject; they denied that citizenship required fighting for a regime they regarded as corrupt. Both sides were arguing about new obligations, about novel conceptions of public duties. Thus the contestants organized their violent disagreement around issues of identity and citizenship, issues that had activated no popular mobilizations before the Revolution began. As a set of ideas and practices that were largely unknown two centuries ago but have become commonplace today, how did citizenship arise and change? What determines the salience of citizenship as an identity? Under what conditions do states adopt more or less inclusive definitions of citizenship? What difference does the character of citizenship make to routine social life?

French experience matters in these regards because French revolutionaries invented important elements of the citizenship our world knows today. Although the bicentenary of the 1789 revolution witnessed a great burst of idealist history and a certain rejection of base-superstructure approaches to explaining the revolution, realist social historians have continued to enrich our understanding of revolutionary processes, both

[4] Martyn Lyons, *Revolution in Toulouse. An Essay on Provincial Terrorism* (Bern, 1978), p. 39.
[5] AMT, 2/I/33.
[6] *Ibid.*

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in France and elsewhere.[7] Revolutionary processes matter especially to our inquiry because the sundering of a state's unity exposes, challenges and transforms ties between citizens and states. Rather than trace the history of French citizenship in detail, this paper therefore takes French

[7] For a comprehensive review of historiography and commemoration as well as a call for expanded efforts by social historians, see Steven L. Kaplan, *Adieu 89* (Paris, 1993). For examples and citations of social-historical analyses, see Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1984) and *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1992); Gail Bossenga, *The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille* (Cambridge, 1991); George C. Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution. Marxism and the Revisionist Challenge* (London, 1987); Alan Forrest and Peter Jones (eds), *Town, Country, and Region during the French Revolution* (Manchester, 1991); Fabienne Gambrelle and Michel Trebitsch (eds), *Révolte et société. Actes du Colloque d'Histoire au Présent, Paris mai 1988*, 2 vols (Paris, 1989); Jacques Guilhaumou, "Le fédéralisme marseillais: une identité politico-discursive", in Bruno Benoit (ed.), *Ville et Révolution Française. Actes du Colloque International Lyon, Mars 1993* (Lyon, 1994); François Lebrun and Roger Dupuy (eds), *Les résistances à la Révolution* (Paris, 1987); Ted Margadant, *Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution* (Princeton, 1992); John Markoff, "The Social Geography of Rural Revolt at the Beginning of the French Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, 50 (1985), pp. 761–781; Peter McPhee, "Les formes d'intervention populaire en Roussillon: L'exemple de Collioure, 1789–1815", in Centre d'Histoire Contemporaine du Languedoc Méditerranéen et du Roussillon, *Les pratiques politiques en province à l'époque de la Révolution française* (Montpellier, 1988); Michael Meinzer, *Der französische Revolutionskalendar (1792–1805). Planung, Durchführung und Scheitern einer politischen Zeitrechnung* (Munich, 1992); Charles Tilly, "State and Counter-revolution in France", *Social Research*, 56 (1989), pp. 71–97; "Cities, Bourgeois, and Revolution in France", in M'hammed Sabour (ed.), *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. Bicentenaire de la Grande Révolution Française* (Joensuu, 1992) and *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (Oxford, 1993); Michel Vovelle (ed.), *Bourgeoisies de province et Révolution* (Grenoble, 1987); Isser Woloch, *The New Regime. Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York, 1994). Outside of the French Revolution, important recent contributions include Rod Aya, *Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence. Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method* (Amsterdam, 1990); Peter Bearman and Glenn Dean, "The Structure of Opportunity: Middle-Class Mobility in England, 1548–1689", *American Journal of Sociology*, 98 (1992), pp. 30–66; Nancy Gina Bermeo, *The Revolution within the Revolution. Workers' Control in Rural Portugal* (Princeton, 1986); Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley, 1987); Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley, 1991); Jeff Goodwin, "Old Regimes and Revolutions in the Second and Third Worlds: A Comparative Perspective", *Social Science History*, 18 (1994), pp. 575–604 and "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions", *Theory and Society*, 23 (1994), pp. 731–766; Nikki R. Keddie, "Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood?", *Contention*, 1 (1992), pp. 159–182; Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution. Origins, Course, and Legacy* (New York, 1993); Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da Ilusao. A Revoluçao Mundial e o Brasil 1922–1935* (São Paulo, 1992); Andreas Suter, "Der schweizerische Bauernkrieg 1653. Ein Forschungsbericht", in Albert Tanner and Anne-Lie Head-König (eds), *Die Bauern in der Geschichte der Schweiz* (Zurich, 1992); Wayne TeBrake, *Regents and Rebels: The Revolutionary World of the Eighteenth Century Dutch City* (Oxford, 1989) and "How Much in How Little? Dutch Revolution in Comparative Perspective", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis*, 16 (1990), pp. 349–363; William TeBrake, *A Plague of Insurrection. Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323–1328* (Philadelphia, 1993); Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution. Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory* (Armonk, NY, 1991), *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, 1992) and "Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950–1980", *Social Science History*, 18 (1994), pp. 543–574.

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experience as a point of departure for general reflections on the social history of citizenship and its connection with public identities in states of the last two centuries. In order to avoid excessive abstraction, nevertheless, the paper returns repeatedly to France as a concretization of historical changes in citizenship.

By 1793 France's revolutionary regime had abolished most old-regime titles of distinction in favor of calling all the former monarchy's subjects *citoyens*, but many putative citizens were contesting the terms of their relations to the state. The construction of a state church whose priests (the "constitutionals") were civil servants had divided the population sharply between the church's adherents and enemies. "Refractory" priests – those who had refused to swear the oath accepting the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and had thereby rejected incorporation into the state's new religious bureaucracy – disappeared underground or into exile but frequently maintained contact with faithful followers. More generally revolutionary, counter-revolutionary, and in-between French people, including those of Languedoc, disputed furiously what it meant to be French, patriotic, Catholic, and/or a citizen.

How did citizenship come into being anyway? And what was it? If citizenship is a tie entailing mutual obligations between categorically-defined persons and a state, the identity "citizen" describes the experience and public representation of that tie. Such an identity does not spring whole from a deliberate invention or a general principle's ineluctable implications but from the historical accumulation of continual negotiation. In April 1793 young, unmarried French men held the identity citizen to the extent that they and agents of the revolutionary state mutually recognized and represented rights or obligations stemming categorically from the collective attachment of such young men to the state. In fact, as we have seen, the tie and the identity that grew from it were then undergoing contestation because of other competing ties many young men held simultaneously – ties to friends, co-workers, families, villages, or the old Catholic church – and because the exemption of republican officials from conscription in order to do their revolutionary work at home made the demand for military service seem all the more unjust to non-officials.

In old-regime France, citizenship had not existed, at least not at a national scale covering any substantial share of the population. To be sure, one might follow Max Weber in arguing that European cities had created small-scale versions of citizenship long before 1789; old-regime French cities did typically recognize classes of members who enjoyed political and economic rights the rest of the population lacked.[8] One might also claim that nobles and priests exercised categorical rights and obligations *vis-à-vis* the monarchy, even that the Estates General, on the rare occasions that they met, constituted a kind of national citizenry.

[8] Max Weber, *General Economic History* (Glencoe, 1950), pp. 315–337.

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A rump of the Estates General convened in 1789, after all, converted itself into a national representative assembly and established categorically-based rights for large numbers of adult French males. In those senses, the revolutionaries who created citizenship after 1789 borrowed from old-regime institutions. Still, only in these thin, equivocal ways could we say that the old regime maintained a system of citizenship.

From its outset, the Revolution enormously increased the scope of citizenship. "The spread of citizenship", notes Pierre Rosanvallon, "arose from the equation of civil and political rights in the new principle of popular sovereignty."[9] According to that radical principle, all worthy and responsible persons should not only enjoy state protection but also participate directly in governing the nation; the only question was how to identify the worthy and responsible, how to exclude the rest. From the Revolution onward, French citizenship fluctuated in scope, but over the long run expanded greatly. Although women did not vote until 1946, among native-born males adult suffrage and eligibility for office reappeared in 1848 to survive with only minor infringements from then onward. With the Revolution, virtually all French people acquired access to state-run courts. During the nineteenth century, rights to assemble, to associate, to strike, or to campaign for elections expanded in company with obligations to attend school, serve in the military, reply to censuses, pay individually-assessed taxes and fulfill other now-standard duties of citizens. During the twentieth century, finally, a series of welfare benefits including unemployment insurance, guaranteed pensions and family allowances joined the citizenship package. If to this day French politicians still dispute which persons born to parents who are not themselves citizens are eligible for the rights and obligations of citizenship, on the whole citizenship has acquired a scope France's old-regime population would have found incredible. France has a created a strong version of citizenship.

Strong citizenship depends on direct rule: imposition throughout a unified territory of a relatively standard system in which an effective hierarchy of state officials reaches from the national center into individual localities or even households, thence back to the center. Despite massive state expansion from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, France's pre-revolutionary monarchy ruled for the most part indirectly, through intermediaries who enjoyed substantial autonomy and discretion in geographic subdivisions that themselves bore particular chartered relationships to the central state apparatus. In some respects, the states of Louis XIII and Louis XIV actually increased the indirectness of their rule by the practice of selling – or leasing, subject to periodic revocation and renegotiation – charters and privileges in return for advances of cash that could pay for the incessant costs of war.

[9] Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France* (Paris, 1992), p. 71.

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The old-regime French state ruled through provincial estates, municipalities, chartered guilds, military governors who often held their offices hereditarily, courts whose judges owned their offices, religious institutions that exercised great independence, and thousands of proud nobles who clung jealously to their own particular privileges – not to mention the financiers and tax farmers who loaned the state money for its wars and day-to-day operations in return for wide powers to enrich themselves at public expense. Although the famous Intendants did serve at the king's pleasure, or that of the *contrôleur général*, even they operated by building up their own clienteles and regional alliances.[10] Indirect rule blocks citizenship for anyone but the small, connected governing elite.

The Revolution dissolved indirect rule and installed a highly-standardized administrative hierarchy from national legislature to local commune, with communication and power running in both directions. Although in the early years France's revolutionaries bypassed old webs of nobles, priests and royal officials by relying heavily on preexisting networks of merchants, lawyers, other professionals, and their clienteles, by the time of Napoleon the national bureaucracy had acquired a weight of its own. With the creation of an effective, pervasive national police system after 1799 under Fouché's ruthless leadership, the administrative structure that governed France for the next century fell into place.

Seen in historical and comparative perspective, however, the creation of direct rule in France and elsewhere did not depend so much on the genius of a Robespierre, a Fouché, or a Napoleon as on massive struggles of would-be rulers with recalcitrant populations. The lines of force in the process ran something like this:



[10] William H. Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France* (Cambridge, 1985); Gail Bossenga, "City and State: An Urban Perspective on the Origins of the French Revolution", in Keith Michael Baker (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. 1. The Political Culture of the Old Regime* (Oxford, 1988); James B. Collins, *Fiscal Limits of Absolutism. Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1988); Joël Cornette, "Le 'point d'Archimède'. Le renouveau de la recherche sur 'l'Etat des Finances'", *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 35 (1988), pp. 614–629; Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism. Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy* (London, 1992); Sharon Kettering, "Brokerage at the Court of Louis XIV", *The Historical Journal*, 36 (1993), pp. 69–87; Ernest Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France. II: Des derniers temps de l'âge industriel 1660–1789* (Paris, 1970); Traian Stoianovich, "The Segmentary State and *La Grande Nation*", in Eugene D. Genovese and Leonard Hochberg (ed.), *Geographic Perspectives in History* (Oxford, 1989).

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In a typical Western European scenario, the massive growth of armies and navies after 1750 or so made mercenaries decreasingly attractive to rulers, who turned more and more to drawing troops from their domestic populations, and to the extraction of new taxes to pay those troops.[11]

In a wonderful irony, military buildup generally had the side-effect of reducing the military's autonomous political power. That happened because military organizations whose personnel came from the domestic population could less easily live by preying on their fellow countrymen and therefore created segregated systems of housing and supply; because they came to depend increasingly on appropriations from legislatures that had minds of their own; and because civilian bureaucracies devoted to finance, supply, administration and long-range planning hedged them in. Ordinary people, to be sure, bore the costs of these new, expensive military systems. But both ordinary people and their patrons fought war-impelled taxation, conscription, seizures of goods and restrictions on trade by means ranging from passive resistance to outright rebellion, put down with varying combinations of repression, persuasion and bargaining. The very acts of intervening, repressing, persuading and bargaining formed willy-nilly the institutions of direct rule. Out of struggle emerged citizenship, a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of the persons' membership in an exclusive category, a category of native-born or naturalized people. To be sure, the process varied systematically as a function of previously-existing forms of government and social structure, giving much more weight to the cooptation of autonomous wielders of military force in regions of large noble-run estates such as Hungary and much greater scope to the bourgeois who already dominated cities in such commercialized regions as Holland.[12] City-states and small principalities experienced something like direct rule when most of Europe wallowed in indirectness, while

[11] Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns. State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, 1994).

[12] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (rev. ed., Oxford, 1992); Charles Tilly and Wim Blockmans (eds), *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, AD 1000–1800* (Boulder, 1994); for qualifications and alternative interpretations, see Julia Adams, "Trading States, Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early Modern Dutch Development", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 36 (1994), pp. 319–355 and "The Familial State: Elite Family Practices and State-Making in the Early Modern Netherlands", *Theory and Society*, 23 (1994), pp. 505–540; Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change. Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, 1992); Jean-Philippe Genet (ed.), *L'Etat moderne: Genèse* (Paris, 1990); Philip Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia", *American Journal of Sociology*, 99 (1993), pp. 265–316; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power I. A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760; II. The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge, 1986 and

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the Ottoman empire only moved to a semblance of direct rule in the process of disintegrating. Nevertheless, under pressure of military expansion, as well as through the effects of French conquest, almost all European states converged on direct rule and the elaboration of citizenship at a national scale.[13] In general, ties of citizenship grew stronger and more exclusive, overshadowing other within-nation ties such as those of neighborhood and kinship while international barriers to multiple citizenship became less penetrable. Even religion, that powerful definer of solidarities at the small scale, became less crucial as a criterion of membership in national communities. Some variation persisted, of course: within certain states (e.g. Switzerland), multiple levels of citizenship proliferated at local, regional and national scales, while in others (France being the model) a single centrally-defined citizenship prevailed. In all cases, nevertheless, some version of the causal chain from military activity to citizenship prevailed.

A related set of processes produced nationalism, both state-led and state-seeking.[14] Nationalism in general forwards the view that the world

1994); Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State. Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New Haven, 1983); Traian Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds. The First and Last Europe* (Armonk, NY, 1994); Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London, 1994).

[13] In addition to the sources cited in the previous note, see Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats. The Ottoman Route of State Centralization* (Ithaca, 1994); Wim P. Blockmans, "A Typology of Representative Institutions in Late Medieval Europe", *Journal of Medieval History*, 4 (1978), pp. 189–215 and "Princes conquérants et bourgeois calculateurs. Le poids des réseaux urbains dans la formation des états", in Neithard Bulst and Jean-Philippe Genet (eds), *La ville, la bourgeoisie et la genèse de l'état moderne* (Paris, 1988); Wim Blockmans and Jean-Philippe Genet (eds), *Visions sur le développement des Etats européens. Théories et historiographies de l'Etat moderne* (Rome, 1993); Harald Gustafsson, *Political Interaction in the Old Regime. Central Power and Local Society in the Eighteenth-Century Nordic States* (Lund, 1994) and "Conglomerates or Unitary States? Integration Processes in Early Modern Denmark-Norway and Sweden", in Thomas Fröschl (ed.), *Föderationsmodelle und Unionsstrukturen. Über Staatenverbindungen in der frühen Neuzeit vom 15. zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1994); Marjolein 't Hart, *The Making of a Bourgeois State. War, Politics and Finance during the Dutch Revolt* (Manchester, 1993).

[14] John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1982); Justo G. Beramendi, Ramón Máiz and Xosé M. Núñez (eds), *Nationalism in Europe, Past and Present*, 2 vols (Santiago, 1994); Ernst Bruckmüller, "Ein 'deutsches' Bürgertum? Zu Fragen nationaler Differenzierung der bürgerlichen Schichten in der Habsburgermonarchie vom Vormärz bis um 1860", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 16 (1990), pp. 343–354; Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism", in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), *Understanding Political Development* (Boston, 1987); Otto Dann and John Dinwiddy (eds), *Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution* (London, 1988); Mary Fullbrook, *National Histories and European History* (Boulder, 1993); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983); Stephen Graubard (ed.), "Reconstructing Nations and States", *Daedalus*, 122 (1993), entire issue; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA, 1992); Ernst Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?", *International Organization*, 40 (1986), pp. 707–744; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*

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divides into coherent nations, that each nation deserves its own state, and that each state has the right to create its own nation. (A nation, in this view, shares a common origin, culture and sense of destiny.) Nationalism incorporates citizenship to the extent that a state establishes a category of persons presumed to constitute a nation who by virtue of their membership in the category acquire distinctive rights and obligations *vis-à-vis* the state. Strong nationalism insists that citizens' rights and obligations take priority over those attached to other ties in which citizens are engaged.

By virtue of its monism, strong nationalism often causes trouble. Trouble begins with the fact that populations within the territories of actual states have always actually been heterogeneous in origin, culture and sense of destiny; even apparently unitary Norway has its Sami, its Asian refugees, and its two competing national languages. Trouble continues with the fact that other ties, and the identities attached to them – familial, religious, economic, ethnic or linguistic – often impose obligations that conflict with states' demands for military service, manpower, solidarities, enmities, tax payments or other surrenders of resources. Despite such obstacles, European rulers made weak efforts to homogenize their subject populations from the Peace of Westphalia to the French Revolution, and stronger efforts thereafter. The deliberate creation of memorials, museums, flags, songs, patriotic symbols, standardized languages, educational systems, national histories and popular justifications for state policies in both the domestic and international spheres did

since 1789. Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1990); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, 1985); Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985); Michael Kearney, "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 4 (1991), pp. 52–72; Julia Kristeva, *Nations without Nationalism* (New York, 1993); David D. Laitin, "The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union", *World Politics*, 44 (1991), pp. 139–177; David D. Laitin, Roger Petersen and John W. Slocum, "Language and the State: Russia and the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective", in Alexander J. Motyl (ed.), *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR* (New York, 1992); Adam J. Lerner (ed.), "Reimagining the Nation", *Millennium*, 20 (1991), entire issue; Michel Löwy, "Internationalisme, nationalisme et anti-impérialisme", *Critique Communiste*, 87 (1989), pp. 31–42; Roy E.H. Mellor, *Nation, State, and Territory. A Political Geography* (London, 1989); Daniel A. Segal, "Nationalism, Comparatively Speaking", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1 (1988), pp. 301–321; John H. Stanfield II (ed.), "Theories of Ethnicity", *American Behavioral Scientist*, 38, 3 (1995), entire issue; Richard H. Thompson, *Theories of Ethnicity. A Critical Appraisal* (New York, 1989); Charles Tilly, "Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union", *Theory and Society*, 20 (1991), pp. 569–580 and "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992", *Theory and Society*, 23 (1994), pp. 131–146; Peter Waldmann, *Ethnischer Radikalismus. Ursachen und Folgen gewaltsamer Minderheitenkonflikte* (Opladen, 1989); Brackette F. Williams, "A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 18 (1989), pp. 401–444; Victor Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies", *Daedalus*, 121, 2 (1992), pp. 97–122.

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homogenize national cultures to some degree; those efforts constituted state-led nationalism.

In the presence of articulate and beleaguered minorities whose routine social arrangements these efforts threatened, however, state-led nationalism generated state-seeking nationalism: the organized demand for autonomous, or even independent, political standing within distinct territorial boundaries. The larger the advantages of running your own state and the larger the disadvantages of *not* running your own state, the more minorities made nationalist claims. The same great powers that were taking strenuous measures to homogenize and subordinate their own domestic populations ratified the principle of national self-determination as they picked apart the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Thus they reinforced the availability of that principle to such ostensible nations as the Irish and the Basques. On both sides of the state-led/state-seeking gap, political leaders sought to attach citizenship to sovereignty, on one hand, and to a state-defined dominant culture, on the other.

Far more people than nationalists employed citizenship as a political tool or object of struggle; once it existed, that set of ties provided precious opportunities to its parties. Employers, for example, have repeatedly sought out foreign workers for dirty jobs not only because they came cheaper than natives but also because – especially if they lacked legal residence in the country – the threat of expulsion or prosecution rendered them more compliant and harder to organize than citizens would have been. Again, opponents of regimes have been able to use ostentatious resistance to standard citizens' obligations such as tax payments, military service, or replies to censuses as a way of dramatizing their opposition; in Spain's Basque country today, young Basques who support greater autonomy for their province are practicing *insumisión*, refusing to report for conscription in just such a dramatization. Finally, citizenship sometimes serves as a basis of collective action, including attacks on foreigners, demands for their expulsion, and calls for denial of benefits to them as well as the mutual aid of expatriates and the joining of citizens in mobilization for war.

As its link with nationalism suggests, the spread of citizenship by no means guaranteed democracy; authoritarian regimes such as those of Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, and Salazar all stressed bonds of citizenship. Yet citizenship's expansion made democracy at least possible where it had not previously existed. To see that clearly, we must define terms with care. "Formalist" definitions of democracy require elections, constitutions and similar institutions, while "substantivist" definitions stipulate equality, justice and similar outcomes. Choosing a position between formalist and substantivist definitions, let us think of democracy as the intersection of broad, relatively equal citizenship with a) binding consultation of citizens in regard to governmental personnel and policies, and b) protection of citizens, including members of minorities, from

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arbitrary state action.[15] Such a definition ties democracy inexorably to states, or at least to governments; it denies the anarchist claim that in the absence of governments as enforcers of agreements and obligations democracy would prevail. It also allows for the possibility that a state sustains democracy among its citizenry while treating non-citizens – at home or abroad – abysmally. The definition allows us to think of all states as falling somewhere from 0 to 1 along four continua:

narrow (0) to broad (1) citizenship
unequal (0) to equal (1) citizenship
no (0) to extensive (1) binding consultation of citizens
no (0) to extensive (1) protection of citizens from arbitrary action

Thus a state rated 0000 is an utter tyranny, one rated 1100 a populist dictatorship, one rated 1111 a complete democracy, and so on in between. All real states fall somewhere between 0 and 1 on each dimension, with the average Western European regime of today possessing a profile something like 0.80, 0.80, 0.75, 0.85 – imperfectly democratic, less consultative than the ideal because of administrators' autonomy, but unusually so in world-historical perspective.

This conceptualization ties democracy to citizenship by definition. It does so on two grounds: *first*, that without a set of mutual obligations between citizens and states neither binding consultation nor protection from arbitrary state action would prevail; *second*, that the struggles producing citizenship also created binding consultation and protection at a national scale. In the case of France, voting rights, the powers of legislative assemblies, and other institutions of democratic practice arose from hard-fought conflicts at local, regional and national scales from 1789 onward. Binding consultation and protection did not consist merely of elections and constitutionally-guaranteed liberties, but also of wide-ranging political practices: assemblies, public meetings, associations, electoral campaigns, political parties, petitions, demonstrations, legal

[15] See Charles Tilly, "Democracy is a Lake", in Herrick Chapman and Reid Andrews (eds), *The Social Construction of Democracy* (New York, 1995) and, more generally, Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, 1971) and *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven, 1989); Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies. An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley, 1990); Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Democratic-Elite Theory. Stabilization versus Breakdown of Democracy", *Archives européennes de sociologie*, 31 (1990), pp. 317–350; Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, 23 (1990), pp. 1–21; Maarten Prak, "Citizen Radicalism and Democracy in the Dutch Republic: The Patriot Movement of the 1780s", *Theory and Society*, 20 (1991), pp. 73–102; Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 47–63; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago, 1992).

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proceedings, and much more. All these practices reinforced citizenship, mutual rights and obligations connecting state officials to categorically-defined subjects of the state.

European experience with citizenship and democracy suggests the following propositions concerning the social bases of democracy:

1 Broad citizenship depends on a) extensive domestic taxation, b) broad class coalitions, and c) direct recruitment of large military services from the domestic population.
2 Equal citizenship depends on a) creation and expansion of electoral systems, and b) broad class coalitions including powerholders.
3 Binding consultation depends on a) representation with respect to the assessment and collection of taxes, b) subordination of the military to civilian control, and c) extensive domestic taxation (as opposed, for example, to state revenues drawn directly from exports).
4 Protection from arbitrary state action depends on a) class coalitions in which old powerholders ally with relatively powerless but large segments of the population (for example, bourgeois and workers), thus extending old privileges and protections, and b) subordination of the military to civilian control.

The relative strength of these factors – coalitions of old powerholders with powerless segments of the population, and so on – before democratization affects the kind of democracy emerging. For example, the prior existence of well-established electoral systems, however local and/or aristocratic, provides an impulse to equalization, while destruction of the military in war makes binding consultation and protection from arbitrary state action more prominent than broad and equal citizenship. Where barriers to these factors persisted, as with the continued autonomy of military forces in Iberia and the Balkans, both citizenship and democracy developed hesitantly or not at all. Still, the main point goes like this: *all* the social bases of democracy thus identified grew up in part as by-products of expanding military activity in the course of which rulers found themselves obliged to bargain with their civilian populations for the essential manpower and means of war.

If European states followed such a path to citizenship and democracy, we need not conclude that all states elsewhere will, should, or must follow the path of militarization and struggle. Military conquest, decolonization and the settlements of wars all create temporary dissolutions of sovereignty in which polities open to rapid reorganization. Revolutions and cycles of domestic protest sometimes produce similar weakening and transformation of state structures. The sheer availability of Western models and support from outside powers for their institutionalization provides opportunities for democratic transformation that did not exist in 1793.

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Nor can we be confident that citizenship and democracy will retain their strengths in every country that once constructs them; since World War II, many African and Latin American countries have already undergone a round or two of alternation between authoritarian narrowing of citizenship and democratic broadening of its scope. To the extent that it undermines the capacity of states to deliver on their commitments to citizens, globalization of the world economy and polity will weaken both citizenship and democracy. Under the regime of Maastricht, the European Union is blurring citizenship in its member states both by extending substantial rights of mobility, employment and welfare benefits to expatriates of other member states and by making the Union's administrative and judicial apparatus a guarantor of such supranational rights. Considering the bitter present divisions within such countries as Russia, Bosnia, Romania, Italy, and even France, we can reasonably conclude that the establishment of comprehensive citizenship in some places and its retention in others constitutes Europe's most pressing political challenge today. The struggle begun in 1793 has not yet ended.

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