

ABSTRACTS FROM INQUIRY

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Cognitive Meaning and Cognitive Use, David RYNIN, University of California, Berkeley.

In the first part of this paper the author restates arguments made earlier against well-known criticisms of a logical nature leveled (by C. Hempel and Others) against the so-called verifiability principle, which purport to show that it is at once both too restrictive and too permissive: including as cognitively meaningful, statements intuitively lacking this property, and excluding others that are generally admitted to possess it. The author claims to show that the charge that the verifiability principle is unduly permissive will not stand, because of certain logico-semantic blunders made by the critics; and that the charge of being too restrictive can be removed by introducing the notion of *quasi-truth-conditions*. He then moves on to an examination and elaboration of the concept of *cognitive use*, in terms of which he attempts to turn the flank of the argument purporting to show that the verifiability principle is too restrictive, explaining that even if one does not invoke the concept of quasi-truth-conditions, that of cognitive use enables one to save for science and cognition in general sentences that lack truth-values (cognitive meaning). A version of the verifiability principle that denies cognitive meaning to non-finitistic, nonanalytic mixed-quantifications does not therefore do any injury to science, frequent claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

Knowledge and Society, Arnold LEVISON, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, *The Idea of a Social Science*, and debated in recent issues of *Inquiry* by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to construct an argument to show that in specifying the "data" of social science, we have to introduce an element of "interpretive understanding" which radically alters the meaning of the term "empirical base" in social scientific contexts, thus supplementing Winch's argument in his reply to Louch. At the same time, my argument shows, I believe, that this view of the nature of social science does not lead to any arbitrary restrictions on the *methods* of research pursued by social scientists, as is sometimes imagined. What the argument leads to is the conclusion that our knowledge of society involves distinctive epistemological features that differentiate this kind of knowledge from the kind of knowledge we have in the natural sciences.

The Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, Maurice NATANSON, University of California, Santa Cruz.

Alfred Schutz was the outstanding representative of the phenomenological approach to the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences. An attempt is made here to explore one fundamental feature of Schutz's work: his theory of typification. That theory is found to be a development of Husserl's doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness and is shown to be concerned with the structure of pre-predicative experience as well as the process of abstraction and ideation as constitutive of the "natural standpoint" of daily life.

The Purpose of Analysis in Moore's Principia Ethica, Eivind STORHEIM, University of Oslo.

After distinguishing two senses of "analysis", the author claims that the purpose of Moore's analytical (meta-ethical) program in *Principia Ethica* was to serve as an indispensable tool for avoiding false judgments in substantial ethics and for establishing true ones. It is shown that Moore's analyses and assumptions are not normatively neutral in that, (1) he disagreed with other philosophers about the extension (as well as the intension) of moral terms, (2) he disagreed in extension with "common-sense" morality. Finally, an attempt is made to show that Moore's

moral methodology, in which his analytical distinctions play the crucial part, is meant to be of practical value for everybody in their moral decisions.

Some Epistemological and Methodological Issues in Clinical Research, Benjamin B. WOLMAN, Long Island University, and Institute of Applied Psychoanalysis, New York.

Epistemological realism was postulated as a prolegomenon to clinical research. Observation of single cases must precede any effort for generalization. Observation of men by men is always a field process. In clinical research the experimenter exercises a great amount of power over the subject, thus a naive empirical approach and operationism may be misleading. Clinical theory must be coated in a language different from empirical data and enable the formation of causal chains of events.

Discussions:

Strawson's classification of metaphysical systems, George W. MILLER, University of Cincinnati.

The classification of metaphysical systems in *Individuals* can be challenged in terms of its author's own metaphysical endeavors. While Strawson's metaphysical arguments seem to show that certain general features of our conceptual scheme are indispensable, difficulties arise when he attempts to specify more clearly the way in which one of the basic particulars must be characterized. Given the general characteristics that the basic particular must have, Strawson is unable to disqualify another possible way of characterizing it. Therefore by characterizing the basic particular in the way he does, Strawson would seem to be making a kind of recommendation which necessitates a liberalization of his own classification of metaphysical systems.

Proving the Non-existence of God, John L. POLLOCK, State University of New York at Buffalo.

This article begins by giving a brief account of why the Ontological Argument for the existence of God is invalid. Then it goes on to show that the invalidity of this argument can be used to prove that God cannot exist.

Comments on Dr. Pollock's 'proving the non-existence of God', Dagfinn FÖLLESDAL, University of Oslo and Stanford University.

Review discussion:

*Richard Schaeffler: Wege zu einer ersten Philosophie. Vom rechten ansatz des Philosophischen fragens** (towards a first philosophy. On the nature of Philosophical problems), Guttorm FLÖISTAD, King's College, London, and University of Oslo.

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Functional foibles and the analysis of social change, Marvin B. SCOTT, University of Toronto.

Functional analysis is the major theoretical perspective of contemporary sociology. Although many fruitful studies of social structure have resulted from the application of this perspective, it has been notably sterile in coping with questions of social change. Two major shortcomings of the functionalist view of change are here examined. The first type of shortcoming might be called "evolutionary hangovers". Under this heading we may include "functional ahistoricism" and a "commitment to progress". The second major shortcoming refers to weaknesses of functional theory *per se* — namely, a confusion of causal analysis with functional analysis, a lack of a theory of deviance, and an over-emphasis on stable equilibrium models.

The functionalist theory of stratification: Two decades of controversy, George A. HUACO, Yale University.

The author examines the 1945 and 1948 versions of the Davis-Moore functionalist theory of stratification. The analysis explores the basic postulates, assumptions, and logical articulation of the theory and isolates its distinctively functionalist components. This is followed by a historical account of the major criticisms leveled at the theory. The critics have succeeded in showing the fallacious and tautologous character of the functionalist components, thus, in effect, destroying the theory as a theory. Despite this destruction, various portions of the Davis-Moore theory are shown to be usable, to contain valuable insights, and to be capable of further development.

Ideology and the functional analysis of cultures, Harold FALLDING, University of Waterloo.

Sociology can be free from appraising value judgments, but characterizing value judgments are inseparable from it. It is thus a science that deals with the same questions as ideology reckons with, although in a purely characterizing way. Part of its concern is to judge cultures and it does this by measuring properties inherent in them. A culture is an ordering of symbols for a meaningful, dignified life. The dimensions for measuring any culture are (1) the sufficiency of its symbols, (2) their attractive power through meaningful inclusion in coherent wholes, (3) their consistency through absorption into a single reference system and (4) their appositeness to human needs.

Functional analysis and the problem of rationality, a note on the dilemma of the actor as observer, Roy TURNER, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.

Functional analysis rescued religion from the oblivion to which positivists would have consigned it, by taking 'society' rather than the individual act as the unit of analysis. The history of functionalism has been a record of increasing concern with such holistic units as societies and social systems. One consequence of this shift away from social action (in the Weberian sense) is that the issue of rationality has become largely redundant. Yet the problem remains: How do we account for 'contributions' to the social system in terms that make sense of the perspectives of social actors? An examination of unit actions as they are understood by social actors suggests that functionalism in fact incorporated many of the tenets held by positivists, and that it makes untenable (and implicit) assumptions concerning the 'objectivity' of the scientific observer.

R. K. Merton's concepts of function and functionalism, Hugh LEHMAN, Western Washington State College.

In this paper an attempt is made to provide an analysis of the meaning of the term *function* and related terms as they are used by R. K. Merton in the first chapter of his book *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Several problems are suggested which must be solved if statements about functions are to be considered scientifically adequate. Secondly the term *functionalism* is defined and several of Merton's functionalist explanations of social phenomena are stated and criticized.

ERRATUM

In *Philosophy of Science*, volume 32, No. 3, p. 230, lines 3–5: Read "According to Stevens the coefficient of variation is said to be permissible for ratio scales, mean and standard deviation for interval and ratio scales, and the median for ordinal, as well as interval and ratio scales."