Why Join? Why Stay? Instrumentality, Beliefs, Satisfaction and Individual Decisions on Union Membership

David Peetz*

Abstract

To understand individuals' union membership choices it is necessary to examine decisions both to join and to leave (exit) unions, observed when employees are in jobs where unions are available and there is freedom of choice on union membership ('open' jobs). Using multivariate analysis of survey data, it was found that sympathy towards unions was the most powerful influence upon union joining, but had little impact on union exit, which was more a function of the perceived instrumentality of membership. Employee perceptions on union in-fighting and cooperation with management influenced union membership, as did the outcome of involvement in industrial disputes. Satisfaction with union delegates was a key influence on attitudes and membership. Employee trust of management only influenced exit behaviour through its interaction with satisfaction with union delegates. Job satisfaction had a complex relationship with union membership that is disguised in aggregated studies.

Union membership is a function of an array of interacting forces operating at the level of the individual, the workplace, the enterprise and the national and international economy. Most studies, which have focused either on the macro level or on the micro level, have rarely acknowledged the other. To disentangle and dissect *all* these influences would require, amongst other things, a thorough analysis of the determinants and processes of union and employer strategies, the political economy of the state, and historical and emerging technological, structural and social change. Such a comprehensive task is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the micro level – in particular, on the attitudes and behaviour of individual employees, primarily in response to perceptions of unions, their jobs and management – but in doing so emphasise that this represents only a partial analysis of the determinants of union membership. Several key questions about the micro-determinants of union membership are asked, and addressed using a unique dataset.

1. Literature on the determinants of union membership

As this study focuses on the way in which perceptions of the union, the job and management affect union membership, this brief overview of the literature does not, therefore, canvass the other explanations, including the structure of the labour market, the business cycle and the role of the state, that have been posited to influence union membership.

A number of studies have distinguished between 'ideological' and 'instrumental' reasons for belonging to a union. To make these conceptual distinctions researchers have used various names with varying degrees of elegance – such as 'enterprise unionateness' and 'society unionateness' or 'social unionateness' and 'instrumental unionism' and 'social unionism' (eg Prandy, Stewart and Blackburn, 1974, 1982). In this paper, the term 'union sympathy' is used to describe the general, ideological views about unions held by employees,[1] and 'union instrumentality' to describe the extent to which employees consider they have benefited from union membership.

Some studies show measures of the general image of unions to have been strong influences upon the likelihood of union membership or propensity in the US (Schriesheim, 1978; Getman, Goldberg and Hermann, 1976; Youngblood *et al*, 1984; Deshpande and Fiorito, 1989; Fiorito, 1992), UK (Beynon and Blackburn, 1972) and Belgium (Geves, 1992). However, ideological motivations appeared to be less important than other considerations for union joiners in other studies from the UK (Goldthorpe et al, 1968;

Mercer and Weir, 1972; Cook et al, 1975; Waddington and Whitston, 1993), Belgium (Baupain, 1992), and the Netherlands (Van de Vall, 1970). Several Australian studies have shown the importance of ideological views of unions in influencing membership of Australian unions (Christie and Miller, 1989; Christie, 1992; Deery and De Cieri, 1991; Grimes, 1994), but they are silent on whether they affect decisions to join or leave unions or both.

Union instrumentality – the perceived ability of unions to deliver benefits for members – is the variable that is most consistently related to: union support in US studies (Fiorito and Greer, 1982; Fiorito et al, 1986; Wheeler and McClendon, 1991; Farber, 1990); pro-union voting, joining and propensity to join (Premack and Hunter, 1988; Montgomery, 1989); and union satisfaction (Glick, Mirvis and Harder, 1977; Guest and Dewe, 1991). However, union sympathy and instrumentality may vary between situations and countries (Gallagher and Strauss, 1991). The balance between social and instrumental motivations may also vary between different types of workers (eg Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1977). There is no Australian evidence on the balance of instrumental and ideological motivations for union membership or the mechanisms by which they work.

Satisfaction with a member's union has been shown to be an important determinant of the decision to stay in or leave a union (Klandermans, 1986) and in hypothetical or actual behaviour in union ballots in the US (Bigoness and Tosi, 1984; Leigh, 1986). As Gallagher and Strauss (1991) point out, overseas surveys have usually shown the majority of union members to be satisfied and wanting to maintain their membership (for Australia, see Chaples *et al*, 1977; Dufty, 1972:104; Dufty, 1979:163). Most studies have either not differentiated between attitudes to workplace union delegates (shop stewards) and union leaders or paid officials, or they have only examined one or the other. Where attitudes to unions at different levels are interrogated, respondents are typically more satisfied with their workplace delegates than with their leaders – that is, more satisfied with the level of the union closest to the respondents (Simey et al, 1954; Guest and Dewe, 1991:86). But it is not clear in the Australian context how much this matters, and which level of the union has the critical influence on union membership decisions.

The well-documented tendency for union members to have lower average job satisfaction is well documented, but this does not sit overly comfortably with the patterns of 'dual commitment' that have been observed on numerous occasions (eg Rose, 1952; Sayles and Strauss, 1953; Angle and Perry, 1986; Gallagher and Clark, 1989). If employees join unions because

they are unhappy with their employer, why are union members who are happy with their employer also happy with their union? Do union members decide to join for one set of reasons related to dissatisfaction, but then leave if the union is unable to remedy their dissatisfactions again?

Some have argued that union structure can have an important influence on union growth or decline if it leads to resources being wasted over jurisdictional disputes (Western, 1993; LO, 1991) and to what Willman (1989) calls 'market share' unionism rather than 'expansionary' unionism. Beaumont (1983) found in a British study that inter-union competition was negatively correlated with union success in winning employee support for recognition, but there is no Australian evidence on this issue.

What of employees' perceptions of jobs and management? American and British evidence suggests that 'workers interested in unionisation see it as a means of introducing greater participation on the job and for overcoming employer resistance to change or to dealing with job-related problems' (Kochan, 1979; Millward, 1991: 42). There is limited evidence from overseas that some firms seek to encourage employee involvement as a means of discouraging unionisation (Beaumont, 1986: 158) and that dissatisfaction with involvement increases the likelihood of unionisation (Guest and Dewe, 1988; Reynaud, 1983). Whether the introduction of participative arrangements would reduce trade unionism amongst *already* organised employees would be more problematic: Guest and Dewe's later (1991) study found that unionised employees who were satisfied with their scope for involvement were more likely to have high commitment to both union and employer.

An issue much discussed in the literature, and focal to many managerial strategies, is the improvement of job satisfaction. At first blush, this evidence appears to show an unambiguous relationship with unionisation. Several studies have found job satisfaction to be negatively related to the desire for union membership (Brotslaw, 1967; Kochan, 1979; Brett, 1980; Farber and Saks, 1980; Hills, 1985; Farber, 1985; Fiorito, Gallagher and Greer, 1986). Many also suggest that job satisfaction tends to be lower amongst union members than amongst non-members (Johnston, 1977; Borjas, 1979; Bartel, 1981; Freeman , 1978; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Schwochau, 1987; Guest and Dewe, 1988; for Australia, see: Crockett and Hall, 1987; Miller and Rummery, 1989; Miller, 1990). Farber (1990) argued that a significant increase in job satisfaction (including satisfaction with pay and job security) between 1977 and 1984, was an important explanation of the decline in the demand for unionisation by non-union members in the US. Some studies, however, claimed that the relationship between job

satisfaction and union membership was unstable over time (Bartel, 1981) or between countries (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1985); that low job satisfaction increases the likelihood of union *de*certification in the US (Angle and Perry, 1984); or that there was no link between job satisfaction and either propensity to join a union in British non-union workplaces (McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1993; see also Green, 1990) or union membership in Australia (Kuruvilla and Iverson, 1993; Erwin, Iverson and Buttigieg, 1994). Some studies have found job satisfaction to be *positively* related to *union* satisfaction (Gordon et al, 1984; Fiorito et al, 1988; Kuruvilla et al, 1993). Does this mean that the relationship between job satisfaction and the tendency to unionisation varies according to employees' current union status?

While some studies have researched the reasons people give for joining unions, few (Klandermans (1986) being the main exception) have directly investigated the reasons they have for staying in or leaving them. Similarly, differences among people who have never been in a union, and who were once in a union but have left, have not generally been investigated. Are there quite different reasons why people join and why they remain in a union that may help us understand the implications of current trends in management strategies for employee membership of unions?

There are numerous examples of industrial action providing the critical point for changes in union membership in industries, or in aggregate, in Australia (Hill, 1982; Griffin, 1983) and overseas (Cronin, 1979; Undy et al, 1981; Heritage, 1983; Kelly and Heery, 1989). However, Western (1993) claimed that, in Australia, industrial conflict had no statistical relationship with unionisation during the post-War period. Micro-level data might help us better understand the role of industrial action in union membership.

Through this paper I attempt to analyse some of these issues related to individuals' decisions to belong to a union. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the factors determining why particular jobs are inherently 'union' or 'non-union'. Instead, it focuses on the determinants of union membership in what are referred to here as 'open jobs' – those in which it is apparently primarily employee choice that determines whether an employee belongs or does not belong to a union.

2. Data and methodology

The data for this paper comes from the Survey of Employees in Metropolitan Sydney Establishments (SEMSE), conducted by the author in 1990-91. In total, 942 employees in 35 workplaces with 20 or more employees were surveyed and returned usable questionnaires between August 1990 and

April 1991. Between them, the 624 union members in the sample belonged to 34 unions. The SEMSE sample was a sub-sample of the 1990 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS 90) sample (Callus et al, 1991). This enabled access to data on the workplace context in which employees' union membership takes place.[2] The Sydney metropolitan area accounted for 73 per cent of New South Wales workplaces and 26 per cent of all workplaces in the main AWIRS 90 survey, and AWIRS 90 findings for New South Wales were 'with few exceptions ... generally in line with the national figures' (Cully and Fraser, 1993: 3). The survey covered most industry groups, but excluded agriculture and defence (excluded from AWIRS 90), mining and electricity, gas and water. The employee response rate varied substantially between workplaces, from as low as 25 per cent to as high as 97 per cent; both these results were obtained in quite small workplaces. The median response rate was 57 per cent, the overall response rate just over 50 per cent due to a lower response rate in a small number of larger workplaces.

Most of the data in SEMSE are categorical rather than continuous is nature. When estimating dichotomous choices (eg between union membership and non-membership) ordinary least squares (OLS) models may make predictions that are beyond the bounds of possibility (eg they may predict a probability greater than one or less than zero). The error term may suffer from heteroscedasticity (non-constant variance) leading to inefficient estimators. Accordingly, logit or probit models are generally preferred for multivariate analysis of categorical data. The logit model, which is used in this appendix, takes the functional form

$$\ln (P / (1-P)) = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + ...$$

where

P = the probability of the event (eg union membership) occurring
X = explanatory variables
B = coefficients on the explanatory variables[3]

To illustrate the implications of these tables, the effects of explanatory variables for selected equations are indicated in separate tables. These effects are calculated at the means of all other variables. They compare the predicted probabilities of that particular event (represented in the dependent variable) will occur when the explanatory variable is at its minimum and when it is at its maximum.[4] For reasons of space, the effects from only one equation per table are reported. The estimated effects would differ somewhat if a different equation was used to calculate them.

As the equations here cover a number of variables in equations with different dependent variables, I do not discuss separately the meaning of each variable and its hypothesised relationship to the dependent variables. These are, instead, dealt with during the discussion in the text reporting the findings. The minimum and maximum values of the explanatory variables in each equation are shown, along with the means, standard deviations and variable definitions, in Appendix A.

The concern of this paper is not to find a single, best fitting equation explaining union membership. For one thing, if the intention was just to estimate a union membership equation, the result would be a static picture which ignored the dynamic nature of union joining and exit and the way in which variables may not have a symmetric influence upon union joining and exit. Hence, there are a series of equations which look at union joining, union exit, and union density. To seek to identify a single, best-fit equation would also mask the complexity of the relationships affecting union membership, particularly given the high collinearity between a number of variables. The principle that 'parsimony seems to be an essential character of a good ... model' is followed (Körösi et al, 1992: 11). Sometimes, a variable may be significant in one formulation but lose significance when other variables are added. In such cases, I do not report all possible formulations of the data, but each regression table includes an equation that includes all variables that remain significant in a full formulation of the data.

The main focus is on understanding the relationships at work, rather than finding a single best fit equation. Consequently, each time an equation is presented the maximum information available is used. That is, only observations which have missing data for one or more of the explanatory or dependent variables in a particular equation are excluded from that equation. The data are not restricted to exclude observations which have missing data for variables which are not part of the equation but are part of another equation, a practice that is sometimes used when researchers wish to test competing specifications (not our principal purpose[5]), to allow direct comparisons of goodness of fit statistics. The construction of the SEMSE questionnaire deliberately allowed respondents to choose 'don't know/not applicable' responses in various scalar items as an alternative to the neutral midpoint, 'neither agree nor disagree' (or its equivalent), to avoid respondents being forced to choose unrepresentative responses. The cost is that a higher proportion of responses become, in effect, missing data. If the data were to be restricted by deleting all observations in which any data were missing, the significance levels of some coefficients in some equations

could alter and be misleading because less than full information would be used. As a result, within most of the following tables which present the results of three or four alternate specifications to explain a particular dependent variable, each of the equations may have a different sample size, N. The capacity to directly compare specifications is retained through the calculation of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) from a 'restricted' sample that is the largest possible sample common to all equations in that table.

This makes comparison of the particular specifications more difficult, as both the information criterion and the log likelihood c^2 tests can vary as sample size alters. To overcome this limitation, the tables present two AIC statistics: one from the published equation, based on full information, and one from a 'restricted' sample that is the largest possible sample common to all equations in that table. Thus within each table the fit of equations can be directly compared, inter alia, using the AIC and Schwarz criterion based on a 'restricted' sample being the largest set of valid observations common to each equation in a table. In some cases, more accurate, direct comparisons can be made between the AICs using the full sample for particular pairs of equations.[6]

The results of the analysis are presented below. Some determinants of union joining are discussed first, followed by those affecting union exit and overall union membership.

3. Union joining

Table 1 examines union joining within the twelve months preceding the administration of the questionnaire. All equations pass the RESET test. The fit of the equations was good for cross-sectional data, as indicated by the Cragg-Uhler r^2 which ranged from .27 up to .58.

Clearly, the most powerful influence upon union joining was a two-item index of pro-union sympathy or ideology, USYMPATHY. Holding other things constant at their averages, the predicted probability that somebody in an open job with the most pro-union score on USYMPATHY would become a union joiner, in preference to remaining out of a union, was 90 per cent; for employees in open jobs with the most anti-union score on USYMPATHY, the predicted probability of joining was a mere 4 per cent (Table 2).

Three other variables feature, though their significance varied between equations, in no small part as a result of the small size of the sub-sample (N ranging from 67 to 87). An index of apathy towards union issues was

Table 1 Union joining in open jobs: logistic regression equations

Equation	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)
INTERCEPT	-4.1424*	0.0590	-4.2744**	1.0471
	(2.1055)	(0.7700)	(1.3905)	(0.6424)
USYMPATHY	0.8428**		0.6922**	
	(0.2788)		(0.1953)	
UFIGHT	-0.4538	-0.5629[#]		-0.5735*
	(0.3880)	(0.3021)		(0.2694)
APATHY	-2.0523*	-1.0619	-1.6011*	-1.8270**
	(0.8160)	(0.7138)	(0.8139)	(0.6131)
PARTCOND		1.8138*	1.2195	
		(0.7612)	(0.8155)	
N	67	70	87	70
Akaike I C (full information)	54.615	71.332	72.372	75.039
Akaike I C				
(restricted sample, N = 67)	54.615	68.240	54.602	70.225
-2 Log L$_1$	46.615	63.332	64.372	69.039
χ^2	34.925**	20.729**	40.130**	14.572**
Cragg-Uhler ^{2}	.577	.361	.529	.270
prediction success	.868	.745	.863	.675
RESET $\chi^2_{.05,3}$	2.933	1.130	3.089	1.778

Source: SEMSE
Population: Employees in open jobs who are either non-members of unions or who have joined a union
within the last twelve months.
Weights: Simple employee weights
Standard errors in parentheses
** Significant at 1 per cent probability level
* Significant at 5 per cent probability level
# Significant at 10 per cent probability level

Table 2 Union joining in open jobs: effects of variables

	Predicted probability of union joining		
	at minimum value (%)	at maximum value (%)	Effect (% points)
USYMPATHY (2,10)	4	90	87
APATHY (0,1)	60	23	-37
PARTCOND (0,1)	34	63	30

Source: Equation 1.3, Table 1

constructed by reference to the number of non-committal responses to union-related questions (see also Peetz, 1996b). Referred to as APATHY, it was significant in retarding union joining in three of four equations. In one equation, there was a 37 percentage point difference in joining probabilities between apathetics and non-apathetics.

Employee perceptions on whether unions at the workplace spent a lot of time fighting, measured by UFIGHT, were significant in two equations. However, because its influence upon union joining was also reflected in its influence upon union sympathy, UFIGHT lost significance when USYM-PATHY was included.

The interaction between low employee participation and satisfaction with union delegates was also influential. A dummy variable, PARTCOND, took a value of one when respondents indicated: (a) low employee involvement in the employee involvement index, EMPART; and (b) their being somewhat or very satisfied with their union delegate. PARTCOND had a stronger relationship with union joining than was shown in separate (unreported) equations by either EMPART or satisfaction with the union delegate, SATUDELEG. That is, the link between low participation and union joining may have been enhanced by respondents having a positive attitude towards union delegates. However, PARTCOND's influence on joining was not always significant, again because of its correlation with union sympathy[7] in the context of the small sample size.

4. Union exit

Tables 3 and 5 look at the opposite phenomenon to union joining – union exit. Table 3 considers aggregate union exit – that is, the probability that an employee will have left a union (to become a non-member) *at any workplace* – depicted by the variable ULEFT. Table 5 shows equations predicting same-workplace union exit – the probability that an employee will have left a union *at their current workplace* – depicted by ULEFTHERE. This distinction is made as some of the workplace-specific characteristics that could influence the same-workplace exit rate may be swamped by other observations in data on aggregate union exit. Similarly, some general characteristics that influence union exit might not be so apparent in the same-workplace data. Note also that, because the mean of ULEFTHERE is low, there is not as much variation in ULEFTHERE as in ULEFT, making it difficult to identify all the relationships in a sub-sample of less than 220.

Clearly, the most important predictor of ULEFT was a variable measuring the perceived instrumentality of past and current union membership, UBENEFIT. Employees who felt that they had benefited from union membership were least likely to leave. UBENEFIT was also a very powerful predictor of ULEFTHERE. Amongst employees who felt that they had been made much worse off as a result of being in a union, the predicted probability of their having left a union in their current workplace was 51

per cent. Amongst those who felt that they were much better off as a result of union membership, the predicted exit probability in their workplace was only 1 per cent.

Several other variables, which were otherwise significant in predicting union exit, lost their significance when UBENEFIT was included in the equations. These variables were strongly correlated with UBENEFIT and it was mainly through their impact upon union instrumentality that they influenced union exit. Thus the perception that unions in the workplace spent a lot of time fighting, UFIGHT, was significantly related to ULEFT and marginally related to ULEFTHERE, but only when UBENEFIT was not included in the equation. The perception that unions did not cooperate with management, UNOTCOOP, was marginally related to ULEFT but only when UBENEFIT was not in the equation.

Table 3 Aggregate union exit in open jobs: logistic regression equations

Equation	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)
INTERCEPT	-1.9340**	2.1285*	1.3551[#]
	(0.5064)	(0.8768)	(0.7681)
USYMPATHY		-0.1218	
		(0.0854)	
UBENEFIT		-1.0361**	-1.0245**
		(0.2488)	(0.2340)
UFIGHT	0.3875*		
	(0.1774)		
APATHY	1.1304**	0.6270[#]	0.6101[#]
	(0.3707)	(0.3675)	(0.3541)
TRUSTCOND	3.3124**	1.2831[#]	1.4635*
	(1.0932)	(0.6862)	(0.6257)
UNOTCOOP	0.8651[#]		
	(0.4565)		
N	263	286	293
Akaike I C (full information)	218.055	214.294	224.819
Akaike I C			
(restricted sample, n = 251)	196.961	177.974	180.307
-2 Log L	208.055	204.294	216.819
χ^2	32.922**	38.426**	35.438**
Cragg-Uhler r^2	.196	.220	.197
prediction success	.691	.792	.714
RESET $\chi^2_{.05,3}$	4.261	7.203[#]	6.396

Source: SEMSE
Population: Employees in open jobs who have been or still are members of a union.
Weights: Simple employee weights
Standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at 1 per cent probability level
* Significant at 5 per cent probability level
[#] Significant at 10 per cent probability level

JOBSATUP was significant in explaining ULEFTHERE in some equations, but it did not produce the negative relationship between union membership and job satisfaction that many researchers may have expected. After controlling for several other variables, when employees who considered that they were now less satisfied with their job than two years earlier, they were more likely to leave the union at their current workplace.

Table 4 Aggregate union exit in open jobs: effects of significant variables

| | Predicted probability of union exit | | |
	at minimum value (%)	at maximum value (%)	Effect (% points)
UBENEFIT (1,5)	66	3	-63
APATHY (0,1)	11	18	8
TRUSTCOND (0,1)	13	35	22

Source: Equation 3.2, Table 3

Of particular note was the fact that the union sympathy index, USYMPATHY, did not generally have a significant influence on ULEFT, while the significance of its relationship with ULEFTHERE varied between equations. The act of joining a union may have been strongly influenced by union sympathy, but union exit appeared to have more instrumental explanations and much less in the way of ideological motivations.

When employees were dissatisfied with their union delegate, they were more likely to leave the union at their current workplace. Satisfaction with delegates (SATUDELEG) was consistently more important in influencing attitudes to unions and behaviour regarding union membership than was satisfaction with union officials and leaders or with the ACTU.

The influence of employee trust of management on exit behaviour only really took place through its interaction with satisfaction with union delegates. Employee trust of management, measured by the index TRUSTMAN, was not significantly related to ULEFT or ULEFTHERE. However, a conditional variable, TRUSTCOND, showed a significant relationship to both measures of union exit. TRUSTCOND indicated employees who had both (a) a high trust of management and (b) low satisfaction with union delegates. Such employees had a probability of leaving a union at their current workplace some seventeen percentage points (nearly four times) higher than other employees (Table 6). In workplaces where employees were satisfied with union delegates (or held a neutral position), trust of

Table 5 Same-workplace union exit: logistic regression equations

Equation	(5.1)	(5.2)	(5.3)
NTERCEPT	-1.8862**	5.0707**	3.9597*
	(0.6023)	(1.9503)	(1.7470)
USYMPATHY		-0.2795#	-0.3268*
		(0.1639)	(0.1615)
UBENEFIT		-1.1721*	-1.2909**
		(0.5091)	(0.5091)
UFIGHT	0.3942#	0.0652	0.2053
	(0.2337)	(0.2905)	(0.2694)
APATHY		0.7336	0.7624
		(0.6695)	(0.6627)
TRUSTCOND	3.8937**		4.4745**
	(1.3834)		(1.5274)
JOBSATUP	-0.6643**	-0.6623#	-0.5896*
	(0.2537)	(0.3388)	(0.2998)
SATUDELEG		-1.2230*	
		(0.4851)	
TRUSTMAN		0.3280#	
		(0.1753)	
N	210	204	205
Akaike I C (full information)	105.393	88.746	89.878
Akaike I C (restricted sample, n = 204)	99.736	88.746	89.719
Schwartz criterion (full information)	118.762	115.291	113.139
Schwartz criterion (restricted sample, n = 204)	113.008	115.291	112.946
-2 Log L	97.393	72.746	75.878
χ^2	23.323**	36.619**	39.032**
Cragg-Uhler r^2	.240	.396	.404
prediction success	.732	.885	.872
RESET $\chi^2_{.05,3}$	2.995	0.440	3.550

Source: SEMSE
Population: Employees in open jobs who have been or still are members of a union at their current workplace.
Weights: Simple employee weights
Standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at 1 per cent probability level
* Significant at 5 per cent probability level
# Significant at 10 per cent probability level

management made no difference to the likelihood that an employee would leave the union to become a non-member. But high trust of management was associated with union exit *where union satisfaction was low*. Amongst employees in whom this combination of attitudes was found, the exit rate was high and, despite the small number of such employees (less than 4 per cent of the total sample), their exit rate significantly differed from exit rates

Table 6 Same-workplace union exit in open jobs: effects of main significant variables

	Predicted probability of same-workplace union exit		
	at minimum value (%)	at maximum value (%)	Effect (% points)
USYMPATHY (2,10)	15	1	-14
UBENEFIT (1,5)	51	1	-50
TRUSTCOND (0,1)	3	75	72
JOBSATUP (0,4)	14	2	-13

Source: Equation 5.3; Table 5

for other employees.[8] While this interaction is very obvious in relation to ULEFT, it is not so clear cut in relation to ULEFTHERE where the sample is smaller; the AIC barely favours the equation with SATUDELEG and TRUSTMAN as a predictor of ULEFTHERE (equation 5.2) over an otherwise identical one using TRUSTCOND (equation 5.3), but the Schwartz criterion favours the latter.

APATHY shows up as a positive (though not very strong) predictor of ULEFT but is not a predictor of ULEFTHERE. This result may be due to the smaller N for ULEFTHERE, but might also have some basis in employee behaviour. Many unionists who scored high on the apathy scale may have joined their former union as a result of compulsory unionism. If they had the opportunity to not be in a union at their current workplace, they probably would not have retained their membership when they started work there.

These results from an employee dataset were consistent with findings from an analysis of a workplace-level dataset of the influences on deunionisation of workplaces. When unions were active (as defined by Callus et al, 1991) the introduction by management of schemes aimed at enhancing employee involvement had no effect on deunionisation. But if unions were inactive and management pursued strategies for promoting employee involvement, deunionisation rates increased substantially (Peetz, 1995b).

5. Union density

Table 7 shows predictors of union density in open jobs. All equations pass the RESET test.

Despite its importance in determining union exit and membership, UBENEFIT is not included in Table 7. To do so would be to make Table 7

equivalent to a set of equations about union exit (it would ensure the population was only past and current union members, as the question on union instrumentality was not asked of people who have never been in a union). This would sterilise the influence of union joining on the data.

Table 7 Union density in open jobs: logistic regression equations

	(7.1)	(7.2)	(7.3)	(7.4)
INTERCEPT	-0.6507	-1.0876	-0.6324	-0.4933
	(0.6577)	(0.7661)	(0.5753)	(0.5630)
USYMPATHY	0.3002**	0.2937**		
	(0.0787)	(0.0792)		
UFIGHT	-0.4554**	-0.4268**	0.4921**	-0.4732**
	(0.1503)	(0.1520)	(0.1442)	(0.1568)
APATHY	-1.2793**	-1.2323**	1.1748**	-1.1745**
	(0.3095)	(0.3121)	(0.2976)	(0.3506)
TRUSTCOND	-3.3198**	-3.0353**		-2.4989*
	(1.1012)	(1.1234)		(1.1719)
UNOTCOOP	-0.9739*	-0.9091*	-0.9388*	-0.9950*
	(0.3981)	(0.4018)	(0.3793)	(0.4114)
JOBSATUP				-0.2250[#]
				(0.1355)
SATUDELEG		0.2110	-0.4069*	
		(0.1834)	(0.1725)	
TRUSTMAN			0.1180[#]	
			(0.0697)	
IDBETTER	0.9179*	0.8981[#]	-1.2217**	1.3453**
	(0.4617)	(0.4622)	(0.4369)	(0.4973)
PARTCOND				0.7285[#]
				(0.4129)
N	309	309	309	266
Akaike I C (full information)	293.660	294.336	309.323	259.363
Akaike I C (restricted sample, N = 266)	248.713	248.637	259.405	257.548
-2 Log L	279.660	278.336	295.323	243.363
χ^2	97.945**	99.269**	80.207**	73.805**
Cragg-Uhler r^2	.385	.390	.325	.348
prediction success	.824	.829	.809	.814
RESET $\chi^2_{.05,3}$	1.344	1.596	2.492	2.089

Source: SEMSE
Population: Employees in open jobs
Weights: Simple employee weights
Standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at 1 per cent probability level
* Significant at 5 per cent probability level
[#] Significant at 10 per cent probability level

Clearly two of the most important influences upon union membership, aside from UBENEFIT, are USYMPATHY (through its impact upon union joining) and APATHY. Both are highly significant (in equation 7.1, both have p values of 0.01 per cent). In open jobs, employees with the most pro-union ideological sympathies are 54 percentage points or over three times more likely than employees with the lowest score to belong to a union.

JOBSATUP, which significantly reduces union exit, appears to have only a weak and *negative* relationship with union membership, one which is not even significant at the 10 percent level in some specifications not shown here. This presumably arises from a negative relationship with union joining that more or less offsets a negative relationship with union exit. While the simple correlation between improved job satisfaction and union *exit* was -.11, the correlation between improved job satisfaction and union *joining* was also negative, at -.18, although in this case the coefficient was not significant due to the small sample size. (For the same reason, JOB-SATUP does not appear in the equations of Table 1.) If JOBSATUP is weakly or not related to union density, then a negative relationship with UJOIN would be needed to offset the negative coefficient of JOBSATUP in relation to ULEFTHERE (Table 5). Employees might be more likely to join unions when their job satisfaction falls, and they are more likely to leave when their job satisfaction falls. The net impact upon union density of these countervailing forces is small.

In the absence of UBENEFIT, through which they primarily influence unionisation, UFIGHT and UNOTCOOP are both consistently significant. Employees in open jobs who strongly agree that unions fight a lot were roughly 40 percentage points less likely to belong to a union than those who strongly disagreed (Table 8). Presumably the strength of its relationship derives from its ability to influence both union joining and union exit.

Participation in industrial action *that had a positive outcome*, as perceived by respondents, measured by IDBETTER, also tends to enhance union membership. The effect on predicted membership probabilities is about 22 percentage points. This variable, too, is strongly correlated with perceived union instrumentality.[9] This variable was a much more useful predictor than the mere participation in industrial action, suggesting that participation in unsuccessful industrial action may be counterproductive for union membership.

Other relationships were as would be expected from the data on union joining and exit. The conditional variable TRUSTCOND, which embodies the interaction between trust of management and satisfaction with union delegates, is consistently significant and performs much better in predicting

union membership than either SATUDELEG or TRUSTMAN on their own.

Table 8 Union density in open jobs: effects of main significant variables

	Predicted probability of union membership		
	at minimum value (%)	at maximum value (%)	Effect (% points)
USYMPATHY (2,10)	20	74	54
UFIGHT (0,4)	62	21	-41
APATHY (0,1)	63	32	-31
TRUSTCOND (0,1)	52	4	-48
UNOTCOOP (0,1)	52	2	-50
IDBETTER (0,1)	43	65	22

Source: Equation 13.1, Table VI.13

6. Discussion

The results of this analysis show the importance of separately considering the influences on union joining and union exit if the influences on union membership are to be properly understood. Indeed, it was not possible to produce a single equation that best explained union density because inclusion of the most important variable, measuring past and present union members' experiences of union instrumentality, would have restricted the sample and thereby masked the influences on union joining. A number of significant influences on union membership were shown to exist. However, it is essential to be cautious in drawing the implications of these findings, not least because of other factors that influence union membership.

The strong positive relationship between union sympathy and union joining does not mean that people primarily join unions for ideological reasons. When SEMSE respondents were asked an open ended question directly seeking their motives for union membership, only a small proportion (8 per cent) gave what could be termed as ideological reasons. The desire for union protection was a far more important reason people gave for joining unions. Rather, it seems more to be the case ideological reasons are a powerful factor that had the potential to prevent many employees in open jobs from joining unions. Union sympathy has a very strong influence on union joining. Strong anti-union sympathy virtually guarantees non-membership of a union unless joining is compelled.

If the act of joining a union is strongly influenced by union sympathy, then union exit in open jobs has more instrumental explanations and little in the way of ideological motivations. Many employees joined a union because they had to. But if they later had the opportunity to return to non-union status (for example by moving from a closed shop to an open job), whether they actually did so depended more upon the benefits that unionism had provided to those employees, beliefs that were in turn influenced by such matters as whether unions were seen to be protecting members, responding to members' wishes, attempting to cooperate with management (see Peetz, 1996a), and fighting amongst themselves. Low union satisfaction and union in-fighting contribute to union exit behaviour by employees.

If union instrumentality is such a major influence on union membership, does it follow that union strategies for reversing membership decline should focus on obtaining non-'industrial' benefits, or on making wage gains exclusive for members as opposed to non-members? Perhaps, but not necessarily. Almost half of union members explained their membership in terms of the protection, advice and representation that unions offered. There were very few respondents who indicated that they had joined a union because of the provision of private non-'industrial' benefits to members. Cross-national research suggests that the employer incentive to fight union-isation is strongest where the 'union wage' is not generalised and the union-nonunion wage differential is the highest; the veracity and effective-ness of employer attacks on US unions reflects the high union wage differential in that country (Freeman, 1989; Visser, 1991; Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992). Whether the impact of a higher union wage differential in attracting and retaining members in open jobs would offset the loss of membership arising from greater employer resistance to union membership is ultimately an empirical question, but overseas evidence suggests that the answer is probably no. This illustrates the need for caution in generalising from micro-level data on revealed employee preferences.

One of the most important findings was that the relationship between management strategies aimed at building employee trust of management is an interactive or contingent one. The effect is predominantly conditional upon whether unions are adequately supporting their members through workplace delegates.

The data also indicate that unions which are perceived by their members as not attempting to cooperate with management were less likely to be seen as providing benefits to their members and may have been more likely to lose members. But any employee search for 'cooperative' union behaviour

was not a search for union compliance with management's agenda, as illustrated by the role of successful industrial action in enhancing membership and the fact that respondents were looking for even more cooperative behaviour from management (some 54 per cent of respondents at unionised workplaces indicated that management should 'cooperate' more closely with unions). In the end, this is simply another way of saying that employees want unions to effectively represent their interests in the relationship with management that inherently contains both conflicting and overlapping interests (Peetz, 1996a).

If 'cooperation' with management was an issue for union membership, even more significant was cooperation between unions. Unions which lacked cohesion, which appeared to be engaged in fights among themselves, were less likely to persuade their members that they were providing a benefit and more likely to lose members.

Job satisfaction had a complex relationship with union membership that is disguised in studies which do not disaggregate membership decisions into decisions to join and decisions to leave. It appears that low job satisfaction amongst non-members increases the likelihood that they will join a union as an attempt to redress their dissatisfaction. But for union members, deteriorations in job dissatisfaction may lead to their leaving the union as a result of the failure of the union to address their concerns. These two effects tend to counteract each other, the net result being that, amongst employees in open jobs, the relationship between job satisfaction and union membership is small.

The employee-level data reported in this paper cannot reveal all the factors that determine union membership because many of those factors are not observable at that level. Their value lies in filling in a significant part of the picture, and in revealing to us some of the complexities involved in understanding union membership – such as the ways in which union joining and union exit are influenced by different factors or in different ways, and the ways that some of the relationships affecting union membership are contingent upon the perceived performance of unions at the workplace. This last point serves to remind us that, perhaps despite present appearances, there is nothing immutable about the decline in union membership – unions themselves still have a critical role in determining whether they survive as a major Australian institution into the twenty first century.

Notes

1   I have avoided the term 'union ideology' as this term may also refer to the ideological positions held *by* unions as organisations.

2   Information relating to the representativeness of the data from SEMSE are contained in Peetz (1995a, 1996a).

3   The regression equations have been generated using SAS v6.08. For each explanatory variable, the coefficient and (in brackets) the standard error are presented. Wald chi-squared tests are used to determine the significance levels of coefficients.

4   This approach has been chosen, in preference to reporting the effect of a one unit change in the explanatory variable. Units of measurement vary substantially between variables, making comparison of the effects of different variables difficult. Because the functional form of the logit model is non-linear, one-unit changes cannot be multiplied to indicate the effect of moving from a low to a high score on an explanatory variable. The impact of moving from a low score to a high score has a greater relevance to the analysis in this thesis and so that is the method chosen for illustrating effects in this Appendix.

5   As mentioned, to avoid presenting voluminous material on marginal effects, the marginal effects of only one equation are reported for each table of regressions. In that sense, we are forced to choose a 'preferred' equation but, as is also acknowledged above, the marginal effects would differ if a different equation was used to calculate them.

6   In Table 7, for example, equation 7.2 appears superior (by the barest of margins) to equation 7.1 based on the restricted AIC, but fortunately the two equations have identical Ns anyway and we can see that, on the full information AIC, equation 7.1 actually has slightly better fit.

7   For USYMPATHY and PARTCOND, $r = .19^{**}$

8   The reason this combination was relatively uncommon was that employees who had high trust of management were not dissatisfied with their union delegates very often.

9   For IDBETTER and UBENEFIT, $r = .25^{**}$. For UNOTCOOP and UBENEFIT, $r = -.13^{*}$; and for UFIGHT and UBENEFIT, $r = -.28^{**}$.

References

Angle, H L and Perry, J L (1984) 'Union Member Attitudes and Labor Management Relationship Climates', Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison WI, 284-290.

Angle, H L and Perry, J T (1986) 'Dual Commitment and Labour-Management Relationship Climates', *Academy of Management Journal*, 29(1), March, 31-50.

Bartel, A P (1981) 'Race Differences in Job Satisfaction: A Reappraisal', *Journal of Human Resources*, 16(2), 294-303.

Batstone, E, Boraston, I and Frenkel, S (1977) *Shop Stewards in Action*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Baupain, T (1992) 'Trade Union Membership: Further Probing of Explanatory Factors with Special Reference to Belgium', communication to Ninth World Congress, International Industrial Relations Association, Sydney, September.

Beaumont, P (1986) 'Industrial Relations Policies in High Technology Firms', *New Technology, Work and Employment*, 1(2).

Beynon, H and Blackburn, R M (1972) *Perceptions of Work*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bigoness, W J and Tosi, H L (1984) 'Correlates of Voting Behaviour in a Union Decertification Election', *Academy of Management Journal*, 27(3), September, 654-659.

Blanchflower, D G and Freeman, R B (1992) 'Unionism in the US and Other Advanced OECD Countries', *Industrial Relations*, 31(1), Winter, 56-79.

Borjas, G J (1979) 'Job Satisfaction, Wages and Unions', *Journal of Human Resources*, 14(1), Winter, 21-40.

Brett, J M (1980) 'Why Employees Want Unions' *Organizational Dynamics*, 8(4), Spring, 47-59.

Brotslaw, I (1967) 'Attitudes of Retail Workers Towards Union Organisation', *Labor Law Journal*, 18(3), March, 149-171.

Callus, R, Morehead, A, Cully, M, and Buchanan, J (1991) *Industrial Relations at Work, Department of Industrial Relations*, AGPS, Canberra.

Chaples, E A, et al (1977) *A Survey of Members of the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union in the Sydney Metropolitan Area*, 1976 Field Studies Class, Department of Government, University of Sydney, Sydney.

Christie, V (1992) 'Union Wage Effects and the Probability of Union Membership', *Economic Record*, 68(200), 43-56.

Christie, V and Miller, P (1989) 'Attitudes towards Trade Unions and Union Membership', *Economics Letters*, 30(3), September, 263-268.

Cook, F G, Clark, S G, Roberts, K and Semenoff, E (1975) 'White and Blue Collar Workers' Attitudes to Trade Unionism and Social Class', *Industrial Relations Journal*, 6(4), Winter, 47-58.

Crockett, G and Hall, K (1987) 'Salaried Professionals and Union Membership: An Australian Perspective', *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 29(1), March, 49-65.

Cronin, J E (1979) *Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain*, Croom Helm, London.

Cully, M and Fraser, R (1993) *The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS): The State Dimension*, Industrial Relations Research Monograph No 4, Department of Industrial Relations, Canberra, September.

Deery, S and De Cieri, H (1991) 'Determinants of Trade Union Membership in Australia', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 29(1), March, 59-73.

Deshpande, S P and Fiorito, J (1989) 'Specific and General Beliefs in Union Voting Models', *Academy of Management Journal*, 32, 883-97.

Dufty, N (1972) *Industrial Relations in the Australian Metals Industry*, West Publishing Corporation, Sydney.

Dufty, N (1979) *Industrial Relations in the Public Sector: the Firemen*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Erwin, P J, Iverson, R D, and Buttigieg, D M (1994) 'Individualism versus Collectivism: Who Supports the Employee Relations Act of Victoria', paper presented to

8th conference of Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand, Sydney, February.

Farber, H S (1985) 'The Extent of Unionization in the US', in T Kochan (ed) *Challenges and Choices Facing American Labor*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 15-43.

Farber, H S (1990) 'The Decline of Unionisation in the United States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience?', *Journal of Labor Economics*, 8(1), Part 2, January, s75-s105.

Farber, H S and Saks, H D (1980) 'Why Workers Want Unions: The Role of Relative Wages and Job Characteristics', *Journal of Political Economy*, 88(2), April, 349-369.

Fiorito, J (1992) 'Unionism and Altruism', *Labor Studies Journal*, 17(3), Fall, 19-34.

Fiorito, J and Greer, C R (1986) 'Gender Differences in Union Membership, Preferences and Beliefs', *Journal of Labor Research*, 7(2), Spring, 145-64.

Fiorito J, Gallagher, D G and Greer, C R (1986) 'Determinants of Unionism: a Review of the Literature', in K M Rowland and G R Ferris (eds) *Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management*, 4, JAI Press, Greenwich CT, 269-306.

Freeman, R B (1978) 'Job Satisfaction as an Economic Variable', *American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceedings, May, 68(2), 135-42.

Freeman, R B (1989) 'On the Divergence in Unionism Among Developed Countries', Working Paper No 2817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., January; also in R Brunetta and C Dell'Aringa (eds) (1990) *Labour Relations and Economic Performance,* Macmillan, London, 304-323.

Freeman, R B and Medoff, J L (1984), *What Do Unions Do?*, Basic Books, New York.

Gallagher, D G and Clark, P F (1989) 'Research on Union Commitment: Implications for Labor', *Labor Studies Journal*, 14(3), Spring, 52-71.

Gallagher, D G and Strauss, G (1991) 'Union Membership Attitudes and Participation', in G Strauss, D G Gallagher and J Fiorito (eds) *The State of the Unions*, Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, 139-74.

Getman, J G, Goldberg, S B and Herman, J B (1976) *Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality*, Russell Sage, New York.

Gevers, P (1992) 'Trade Unions, the Belgian Model of Industrial Relations and the Developments in the European Community', communication to Ninth World Congress, International Industrial Relations Association, September, Sydney.

Glick, W, Mirvis, P and Harder, D (1977), 'Union Satisfaction and Participation', *Industrial Relations*, 16(2), May, 145-51.

Goldthorpe, J H, Lockwood, D, Bechhofer, F and Platt, J, (1968) *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Gordon, M E, Beauvais, L and Ladd, R T (1984) 'The Job Satisfaction and Union Commitment of Unionised Engineers', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 37(3), April, 359-70.

Green, F (1990) 'Trade Union Availability and Trade Union Membership in Britain', *Manchester School*, 58(4), December, 378-94.

Griffin, G (1983) 'White Collar Unionism 1969 to 1981: Some Determinants of Growth', *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 25(1), March, 26-37.

Grimes, P F M (1994) 'The Determinants of Trade Union Membership: Evidence from Two Australian Surveys', PhD thesis, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra.

Guest, D E and Dewe, P (1988) 'Why Do Workers Belong to Trade Unions? A Social Psychological Study in the UK Electronics Industry', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 26(2), July, 178-94

Guest, D E and Dewe, P (1991) 'Company or Trade Union: Which Wins Workers' Allegiance? A Study of Commitment in the UK Electronics Industry', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 29(1), March, 75-96.

Heritage, J (1983) 'Feminisation and Unionisation: A Case Study from Banking', in E Gamarnikow, D Morgan, J Purvis and D Taylorson (eds) *Gender, Class and Work*, British Sociological Association/Gower, Aldershot, 131-48.

Hill, J (1982) *From Subservience to Strike: Industrial Relations in the Banking Industry*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia.

Hills, S J (1985) 'The Attitudes of Union and Non-union Male Workers Toward Union Representation', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 38(2), January, 179-94.

Johnston, R (1977) 'The Immigrant Worker' in A Bordow (ed) *The Worker in Australia: Contributions from Research*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 68-112.

Kelly, J and Heery, E (1989) 'Full-time Officials and Trade Union Recruitment', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 27(2), July, 196-213.

Klandermans, B (1986) 'Psychology and Trade Union Participation: Joining, Acting, Quitting', *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, 59(3), September, 189-204.

Kochan, T A (1979) 'How American Workers View Labor Unions', *Monthly Labor Review*, 102, April, 23-31.

Körösi, G, Mátyás, L and Székely, I P (1992) *Practical Econometrics*, Avebury, Aldershot.

Kuruvilla, S C and Iverson, R D (1993) 'A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Union Commitment in Australia', *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 35(3), September, 436-52.

Kuruvilla, S C, Gallagher, D G and Wetzel, K (1993) 'The Development of Members' Attitudes Towards Their Unions: Sweden and Canada', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 46(3), April, 499-514.

Leigh, D E (1986) 'Union Preferences, Job Satisfaction and the Union-Voice Hypothesis', *Industrial Relations*, 25(1), Winter, 65-71.

Lincoln, J R and Kalleberg, A L (1985) 'Work Organisation and Workforce Commitment: A Study of Plants and Employees in the US and Japan', *American Sociological Review*, 50(6), December, 738-760.

LO (Swedish Trade Union Confederation) (1991) *Trade Union Organisation in the Future*, Summary of a Report to the 1991 LO Congress, Stockholm.

Mercer, D E and Weir, D T H (1972) 'Attitudes to Work and Unionism Among White-Collar Employees', *Industrial Relations Journal*, 3, 49-60.

Miller, P (1990) 'Trade Unions and Job Satisfaction' *Australian Economic Papers*, December, 226-248.

Miller, P and Rummery, S (1989) 'Unionism and the Structure of Male Wages in the Labour Market', *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 31(2), June, 185-211.

Montgomery, R B (1989) 'The Influence of Attitudes and Normative Pressures on Voting Decisions in a Union Certification Election', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 42(2), January, 262-79.

Peetz, D (1995a) 'Union Membership, Management, Labour and the Accord', PhD thesis, School of Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour, University of New South Wales, Sydney.

Peetz, D (1995b) 'Deunionisation', paper presented to Ninth conference of Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne, February.

Peetz, D (1996) 'Unions, Conflict and the Dilemma of Cooperation', *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 38(4), December.

Peetz, D (1997) 'Why Bother? Union Membership and Apathy', Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No 357, Australian National University, January.

Prandy, K, Stewart, A and Blackburn, R M (1974) 'Concepts and Measures: The Example of Unionateness', *Sociology*, 8(3), 427-46.

Prandy, K, Stewart, A and Blackburn, R M (1982) *White Collar Work*, Macmillan, London.

Premarck, S and Hunter, J (1988) 'Individual Unionisation Decisions', *Psychological Bulletin*, 103, 223-234.

Reynaud, J D (1983) 'An International View', in R Hyman and R Price (eds) *The New Working Class? White Collar Workers and their Organisations*, Macmillan, London, 247-54.

Rose, A (1952) *Union Solidarity*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Sayles, L and Strauss, G (1953) *The Local Union*, Harper, New York.

Schriesheim, C A (1978) 'Job Satisfaction, Attitudes Towards Unions and Voting in a Union Representation Election', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 68, 548-52.

Schwochau, S (1987) 'Union Effects on Job Attitudes', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 40(2), January, 209-23.

Simey, T et al (1954) *The Dock Worker: An Analysis of Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.

Undy, R, Ellis, N, McCarthy, W E J and Halmov, A M (1981) *Change in Trade Unions: The Development of UK Unions Since the 1960s*, Hutchinson, London.

Van de Vall, M (1970) *Labor Organisations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Visser, E J (1991) 'Trends in Trade Union Membership', in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Employment Outlook*, Paris, July, 97-134.

Waddington, J and Whitston, C (1993) 'Why do White Collar Staff Join Unions? Some Evidence on the Tension Between Individual Activity and Collective Organisation', paper to conference on Unions on the Brink: The Future of the Trade Union Movement, Cardiff Business School, September.

Western, B (1993) 'Postwar Unionisation in Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Countries', *American Sociological Review*, 58, April, 266-82.

Wheeler, H N and McClendon, J A (1991) 'The Individual Decision to Unionise', in G Strauss, D G Gallagher and J Fiorito (eds) *The State of the Unions*, Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison WI.

Willman, P (1989) 'The Logic of Market Share Unionism', *Industrial Relations Journal*, 20(4), Winter, 260-70.

Youngblood, S, De Nisi, A, Molleston, J and Mobley, W (1984) 'The Impact of Work Environment, Instrumentality Beliefs, Perceived Labor Union Image and Subjective Norms on Union Voting Intentions', *Academy of Management Journal*, 27(3), September, 576-90.

Appendix A
Variable Definitions and Their Summary Statistics

Variable name	Definition	Mean	Std dev.	Minimum	Maximum
USYMPATHY	Index of union sympathy (2 questions)	6.30	2.30	2 (low)	10 (high)
UBENEFIT	Whether benefited from being in a union	3.44	0.85	1 (much worse off)	5 (much better off)
UFIGHT	Unions spend a lot of time fighting	1.31	1.10	0 (disagree)	4 (agree)
APATHY	Index of union apathy (=1 if, on at least 7 of 13 items, respondent answers 'no opinion' or 'neither agree nor disagree')	0.47	0.50	0 (no)	1 (yes)
PARTCOND	Low employee involvement, and satisfied with union delegate	0.27	0.44	0 (no)	1 (yes)
UNOTCOOP	Unions do not try to cooperate	0.16	0.36	0 (disagree)	4 (agree)
JOBSATUP	Change in job satisfaction over previous two years	2.24	1.18	0 (much less)	4 (much more)
SATUDELEG	Satisfaction with union delegate	2.27	0.98	0 (very dissat.)	4 (very satisfied)
TRUSTMAN	Index of trust of management (2 questions)	3.51	2.18	0 (low)	8 (high)
TRUSTCOND	High trust of management, and dissatisfied with union delegate	0.05	0.21	0 (no)	1 (yes)
IDBETTER	If has been engaged in industrial action, then last action had beneficial outcome to employees	0.21	0.41	0 (all others)	1 (yes)
EMPART	Index of employee involvement (3 questions)	4.11	2.37	0 (low)	9 (high)
JOIN	Whether became a union member in past year (or remained a non-member)	0.25	0.44	0 (no)	1 (yes)
ULEFT	Whether former union member (or still a member)	0.21	0.41	0 (no)	1 (yes)
ULEFTHERE	Whether former union member at current workplace (or still union member)	0.10	0.30	0 (no)	1 (yes)
UNOW	Whether a union member now	0.61	0.49	0 (no)	1 (yes)