immediate purpose, arrested many of its leading members, including Yaroslav Stetsko and Stepan Bandera. By the late summer of 1941, the Germans had realized that they could more effectively carry out anti-Jewish executions without first inciting pogroms and began to break up the Ukrainian nationalist militias and replace them with police forces or battalions.

Members of the OUN, though, gained prominence in the civil administration and police forces the Germans established, especially in Galicia and Volhynia, where the links between the OUN and the police were particularly strong. In these regions, police forces, often staffed by members of the OUN, played important auxiliary roles in the murder of the local Jewish communities. Sometimes entire OUN battalions were converted into police forces, such as the Nachtigall battalion, commanded by Roman Shukhevych, which became Schutzmannschaft battalion 201. In Galicia and Volhynia as well as throughout the Reichskommissariat, Ukrainian police implemented the transfer of Jewish populations into ghettos and guarded the perimeters of the ghettos. During these roundups, Ukrainian police assisted Germans in shooting Jews and sometimes shot Jews themselves. Himka notes that "the notion that the Ukrainian police were reluctant to engage in anti-Jewish actions and did so only under duress is not supported by anything I have found in police records themselves—quite the contrary" (331).

The final section of Himka's book deals with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which was established by Bandera's faction of the OUN in the fall of 1942 as a form of resistance against the Soviet Union, the Polish Underground State, and the Germans. The chaotic and clandestine nature of the insurgency makes it particularly difficult to tease out exactly which units were acting under whose auspices, but Himka makes an admirable effort to distinguish the so-called Banderites from other insurgent groups and collects ample testimonies that claim units of the UPA perpetrated atrocities against Jews in 1942 and 1943 throughout Volhynia and Galicia. Although he cannot find definitive evidence from UPA documentation, Himka concludes that the murder of Jews reflects "a genuine OUN-UPA policy" (410). "Indeed," he writes, "in addition to killing Jews because they were Jews and because they were allies with the Poles, UPA killed Jews who were associated with or protected by the Soviet partisan movement" (400).

Himka's book is not for the faint of heart. The descriptions are chilling, and the level of detail is more than most readers will need. The prose is, at times, repetitive and even tedious. But the evidence and argumentation are exacting, and the conclusions are convincing. There can no longer be any reasonable doubt that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were complicit in committing atrocities against Jews during the Holocaust. Whether evidence, argument, and corroboration will convince any true believers, though, is another story altogether.

doi:10.1017/S000893892300081X

Messengers of Disaster: Raphael Lemkin, Jan Karski, and Twentieth-Century Genocides

By Annette Becker. Translated by Käthe Roth. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2021. Pp. 304. Cloth $39.95. ISBN: 978-0299333201.

David M. Crowe

Elon University, emeritus

Raphael Lemkin and Janusz Kozielewski (Jan Karski) came from two different worlds, though in 1943 and 1944, respectively, they helped inform the world of the genocidal horrors that had

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938923000596 Published online by Cambridge University Press

been taking place in German-occupied Poland. Karski was born in Lodz in 1914 to a devout Catholic family, while Lemkin, whose parents managed a farm in northwestern Russia, was born in 1900. He was raised in a very observant Jewish family and received a rigorous Orthodox Jewish education. He was deeply affected by the tribulations of Jews during the Great War and in the civil wars afterwards, a topic that Annette Becker discusses in some depth.

Karski was trained as a diplomat, while Lemkin attended law school in Lwow. Both had highly successful careers prior to the outbreak of war in 1939. Lemkin fled Poland and settled in Sweden and later the U.S., while Karski remained in Poland and plied his diplomatic skills for the Polish underground. In 1942, he was sent into the Warsaw Ghetto and later Belzec's transit camp, Izbica. His observations became the basis of the report he later shared with Allied leaders in Europe and the U.S. Lemkin, a gifted scholar and linguist, took a different path and between 1941 and 1944 compiled a vast collection of German occupation documents that became the basis of his seminal work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944). Becker notes that while Karski's reports did discuss the fate of Jews, they contained much more information about the plight of all Poles in occupied Poland. Lemkin did something similar in *Axis Rule*. His chapter 8, "The Legal Status of Jews," was a prelude to chapter 9, "Genocide," in which he coined and defined the term. But the general thrust of his lengthy study was on the impact of Nazi occupation policies on countries and their citizens throughout Europe. Though Becker writes that Lemkin's massive work is "difficult to follow," (137) a patient study of it reveals a great deal not only about the evolution of his ideas about genocide but also its relationship to these policies throughout Europe. What makes Lemkin's work so remarkable is that even though he was deeply affected not least by the crimes of the Holocaust, particularly the murders of his beloved parents Jozef and Bella, he chose a "global" perspective when it came to Nazi crimes.

The centerpiece of Becker's study, at least when it comes to Karski, is his meeting with President Roosevelt on July 28, 1943. Accompanied by Poland's ambassador to the U.S., Jan Ciechanowski, who knew the president quite well (and discussed numerous meetings with Roosevelt in his memoir, *Defeat in Victory* [1947]), Karski found the president well informed about the plight of the Jews; Roosevelt asked Karski to "verify the stories" he had heard about their plight (Karski, *Story of a Secret State* [1944], 387–388). Karski's account of the meeting, which he included in two chapters of his *Story of a Secret State*, was brief, while Ciechanowski's discussion in his memoirs was much more in-depth. Becker notes that the principal reason for the meeting was not the question of the Jews but the overall situation in Poland and the fate of all its citizens.

One of the issues that the author does not adequately discuss is the impact of Karski's talks with Roosevelt and other prominent members of his administration. Rafael Medoff's *The Jews Should be Quiet: Franklin D, Roosevelt, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and the Holocaust* (2019) barely mentions Karski's meeting with the president and focuses principally on the steady flow of information about Nazi crimes against Jews in occupied Europe and the failure of the Roosevelt administration, at least until 1944, to act decisively to save Jews. The creation of the War Refugee Board that year, Medoff argues, was too little, too late because most of the six million murdered by the Nazis were already dead.

The Secret State and *Axis Rule* were published in 1944 and received considerable acclaim. Karski's star quickly faded, and after the war he settled in the U.S. and joined the faculty at Georgetown University. But in 1982, Yad Vashem named Jan Karski Righteous Among the Nations, and twelve years later he was made an honorary citizen of Israel. Lemkin became a member of Robert Jackson's prosecution team in Nuremberg and played an important role in getting the Allies to accept genocide as a sub-charge in the trial. Becker states that though Lemkin was disappointed about this decision, towards the end of the trial some of the prosecutors began to use the term "genocide" more frequently because it was the only term that could perfectly describe the heinous crimes described during the presentations by American and Soviet prosecutors, something Becker correctly notes.

But Lemkin was not satisfied by any of this and was able to convince the newly created U.N. to consider the adoption of a Genocide Convention, which it did in December 1948.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938923000596 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Afterwards, he got caught up in the Convention's ratification struggles but spent the latter part of his life writing his memoirs and working on his multivolume global history of genocide. He was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize ten times but died in relative obscurity in 1959. Since then, Becker concludes, Raphael Lemkin "has not yet found his place in the global consciousness" (195). This might be true in some parts of the world, but his ideas and concepts have taken root in regions and countries that value the importance of international legal protections and concepts for all people, whether in war or peace. These were values strongly voiced and supported by Raphael Lemkin and Jan Karski.

doi:10.1017/S0008938923000596

Democracy, Nazi Trials, and Transitional Justice in Germany, 1945-1950

By Devin O. Pendas. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. vi + 226. Cloth $99.99. ISBN: 978-0521871297.

Andrew H. Beattie

University of New South Wales

Recent decades have seen intense study of the handling of the Nazi past in occupied and divided Germany after 1945 and the prosecution of Nazi crimes in particular. Devin Pendas' 2006 book on the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial (1963-1965) made a significant contribution. His new book explores Allied and German trials and aspects of the German discourse surrounding them in the eastern and western parts of the country from 1945 to 1950.

The introduction outlines the book's main arguments but could say more about source selection and methodology and make a stronger claim for originality. Pendas seeks to challenge easy assumptions about "transitional justice," particularly about whether transitional criminal trials promote democratization, but his depictions of an ostensibly unitary "transitional justice theory" seem overly simplistic.

Chapter 1 explores the International Military Tribunal (IMT), the Americans' "subsequent proceedings" also held at Nuremberg, and, briefly, the military tribunals of the four individual occupying powers. The emphasis is on Allied goals and German responses. Pendas argues that neither the IMT nor the individual powers' military tribunals were primarily designed to address the German population or promote democratization. Only the Americans' "subsequent proceedings" constituted a concerted attempt to teach the Germans "history lessons in judicial robes" (34). But Pendas shows that their reception in the German legal press was replete with defensive legal and historical arguments that undermined the intended lessons.

Chapter 2 traces the four powers' approaches to allowing German courts to prosecute Nazi crimes, which were shaped by pragmatic issues such as manpower, by political considerations such as the level of trust in the German judiciary, and by legal questions about which laws should apply to which crimes against which victims. Pendas highlights the prevailing problems in each zone, such as inconsistency in the French case, the dual application of German and retrospective Allied law (specifically Control Council Law No. 10) in the British case, the restriction to positive German law that precluded the prosecution of crimes against humanity in the American Zone, and a combination of inconsistency, rigour, and increasing politicization in the Soviet Zone.

Chapter 3 analyses the politicized (west) German legal debate about prosecuting crimes against humanity and the forceful objections against using retroactive law to punish Nazi crimes. Here Pendas provides a nuanced and detailed discussion, identifying multiple ironies

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938923000596 Published online by Cambridge University Press