

I am only surprised that he does not make more use of those remarks in which St Thomas points out that revelation itself involves a passage of thought from created effects to their divine cause (*Summa Theologiae* Ia 1.7ad 1 and 12.13 ad 1), since these throw further light on the unity of the *Summa*. The structure of the argument to God is eventually the structure of all theological reasoning.

In the second part of the book Fr Sillem rather quaintly constructs an imaginary conversation between some more recent philosophers and the resuscitated saint, in order to show how the argument might be presented today. St Thomas first shows that the arguments taken to be 'traditional' since Kant's day are not his at all, but come from Leibnitz and Descartes. There is, for instance, no question in genuine Thomist thought of making use of the ontological argument to pass to the idea of infinite being from the idea of necessary being, since for St Thomas the ideas we have to construct in order to say anything at all about God are more negative in content than positive. Our gaze has always to be on the created effects rather than on their cause. This leads Fr Sillem's St Thomas on to the most important section of the book, in which the basic structure of any argument to God is analysed (pp. 125-142). The argument starts from the universe of things, but 'universe' is rightly taken by Fr Sillem in a distributive sense, to mean no more than the sum of its contents. The first step is to ask the metaphysical (non-scientific) question why it is there, not why one part or another of it is intelligible. I am not sure that Fr Sillem makes it clear, despite an ingenious analogy from railway accidents, just what role the intelligibility of the universe plays in forcing us to look for the cause of its existence; nor am I sure that throughout the book he is consistent in rejecting the invalid form of argument which asks us to examine the way things are, rather than that they are. But in any case he passes to the second step of showing that the 'necessary, uncaused, unlimited' being which answers such a metaphysical question is in fact God. He can then answer the objections made at the beginning of the book, objections often valid only against Leibnitzian forms of the argument. There is no need to accept the disjunction of factual and analytic propositions, to insist that statements alone can be called 'necessary', or to restrict causal words to a single 'natural habitat', and so on.

The last word hasn't been said, and probably never will be; but in a subject where words are a good deal more common than ideas it is a pleasant surprise to find so much that is so good appearing in this book.

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NUCLEAR PHYSICS IN PEACE AND WAR, by Peter E. Hodgson. (Faith and Fact Book) Burns and Oates; 8s. 6d.

'Would it be possible to use small tactical nuclear weapons to repel an invading army without precipitating an all-out nuclear strategic assault on the centres of population? . . . The consensus of opinion is that there can be no sure way of

confining nuclear war to the battlefield'. (p. 118).

'It is unrealistic . . . to suppose that an attack if made would not be an all-out one aimed at simultaneously destroying most of the air bases and centres of population and industry with the most powerful hydrogen bombs available. Then the casualties could be numbered in tens of millions, and vast areas blanketed with a lethal or highly dangerous radioactive cloud' (p. 111).

'A nuclear attack could not now be made on another nuclear power without bringing speedy and devastating retaliation, so that there would be no victors in a nuclear war, but only widespread death and destruction over the territories of the warring nations and over neighbouring countries as well' (p. 137).

Observations like these have long been commonplaces, but it is salutary to see them thus restated in the context of this Faith and Fact Book. Dr Hodgson is well-known as a scientist who has specialized in nuclear physics, and some of his previous writings on this subject have been influential among moral theologians—not so much for observations like the above as for their emphasis upon the development of smaller nuclear weapons that might be described as discriminating.

Brief as it is, the book ranges over a very large field, from basic nuclear physics, the history of research into nuclear weapons, the biological effects of nuclear radiations, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, to nuclear explosions, nuclear strategy, civil defence, the morality of nuclear warfare and problems of international control. All of this is of interest, and Dr Hodgson summarizes some complex scientific matters with great skill, but this comprehensiveness has the drawback that, whilst repeating a great deal of information that could easily be gleaned from elsewhere, it involves a dangerously superficial treatment of those questions that are most crucially in dispute. The strategy of nuclear warfare—including the morally central problem of whether nuclear war can be 'limited'—is only quite slightly touched on. There is no discussion at all of the probable scale of existing Western stockpiles, or of the proportion of 'smaller' nuclear weapons to weapons of massive retaliation. And the arguments of that 'considerable body of opinion that is prepared to admit that the use of small atomic weapons may, in some rather abstract circumstances, be morally justified, but that in the present concrete situation they will almost certainly be used immorally' (p. 132) are dealt with in just over a page—beneath a brief, remarkable sub-title: 'Pacifism'.

One would like to think that the labelling of those who only seem to take seriously Dr Hodgson's own above recognitions, as 'pacifists' indicates merely a momentary verbal looseness. For if one re-reads the passages heading this review it is hard to see how, on such a definition, he himself could avoid a 'pacifist' tinge—and one feels he would rather avoid this. The first of these passages, though unsupported even by the briefest analysis that might have taken the measure of that 'no sure way', seems sufficient to denote nuclear war as a morally prohibitive risk, certainly for anyone to whom—as, of course, to Dr Hodgson himself—'the widespread effects of nuclear explosions restrict the

targets on which they may be justifiably used' (p. 128). Indeed, if there is 'no sure way of confining nuclear war to the battlefield', are we not in fact in the situation envisaged by Pope Pius XII, when, in his well-known 1954 address to the World Medical Association, he unconditionally condemned any 'setting in motion of an ABC (atomic, bacteriological and chemical) war' if this 'meant that it would bring in its wake such widely spread evil effects as were completely beyond human control'? (Dr Hodgson, incidentally, interprets 'beyond human control', in this address, simply as 'destruction or disease to an extent quite unknown to the user of the weapon'—p. 130—but surely the phrase must relate to the total reciprocal effects which the *setting in motion* of such a war would *bring in its wake*—and not merely to knowledge or ignorance of the effects of individual 'weapons' in the hands of 'the user'?).

The implications of Dr Hodgson's acknowledgment that there is 'no sure way' of confining nuclear war to the battlefield are strongly reinforced by the two other passages cited—though both are incidental and unemphatic in their contexts. The passage describing the supposition 'that an attack if made would not be an all-out one' as 'unrealistic' occurs in the context of Civil Defence. Its reference to casualties numbered in 'tens of millions' is thus presumably to the effects not of a Western but of an enemy nuclear attack, but, taken in conjunction with the last of these passages—which notes that 'a nuclear attack could not now be made on another nuclear power without bringing speedy and devastating retaliation, so that there would be no victors in a nuclear war'—it could indeed suggest that, on his own definition, Dr Hodgson has slipped into 'pacifism'. After all, who would not wish his thinking to be 'realistic'? Or who would wish to elude the meaning of 'devastating retaliation'? (And 'the widespread effects of nuclear explosions' *do*, as Dr Hodgson remarks, 'restrict the targets on which they may be justifiably used'.)

It is, however, apparent that Dr Hodgson neither wishes to commend pacifism nor 'pacifism'. His two short paragraphs describing the 'pacifist' position are followed by two short paragraphs indicating 'a number of considerations that tend to weaken these arguments'—and these conclude his chapter without further comment. Perhaps this method of discussion is intended to serve the interests of a scientific objectivity, but this series is, after all, concerned with Faith as well as Facts; and, in any case, to leave things as Dr Hodgson leaves them is inevitably to seem to endorse the nuclear status quo. One wishes he had been more explicit in stating—and so in defending—his own position, so that we could at any rate have understood its intellectual basis, and especially have gained some insight into how it is possible to combine common recognitions like those in the passages that have here been stressed with a chronic suspension of judgment, or even with an apparently unperturbed endorsement of the view that 'provided no definitely immoral action is specifically promised, we are entitled to presume that the defence will be according to the moral law' (p. 134). In the present climate of Catholic thought and action in these matters (and we should not forget that three of the four Western statesmen most directly con-

cerned are Catholics—widely supported, in this respect, by Catholic intellectual and spiritual leaders) such an insight would be invaluable.

WALTER STEIN

ATTENDANCE CENTRES. An Enquiry carried out by the Cambridge Institute of Criminology. By D. H. McClintock, in collaboration with M. A. Walker and L. C. Savill ; Macmillan; 28s.

Punishment nowadays is an unfashionable word but, disguise it as one may in the jargon of psychiatry, it still has its part to play. It clearly emerges that Attendance Centres were first conceived in the Criminal Justice Bill of 1938 and made law ten years later as a punitive measure. When imprisonment for the young and birching were abolished, Attendance Centres were substituted in the hope, no doubt, that this humane measure would do something to satisfy the sadistic demands of back benchers without giving undue offence to the sentimentalists for whom punishment is anathema.

Parliament, however, never seems to have been very clear as to what it really intended and the 1950 Rules show a leaning to the welfare aspect. Many experienced juvenile court justices, on the other hand, have been quite clear in what they want of the Attendance Centres. While they have never looked with favour on judicial birching they recognize the type of young offender who needs discipline, not the discipline administered by a long period of restraint, but by a short, sharp lesson which can be taught in twelve hours. That any reformatory treatment can be achieved in a period of twelve hours spread over several weeks is absurd. Still more absurd is the proffering to the Bench of semi-psychological reports on the offender's character by those who merely run these Centres and have such slight experience of him. They are unnecessary and can be a misleading duplication of reports properly tendered by probation officers trained for this work.

Attendance Centres are not intended for those in whom criminal tendencies have become ingrained, in fact they may not be used for those who have been to Detention Centres or Approved Schools. They are primarily designed for the mischievous, for those whose leisure is not put to any purpose and whose unruly behaviour and lack of discipline may easily lead to serious crime. By curtailing their leisure, by making them faintly ridiculous to their companions, by putting them to distasteful (though not necessarily useless) chores and by a smartening up process with arduous physical training it is hoped that the Attendance Centre may teach the unruly that crime leads to retribution. Furthermore, the Attendance Centre may well be combined with Probation and can be very useful as a corrective for breaches of a Probation Order.

Mr McClintock gives an interesting description of the three different types of Attendance Centre: the first in which the aim is purely punitive, the second in which it is purely reformatory, and the third which combines the punitive