

author's opinion of T. G. Masaryk's contribution to public ethics and of the importance of the Czech experience (the Slovaks barely figure) for twentieth-century democracy.

The book has certain merits, not the least of which is Zeman's deft handling of T. G. Masaryk's World War I adventures, especially those involving Russia. He shows Masaryk's success at endowing the Czechoslovak presidency with quasi-monarchic authority and prestige. This achievement had the ironic consequence of enabling Beneš (whom Zeman derides as "just noticeably taller than a dwarf") to steer the country into disasters without any domestic voice—least of all Jan Masaryk's—being raised in effective dissent. This brief work, which encompasses a tumultuous century, contains some oversimplifications. One is the implication that former Prime Minister Kramář was a fascist in 1934 when he joined the National Union political coalition; another is that Finance Minister Rašín was assassinated by a Communist rather than a mentally unstable youth whose lone act was disclaimed by the party.

If Zeman's book is not what one might have hoped, it still offers the layman interesting reading on historic personages and events.

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THE ARMY OF FRANCIS JOSEPH. By *Gunther E. Rothenberg*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1976. xiv, 298 pp. \$12.00.

Among Western scholars, the history of the Austrian army has never won the attention it deserves, a circumstance that is probably due to the fact that in 1866 the army was defeated by the Prussians in a war that settled the question of hegemony in German affairs to Austria's disadvantage. Historians, like other people, are more interested in success than in failure, and as a result we have innumerable books about the victors of Königgrätz, the formidable German General Staff, and the effects of militarism upon German life and politics. Aside from the occasional article in a scholarly journal and some meager biographical studies, nothing of the sort exists in English for the Austrian army. Thus, students of European history who are well informed about Scharnhorst and Schlieffen and Ludendorff are apt to have only the vaguest notions about Wallenstein and Conrad and to draw a complete blank at the mention of Eugene of Savoy.

Gunther Rothenberg's book would therefore be welcome for its comprehensiveness alone. It is doubly welcome, however, because it not only tells the story of the Austrian army from the Napoleonic period to the last days of the First World War—with an informative introductory chapter on its evolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—but because it also gives us a great deal more: a careful analysis of the relationship between the institutional and social history of the army and that of the empire it served, a balanced assessment of the army's influence on governmental decision making, and an interesting description of its role as a unitary factor in a realm that was continually threatened with divisive forces. The scholarly authority and shrewdness of judgment that Professor Rothenberg brings to bear upon these problems makes this the best one-volume treatment of its subject in any language.

The author has a sympathy for the army and those who served in it that he does not try to conceal. As he points out, the Austrian army never represented the threat to civilian supremacy that the Prussian army did, nor did it encourage the kind of militarism that eroded the political will of the German middle class. It existed to defend the realm, and the guiding principle of its officer corps was loyalty to the dynasty. If the army's social composition reflected the heterogenous nature of the empire, with

all its cultural incoherence, this loyalty to the dynasty held it together, not only during the multiplying tensions of the Dual Monarchy in peacetime, but also through the grueling experience of the Great War. Indeed, the Austrian army remained intact, despite the fact that the cream of its junior officers and its NCO's were virtually wiped out in the battles on the Save and in Galicia in 1914 and the additional fact that it was hampered by the empire's unsteady political structure and the inefficient command and staff structure that resulted from it.

Professor Rothenberg is at his best in describing the army's attempts to adjust its internal structure to the changing political fortunes of the monarchy, particularly in the aftermath of the revolutionary troubles of 1848 and the defeat of 1866. He is equally effective in demonstrating how its efficiency as a fighting force was weakened—in 1859, in 1866, and in the years 1914–18—by the economic and technological backwardness of the empire.

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BANQUES ET BANQUIERS EN AUTRICHE AU DÉBUT DU 20^e SIÈCLE.

By *Bernard Michel*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation des Sciences Politiques, 1976. 405 pp. Tables. 198 F., cloth. 164 F., paper.

BANKING AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: THE ROLE OF BANKS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE CZECH CROWNLANDS, 1873–1914. By *Richard L. Rudolph*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. xii, 291 pp. Tables. \$28.00.

Practitioners of modern historical methods have not accorded the history of the Habsburg Monarchy treatment equal to that given the lands to the west. Traditional concerns prevail, especially in Western literature on the Monarchy. It is all the more remarkable, then, that two recent works by nonnative scholars with modern, but very different, approaches have focused on the history of Austrian banking. If this be more than coincidence, its explanation may be sought in the actual or perceived importance of banking to the broader problems of Austrian history, a relation that both authors set out to clarify.

Professor Michel poses the question most broadly, declaring that he seeks not only "to describe a social category or a form of economic activity but to define, by means of these, the essential character of Central Europe" (p. 11). Michel, however, was not seduced into flighty speculations. His book works on two levels. One is a logical, detailed exposition of Austria's financial structure, of the policies and activities of banks—at home, internationally, and in relation to Hungary—and, finally, of the position of bankers in Austrian society and politics. Interwoven with this presentation is a second level of discourse illuminating the mutual interaction of the Austrian social environment with the world of finance. Essentially, Michel points out the deeply conservative nature of Austrian society even during the phase of its most dynamic economic development. The distrust of industrial investments also pervaded the thinking of bankers, who eschewed this type of activity until about 1898, when the decreasing profitability of loans to the state left them little alternative. Michel sees this conservatism as deriving ultimately from the airtight compartmentalization (*cloisonnement*) of Austrian society, marked by the spirit of *Stände* and conflicting nationalisms. After the turn of the century, this compartmentalization was reflected in the banking structure in the successful challenge of Austro-German banking by the "Czech" banks or, to give a less obvious example, in the intensification of the competition of the spreading network of the local branches of the Viennese banks and the local agrarian