

In conclusion, I endorse Haldane's call for engagement between Thomism and analytic philosophy, as well as his thesis that the interaction would benefit both. But I have tried to point out that there is a history and sociology to all this, and that as a result there are serious obstacles to carrying out his proposal. Finally, I have suggested that if these obstacles are to be overcome and Haldane's proposal is to succeed, it will not be entirely by the force of argument.²

- 1 Cf. John Haldane "A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind", *Ratio*, Vol XI, 1998, pp. 253–77; also in D. Oderberg (ed.) *Form and Matter* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). The relevant issue of *The Monist* is vol. 80, no. 4 (Oct. 1997).
- 2 Haldane is not unaware that these kinds of issue are relevant. See his "What Future has Catholic Philosophy?" in Michael Baur (ed.) *Virtue and Virtue Theories: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1998), pp. 79–90.

Bonnie Kent

Pleading for an end to "neoscholastic hostility" to analytical philosophy, John Haldane urges Catholic philosophers to join the Anglo-American mainstream. Analytical philosophy, he argues, is nowhere near as anti-metaphysical, sceptical, or nihilistic as Catholics in the United States commonly assume. The time has come for Thomists to emerge from the ghetto, learn "the central themes of contemporary analytical philosophy" and engage with it. The only alternative is a Thomism that continues to be stagnant and marginalised.

This plea for a commitment to revitalising Thomism inevitably raises the question of what it is for a Catholic to be a Thomist in our own day, when Aquinas is the foremost doctor of the Church. If a Thomist is one who studies the thought of Aquinas and tries to present a faithful exposition of it, then the only good Thomists today must perforce be historical scholars. If, on the other hand, a Thomist is one who imitates Aquinas's approach to problems in philosophy and theology, then she will work to develop reasonable solutions that form a coherent system, will feel free to deviate from the teachings of any human authority, including Aquinas's own, and will generally operate more as an analytical philosopher than as a scholar.

While Haldane seeks a compromise between these two conceptions of Thomism, he clearly tilts toward the second: the imitation of Thomas. In

this I think he would have the Angelic Doctor's support. As Aquinas eagerly engaged with the "new" Aristotelianism of his own day, so, I believe, he would eagerly engage with the analytical philosophy of the late twentieth century. No doubt he would find certain aspects of it objectionable, even as he found certain aspects of radical Aristotelianism (or "Latin Averroism") objectionable. Nevertheless, he would meet his adversaries on their own turf, arguing philosophically against today's philosophers in much the way that he argued against Siger of Brabant. Thus I do not disagree with Haldane in principle. I shall only consider some objections to his proposal and recast it in different terms.

The growing professionalization of human knowledge, especially in American philosophical circles, tends to encourage both methodological warfare and a narrow intellectual focus. Students are pressed soon after beginning graduate study to choose an area of specialization and stick with it. Those who wish to become historians of philosophy must settle on a period, even on an author, study the necessary languages, master the texts, and work to produce a careful, well documented interpretation of them. Those who wish to become analytical philosophers must settle on a field (e.g., philosophy of mind), learn the leading philosophical controversies within it, master the competing views on them, and work to contribute an original solution. The difference in aims and methodology typically comes combined with a difference in values. What Haldane fondly describes as "mining" Aquinas's work for interesting ideas would look to a historical scholar like a combination of exploitation and destruction, the intellectual equivalent of strip mining. Scholars routinely protest that analytical philosophers have no genuine desire to understand Thomas's thought, only a desire to use it. In the course of using it, they often attribute to him opinions he never held or even clearly rejected. (The fate of "transcendental Thomism" may serve as a reminder that not all marriages between Aquinas's teachings and modern philosophical trends end happily.)

Analytical philosophers, in turn, protest that scholars destroy the spirit of Thomas's work in their obsessive concern to preserve the letter. While historians do a fine job of explaining what he thought, they fail miserably in giving reasons why philosophers of today should care what he thought, much less why anybody should agree with him. There are philosophical problems to be solved, not merely so many texts to be interpreted. When one can often find fruitful solutions in Thomas's work, is it not worth introducing them into philosophical debates, even at the risk of distorting his teachings?

The prospects for an alliance between these two factions may appear all the dimmer thanks to the market niche that Catholic institutions have traditionally occupied in the profession. When their strength has long been

in the history of philosophy and Continental philosophy, areas of weakness for most secular departments, why should they change their focus? Would it not be better to continue doing what they do well than to venture into the free-for-all of the Anglo-American mainstream? Would it even be possible to join the mainstream without loss of identity? What looks from one perspective like a ghetto may look from another like a minority culture in need of protection. Members of Catholic universities might accordingly see Haldane as preaching the gospel of assimilation, a sermon all the more peculiar at a time when the old American ideal of the melting pot has largely yielded to the new ideal of the tossed salad.

A more charitable reading suggests that this is not, in fact, a plea for assimilation: it amounts to a call for missionary work in professional philosophy. Concerned that Catholics are abandoning philosophy to those they believe to be in error, Haldane urges his *American* colleagues to overcome their secessionist tendencies. Interpreting the lecture along these lines, I suggest that analytical philosophy be regarded not as some body of "doctrine" but rather as a language, one that Catholics must learn if they want to bring the insights of Aquinas into mainstream philosophical debates. As those who choose to do missionary work in a foreign country must learn the language of the natives, so those who choose to do missionary work in professional philosophy must learn the language of the "analysts." This involves both mastering the jargon ("internalism," "reductionism," "anti-realism," etc.) and studying the canonical works that tend to serve as shared points of reference. Of course, learning a language always to some extent involves learning a different way of thinking, but it plainly does not require giving up one's present way of thinking, much less one's beliefs and values. Learning to speak "analytic" no more requires endorsing positions that analytical philosophers defend than learning to speak French requires becoming a disciple of Foucault or Derrida. (Far from it: one obvious advantage of bilingualism is simply the ability to explain to some monolingual professional, in terms he can understand, why you find his argument unpersuasive.) As Catholic scholars well know, the study of foreign languages tends to improve one's own thinking, too. Efforts to translate into another language often force one to consider in greater detail precisely what one means. This can be an especially useful exercise for specialists in Thomism, with its large technical vocabulary and set of operative principles. When we try to explain an argument by Aquinas in terms that any fool could understand, we may sometimes come to the painful but beneficial recognition that we ourselves have only a superficial understanding of it. Merely trying to disentangle some of his teachings from various Aristotelian "axioms" that we cannot accept proves no small challenge.

In suggesting that analytical philosophy be considered a language, I do not mean to deny that it has any substance, but only that the substance can properly be compared with that of Thomism. In place of some coherent, comprehensive system of thought we find a set of problems that changes considerably over time, together with a wide range of rival solutions to them. Should Catholic philosophers want to object that all the proposed solutions to a given problem appear to share certain assumptions, such an objection, far from being contrary to the “rules” of analytical philosophy, might even be considered a classic analytical move. (I seem to recall Wittgenstein’s making it again and again.) As one need not share analytical philosophers’ answers, neither need one support their framing of the problems. One must, however, be prepared to offer reasons why the problems might more fruitfully be framed in a different way. It would not suffice to report that Thomas framed them differently—no appeals to authority allowed; one would need to present a philosophical (vs. purely historical) explanation of why he did.

In sum, the missionary work Haldane envisions seems to me less daunting than his own description might suggest. Learning to communicate with the natives, mercifully, does not require going native.

Christopher Martin

One of the most engaging aspects of Haldane’s writings is the way he manages to put across deeply-held personal views in a cool and detached style—a feat he achieves superlatively in “Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy”. I should like to imitate him in this, as in much else, but find I cannot so. This paper will be more personal in style.

I am a British philosopher, trained in analytic techniques and styles at Oxford, and I work in a Scottish university. I should like to endorse all Haldane’s points and recommendations whole-heartedly, but pessimism keeps on creeping in; and when I look at the situation of American-British philosophy in general I have doubts about the extent to which Haldane’s programme can be carried out.

First, Haldane endorses as positive the development of a tendency of “analytical Thomists”. Well, if anyone belongs to this school, I suppose I do (at a lowish level). Even when reading St Thomas I find myself objecting to some thesis of his “But what would