

enough to cast doubt on the account of the emergence of the human race given by these scientists, which deals, surely, in great historical sweeps that would make accurate dating possibly only to within a margin of hundreds, if not thousands, of years? It seems to me that Hick is here admitting the claims of 'modern science' with too little examination.

But Hick does not think it would help much if we were able to believe in an historical Fall. For he regards any Theodicy which attempts to attribute the ultimate responsibility for evil to misuse of free will as doomed to failure because of certain philosophical objections. To assert that entirely good beings, with no evil tendencies and with clear knowledge of what they were doing, freely opted for the evil rather than the good is, he maintains, besides being intrinsically unintelligible, nothing less than the assertion that evil was here created *ex nihilo*; and to assert this is to deny the uniqueness of God as Creator and to fall into dualism. It seems to me that, though Hick several times goes over this ground, he always goes over it too fast. Is it the case that a choice that proceeded from no in-built flaw of character would be an entirely random event, and not properly a choice at all? Is it the case that an evil choice, if in no way caused by circumstances for which God is ultimately responsible, would give rise to something which could be said to be created *ex nihilo*? In answer to the first question it does not seem to me that we regard every act that is totally 'out of character' as random and therefore unintentional. In answer to the second question it seems doubtful whether any *thing* (Aristotelian first substance) which could be brought into existence by the action of a free being could itself be evil. ('The streptococcus is the test', I suppose.) But the bringing into existence of some *state* of a thing, which state might itself be evil, does not amount to creation *ex nihilo*. Hick shows up rather badly here, I think, as a *philosopher*: there is not enough investigation of what precisely is being asserted, there is not enough examination of test cases, there is too much taking for granted that everybody has a perfectly clear idea of what *creation*, or some other difficult concept, contains.

BODY, SOUL, SPIRIT: A SURVEY OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM. By C. A. Van Peursen, translated by H. H. Hoskins. OUP, 1966. 30s.

This is the most useful survey I have come across of the body-mind problem; it is more remarkable, as one would expect from its author's modest introduction, for its correct and lucid summaries of the principal theories which have

To turn to what I have called Hick's 'point of acceptance'. This is the 'vale of soul-making' apologetic. One of his recurrent themes is that Theodicy must look, not to the past, as does the traditional theology of the Fall of Man, but to the future. Hick's theodicy (like his doctrine of the existence of God) is eschatological. It is as the necessary prelude to a life culminating in a full personal relationship with God that we must see the sin and suffering that besets our present existence. Those who send their sons to school intend them to meet hardship and the unpleasant side of discipline. And in an analogous way the evils of this life are actually *intended* for us by God. But there are some schools to which no decent parent would send his son; and it is hard to believe that this world, if a school, is not a school of this sort. I am not one to belittle the horrors of cross-country running, but I regard it as absurd to put lung cancer and dementia precox into the same category.

In so far as I know the difference between Theology and Philosophy I would say that his 'point of acceptance' is argued theologically, and his second 'point of rejection' (which is the important one) is argued philosophically. I am more impressed by his theological than by his philosophical argument. His exposition of the 'vale of soul-making' line is, I think, the best that I have met. But I still do not find it convincing. It is with relief, therefore, that I return to the Augustinian ways of thinking from which his philosophical artillery is not heavy enough to shift me.

It has been difficult to select, out of so full a treatment of this perennial problem, the few points which are all that could be discussed in a review. The high quality of Hick's work is evident from the large number of interesting topics which competed for discussion. My selection of minor errors for commemoration must be still more arbitrary: p. 64, 'conscience' for 'consciousness'; p. 187, 'O.P.' for 'O. Praem.'; p. 265, 'Eastern' for 'Easter'; p. 317 'etsi' translated as 'as if'; p. 374 'discensus ad infernos' for 'descendit ad inferos'; p. 392, 'Corinth' for 'Colossae'.

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been advanced than for original thought on the subject.

After a preliminary chapter, the rather extreme dualism of Descartes and Plato is set out, and Plato commended for his sketch of a

more satisfactory view, to the effect that man is 'eccentric', that is to say basically orientated towards something beyond himself. Feuerbach and Berkeley are criticised, though with a great deal of sympathy and appreciation, for their ultimately misguided though permanently interesting efforts to resolve the dilemma in terms of one of its limbs; Feuerbach reducing mind to a function of body, Berkeley body to a function of mind. The thought of primitive peoples, of archaic Greek philosophy, and of the Biblical authors is efficiently ransacked for a better solution to the problem; and modern physiologists, existentialists, and linguistic philosophers are also laid under contribution. (It is excellent that the inquiry is not confined to 'philosophy' in the restricted sense; this would have been a sure way of getting nothing useful done.) St Augustine, in spite of the strong dualistic element in his thought, turns out to have been on the right lines after all in his conception of man as being in essence *in via* towards God. Once this central characteristic of man, as being through and through becoming, intentional or directed being, is firmly grasped, body and soul may be understood as different aspects of this whole, to be abstracted for certain limited purposes. The doctor, for instance, may well have to understand his patient as a mere

aggregate of organic compounds in prescribing medicine for him; harm is done only when you pose insoluble problems by understanding man as a body, and then trying to work out how the soul is attached; or conceiving him as a soul, and then wondering through what unfortunate mischance and by means of what ingenious linking mechanism he has to lug a body around.

I should like to have had some appraisal of the results of psychical research in their bearings on this problem; though the implications of the findings marshalled, say, in Thurston's *Poltergeists*, Wiesinger's *Occult Phenomena*, and Tyrrell's *The Personality of Man*, are rather alarmingly dualistic – and so as unfashionable as they are inconvenient to take seriously. And how about the very radical and pervasive dualism of Indian thought? Dualism, if an aberration, is by no means exclusively a Western one. But such objections to a book which, considering its brevity, is so astonishingly complete a view of this complex and elusive problem, are perhaps hyper-critical.

I cannot personally judge the quality of the translation, but for an author to commend a translator for actually having *improved* his book (p. vi) must be unusual.

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URBAN CHURCHES IN BRITAIN, A QUESTION OF RELEVANCE, by K. A. Busia, World Studies of Churches in Mission, London, Lutterworth Press, 1966. 21s. paperback; 25s. hardbound.

Dr Busia's work forms part of a series projected by the World Council of Churches on the general theme of the churches in the missionary situation. His is the first survey in a new series; investigators from 'the Younger Churches' have been invited to lead inquiries in Europe and North America.

He deals with an area of Birmingham, described as Brookton, and the theme of the study is how the Christian operates in an urban environment. Nineteen churches and religious groups, including an Orthodox community, the Society of Friends and various sects as well as Anglican, Nonconformist and Roman Catholic churches, were considered, and details are given of the religious activities centring on these institutions.

One of the most interesting factors in this investigation is the scope it gives to the clergy and members of the churches to express their ideological positions, for instance, on the Christian teaching on the home and the family;

and one of the most disappointing things about the survey is that Dr Busia does not really come to grips with how church members are – or are not – influenced by such views in their ordinary lives.

A great deal of valuable work on the Birmingham churches has been carried out by the author, and it is certainly well worth the attention of those who want to know how churches operate today. But in general I find the book disappointing. First of all, sociologically: although Dr Busia gives details of the methodological approaches adopted, he has made very little use in the book of sociological concepts; nor does he consider the relevance of the findings of other studies of urban churches to his survey. Perhaps it was thought that this would render the book less interesting to the general reader; if so, I think it is a mistake. Secondly, the aim of this new series is to offer an objective analysis from the point of view of a Christian who comes from another cultural