France's 1840 response to the Eastern question (chap. 2), and Algerian colonization (chap. 3). Even the most discerning interpreters of *Democracy* have overlooked Tocqueville's remarks about popular sovereignty and peoplehood, topics that Atanassow explores in careful detail in chapter 1. For although Tocqueville marveled at how the providential sweep of equality "pushes against all limits and borders," he recognized that popular government needs a circumscribed "people" (pp. 20, 62) along with a "story about the particular collective that is entitled to govern itself" (p. 103).

Atanassow claims that such imagined communities are prerequisites for the survival of liberal democracies. And surprisingly, they may be strengthened by the same globalizing processes that seem to erode them. One of the book's most illuminating discussions appears in chapter 3, where Atanassow contrasts Tocqueville's neglected thoughts on globalization with those of his contemporaries, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Unlike Marx and Engels, who imagined a zero-sum struggle between national identities and capitalist expansion, Tocqueville believed that the worldwide egalitarian revolution would solidify national differences while effacing class distinctions. Taking its cue from Tocqueville's analysis, the book suggests that today's liberal democracies should not—and need not—sacrifice their own identities.

Chapters 2 and 3 look outward from America and France to the rest of the world. Atanassow reopens Tocqueville's 1840 exchange with J. S. Mill on the issue of war and national pride, aiming to correct scholars' standard interpretations that often pit an unapologetic, pugnacious Tocqueville against an even-tempered Mill. It is true, as chapter 2 notes, that their correspondence over the Eastern crisis did not put an end to their fruitful friendship. Furthermore, both figures recognized the shortcomings of their respective positions, a point that resounds throughout Atanassow's clear-headed interpretation. Yet the book's effort to rehabilitate Tocqueville's reputation in this period is much less convincing. Although he did acknowledge the potential pitfalls of populist fervor, Tocqueville continued to insist on the indispensable role of national pride in revivifying France's languid, bourgeois-led domestic life.

As Atanassow points out, Tocqueville clashed with the July Monarchy's foreign minister François Guizot about how and where to channel the nation's energies (pp. 92–93): to pursue international glory or domestic material prosperity. For Tocqueville, "if the government is to be both liberal and democratic, involving the people in international affairs is no longer a matter of choice but of double necessity" (p. 99). The entire globe becomes "the arena where the highest form of national instruction can take place" (p. 101) and the crucible in which French identity is further forged. But Atanassow's conclusions about Tocqueville's internationalist turn cannot help but underscore its militarism. In the case of the Eastern crisis, Tocqueville declared that "a disadvantageous war was less to be feared than 'a peace without glory'" (p. 91). Even if he could foresee some of the dangers stirred by patriotic sentiment, Tocqueville himself seemed to err on the side of grand nationalist excess when it came to reforming his enfeebled French democracy.

It seems an odd choice, then, to resurrect Tocqueville's nineteenth-century calls to assert French dominance abroad to address the current crises of liberal democracy. Even so, Atanassow does not shy away from bold Tocquevillean conclusions in the book's closing pages, though she presents them under the heading of "liberal moderation" (p. 174). "To remain liberal, then, democracy requires the…conciliation of national pride" (p. 167) fostered by an active foreign policy. But where do we draw the line between building a salutary national identity and justifying illiberal policies that endanger other nations and people, some within our own borders? Can a democracy cultivate national pride by taking a leading role on the world stage, as the book's "nondogmatic" liberal perspective recommends, without succumbing to the sword rattling that suffused Tocqueville's imperialism?

By marshaling Tocqueville on the contentious issues of colonization and globalization, Atanassow seems to reinforce the complexity of those dilemmas she so expertly highlights— while also leading us implicitly to question the value of Tocqueville's solutions. Despite these lingering questions, scholars of Tocqueville, contemporary democratic theorists, and anyone worried about the fate of free government will find much to learn in this thoughtful and timely book.

Justice by Means of Democracy. By Danielle Allen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2023. 288p. $27.50 cloth.
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In this insightful, well-argued, and systematically structured book, Danielle Allen makes the case that those who are concerned with justice should focus not only on questions about how to fairly distribute income, wealth, and other valued resources but also, and centrally, on how to achieve political equality. Justice, she writes, is "best, and perhaps only achieved by means of democracy" (p. 4).

Allen introduces what she characterizes as three "guiding design principles" that aid the pursuit of justice: the value and interdependence of negative liberties and positive liberties, a commitment to political equality, and what she calls "difference without domination." The last design principle directs those who would pursue justice in political societies characterized by social, economic, and political differences to be alert to the possibility that laws, institutions, norms, and

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other social constraints might contribute to domination, and therefore they should restructure those social constraints in domination-reducing ways.

After introducing her guiding design principles, Allen applies them to what she characterizes as four distinct realms: the political realm, the social realm, the realm through which people define membership in political societies, and the economic realm. Here, her aim is to ascertain which institutions, rules, laws, and norms follow from the guiding design principles in each realm or, in her words, to develop "domain-specific version[s] of the guiding design principles."

To give readers a sense of both the scope and pragmatic focus of this project, it is worth spelling out some details of these domain-specific applications. In the political realm, the relevant domain-specific principles include the accountability of political authorities to the people; checks and balances that militate against the concentration of power, in whatever form that might take; political inclusiveness; government capacity to act ("energy"); and protections against rights abuses ("republican safety").

In the social realm, the guiding design principles recommend what Allen calls "a connected society": that is, one "in which citizens have ample opportunities for both bonding and bridging relationships" (p. 103). In other words, social and cultural rules, norms, and institutions should enable people to form connections that strengthen bonds with members of the particularistic groups to which they belong and with which they identify, *and* they should encourage people to form ties across such groups, with members of groups to which they do not belong and with which they do not identify.

When it comes to political membership, Allen argues for what calls "polypolitanism": the idea that people should be enabled and encouraged to develop connections with multiple particularistic groups. Those connections, she writes, should encourage us to be open to "the possibility of embracing many other, nonoverlapping affiliations, both for ourselves and for others" (p. 130). A "polypolitan" system of political membership fosters welcoming and accepting attitudes toward migrants and "draws on the resources of layered polity memberships, multiple affiliations, and multiple pathways to voice to ensure that migrants have access to political equality within receiving countries" (p. 152).

In the economic realm, Allen recommends what she calls "empowering economies." On her view, among the domain-specific versions of the guiding design principles that apply to the economic sphere is "free labor," which recommends ending enslavement and wage theft, enabling labor mobility, and promoting "good jobs"; that is, jobs that enable workers to enjoy a middle-class lifestyle, career growth, fulfilling work, and free time for other pursuits. Additional domain-specific versions of the guiding principles recommend the organization of firms in ways that promote difference without domination, investment in relationships that bridge the divisions produced by competition, and the use of democratic means to steer economies.

As Allen stresses throughout this book, her principles differ from the principles of justice advanced by John Rawls, who argued in his 1973 *Theory of Justice* that justice requires an equal distribution of the most extensive set of basic liberties feasible; equal opportunities to attain positions of power and responsibility; and an equal distribution of income, wealth, and other valued resources, unless an unequal distribution benefits the least well-off. Allen's critique of Rawls is consonant with that Iris Marion Young advanced in her 1990 book, *Justice and the Politics of Difference.* For Young, people cannot organize societies justly only by distributing resources and other valued goods fairly. Instead, justice requires democratizing "decisionmaking power and procedures" in multiple realms, including the formal political sphere, civil society, and the economy. On Young's view, a society is just to the extent that it enables people to develop and exercise their capacities, express their experiences, and participate "in determining [their] action and the conditions of [their] action]" (Young 1990, p. 20).

Danielle Allen likely would characterize the last sentence in the previous paragraph as summarizing Young's vision of human flourishing. Young sees humans as beings who thrive when they develop and exercise their capacities, express their experiences, and participate in determining their actions and the conditions that shape them. Allen describes herself as a eudaemonist (or, more specifically, a "eudaemonist democratic pragmatist"; p. 7); she believes that, to know what justice is and what justice requires, one needs to know what makes people flourish. Indeed, this belief grounds her key departures from Rawls. For Allen, it is *because* human flourishing requires being a co-creator of the rules, laws, norms, and other social constraints that delimit one's action that the road to justice goes through democracy.

Allen's view of human flourishing strikes me as eminently plausible. However, so does Iris Marion Young's view, which seems to include, depending on how you count, one or two additional conditions. I am not a eudaemonist, and I am not quite sure how one adjudicates among competing visions of human flourishing. I can imagine a more traditional liberal like John Rawls reading *Justice by Means of Democracy* and responding, "Allen's is one possible vision of the good life, but might not another involve the rejection of politics in pursuit of some higher good; for example, a religious purpose that eschews participation in creating and re-creating laws, norms, and other social structures?"

In the acknowledgments to this book, Allen describes her remarkably politically engaged family, which includes her grandfather, who helped found a chapter of the

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NAACP; her father, who ran in the Republican primary for the 1992 US Senate special election in California; and her aunt, who ran for Congress that same year on the Peace and Freedom Party ticket in California's District 13. As these examples attest, an important part of what it means to live a good life can involve participating in politics. Yet in my own family, I can think of people for whom politics is sufficiently emotionally taxing, even anxiety inducing, that participating politically inhibits (to recall Iris Marion Young's vision of human flourishing) the development and exercise of their capacities. Some people seem to flourish when they turn away from the project of participating in co-creating the conditions that structure social action and toward other purposes such as artistic expression, spiritual fulfillment, or intellectual discovery. Perhaps the trouble—the injustice—that such choices highlight is a politics so divisive, so pernicious that it undermines (some) people's well-being. If so, then Danielle Allen's vision of justice provides an excellent guide for the challenging work of re-democratizing our politics.

The Right Not to Stay: Justice in Migration, the Liberal Democratic State, and the Case of Temporary Migration Projects. By Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. 192p. $105.00 cloth.
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Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi's *The Right Not to Stay* is a welcome intervention in the ethics of temporary labor migration. The authors maintain that the debate is captured by a framing expressed by Martin Ruhs's famous rights versus numbers dilemma (*The Price of Rights,* 2013). This analysis suggests a trade-off between openness to labor migration and the granting of equal rights after admission. Given that migration even with reduced rights has substantial positive effects on welfare, some have justified temporary migration programs from the perspective of global justice. Assuming migrants make this choice voluntarily, the trade-off is permissible. Others, conversely, have rejected the trade-off as an instance of structural injustice, arguing that labor migrants only settle for temporary migration as a second-best alternative under conditions of exploitation; instead, they call for expanded political and social rights, up to and including a form of citizenship.

Ottonelli and Torresi resist this framing. They do not agree that citizenship is the suitable solution to the normative problems created by temporary labor migration and that states not offering full inclusion to temporary migrants are necessarily acting unjustly. But interestingly, their reasoning differs from the global utilitarian perspective, because it does not justify trading off rights for increased opportunities of migration. In effect, their contribution reframes the question, asking instead what the liberal commitment to equality actually requires in the case of temporary labor migrants.

The authors argue that temporary migration projects create a fundamental tension for liberal theory and are not simply a non-ideal problem. They maintain that these projects create a dislocation between the social space that migrants (temporarily) inhabit and their social bases of self-respect, which are found "partly at home and partly in the virtual social space created by their geographies and temporal displacement" (p. 57). This separation makes it rational for the temporary labor migrant to trade away equal status in the receiving society to advance their home-centered project. However, it also creates a tension between two commitments of liberal egalitarianism; namely, the recognition of people's right to pursue their own life plans and the duty to establish equal social relations. Ottonelli and Torresi's proposal out of this impasse is a regime of special rights for temporary labor migrants that would address the risk of vulnerability and marginalization they face without imposing on them the conditions of full membership that clash with their personal projects.

The main theoretical contribution of the book is found in the chapters exploring the concept of voluntariness and the principle of accommodation. These discussions are informed by a methodological commitment to moral parity between migrants and nonmigrants, driven by a normative commitment to viewing migrants as "agents, rather than passive recipients of benefits, or of distributions of resources and opportunities" (p. 70). In addressing the question of voluntariness, Ottonelli and Torresi argue that choice can be viewed as voluntary if four necessary and sufficient conditions are met: the choice must not be coerced, made with adequate knowledge, with the available alternatives sufficiently good, and exit options available. Because the methodological requirement of parity rules out an overly demanding interpretation of these conditions, the upshot is that a choice to migrate under conditions of structural injustice can be done voluntarily. This discussion is extremely helpful and potentially extends beyond the ethics of migration; however, it does seem unfortunately to limit the scope of the argument. The focus is meant to be on low-skilled labor migrants, but the requirement of exit options makes most existing temporary migration (outside the common European markets) involuntary on this definition.

Ottonelli and Torresi continue to argue that the liberal state is obliged to treat people as bearers of life plans, which means "setting up a system of rights that creates and protects the conditions in which people can actively pursue their projects and their conception of the good" (p. 94). The novel claim is that this principle of accommodation extends to all migrants within the state's territory and that migrants' life plans should be accommodated *as migration plans;* that is, viewing migration as a

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