generates the other forms in 'a timeless sort of pluralizing diffusion of itself' (3.4); the perfectionist account, whereby the forms, like all good things, are good because they are perfect instances of themselves (3.5); and system accounts, whereby the good just is the appropriate arrangement of the virtue forms and other goods (3.6).

B.'s rejection of perfectionism – the view that the good is essentially the 'property of being a perfect instance as such, or of perfection or ideality as such' (p. 156) – is puzzling, especially since Part 2 claims that the good of the interrogative account is, effectively, whatever is *fitting* in a given context (p. 127). It is unclear how this appeal to fittingness, while necessary for the highly contextual interrogative good to retain *any* unified sense across all situations in which the G-question is asked, is supposed to escape perfectionism. What, after all, grounds the judgement that something is fitting in a certain context? In ordinary language, we say something is 'fitting' when it coheres with whatever standards are relevant. Similarly, we say something is 'more fitting' when it coheres better or more perfectly. But if the good enables us to make judgements about fittingness and if fittingness *just is* a comparison to an ideal, then it is unclear what makes B.'s interrogative good non-perfectionistic.

Part 4 tackles some remaining issues, including ambiguities in Plato's use of 'the good' (4.1–2), the importance of mathematical training (4.3) and cosmological concerns (4.4). An important consideration comes to light in 4.2: Proclus thought Plato held two distinct forms of the good, the sun-like good and the participand good. The good of the Sun cannot be the participand good or the good of the one-over-many relation. This is because the sun's relation to ordinary visible objects is not participation; visible objects are not 'junior suns' (p. 169), not representations or shares of the sun. B. concludes that the form of the good must have both a sun-like interrogative mode, the focus thus far, and a declarative mode, or the mode of the form participated in by the many good things. Once the declarative mode peeks out from behind the clouds, however, it is tempting to ask whether (and why not) some of the passages B. is at pains to read consistently with the sun-like mode in Parts 2 and 3 might not be better explained by the possibility that Plato, in this part of the *Republic*, passes from one mode to the other without much warning or that he addresses both modes simultaneously.

Further challenges are sure to be brought against B.'s interpretation. But this is hardly a shortcoming of the project; rather, it is a testament to its brilliance. Rarely does a piece of scholarship offer such a thorough and ingenious revision of such a familiar text. Even if aspects of B.'s revision turn out to be untenable, its comprehensive and unique vision is sure to inspire rich discussions for years to come.

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PLATO'S *CRATYLUS*

This volume is the product of the 2017 *Symposium Platonicum Pragense* and is published under the banner of 'Brill's Plato Studies'. It is available as an e-book and as a hardback.

The editor, Mikeš, has neatly compiled ten chapters alongside an appropriately compact preface and a helpful *index locorum* (with references to all ancient citations, including those of Plato). Mikeš makes no pretensions to a unified or comprehensive interpretation of the *Cratylus*, and, though the book's official description suggests a thematic focus on language and ontology, the chapters cover a broad scope, sometimes engaging long-standing debates and sometimes breaking ground in novel ways. This broad range is not a weakness, and it serves as an apt testament to the difficulty and wonderful productivity of the *Cratylus*.

In Chapter 1 S. Lund Jørgensen proposes that the *Cratylus*' initial discussion conveys how to read the dialogue: as a conversation between Socratic philosophers. Specifically, Lund Jørgensen argues that Hermogenes ought to be considered a robustly Socratic figure who uses technical expressions, formulates claims precisely and understands philosophical distinctions and idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, Hermogenes employs these in a classically Socratic *epagoge*, has a Socratic openness to refutation and, in some cases, even engages in Socratic irony. While readers are bound to question the details (especially regarding irony), Lund Jørgensen's presentation is exceptionally clear and convincing, and it strongly supports the novel conclusion that Hermogenes is a sharp and experienced philosopher. One might ask why this is significant, as many simply assume the *Cratylus* to be 'early' or 'Socratic', and Xenophon counts Hermogenes among Socrates' circle (*Mem.* 1.2.48). The second part of the chapter addresses this concern by offering what Lund Jørgensen admits is a rather hasty presentation of the philosophical pay-off (renewed interpretations of the 'stable natures' argument at 368d8–e9, the *nomothetēs* and the dialogue's commitment to naturalism).

In Chapter 2 F. Ademollo outlines a number of ways in which the *Cratylus* might connect with twentieth-century philosophy of language. Perhaps most valuable is the way in which he situates the *Cratylus* with respect to the modern sense/reference distinction. For instance, the naturalist position presented early in the dialogue holds that names *refer* to their objects, but they do so by way of their *sense* (or, in the *Cratylus*, the informational content drawn from their etymology). Yet, as Socrates points out later in the dialogue, the trouble with this is that sense is not reliable as a means for referencing (name-givers can be mistaken about sense, a name's sense is obscured through usage etc.). Hence, Ademollo presents Socrates' conventionalist response to Cratylus' naturalist position as analogous to S. Kripke's response to B. Russell's descriptivist theory of names from *Naming and Necessity* (1980): in both cases 'etymological sense' is shown to be unnecessary, and we are left with the rigid designation, or reference, of our names. Regardless of the success of this analogy, Ademollo provides a brilliant defence of the *Cratylus* as the earliest systematic treatment of this sense/reference distinction, and his argument is one that future interpretations will need to take into account.

In Chapter 3 F. Aronadio argues that the *Cratylus* distinguishes between two components of language: intentionality (the aboutness of language) and reference (what language picks out). According to Aronadio, the dialogue canvasses uses of language that are intentional but not referential, such as the etymologies and incorrect uses of names (e.g. 'Hermogenes' at 429e). Moreover, Aronadio argues that this solves the puzzle in the *Sophist* of our inability to say τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν (237bf.): although there is nothing that τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν refers to, the phrase is understood and, hence, intentional (and, hence, a legitimate use of language). Readers are bound to dispute this connection and the distinction giving rise to it – for example 'Hermogenes' does seem to refer (to Cratylus), and the whole point of the Eleatic τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν seems to be that it fails to be intentional. However, Aronadio's argument is extraordinarily novel and bound to be provocative.

In Chapter 4 Mikeš argues that the *Cratylus* is unified by presenting a position he terms 'conventionalist naturalism'. According to Mikeš, this resolves several longstanding debates in the *Cratylus* (the apparently displaced truth-passage in 385b2–385e3, the multiple confusions surrounding the tool analogies in 386f., and – most significantly – the vexed 'forms of names' references at 389af.). In particular, Mikeš argues that name-forms are neither classic Platonic forms nor phonetic entities. Instead, they are an 'ontological third' akin to Fregean *sense*. Tantalizingly, none of the resolutions to the debates is thoroughly elaborated (this would be impossible in a single chapter), and the chapter ends with too brief an analysis of their role in the remainder of the dialogue (especially in the arguments of Socrates' 're-examination'). Nevertheless, Mikeš's suggestions concerning how the ontology of name-forms relates to the semantics of the dialogue are intriguing, well worth reading and hopefully the seed of a productive line of discussion.

In Chapter 5 A. Pavani defends the position that a 'natural name' (389d4–5) is a sort of concept. She does this by paying careful attention to the 'tool analogy' context in which the phrase 'natural name' is introduced. There is much that is valuable in her analysis of the analogy, not the least of which is a table on page 98 graphically distinguishing the analogues. Pavani concludes that the analogy successfully points to what it is that correct names share. After surveying the options in the literature (and rejecting that a 'natural name' is a form, a linguistic type or a meaning), Pavani argues that it is 'conceptual reference'. Readers are bound to question the difference between Pavani's use of 'meaning' and 'concept', but the chapter certainly provides a valuable new discussion of the terms used in the tool analogy and their ontological constituents.

In Chapter 6, written in German, J. Jinek addresses the names of the gods both in the dialectical passages at 391f. and in the subsequent etymologies. This chapter departs markedly from the more traditional methodologies employed in previous chapters by focusing on esoteric and comic (Jinek claims specifically Aristophanic, p. 109) elements. For instance, he interprets Socrates' forgetfulness of names of gods higher than Zeus as both ridiculous (p. 118) and as an esoteric gesture (p. 119) – so as not to attempt rational discourse about something above reason's threshold. The philosophical thrust of Jinek's chapter is that the correctness of the gods' names is a matter of metaphysics; for instance, Κρόνος is correct because it is grounded in the principles διάνοια and νοῦς. What this might amount to is not explained, and readers might wonder why the apparently serious treatments of this question in Proclus or the Derveni Papyrus (mentioned on p. 116 n. 30) is not discussed. Nevertheless, this chapter provides a number of insights for anyone working on the names of the gods in the *Cratylus*.

In Chapter 7 O. Pettersson focuses on the etymology of 'Hermes' (407e5–408b3) to shed light on Socrates' discussion of 'inquiry without names' late in the dialogue. Clearly and convincingly, Pettersson traces the three different aspects of the etymology and connects them to other parts of the dialogue in order to conclude that Socrates indeed meant that we should investigate without names. First, Hermes is the god of commerce, and Socrates opposes the sophistic commercialism of names (as items that could be circulated apart from context). Second, Hermes is a thief, and Socrates warns against relying on language that borrows from others. And third, Hermes is deceptive, and Socrates presents the human portion of *logos* as inescapably permeated by deception. Pettersson recognises that each of the shortcomings of human language points to a divine alternative, but he ends with ambivalence: 'This does not mean that all hope is lost, but it does mean that Socrates might be right. Reality is to be sought through reality and names through names' (p. 142).

In Chapter 8 M. Bergomi argues that Plato uses Gorgias' treatise *On That Which is Not* (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος) as a source for conventionalist arguments in the *Cratylus*. Though Gorgias is nowhere quoted or seemingly alluded to in the *Cratylus*, Bergomi enumerates parallels between the two works to take what she admits is a first step in the direction of establishing Gorgias as a philosophically relevant influence on the *Cratylus*. Some readers might worry that, given the little we know about Gorgias' treatise, such an endeavour is doomed to *obscurum per obscurius*. However, this ground-breaking chapter opens some extremely interesting questions about the relation between Gorgias' treatise and the *Cratylus*, and it will doubtless serve as the basis for future discussions of the relation between these two important works.

In Chapter 9, written in French, F. Ildefonse proposes a reading of the *Cratylus* that makes sense of some ideas developed by the *Sophist* and by Stoicism, respectively. In particular, she discusses how each work differs in its treatment of the parts of language – the *Cratylus*' position on natural *names*, the *Sophist* on *logos* and the Stoics on *lekta*. This chapter is rather impressionistic, though it contains a number of insights, particularly with respect to the translation of the terms involved.

In Chapter 10 F. Karfík tracks the transitions from a focus on names and flux in the *Cratylus* to a focus on *logos* and a more relational ontology in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. He does this to show that the concern of the *Cratylus* is not primarily the adjudication of naturalist and conventionalist theories of language, but rather the question of whether or not we need language to acquire knowledge – whether or not mimetic language is sufficient for knowledge and truth. This essay is valuable as descriptive of these long-standing issues, but regrettably does not engage specifically with the secondary literature on them.

As noted, the quality of contributions is somewhat uneven. However, this volume contains a great deal of excellent work on Plato's *Cratylus* and constitutes an important contribution to the scholarship on that dialogue, one that scholars of the dialogue will need to become familiar with.

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THE TOPICS OF THE *METAPHYSICS*

P.'s new French annotated translation is an important contribution to the study of *Metaphysics* book B. The accurate French version (based on W.D. Ross's edition of the Greek text) is accompanied by an introduction, in which P. discusses mainly the dialectical argument and the preliminary character of B. The lengthy notes to the translation clarify the meaning of each 'difficulté' – the French word that renders the Greek ἀπορία (p. 8 n. 1) – and provide information about parallels both in Aristotle and Plato. Some of the possible similarities and dissimilarities with the treatment of difficulties in Book K1–2 are considered