

oration” is understood so broadly, why does Friedrich ignore Jewish “collaborators”—the Jewish police in the ghettos, for instance?

To conclude, I fully concur that drawing attention to and analyzing myths is an important task of the historian. So is overcoming “mental predispositions,” but I am not sure that Friedrich has overcome his own.

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To the Editor:

It is good that *Slavic Review* (64, no. 4) published the collection of articles in “Forum: On Collaboration in Poland and the Soviet Union during World War II,” but it is a pity that the treatment of the Poles is generally disappointing, especially in Karl-Peter Friedrich’s article, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II.” Friedrich’s thesis is not new: that the Poles helped the Germans to exterminate the Polish Jews, either directly or through indifference to their fate. It is unlikely that there will ever be a balanced consensus—especially between Poles and Jews—on the subject of Polish attitudes toward the Jewish Holocaust in German-occupied Poland. Friedrich’s article, however, is not only one-sided but also has some strange omissions. What is missing here is the context of German terror, which the Poles had to face every day, and the natural urge not to run risks in order to survive. So much the greater was the courage required to hide and feed those Jews who were outside the ghetto, as was done by members of the underground organization to help the Jews, Żegota, though not only by them. As for the number of Jewish survivors in Poland, whom Friedrich estimates at no more than 15,000 at war’s end (745), Lucjan Dobroszycki’s detailed study based on Jewish records shows that registered Jewish survivors at the end of 1945, numbered 99,881, of whom 18,285 were on German territory (*Survivors of the Holocaust in Poland: A Portrait Based on Jewish Community Records 1944–1947*, 1994, 83). This was before the influx of Jewish survivors from the USSR, who numbered between 150,000 and 200,000.

The title of John Connelly’s article suggests that Poles had no opportunity to collaborate, so they have no grounds for national pride in their wartime resistance (“Why the Poles Collaborated So Little—And Why That Is No Reason for Nationalist Hubris”). Indeed, given Nazi terror and Adolf Hitler’s refusal to consider any kind of *political* partnership, the Poles had no room to engage in such activity. Does that mean, however, that they had no option but to resist? In theory, their leaders could have chosen passive resistance, but this was ruled out by both Polish tradition and their own participation in fighting for Poland’s independence from 1914 to 1921. Furthermore, the decision to fight was made before German policy was clear to all, and the Poles have good reason to be proud of their “Underground State” and its Armia Krajowa (Home Army).

In his generally balanced article, Connelly demolishes some of Friedrich’s extreme contentions and notes that even if the Poles had seen the Jews as neighbors (that is, helped them as they helped other Poles), the Jewish survival rate would only have improved by 5 percent (780). But at the same time, Connelly also condemns “the megalomania of Polish nationalism” (772). If we look at other countries, however—as he encourages us to do (781)—we can see that each country tends to idealize its resistance to the Germans. Moreover, Connelly rightly states that each resistance movement must be seen in its historic context. One might add that this also applies to how national historical memory is shaped. In communist Poland, the official historiography of wartime resistance to the Germans lauded the communists, who represented only a tiny percentage of the national movement, while condemning as “fascist” the anti-German and anticommunist Armia Krajowa. (At the same time, nothing could be written about the Soviets’ brutal oppression of the Poles in former eastern Poland from 1939 to 1941.) It is not surprising, therefore, that the Armia Krajowa was idealized in popular memory, and then lauded in both popular and academic historiography after the collapse of communism in Poland in summer 1989. Dissenting voices were also heard, however, especially on the Armia Krajowa leadership’s decision to carry out the Warsaw Uprising against the Germans. This uprising lasted from 1 August to 2 October 1944 and led to wholesale destruction and great loss of life, as the Red

Army watched from across the Vistula. It is true that Polish historiography, both popular and academic, largely ignored the Jewish Holocaust in Poland until the public debate over Jan T. Gross's book. This led to a wave of research and publications, and the German genocide of the Polish Jews is now included in Polish school curricula.

As to the charge of Polish economic collaboration, Martin Dean ("Where Did All the Collaborators Go?") is to be commended for stating what Connelly hints at in his article—that is, that the scarcity of goods (above all, food) in German-occupied Poland, probably meant "that economic necessity as much as greed encouraged many Poles to acquire former Jewish property" (794) though the best was reserved for ethnic Germans. Regarding another form of "collaboration," Dean notes that several hundred Poles serving in German-controlled local police units were punished after the war, especially those who participated in the German liquidation of Jewish ghettos (796–97). Trials of men accused of collaborating with the Germans were, indeed, held soon after the war in northeastern Poland, but most of the accused were charged with such collaboration in the form of anti-communist resistance while very few were charged with crimes against Jews. Studies and documents of these trials were published in the two-volume work titled *Wokół Jedwabnego*, edited by Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak (2002). Finally, while Dean writes that some Polish "Volksdeutsche" were subject to conscription in the Wehrmacht, he also states that according to the personnel records of the Anders Army (The Polish Second Corps that fought in Italy), many ethnic Poles served in the "German police, Wehrmacht, and even SS forces" (797 and note 15). In fact, tens of thousands of ethnic Poles were conscripted into the Wehrmacht in former (Polish) Silesia and (Polish) Pomerania—formerly part of the German empire—because most were automatically categorized as "Volksdeutsche" a fact Connelly discreetly mentions (776, note 14). It would be interesting to know how many of these men actually served in the German police and SS and who they were. In any case, it was mostly the Volksdeutsche Poles who deserted the Wehrmacht in droves to join the Anders Army in 1943–45, as well as the Polish units fighting in France, Holland, Belgium, and northwestern Germany in 1944–45.

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Professor Friedrich replies:

Let me first make it clear that it is NOT my thesis "that the Poles helped the Germans to exterminate the Polish Jews," as Anna Cienciala erroneously asserts. *Certain* social groups and a number of individuals, however, were ready to cooperate and did in fact cooperate with the Nazi German authorities.

Second, I am more optimistic concerning the possibility of a future scholarly consensus regarding Polish attitudes toward the murder of the Jews by the Nazis. But this will probably not be reached during the lifetime of those who have personally experienced war and occupation. On the other hand, given the Jedwabne controversy, I am not so hopeful about a Polish breakthrough in matters relating to the Holocaust. Except for the writings of Norman Davies, foreign historians and their theses are not popular in Poland. In addition, a homegrown faction of right-wing intellectuals are busily working to replace the discarded communist myths with new ones (see my forthcoming contribution to *Polin: Polish Historiography Faces New and Old Challenges*, vol. 21 [2008]).

Third, Cienciala misrepresents the numbers given by Lucjan Dobroszycki. From mid-1944, Jewish survivors returned to Poland individually from the territories that were re-Sovietized. Since the end of 1944, former citizens of the Second Polish Republic—including Jews—were officially "repatriated" from the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian Soviet Republics. Many returned with the Polish People's Army. Consequently, Jews who registered by late 1945 were in large part people who had survived in the USSR. The number I mentioned (15,000) refers to those Jews who survived among the Polish peasants and in little towns; a reliable estimate for the overall number of surviving Jews in the Polish lands may be around 40,000 (see Andrzej Friszke, *Polska: Losy państwa i narodu, 1939–1989*, 2003, 43).

Fourth, as is well known, Polish resistance *was* actually *passive* most of the time; just remember the famous Armia Krajowa slogan: "Z bronią u nogi" (With our rifles at our feet,