POLITICS AND LATIN AMERICA'S URBAN POOR:
Reflections from a Lima Shantytown*

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In the early 1970s, Wayne Cornelius asked, "Are the migrant masses revolutionary? Definitely not, at least in Latin America and many other parts of the developing world."[1] These words summarized an emerging revisionist view of the political character of Latin America's new urban poor. Careful empirical research had proved wrong previous scholars and observers who had expected the new migrant populations in Latin America's cities to become sources of support for revolutionary political movements.[2] A new picture of the inhabitants of Latin America's burgeoning shantytowns came into focus, showing these populations to be either passive or loyally engaged in the surrounding political system. According to this picture, squatters held considerable hope for individual advancement, forged clientelistic ties with government officials, and showed few signs of joining radicalized, class-conscious social movements.[3]

More recent empirical studies suggest, however, that a reassessment of the political attitudes and behavior of shantytown-dwellers may be overdue. Times have changed, and so, apparently, have the urban poor. Studies of shantytown communities from Santiago to Managua at least blur observers' earlier picture of the political life of these communities and their members. Residents of Santiago's *poblaciones* reportedly became central protagonists in the struggles against military rule; resi-

1. Wayne A. Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975), 2.

2. For example, see Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor*; Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Henry Dietz, *Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980). Janet Perlman distinguished between "administrative" and "direct action politics" but found very few *favelados* engaged in the latter. See Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976).

3. See also William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *LARR* 2, no. 3 (1967):65–98.

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dents of Rio's *favelas* have turned to new institutions like Christian base communities to express a recently acquired sense of social injustice; and the urban poor of Managua under the Somoza regime threw their support behind an openly revolutionary movement.[4]

Considerable evidence also indicates that Lima's shantytown residents too may be less clientelistic and conservative than they once appeared.[5] The most obvious indicator of a shift is the changed voting behavior of Lima's shantytown residents. Whereas in the 1960s, voting patterns were similar in lower-, middle-, and upper-class residential districts, striking differences appeared in the 1980s. Shantytown voters increasingly threw their support behind Marxist and center-leftist candidates, while middle- and upper-income voters supported center-right and rightist candidates. For the first time, social class became an accurate predictor of voting behavior in Lima.[6] The conservative 1990 presidential candidate, Mario Vargas Llosa, failed to appeal to many shantytown voters. Throughout much of the 1980s, many lower-class districts elected local authorities from Marxist political parties. The second indicator is that although armed movements such as Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru have drawn much greater support

4. On Chile, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible Transition," in *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements,* edited by Susan Eckstein (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 259–77. On Brazil, see Scott Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986); and Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Interclass Alliances and the Opposition to the Military in Brazil: Consequences for the Transition Period," in Eckstein, *Power and Popular Protest,* 278–98. Studies by Carlos Vilas and Orlando Núñez Soto underscore the participation of the urban poor and the centrality of lower-class urban neighborhoods in insurrections against the Somoza regime. See Carlos Vilas, "El sujeto social de la insurrección popular: la Revolución Sandinista," *LARR* 20, no. 1 (1985):119–47; and Orlando Núñez Soto, "The Third Social Force in National Liberation Movements," *Latin American Perspectives* 8, no. 2 (1981):5–21.

5. The terms *clientelism* and *patron-client ties* risk becoming meaningless through overuse. Definitions allowing us to distinguish between clientelistic and nonclientelistic lower-class political behavior are therefore in order. At the micropolitical level, *clientelism* refers to relations between lower-class agents and social elites (but more often in the present context, political elites) or representatives of the state. Such relations are simultaneously unequal and reciprocal and involve face-to-face contact between the "patron" and the lower-class actor who hopes to gain material favors. The relation between patron and client is thus highly personal and individualized. Clientelism also contains an important element of brokerage. A lower-class leader will often play the role of broker between his or her constituency and the state (or other powerful outsiders), assuming an attitude of submission or even servility vis-à-vis the powerful while simultaneously enforcing discipline and submission on other community members. At a more historical level, I accept the view of Nicos Mouzelis that clientelism and populism (although different) are "vertical forms of inclusion" of workers and the lower classes into the political systems of late industrializing countries. See Mouzelis, "On the Concept of Populism: Populist and Clientelist Modes of Incorporation in Semiperipheral Polities," *Politics and Society* 14, no. 3 (1985):329–48.

6. On the earlier period, see Sandra Powell, "Political Participation in the Barriadas: A Case Study," *Comparative Political Studies* 2, no. 2 (1969):195–215. On changes in the current decade, see the excellent article by Henry Dietz, "Political Participation in the Barriadas: An Extension and Reexamination," *Comparative Political Studies* 18, no. 3 (1985):323–55.

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from highland rural areas, it is unlikely that such organizations could have sustained their considerable level of activity in Lima without sympathy and support from some segment of the shantytown population.

Evidence to be presented in this article suggests that the picture of the urban poor as conservative and concerned primarily with individual advancement should be adjusted rather than discarded. Class-conscious and militant social movements in Peru in the 1980s found support in shantytowns and indeed even emerged from them. But as will be shown, such movements have not simply displaced older patterns of conservatism and clientelism. Extensive research in a poor community in the northern part of Lima during the mid-1980s revealed a complex and politically divided population in which patterns of conservatism and clientelism persisted while new currents of popular radicalism and class-based activism appeared.

This article will begin by presenting evidence, drawn from interviews with two dozen shantytown leaders and community activists, of a complex and mixed popular political culture in contemporary Lima. It will then place current patterns in the context of recent Peruvian political history and suggest ways in which macro-level changes during the period of military rule (1968–1980) and since the transition back to civilian rule have influenced popular political culture. Survey data will be drawn on in weighing the impact of structural, demographic, and experiential factors in shaping the political views and practices of shantytown residents. The article will end by highlighting the implications of the Peruvian case of heightened social mobilization and class consciousness for a more theoretical and regional understanding of the political character of the urban poor.

The fieldwork on which this study is based was carried out during an eighteen-month period in 1985 and 1986. The district under study was large enough (having a population of one hundred and eighty thousand) and typical enough of Lima's shantytown areas to suggest that the patterns and themes revealed in this research are characteristic of lower-class Lima as a whole. The district's occupational structure, which features a heavily blue-collar and informal-sector population, resembles that of other large shantytown districts in Greater Lima. Literacy rates and the percentage of residents who are squatters are also well within the range of lower-class Lima as a whole. Henry Dietz lists this district as one of the ten lowest in the province of Lima in terms of socioeconomic status; together, these ten districts account for 53 percent of the city's population.[7]

7. Dietz, "Political Participation." The original ten districts increased to eleven in 1982, when a large district in the southern part of the city was split in two. Economic and demographic data for the province of Lima are broken down by district in the Peruvian National Census of 1981. Another useful discussion can be found in José Matos Mar, *Desborde popular y crisis del estado* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1985).

The district also typifies lower-class Lima in the overt changes in political behavior mentioned above. In terms of voting behavior, ten of the eleven lowest-ranked shantytown districts in 1983 elected mayors from the Izquierda Unida (IU), a coalition of Marxist and socialist parties and individuals. One of these districts was the site of this study. The district's IU mayor was reelected in 1986, along with six other IU mayors in shantytown districts. Another leftist candidate was elected in 1989, as was the case in five other lower-class districts. This district's leftist electoral affinity thus makes it representative of a large number of Lima shanty-towns in the 1980s.[8]

Second, a shadowy guerrilla presence was detectable here as else-where in lower-class Lima, although most residents rejected guerrilla groups. For example, in early 1987 (after my fieldwork was completed), gunmen, presumably *senderistas,* killed a local activist affiliated with APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) who was also a com-munity leader. The manner in which the attack was carried out suggested that the assailants had local knowledge of the district and its leadership. Again, this sparse but occasionally visible guerrilla presence was typical of lower-class Lima in the 1980s.

CLIENTS AND RADICALS IN A LIMA SHANTYTOWN

In mid-1985 three residents of Las Flores,[9] a neighborhood perched high in the hills above the Túpac Amaru highway in northern Lima, took a bus to the offices of the municipal water authority, Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima (SEDAPAL). On the surface, there was nothing unusual about this visit. Shantytown leaders from settlements where potable water projects are under way regularly visit SEDAPAL's offices. But the team of engineers and planners who met with the Las Flores water commission was disconcerted by this visit. During the pre-vious year they had engaged in friendly, easygoing meetings with another set of leaders from Las Flores. Both sides had agreed on a joint financing scheme for the project, including contributions from the neighborhood's residents, and nothing seemed to stand in the way of the water project's proceeding. Now they faced a new water commission whom they had never seen before. The meeting was tense, with the new water commis-sioners insisting that the terms previously agreed on had been nullified in a neighborhood assembly. They had been sent to negotiate a much lower

8. Electoral results are drawn from Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, *El nuevo rostro electoral: las municipales del 83* (Lima: DESCO, 1985); Tuesta, *Pobreza urbana y cambios electorales en Lima* (Lima: DESCO, 1989); and Rafael Roncagliolo, "Elecciones en Lima: cifras testarudas," *QueHacer* no. 62 (Jan. 1990):12–20.

9. All names of places and persons are pseudonyms, except those that are already general public knowledge.

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rate of community contribution. Their attitude was strident, even hostile. A more cooperative member of the original Las Flores water commission later complained about the new Water Commission and the awkward position it placed him in vis-à-vis SEDAPAL: "The engineers say, 'Those people cry a lot, they bother us a lot, you have to attend to them' . . . [The new water commission members] say, 'Let's go fight SEDAPAL, let's go shout.' How can we, the leaders, go shout at SEDAPAL? What would they say to us? We'd come off badly."

The seemingly parochial and localized conflict between the two water commissions of Las Flores actually revealed a pervasive rift in the political-cultural currents and practices of Lima's shantytown populations. Community members were divided over many key elements of political culture or consciousness: their subjective class identification, their perceptions of the propriety and effectiveness of alternative strategies, their beliefs about the proper role of community leaders and leaders' relations with community members, and their views of the ultimate goals of political action. The following discussion offers examples of these differences, which tended to form two coherent patterns in the beliefs and practices of local leaders and community activists. To facilitate exposition of the findings, I will treat the population as if it were divided into two groups, which I call "clientelists" and "radicals."[10]

Social Identification

Shantytown leaders whom I interviewed varied in their subjective class identification. Some were egalitarians, identifying strongly as workers who saw themselves as joined in unavoidable conflict with owners, managers, or "the rich." Others accepted social hierarchy, both within the community and in the broader society.

More radicalized community members displayed horizontal class consciousness and egalitarianism, attitudes that often surfaced in discussing their work lives. For example, Leoncio Mamani, a district resident, had worked for twenty-seven years in a candy factory in the Avenida Colonial, part of Lima's industrial core. He believed that a fundamental divide separated workers from company owners and managers: "There's a limit: the worker's a worker, and the owner's an owner. [The worker] can't be in harmony with the owner. There are differences of classes. . . .

10. This dichotomy is obviously a simplification. Although the survey data to be presented in this article suggest that many *pobladores* hold consistently opposed views on the matters mentioned above, the reference to two categories of residents should not be taken too literally. Nor am I assuming from the outset that "radicals" will never engage in forms of clientelism of their own. But the analysis that follows provides considerable evidence of an emerging pattern of political action and strategy as well as an associated political ideology or mentality that differ in many important ways from traditional clientelist patterns.

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One is the bird of prey, and the other has to carry the bird's load." When asked, "Why is harmony impossible?" Mamani responded, "Because the only thing that's important to the owner is exploitation. It doesn't matter to him whether the worker eats or sleeps. . . . He uses the worker like a machine."

This sense of the inevitable antagonism between classes and a concomitant sense of "popular" or working-class solidarity also appeared in discussions of shantytown community affairs. Radicalized leaders and activists were deeply aware of their status as workers and poor people. They displayed a certain pride and assertiveness regarding their social position and viewed it as a basis for solidary action. One resident explained that, in contrast to rich neighborhoods where services are readily provided, "here we don't have water, we don't have electricity, we don't have anything. Who's going to come knock on my door and say, 'Señora, here you are'? . . . That's what brings us together to fight."

The district's more clientelistic leaders and activists, in contrast, avoided identifying themselves with the district's poverty. Nor did they view solidarity with fellow workers as the basis for militant action. Thus a resident who worked as a ticket-taker at a downtown cinema was pleased that he and his fellow workers did not belong to a union: "This way we don't go on strikes or on marches. . . . We don't create problems or anything public."

Although I found no systematic relationship between occupation and political attitudes, more clientelistic residents often perceived their work as approximating that of professionals or managers, or like one former bank teller, they continued to see themselves as holding occupations "above" those of workers long after they had been forced into lower-paying, lower-status jobs. When interviewed, the former bank teller was living in a makeshift home, high in the district's hills, and driving a taxi. He explained nonetheless, "In a bank, beginning with clothing, you have to be well-dressed, you have to live more or less in a presentable place. . . . It's not like being a worker, who can live on top of a hill and go to work with worn-out shoes. . . . Because of your social position, you have to deal with other kinds of people, you have to educate yourself more, choose your friends. It's not like being a worker. . . . In your social life as well, a worker can go to a bar and get drunk, but a [white-collar] employee can't do that. You always have to be careful about your prestige."

Strategy

Earlier research has already exploded the "myth of marginality" by showing that Latin American shantytown residents actively participate in

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their surrounding economies and polities.[11] But although the urban poor were not "marginal," researchers in Peru and elsewhere emphasized the clientelistic and submissive ties that *pobladores* forged with government officials and others.[12] My research suggests that this pattern persisted in the mid-1980s among one subset of the shantytown population. Another significant subset, however, engaged in confrontational and strident demand making.

Two very different strategic logics were visible among Lima's shantytown residents. The strategy of radicals was to extract services and concessions by uniting the poor to exert maximum pressure on the state and other potential benefactors. Other residents preferred a clientelistic strategy of cultivating friendly relationships with officials and others. These distinct strategies reflected divergent and competing views of the state. Radicalized residents viewed the state as a representative of capitalists or "the rich": the state would respond to lower-class interests and needs only when subjected to pressure and threats. Radicals' views of the state were colored by suspicion and antagonism. Clientelistic residents and leaders, however, perceived the state as expressing more universal interests and therefore friendly to requests from representatives of the poor.

Radicalized activists envisioned success coming from breaking the tacit rules governing relations between the state and the poor. One local leader, a frequent organizer of marches and street demonstrations, explained how pobladores intentionally violated the rules of political conduct as laid out by the state: "When you go and make demands (*reclamos*) before the central government, it makes them uncomfortable. Under no circumstances do they want poor people to go in a group to make demands. They get scared. . . . They prefer that only one or two leaders go to do the paperwork." In the radicals' view, such rule-breaking was necessary to extract concessions from a basically hostile government.

Clientelistic leaders were more respectful of the state-established rules-of-the-game. This approach reflected in part the calculation that such respect could render certain rewards. But it was also a less conscious outgrowth of these leaders' social identification and general political orientation. Clientelistic leaders who sought friendly interactions with officials in government or private agencies did so partly because they viewed themselves as socially similar to these professionals and partly

11. See Perlman, *Myth of Marginality.* See also Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor.*

12. Henry Dietz reported such findings for the Peruvian case in *Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule* and in "Bureaucratic Demand-Making and Clientelistic Participation in Peru," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America,* edited by James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 413–58. See also David Collier, *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

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because they viewed the state as basically sympathetic to the needs of the poor.

The contrast between the strategies and styles of clientelists and radicalized activists was dramatic. The first account was given by one radical activist of a march to the offices of the national Health Ministry.

It was a big struggle, because we had to go to the Health Ministry in marches, with the ladies with their babies on their backs . . . We went once to the ministry with a group of about eighty mothers. Forty went up, inside the ministry, and forty stayed outside. When we started shouting inside, the whole ministry got scared, the telephones started ringing! And the people stuck their heads out the windows of the ministry, and they saw that we were below, outside. We had entered in groups of three so they wouldn't notice us. But when we were upstairs and took out our banner and started shouting, everyone got scared. The director, all of them, were worried, and we said "We're not moving from here until you give us a solution." We made the engineer [with whom leaders had dealt earlier] go outside and talk directly with the people.

This account provides a striking contrast with the one given by two clientelist leaders of a visit to the Housing Ministry:

[We went] to various offices and spoke with various engineers, etc., places where we already knew that we should go. We took maps [and said], "We're leaders, we live in such-and-such a place." We told the history of the community also. "Well," [the engineer] said to us, "on Thursday I'm going to go, because I have to see where you people live." And that day the engineer came. He was a marvelous old man. [In a later visit], we went in just like that and we sat down. The engineer introduced us to his secretary, saying "Well, miss, these gentlemen are leaders from the pueblo of Las Flores, so whenever they come and ask for me or bring documents, attend to them immediately for me." Because we had told him about the community's suffering and everything.

Views of Community Leadership

Distinct views of the proper role of community leaders have arisen from clientelists' and radicals' differing social self-identifications. Some leaders identified with poor people and workers, others with higher social classes. Showing solidarity with other workers was a central aspect of leadership for combative and demand-oriented leaders, who saw themselves as workers and poor people leading others like themselves. Radical leaders insisted that they had nothing material to offer their constituents and stressed negotiating hard with the state for services and other resources. Their approach was the opposite of that of the "status spending" often engaged in by more clientelist leaders, who initiated state-sponsored projects to shore up their own local prestige.

Suspicions about status spending and conflict over the proper role of leaders in managing community economic affairs were the source of the original Las Flores water commission's troubles. A more radical neighbor

accused the head of the commission of being "servile" in his negotiations with SEDAPAL while indulging in a kind of conspicuous consumption within the community: "He doesn't like to struggle. He likes to say, 'It costs me so much for this thing, and I allow myself the luxury of paying for it.' But he doesn't like to bargain." Another neighbor made similar complaints: "If [the water commissioner] feels capable of acting like a millionaire, what's he doing here? Why doesn't he go live in San Isidro or Miraflores [elite residential districts of Lima] . . . ? In every meeting we have, that's the first thing he says to us, that he's the leader with his pockets full of money. What he means is that he doesn't owe the people anything, that if he's the leader, it's because to be a leader you need money for transportation."

Beyond these competing conceptions of the economic dimension of leadership, those interviewed were also divided in their views of the amount of community participation that leaders should foster. Clientelist leaders saw their role as one of administering community affairs on behalf of other community members who were less culturally and economically advantaged. As one such leader said, "The leader has the job of doing all of the paperwork himself, until the final consequences. We have to direct the [community residents] in everything having to do with paperwork and leave everything all finished for them." In extreme cases, leaders who viewed themselves as in, but not of, the community adopted an openly hostile view of their neighbors. One such case was a conservative leader who reported difficulty in convincing his constituents to record their houses in a community register: "It's ignorance. . . . They live like animals, it's true. So a leader has to fight, has to coax them like a child, like a baby, 'Listen, come on, I'll register you.'"

The contrast between the conservatives and more radicalized leaders was startling. They saw community participation as not only strategically effective but an end in itself. The measure of a leader's worthiness was the amount of participation he or she could stimulate; the tenure of a leader who achieved material gains for the community without arousing local activism was viewed as flawed. One community member spoke warmly of the current district mayor's capacity for encouraging participation: "I've talked with a lot of neighbors, and almost a majority agree that the mayor should continue [in power], mainly [because] she participates and makes all of us participate in all of the problems that exist. She started having general meetings [*asambleas*], and in a general meeting, you speak straight out."

The Goals of Political Action

It might appear that the leaders and activists I am calling "radicals" and "clientelists" shared the goals of securing material and infrastructural improvements for their communities, that if the methods and the tenor of

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their activities differed, their objectives were the same. But in a deeper sense, radicals and clientelists differed sharply in their understandings of what they were doing and why. Clientelists saw themselves as pursuing improvements in infrastructure—such as installing potable water systems, electrification, or street leveling and paving—in order to develop their community in a physical sense. Radicals saw themselves as part of broader social movements. Although they also sought material improvements, they voiced more ambitious goals of political transformation and social leveling. This sense of participating in a broader movement was reinforced by the dense matrix of local organizations in which the radicals operated (to be discussed), including Christian base communities, "popular dining halls" (*comedores populares*), leadership training centers, and, in many cases, the local district mayor's staff and district council.[13]

Involvement in such organizations played an important part in developing a sense of membership in a social movement. One resident recalled experiencing this kind of awareness after she began to take part in a local women's club: "I began participating in [club] meetings and since then started realizing that my problems are not mine alone. They exist at the district level, or you could even say—who knows?—at the world level. It's just that everyone is in his or her own place."

Although more radicalized leaders often shared the immediate ends of local *barrio* material development promoted by clientelists, they also described themselves in interviews as aiming toward more ambitious social and political goals. The president of a women's club, unaccustomed to the language of abstraction, groped for words to explain her ultimate aims: "What we señoras want, the reason we organize ourselves, is to be able, we hope with time, our objective is that there should be a new society, a change . . . We hope that there will be a change like this: we all eat or no one eats. But right now, there are some who eat and others of us who don't eat. That's bad. From my way of looking at things, it shouldn't be that way."

Another resident, an illiterate highland migrant and a militant member of a Marxist political party, spoke with greater ideological fluency. But the underlying idea of political transformation and social leveling was the same: "Our analysis is, the only way we can reform this country is by seeing that there aren't bosses, there aren't any exploiters. Making this Peru a socialist Peru where there won't be bosses or exploiters. That's what we're aiming for, that Peru be reformed, but it has to be a socialist Peru. And we want people to become conscious, so that we can all make this change, because we're now so exploited."

13. Mayors and district councilors affiliated with the Izquierda Unida were in fact radical-style residents who had risen to positions of prominence in district affairs. This pattern is typified by the career of the district mayor who held office between 1983 and 1989. A local resident in her thirties, the mayor became politicized through her activism in a parish youth organization.

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The foregoing analysis, in which shantytown residents' alternative political practices and strategies were treated as the fallout of conflicting political worldviews, runs against the grain of many studies of peasants and the urban poor that stress the highly strategic and rationalistic quality of political action among such groups. Because this approach is intuitively appealing and clearly appropriate in many settings, it is worth explaining why I have not adopted it in the current context.

According to what might be called a rational-actor perspective, shantytown-dwellers have at their disposal a broad repertoire of strategies, a tool-kit of methods for extracting valued goods, all of which they see as morally or normatively neutral. Residents use the criterion of effectiveness alone in adopting strategies. Their strategies will vary according to the kind of goods sought, the nature of the ministry to be approached, and so on, and they are likely to turn from one strategy to another in the course of a single community effort: if friendly negotiations fail they will turn to street demonstrations, then to occupying buildings, and so forth.

Despite its a priori appeal, such an approach does not coincide with the reality that I observed in Lima's shantytowns. Clearly, leaders and activists were capable of varying their strategies. Particularly those I call "radicals" would sit down at certain moments in closed sessions and negotiate the finer details of the concessions they had extracted. But the converse was not true of clientelists, who were extremely reluctant to organize confrontational marches or to occupy buildings. Militant action would have undermined the logic of their relations with outside benefactors. Equally important, it would have violated their sense of their own social status and their relations with their communities. The head of Las Flores's original water commission was making the point that the politics of confrontation had no place in his strategic repertoire when he complained, "How can we, the leaders, go shout at SEDAPAL? What would they say to us? We'd come off badly."

The view I am proposing is that political strategies and practices form an integral part of an actor's general political and social worldview. Thus when shantytown activists took part in street demonstrations, they did so not only because they saw these actions as effective but because they saw their relation with the state and the "rich" as basically conflictive. In their view, to avoid playing out that conflict would be to mask reality and therefore wrong. Clientelists avoided conflict not only because they cagily perceived this approach as a way of maximizing their likelihood of success but because they identified with the officials with whom they dealt. In sum, idea systems and worldviews of the kinds that influence Lima's poor are powerful forces that shape behavior.[14]

14. This is not to say that effectiveness and results are unimportant. A set of strategies that turned out to be ineffective—or in the current context, to entail extremely high costs such as

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POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POBLADOR CONSCIOUSNESS

Three arguments will be set forth in this section: that the tensions between two contemporary political cultures are not only a phenomenon of community leaders but have some resonance among the general voting population; that the radical current in popular political culture is traceable to macropolitical changes occurring in Peru beginning in the 1970s; and that the subset of residents whom I am calling clientelists have been less exposed than their more radicalized neighbors to these changes. In this sense, radicalism is a newer current in Lima's popular political culture, while clientelism is more continuous with past patterns of lower-class attitudes and roles in the political system.

A sample survey of 882 registered voters, all residents of the district under study, was taken to explore voters' attitudes toward class solidarity and social identification, appropriate methods for political action, and other ideological features.[15] Notwithstanding the notorious difficulty of measuring broader attitudes with specific survey questions and the generally weaker relationships in cross-sectional survey data than in aggregate or time-series data, this survey found that the cleavage so prominent in the interviews with community leaders was also revealed in this cross-section of the general population.

Voters were asked whether if unemployed, they would accept a job in a factory on condition that they would not join the union representing factory workers. The question was intended to distinguish between voters

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bringing on physical repression—would probably fail to attract many adherents in the long run. But note that success may be measured differently by various groups: one leader's success at installing running water could be viewed by another as a failure because it did not stimulate broad community participation. In the context described here, the strategies of radicals as well as clientelists were at least moderately successful according to the values of each group.

15. The survey was conducted in May and June of 1986. The sampling frame was provided by lists of voters, which I had access to thanks to the cooperation of the Registro Nacional de Elecciones in Lima. Several reasons can be cited for considering these lists to be fairly accurate. Voting is compulsory in Peru after age eighteen, and citizens are required to carry evidence of current registration. The Registro's lists were updated comprehensively in July 1984. Those who came of age between that time and mid-1986, when I conducted the survey, were required to register on a continuing basis and therefore would have been included in the lists from which the sample was drawn. The voting lists are compiled in "books" or sets of loose-leaf registration forms, each containing a sheet corresponding to one of 200 voters per book. In 1986, 371 books of voters registered in the district thus contained approximately 74,200 voters. The Registro agreed to select three voters per book, using skip numbers that I supplied. Deaths and moves out of the district reduced the original group of 1,113 to an effective sample of 985 voters. To ensure a high response rate, I hired and trained local district students who were familiar with the layout of the district's neighborhoods and would appear familiar enough to inspire confidence in respondents (although no student was assigned an interview with anyone whom he or she knew personally). The students interviewed 882 (90 percent) of those selected; the remaining 103 (10 percent) refused to answer questions. The survey instrument was pretested in two neighborhoods in the extreme southern portion of the district. To avoid contamination, these neighborhoods were excluded from the final sample.

who valued horizontal class solidarity enough to accept some sacrifice in deference to it and those who placed individual family needs above support for fellow workers.

Responses to this open-ended question ranged from strong phrases of support for labor unions (such as the view that without unions, workers are "mere slaves") to the opposite view that unions are superfluous or create more problems than they solve. More than one-third of the respondents (37 percent) rejected the hypothetical job offer under the stated conditions, while less than two-thirds (63 percent) accepted it. A few respondents said that they would first accept the employer's conditions and join the union later. These responses suggest considerable variation in levels of horizontal class consciousness.

Other questions sought to elicit distinct patterns in respondents' general political ideology. In the open-ended interviews already cited, radical leaders and activists tended to view the state as antagonistic to the poor. They also considered "struggle" to be the most effective and appropriate strategy for extracting services and other benefits from Peru's central government. Clientelists perceived the state as a beneficent ally of the poor, and they instinctively turned to negotiations to secure assistance and services from the government. Two separate survey questions were designed to elicit the broader voting population's understanding of its relationship to the state. Respondents were asked first whether local organizations should work with the central government and later the more strategically oriented question of whether "struggle" (*medidas de lucha*) or "legal petitioning" (*trámites legales*) is the more useful method for gaining benefits from the state.

Responses to both questions again reflected considerable diversity of local opinion. About two-thirds of respondents (64 percent) favored working with the central government, while one-third (36 percent) opposed such collaboration. Similarly, 66 percent of respondents chose legal petitioning as the more effective method for securing benefits for their community, while 33 percent preferred "struggle."

Thus the shantytown district's mass voting population appeared to hold radical as well as clientelist views of the state, fellow workers, and political strategy, views paralleling those of community leaders. What evidence is there that these views were part of consistent and mutually exclusive patterns of belief or consciousness? A first step in answering this question is to examine how well a "radical" (or "clientelist") response to one question predicts a similarly radical (or clientelist) response to another. Table 1 allows a comparison of responses to the question regarding legal petitioning versus struggle between those accepting or rejecting the hypothetical job offer. Responses to the two questions were associated and in the predicted direction: those demonstrating less support for labor unions, and thus less horizontal class

T A B L E 1 *Cross-Tabulation of Union Solidarity with Strategy Preference*

	Job barring union affiliation	
Better Strategy	*Accept* (%)	*Reject* (%)
Petitioning	71	59
Struggle	29	41
Total	100	100
	(N = 462)	(N = 284)

Source: Survey data.

Note: Chi-square equals 11.2. The association is significant at the p equals .001 level.

consciousness, were significantly more likely to favor legal petitioning than those rejecting the job offer. This finding suggests at least a partial clustering of radical and clientelist views within the district's general voting population.

A similar degree of clustering of opinion exists between strategic preferences (struggle versus petitioning) and views of the state. Table 2 shows that those who favored legal petitioning also viewed the state as an appropriate ally for popular organizations at a rate of more than two to one, whereas those favoring "struggle" are split nearly evenly on the issue of whether or not to work with the state. These results echo findings in the previous section: a preference for confrontation over negotiation is linked to more general and sometimes visceral mistrust and antagonism toward the central government.

Similarly, voters' views on the appropriateness of the relationship between the state and popular organizations help predict their views on union solidarity. Those wary of the central government as an ally were significantly less likely to accept the hypothetical job offer, and vice versa (the association was significant at the level of p equals .05).

Factor analysis confirms that these three attitudinal variables can be perceived as related to a single underlying and hypothetical variable that measures degrees of radicalism.[16] Factor analysis offered the additional advantage of providing factor loadings, which could then be used to score individual responses on a summary index of "radicalism" (to be discussed subsequently). These factor loadings were 0.718 for strategic

16. Principal component analysis revealed one factor with an eigenvalue greater than unity, with which all three attitudinal variables were positively correlated. In using eigenvalues of greater than 1 as a stopping criterion in factor analysis, I am following the method outlined by R. J. Rummel in *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1970). The eigenvalue associated with the underlying factor used here was 1.278.

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TABLE 2 *Cross-tabulation of Views of the Government with Strategic Preference*

| Better Strategy | Should organizations in your neighborhood work with the central government? | |
	Yes (%)	No (%)
Petitioning	73	56
Struggle	27	44
Total	100	100
	(N = 500)	(N = 280)

Source: Survey data.

Note: Chi-square equals 23. The association is significant at the *p* equals .001 level.

preference, 0.670 for cooperation with the state, and 0.524 for job versus union.

A final piece of evidence that the rift between radicals and clientelists is revealed at the mass level comes from analyzing voting behavior. As noted earlier, a leftward shift in the voting patterns of Peruvian shantytown residents was one of the first clear indications of an erosion of the clientelist and conservative patterns that scholars had previously noted as characterizing these populations. But the Marxist Left has by no means enjoyed universal support in the shantytowns. In fact, considerable variation of voting patterns can be seen in the district under study, as in every other lower-class district in Lima. The data collected in this study allow deeper understanding of variation in lower-class voting patterns. Indeed, the ideological rift indicated by my qualitative and quantitative data appears to be related to voting behavior. More radicalized respondents to the mass survey were significantly more likely to support Marxist candidates in both municipal and presidential elections, while more clientelistic respondents showed a greater affinity for rightist or centrist candidates and parties.

This relationship between political worldview and voting behavior emerges clearly when examining district voting patterns in the 1985 presidential election. Survey respondents were asked to report how they had voted in a series of elections. The 1985 presidential election, which occurred one year before the survey, was the freshest in respondents' memories and probably yielded more reliable responses than did questions about less recent elections. Furthermore, electoral returns show that in this district (as elsewhere in working-class Lima) Aprista presidential candidate Alan García held great appeal. The Marxist Left received a lower percentage of the district's vote in 1985 (36 percent) than it had in any election since 1980. Table 3 indicates that differences in general political worldview were indeed associated with voting behavior. The

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T A B L E 3   *Cross-Tabulation of Choice in the 1985 Peruvian Presidential Elections with Political Orientation*

	Mean score on index of radicalism			
	0 (%)	*.64* (%)	*1.27* (%)	*1.91* (%)
APRA	79	69	61	41
United Left	21	31	39	59
Total	100 (N = 188)	100 (N = 242)	100 (N = 140)	100 (N = 56)

Source: Survey data.

Note: Factor loadings for each of the three component variables generated in the factor analysis were used to construct this index. Each respondent was assigned a score of 0 (for a "clientelist" answer) or 1 (for a "radical" answer) to each of the three component attitudinal questions. These responses, weighted by the factor loading for each of the three variables, were then summed to produce a final score, in which eight discrete values were possible. Table 3 collapses the middle six scores into two columns. The range of scores in the second column is .524 to .718, and the range in the third column is 1.194 to 1.342. Chi-square equals 31.3, which is significant at the p equals .001 level.

proportion of respondents who reported voting for leftist candidates increases as responses moved from less to more radicalized worldviews.[17]

In sum, analysis of the survey data yields findings parallel to the analysis based on the qualitative material: the political consciousness of shantytown residents varied in ways parallel to that of the community's leaders, although the patterns were predictably less consistent at the mass level. It may now be asked, what factors have produced this dualism or bifurcation of popular political culture into two currents, one more radicalized, a second more clientelistic and conservative? In answering this question, it is useful to turn to recent history and the macropolitical context as well as to data, again generated by the sample survey, relating patterns of consciousness to the life experiences of the district's residents. These two levels of analysis are closely connected because local experiences have been shaped, and in fact changed, by shifts in the macropolitical context of the past two decades.

17. Similar results are obtained when support for the Left is measured across a series of elections. For example, of those scoring lowest on the index of radicalism, only 14 percent voted consistently for the Left across four national and local elections between 1980 and 1985, whereas 44 percent of the most radical consistently voted for the Left. In table 3, I have excluded voters who reported supporting the more rightist Popular Christian party and Popular Action candidates because their numbers were very small.

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The Context of Political-Cultural Change

It has become a commonplace among students of Peruvian politics that the military regime of the 1970s, especially its "first phase" under Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975), marked a turning point in recent Peruvian political history. Early research carried out either during the "revolutionary" military regime's tenure or shortly after Velasco's fall emphasized the dramatic changes that the regime had attempted to bring about.[18] More recent assessments made from the vantage point of the 1980s have indicated the unintended, but often far-reaching, longer-term consequences of Velasco's rule.[19] My study suggests similar conclusions with regard to the effect of military rule on the political character of the urban poor. The swelling of the radical current in popular consciousness was largely an unintended consequence of Velasco regime reforms and subsequent changes. This outcome must be understood as unanticipated because, although the Velasco regime sought to stimulate "full participation" of the urban poor by strengthening shantytown institutions and allowing them greater access to the central government, the regime's intention was also to forge loyal, ultimately tame shantytown organizations. It is sometimes said that the regime's idea of participation was similar to marching in a military parade. Clearly, the subset of shantytown radicals analyzed above do not fit this idea.

What were the precise macropolitical changes that radicalized a segment of Lima's urban poor? Among the best researched aspects of change under the military regime is the emergence during these years of an increasingly militant labor movement with close ties to the Soviet-aligned Peruvian Communist party and to newer Marxist parties as well. This newly revived wing of the Peruvian labor movement, affiliated with the Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), is often characterized as "*clasista*," in contrast with the more pro-boss and quiescent APRA-associated unions affiliated with the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP).[20] Workers who belonged to unions where a new clasista leadership took over from the Apristas or those who worked in factories where Marxist organizers formed unions for the first time were often shantytown residents. Thus the ideological and political shift in the

18. For example, see Cynthia McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule,* edited by Abraham Lowenthal (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

19. For example, see Evelyne Huber Stephens, "The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of the Left," *LARR* 18, no. 2 (1983):57–93; and Teresa Tovar, *Velasquismo y movimiento popular* (Lima: DESCO, 1986).

20. See Carmen Rosa Balbi, *Identidad clasista en el sindicalismo* (Lima: DESCO, 1989); and Stephens, "The Peruvian Government."

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labor movement would be expected to have repercussions in the shan-tytowns as well. This natural spillover was undoubtedly accelerated in 1977, when Velasco's successor, Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975–1980), purged the unions of their more confrontational membership in the wake of a national strike. Many former union activists then turned their energies toward neighborhood organizations.

A less studied element of Velasco's reforms is education policy, but here too the effect was to reshape popular political culture. Educational reform under Velasco aimed to transform the approach to public education and its content. Velasco's educational policy had several features. Skilled workers were given greater access to technical training, and access to the national universities for poorer students was also expanded. The number of university students nationwide jumped by an average of 9 percent per year during the "first phase" of the military government.[21]

Equally important changes occurred in the content of education. Designers of elementary and secondary curricula sought to infuse public education with a more nationalist and critical content.[22] For the first time, students in Peru's public high schools read writers such as the socialist José Carlos Mariátegui, the poet César Vallejo, and the novelist and anthropologist José María Arguedas. Moreover, consistent with the regime's insistence on "full participation," those in charge of Velasco's educational policy followed pedagogical theories that treated students and parents as active agents in the educational process. They hoped thus to eliminate authoritarian teaching practices and the emphasis on rote learning.

The new role of schools as a source of critical consciousness was reinforced later in the 1970s, when a Maoist political party helped found a national teachers' union, the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú (SUTEP).[23] During the Morales Bermúdez regime of the late

21. Calculated from Gonzalo Portocarrero and Patricia Oliart, *El Perú desde la escuela* (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1989). The 1960s and 1970s witnessed an enormous expansion in Peru's national universities, which began during the first administration of Fernando Belaúnde Terry. Frustrated in his attempts at reform in other areas, Belaúnde poured money into the educational system with the result that by the time that Velasco took power, Peru was already an unusually well-educated Third World country. See the discussion of education policy under Belaúnde in Julio Cotler, *Clases, estado y nación* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978), 366.

22. See Portocarrero and Oliart, *El Perú desde la escuela;* and Teresa Tovar, *Reforma de la educación: balance y perspectiva* (Lima: DESCO, 1985).

23. One can speculate about the factors producing an affinity between Peru's teachers and radical politics. Schoolteachers in Peru come disproportionately from working-class backgrounds. In the late 1960s, when working-class students began to attend universities in large numbers, the number of students electing teacher training expanded fivefold. Meanwhile, the number of university students majoring in the humanities tripled and those studying natural sciences and engineering doubled. See Enrique Bernales, *Movimientos sociales y movimientos universitarios en el Perú* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica, 1975). Furthermore, a wide gap exists between the relatively high educational level of primary and secondary

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1970s and into the 1980s, teachers and their union frequently criticized government policy sharply and the political and social system more generally. Because of the teachers federation's link with a formalized Marxist party, public schools often became a conduit between lower-class communities and the partisan Marxist Left.

A third change set off during the Velasco period was the arrival in the shantytowns of myriad outside organizations and actors, some of them interested in promoting a more radical politics. These actors included cadres from new Marxist political parties, Catholic Church activists, literacy workers, and "health promoters." The work of some was encouraged by the regime. But even when these actors opposed the regime and had to act clandestinely (as was true of the Marxist party cadres), they benefited from the programs of the Velasco regime and its rhetoric of exhorting "full participation" in the shantytowns.

In particular, the regime strengthened shantytown neighborhood organizations but did not ensure the loyalty of new organizations to the military government.[24] The Velasco regime had hoped to improve the lives of the urban poor materially and also to create institutional bonds of loyalty and support with these groups. The government's strategy was to create new structures of local political activism by implanting a hierarchy of semi-representative, neighborhood-based organizations.

But although the regime succeeded in heightening the level of organization in the shantytowns and in sparking a spirit of participation, it was much less successful in defining the longer-term institutional or political loyalties of newly activated squatters. In the district under study and many others throughout Lima, the very organizations created by the regime became support bases for leftist parties and were influenced by activist clergy and lay church workers. The presence of both the Marxist Left and socially activist Catholics in the shantytowns of Lima increased significantly in the early years of Velasco's rule, and these actors remained pervasive throughout the 1980s. To the extent that pobladores became involved in this new extended web of organizations, and they did so to varying degrees, the older patterns of conservatism and clientelism were eroded.

Analysis of survey data underscores the impact of these broader shifts on shantytown residents' attitudes and practices and allows us to eliminate alternative explanations of the variation between more radical-

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schoolteachers and their income level. According to official statistics, in mid-1980 the average teacher's salary could purchase only 40 percent of a family food basket; by the end of the first quarter of 1989, that figure had declined to 10 percent. These figures from the Instituto Peruano de Planificación are cited in Hernando Burgos, "Maestros, la última clase," *QueHacer* no. 58 (Apr. 1989):3.

24. For a detailed description of Velasco's policies in the shantytowns and the neighborhood committee's design, see Alfred Stepan, *State and Society,* chap. 5.

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ized and clientelistic patterns of consciousness. As noted earlier, by using principal component analysis, I was able to reduce the three interrelated attitudinal variables (reflecting social identification, strategy preferences, and views of the state) to a single underlying factor that can be thought of conceptually as measuring degrees of radicalism. I then treated this underlying factor as the dependent variable in a multiple regression model. The model included independent variables measuring the degree to which individual respondents were exposed to the kinds of changes that one would predict (according to the preceding historical analysis) would be associated with emerging new patterns of political culture in Lima's shantytowns. Thus the effects on political consciousness of education, exposure to labor unions, and participation in local organizations were tested.

The impact of variables that would confirm conflicting hypotheses was also explored. In particular, I sought to determine whether more structural factors (those resistant to the historical developments described earlier) played a part in shaping political worldviews. Thus I explored the impact of gender, age, place of birth, and geographical location within the district. A positive result might have cast doubt on the notion that the radical-clientelist split reflects a historical shift. For example, it is conceivable that radical and clientelist orientations did not characterize two different sets of persons who were more or less affected by contextual factors reflecting historical changes since the 1970s but rather two different points in the individual life cycle. If this supposition were true, then one would expect age to be related (presumably inversely) to radicalized responses. Previous research in Latin America has emphasized some differences between migrants to the cities and subsequent generations of city-born shantytown residents. Data on place of birth and length of residence in Lima allowed exploring the impact of migration on political consciousness.[25] The influence of occupation and income on political worldviews was also explored. Positive results might indicate that behavioral and ideational differences reflected enduring socioeconomic distinctions among the district's voters or differing roles in the productive system of the occupationally diverse "popular sectors."

The results of this analysis in fact confirmed the role played by a shifting local context, which in turn was tied to the political and cultural changes described earlier, in giving rise to radicalized currents in the district's political culture (see table 4). In contrast, neither socioeconomic nor geographic nor life-cycle differences were significantly associated with levels of radicalism.[26]

25. See, for example, Cornelius's treatment of migrants versus "native sons" in *Politics and the Migrant Poor*.
26. It would be a mistake to conclude that the general context of economic crisis is uncon-

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TABLE 4 Results of Regression Analysis of Levels of Radicalism

Variable[a]	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	T-Statistic	Probability Greater than T	Standard Estimate
Intercept	–0.696	0.241	–2.895	0.039	0.000
Unionism	0.485	0.123	3.929	0.000	0.152
Male participation[b]	0.368	0.117	3.131	0.002	0.122
Education[c]	0.099	0.041	2.423	0.016	0.106
Occupation[d]	0.070	0.089	0.784	0.433	0.031
Migrant[e]	0.020	0.099	0.201	0.841	0.009
Income	0.008	0.017	0.489	0.625	0.019

Source: Survey data.

[a]Age has been omitted from the model because it is highly negatively correlated with education. Similarly, gender has been omitted because it is a component of, and thus highly correlated with, male participation. When age is entered into the model, its beta estimate is –0.050 (standardized estimate –0.055); the probability of nonassociation of the related T-statistic is .281. When gender enters the model (scored as female equals 0, male equals 1), the beta estimate is .068 (standardized estimate .030), and the probability of nonassociation is .519. The degree of freedom for each variable is 1.
[b]Interaction term (see discussion in text).
[c]Measured according to the educational level the respondent achieved (none, some primary, primary school completed, some secondary, and so on).
[d]Measured as factory worker versus independent, service, or technical worker. Neither this nor alternative categorization of workers produced a statistically significant association.
[e]Scored as a dichotomous variable: migrants equal 1, Lima native equals 0. Note that length of residence in Lima, as well as region of origin of migrant, failed to produce significant associations.

The regression analysis underscores the importance of three variables that are positively associated with a radicalized political worldview: exposure to labor unions, certain patterns of involvement in local organizations, and education. Individuals who were exposed to unions, either by becoming union members or indirectly through a spouse who was a union member, scored higher on the radicalism variable than those with-

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nected with the rise of confrontational politics. In terms of macroindicators, Peru's economic crisis dates back to 1973. The country subsequently experienced two sharp recessions during the 1980s (in 1982–1984 and from 1988 until the time of this writing). The crisis was accompanied by sometimes precipitous declines in lower-class real incomes. For instance, by early 1989, average wages in Lima stood at 59 percent of their 1985 level. See Carmen Rosa Balbi, "La recesión silenciosa," QueHacer no. 59 (June–July 1989):12–22. Certainly, the crisis forms part of the backdrop to the rise of lower-class radicalism outlined here. One might speculate fairly that had the Peruvian economy performed better and Peru's lower classes been shielded from drastic declines in their living standards, the politics of radicalism might have attracted fewer adherents. But it is worth noting that the period when my survey data were collected coincided with the early years of the regime of Alan García (1985–1990), a time of economic recovery. The Peruvian economy grew by 9 percent in 1986, and the APRA government successfully redistributed income toward the urban popular sectors. Yet my observations and interviews encountered no perceptible decline in confrontational strategies during this all-too-brief respite.

out such exposure. Note that this effect is not a spurious stand-in for occupational differences. Occupation, which was measured in terms of categories like factory worker, service worker, or low-level white-collar employee, had no direct effect on political mentality.[27] Thus if two persons had similar occupations (and other characteristics in common) but one became involved in a union and the other did not, then the union member would be expected to be more radicalized than the non–union member.[28]

The direct relation between education and radicalism confirms the role of changes that began during the Velasco period in reshaping popular political culture in Lima. Classrooms in lower-class districts became sources of a newly critical political consciousness, the result of the Velasco curricular and pedagogical reforms as well as Marxist parties' new sway over elementary and secondary teachers after SUTEP was founded. The notion that Peru's schools have become the source of a "critical idea" or view of Peru's history and contemporary problems, which was advanced recently by Gonzalo Portocarrero and Patricia Oliart, was strongly confirmed by the present study.[29]

Male participation, the third variable significantly associated with levels of radicalism in the model, is an interaction term combining relatively high attendance at meetings with gender. A score of 1 on this dichotomous variable indicates a male who participates actively in some local organization; women and inactive men score 0. Neither being male nor taking part actively in local organizations was itself sufficient to alter views on the state, strategy, and class solidarity. Rather, both factors were required for such changes to occur.[30]

27. Occupational differences were associated with the probability of exposure to labor unions, with respondents involved in factory work being more likely to have some experience with labor unions than others. In this sense, an indirect tie exists between occupational differentiation and political mentality. But note that the impact is mediated through union exposure.

28. A more finely tuned operationalization of the historical shift laid out earlier would have distinguished not merely union exposure from nonexposure but exposure to "classist" unions versus exposure to more conservative unions and versus nonexposure. In pretesting the survey instrument, however, it became clear that this difference could not be determined easily.

29. See Portocarrero and Oliart, *El Perú desde la escuela.* The analysis presented here of the impact of education clearly does not allow distinguishing between two changes, both of which occurred under Velasco: the expansion of educational opportunities for the poor and changes in curricular content. Based on analysis of secondary sources and qualitative interviews, I believe that both aspects of the Velasco reforms made education a key element in forging a more class-conscious and confrontational lower-class political worldview.

30. The model somewhat artificially treats male participation as a factor producing ideological radicalism rather than the reverse (ideological radicalism predisposing men to greater participation). My observations in the district indicate that this inference is a generally appropriate simplification. Pobladores become involved in local associations and clubs, often for practical reasons, and these organizations in turn have a radicalizing effect on them. But it is highly probable that in some cases the causal arrow should be reversed.

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In my opinion, this finding indicates that men and women differed in the kinds of organizations they tended to join. Not all local organizations instilled a class-oriented and confrontational political mentality in their membership, as has already been shown in the previous section. The kinds of organizations that women tended to join, which included a wide variety of women's clubs and religious groups, have had a mixed impact on political consciousness. Some may have encouraged a more critical and combative political worldview, while others reinforced clientelistic strains in lower-class political culture. But the kinds of organizations that men tended to take part in, particularly neighborhood committees and political organizations, moved their members unidirectionally toward a more radicalized mentality.

To summarize, the analysis of survey data reinforces the view that clientelism and radicalism are two distinct political cultural currents that affect district residents. The radical-clientelist demarcation is not one that residents cross over in the course of their lifetime (age was found to be unassociated with worldviews). Neither does this difference reflect enduring socioeconomic hierarchies that are common even within lower-class districts or differences between migrants and their offspring. Nor do distinct patterns of consciousness reflect the raw, unmediated effect of occupational differences. It was exposure to labor unions, rather than differences in occupation, that had a significant impact on political worldviews. Unions, schools and universities, and certain shantytown neighborhood organizations were the places where the radical consciousness was formed.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN PERUVIAN POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE

The need to adjust the picture developed in the 1960s and 1970s of Latin America's urban poor as politically quiescent and clientelistic was noted at the outset. It is now clear that such a description no longer fits at least a subset of Lima's shantytown residents. What, then, is the broader comparative regional significance of the erosion of clientelism and the emergence of more militant and class-conscious social movements in Peru?

The relative unimportance of economics in explaining the rise of a militant popular movement in urban Peru has important broader implications. In a recent study, John Walton has argued convincingly that the rise of protest movements throughout South and Central America and the Caribbean in the 1980s was linked to debt-induced economic crises and the austerity measures employed to meet them.[31] The evidence presented

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31. John Walton, "Debt, Protest, and the State in Latin America," in Eckstein, *Power and Popular Protest*, 299–328.

in this study does not directly contradict the view that economic crisis lies at the root of new protest movements in Peru and elsewhere. Although I have shown that economic and occupational differences at a given point in time had little relevance in explaining who among the Peruvian urban poor would take part in militant forms of social protest and who would not, my data do not speak directly to the issue of decline in socioeconomic status over the past decade. Still, this study does focus attention on a set of political and social factors that may mediate between economic crisis and popular response: the actions and strategies of the state and the reactions they provoke among the lower classes, a heightened potential for broad popular protest coming out of a strengthened and more militant labor movement, and new counter-hegemonic influences of powerful institutions such as the Catholic Church and the public schools.

This study also offers theoretical and comparative implications for understanding the relationship between distinct subgroups within the urban popular sectors, as defined by their productive role, and lower-class political action. Studies of the informal sector and its links to the urban proletariat in recent years have greatly enhanced our understanding of the internal heterogeneity of the urban popular sectors.[32] But this study counsels against interpreting distinct patterns of lower-class political action as a direct consequence of internal class or productive differences within the popular sectors. No simple categorizing of the urban poor into the relatively richer or poorer or into proletarians versus informal-sector workers, petty commodity producers, or lumpenproletariat advances our understanding of the variations in outlook on political strategy, the state, or social class among the heterogeneous urban lower class. Generally speaking, the Peruvian experience suggests that the loci of political socialization other than the workplace—schools and shantytown organizations—can play a more important role in molding and even transforming political consciousness than the directly work-related experience of the urban poor.

The exception to this generalization is the finding that labor unions have marked workers' political consciousness. It comes as no surprise that unions produce more class-conscious and politically assertive agents, although it is worth noting again that unions and not the unmediated experience of factory work have had this effect in the Peruvian case. But what runs against the grain of much scholarship is the impact of union activism on the broader universe of the lower classes beyond the factory. The scholarly division of labor between students of the labor movement and students of the shantytowns has tended to separate the two settings

32. See Alejandro Portes, "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Last Decades," *LARR* 20, no. 3 (1985):7–39; and *Casual Work and Poverty in Third World Cities,* edited by R. J. Bromley and Chris Gerry (New York: John Wiley, 1979).

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artificially, despite their obvious links in the lives of those who work in the factories and live in the shantytowns.

In Peru, an erosion of clientelism and the emergence of a more class-based (or popular-sector-based) social movement in the shantytowns did not occur until after a reorientation of the labor movement and the rise of "clasista" unions. The capacity of this new approach to labor organizing for spilling over into the broader constellation of organizations of the urban poor, in a country where the organized working class is small in relation to the disorganized and nonproletarian poor of the cities, endowed this shift with much broader political significance.

Finally, the Peruvian case focuses scholarly attention on the urban context, rather than on migratory experiences, in explaining the political character of the urban poor. This is not to say that a childhood in a rural setting or the impact of migration and perhaps an ongoing link with the *campo* does not leave lasting marks on those who experience one or the other. Nor does this view belittle the impact of migrants in transforming the cities. Certainly the Andean cultural presence in lower-class Lima is palpable. But the finding does suggest that, especially in periods of dramatic changes in the political socialization patterns of urban-dwellers (as in Peru in the 1970s and 1980s), experiences linked to the new urban setting can eventually outweigh those of a rural or migratory background. The differences between union members and nonmembers, between high school graduates and those with only a year or two of elementary education, or between participants in certain kinds of neighborhood associations and clubs and the uninvolved—all of these may come to outweigh the differences in political consciousness between provincial migrants and natives of the city.

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