

Editorial Foreword

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEVELOPMENT. If self-awareness is a measure of progress, then the social sciences have gained a lot of ground in the last generation. Different experiences, new theories, and refined methodologies have undermined a good many confident assumptions and broken the hold once held by concepts of modernization and functionalism. It is not so clear, however, just what transformation has taken place. Revolutions are said to consume their children, but academics have always feasted off their fathers. Are the new approaches really so fundamentally new, their results so very different? Could current views be as closely tied to American disillusionment as earlier ones were to American dominance? Starting from philosophical concern with ideas about stateness, pragmatism, pluralism, and normal science, Leonard Binder reviews the intellectual process that has led to current concepts of development (a process reflected in every volume of *CSSH* and particularly in the essays by Shils, in 2:3; Bendix, 9:3; Tipps, 15:2; Wallerstein, 16:4, and Skocpol, 18:2). In the course of that review he notes the ideological implications and the echoes of international politics built into various theories of functionalism, modernization, and development. This then leads to a fresh view of current approaches that concludes with a surprising reassessment of the future of liberalism.

The discussion of development thus naturally moves back toward the sociology of knowledge and forward toward the analysis of specific cases, and each of these possibilities is explored in the other essays in this section. George A. Huaco treats functionalism as both a particular and a general sociological theory, a theory that in all its aspects has been subjected to devastating epistemological criticism. If the criticism is correct, there is something to be explained, a problem for the intellectual history of sociology or the sociology of knowledge (see Bonnel, 22:2, and Pletsch, 23:4): How could a system so weak have achieved such dominance? Huaco's answer is as disturbing as the problem, for it points not only to functionalism's Panglossian ideology but to the startling possibility that most sociologists simply adopted the vocabulary in fashion without attending to the implications of the theory from which it sprang. The example of Latin America has had, as Binder notes, a special importance for theories of development. And in analyzing the recent politics of Argentina, Chile, and Greece, Nicos Mouzelis makes use of both the older and the more recent frameworks for understanding political development. His first task is to establish the similarities in the phenomena before him, the turn to dictatorship in three established polities (note Hansen and Wolf, 9:2, and Rokkan, 10:2). The common elements found by comparing these three cases are also compared to other examples (Mouzelis mentions the Balkans, Mexico, and Brazil; on clientelism, see also

Eisenstadt and Roniger, 22:1, and Kaufman, 16:3), and then they are placed within larger patterns of development (compare Williams, 11:3; Modelski and also D. Smith in 20:2). In meeting the task at hand he is thus able to combine categories of Western parliamentarianism, modernization, and sequences with those of peripheries, centers, and a world-capitalist system; he can note the importance of social structure while assuming the autonomy of politics. To explain how such pragmatic eclecticism is possible is to take a stand on the issues of theory raised in these papers. The ease with which quite diverse approaches can be combined helps to explain why the subject of development has been so central to a whole generation of social science, more pervasive in those disciplines than any single theme has been in the natural sciences or modern literature.

THE ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ELITES. Political stability clearly requires that those who run the state feel sufficient commitment to some ideal, or satisfaction with their lot, or fear of change to be willing to do their jobs. Usually they do, and therefore are, and the more common problem is for states to be directed by administrative elites whose actions, though calculated to preserve order, in fact undermine it. No one doubts the importance of such officials, and of their dissatisfactions, in times of revolution (see Armstrong on bureaucracies, 14:1; Hermassi on revolution, 18:2; and Wilson on the Meiji, 25:3); the problem has been how to tell when and why they are discontent. Here Carter Vaughn Findley puts forth a suggestion that is easy to understand but difficult to carry out. He argues that long-term developments in Ottoman Turkey and the general economic crisis of the early twentieth century (he notes the example of Mexico, compare Tardanico, 24:3) made Ottoman officials particularly sensitive to their standard of living, and he finds a way to estimate whether it was rising or falling. On the basis of that research he argues that economic explanations should be added to political and intellectual ones in accounting for the role of the bureaucratic intelligentsia in the Turkish revolution. The importance of provincial and bureaucratic elites in statemaking rather than statebreaking is the concern of the books Robert Wuthnow reviews (on this see Markoff, 17:4; Cavalho 24:3; Kraus and Vanneman and also Heper in 27:1); but he, too, emphasizes the economic basis on which an elite depends. Assessments even of contemporary European leaders, Charles Tilly insists, should go beyond questions of tactics, and he is critical of the analysis provided by a group of authors whose efforts were sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, whose committees received attention from Binder, too. Influential elites do not have to be in politics.

CSSH DISCUSSION. This constructive exchange about German academics (see O'Boyle, 25:1) engages some critical issues about how to connect the history of ideas to the society in which they flourished.