

Music and Austrofascism: Radio, Pan-Germanism and the Reinvention of the Wiener Symphoniker

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Abstract ‘Austrofascist’ has again become an accepted term to describe the Austrian regime from 1933 to 1938. This article contributes to this re-emergence using the example of the Wiener Symphoniker, and by seeking long-term ‘fascistization’ processes surrounding the orchestra rather than blunt comparisons against developments in neighbouring regimes. The account hinges on the Austrian radio service (RAVAG), through which, during the economic crises of the 1920s, the state exerted alignment pressure on many cultural institutions. As Chancellor Dollfuss declared the ‘depoliticization’ of Austria (the banning of political parties) in 1933, RAVAG used its leverage to break the orchestra’s union alliances and dictate personnel selection according to politics. On this foundation, new radio series like *Stunde österreichischer Komponisten der Gegenwart* (‘Austrian Composers of the Present’) extolled ‘pan-Germanism’: a nationalist ideology that proclaimed the European supremacy of German Austrians and attempted to forge an Austrofascist community – even as it simultaneously created exploitable overlap with National Socialism.

‘Austrofascism’, as an editorial of 2013 put it, ‘is back.’¹ This is not – though it could perhaps be – a reflection on the twenty-first-century Austrian political landscape.² Rather, it is an acknowledgement that ‘Austrofascism’ (or, in German, *Austrofascismus*) has once again become a widely accepted term amongst scholars to describe the period in Austrian history from 1933 to 1938. Originating in the 1930s as a favoured term of analysis amongst Marxist intellectuals, ‘Austrofascism’ gradually lost ground in the second half of the twentieth century.³ Scholars working in German and in English

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¹ Florian Wenninger and Lucile Dreidemy, *Das Dollfuss/Schuschnigg-Regime 1933–1938: Vermessung eines Forschungsfeldes* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013), 7.

² I refer, as an obvious example, to the electoral success of the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in recent decades, a party often accused of having ‘fascist’ links. See Michał Krzyżanowski, ‘From Anti-Immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to Islamophobia: Continuities and Shifts in Recent Discourses and Patterns of Political Communication of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)’, *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*, ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 135–48.

³ See, for instance, the work of the prominent Viennese socialist Otto Bauer (1881–1938), in particular his essay ‘Der Austrofascismus nach der Naziputsch’, *Der Kampf*, 1 (1934), 129–31.

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had largely turned away from the term, either to save Austria from the inglorious fate of fascist statehood, or because direct comparisons with the neighbouring German and Italian regimes made 1930s Austria seem a pale imitation for which other labels – ‘conservative’, ‘reactionary’, ‘authoritarian’, ‘semifascist’, ‘para-fascist’ – appeared more fitting.⁴

Yet in recent decades a broad swathe of historians – writing in German and in English, and no longer taking up Marxist critical cues alone – has readopted Austro-fascism as a legitimate historical category.⁵ In so doing, they have widened its purview beyond the crucial period from 1933 to 1938, at the beginning of which the Christian Social chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss dissolved the national parliament, and at the end of which Hitler’s troops marched into sovereign Austrian territory in order to initiate the so-called *Anschluss* (‘annexation’). This same approach has typically had the effect of reframing Austrian fascism as a process rather than as an ideological doctrine: that is, its advocates trace ‘fascistization’ processes according to which the conservative Austrian establishment of the early 1930s forged alliances with indigenous fascist groups, explicitly so that they might stabilize the state against the threats allegedly posed by socialist disruption and democratic paralysis, and in order to extend their own leadership stock and populist reach.⁶ Simultaneously, the establishment participated in the transnational circulation of what have been called fascist ‘commodities’: they drew, in short, on the key regimes of Mussolini and Hitler as models for governance, as pools of what were seen as novel ideas and practices.⁷ Such novelties were not simply slavishly imitated, however, at the behest of some common fascist ideology; rather, they were implemented in economic, social and cultural circumstances specific to Austria,

⁴ For examples of these labels and debates surrounding them, see Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘Fascism, Right and Left’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (1966), 183–97; also John Rath and Carolyn W. Schum, ‘The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?’, *Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 249–57; and Bruce Pauley, ‘Fascism and the Führerprinzip: The Austrian Example’, *Central European History*, 12 (1979), 272–96. ‘Para-fascist’ is Roger Griffin’s term: see *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1993), 120–4; and on Austria, 124–6.

⁵ See, for example, Emmerich Tálos, *Das austrofaschistische Österreich, 1933–1938* (Vienna: LIT, 2017), and *Austrofaschismus: Politik – Ökonomie – Kultur, 1933–1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer, 5th edn (Vienna: LIT, 2005). Also Julie Thorpe, ‘Austrofascism: Revisiting the “Authoritarian” State 40 Years On’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 45 (2010), 315–43, and Tim Kirk, ‘Fascism and Austrofascism’, *The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003), 10–31. ‘Austrofascism’ has also long held currency in summary histories where there is little space for fine-grained circumlocution. I note, for example, its prominent presence as chapter heading in Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815–1986* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 192–244.

⁶ The term ‘fascistization’ is taken from Aristotle Kallis, ‘“Fascism”, “Para-fascism” and Fascistization: On the Similarities of Three Conceptual Categories’, *European History Quarterly*, 33 (2003), 219–49.

⁷ See the list of ‘commodities’ in Kallis, ‘“Fascism”’, 230. On Mussolini’s fascism as ‘export product’, see also Kallis, *Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922–1945* (London: Routledge, 2000), 139–44.

and so necessarily took on their own national trajectories, were interwoven with Austrian trends and had effects on everyday Austrian life and its experiences.

To cite only one example of such scholarship, Julie Thorpe has shown how Dollfuss, soon after bringing a halt to parliamentary proceedings in March 1933, introduced emergency decrees to limit the country's press through censorship, issued bans on opposition newspapers and created a press chamber that a few years later would integrate with a new propaganda ministry.⁸ These developments were clearly inspired by Mussolini's Public Security Laws of 1926, on the one hand, and media regulation in Goebbels's Germany, on the other. Yet at the same time, the Austrians were hardly novices in the field of state censorship; they also had their own long history on which to draw. Thorpe demonstrates, for example, how Dollfuss's Austrofascist press censorship mechanisms were modelled on specifically Austrian precursors of up to a century before, including those of Metternich in the *Vormärz*, emergency decrees made during the First World War and proscription on criticism of the government introduced in the late 1920s.⁹ Moreover, Thorpe shows how in 1934, numerous popular newspaper editorships were handed over to prominent members of the paramilitary *Heimwehr* ('Home Guard'), one of Austria's home-grown fascist movements, closely intertwined with Dollfuss's Christian Socials and their grip on power. This move was a means of bolstering support for Austrian independence *against* provincial German nationalism; it was intended to oppose the growing might of fascist Germany, not flatter it through imitation.¹⁰

At the heart of the present article is another example from public life, one closely related to the print media and yet much less studied, namely the Austrian public radio service.¹¹ Austrian radio has often been said to have turned fascist in May 1933, when, amidst a raft of similar promotions to executive positions, Dollfuss appointed Richard Steidle as the service's vice-president.¹² Steidle, leader of the Christian Socials in the Tyrol and founder of its regional *Heimwehr* group, had recently taken on the new role of Austrian propaganda commissioner.¹³ His appointment cued the introduction in weekly radio schedules of a so-called *Stunde der Heimat* ('Homeland Hour'), a *Zeitfunk* ('Contemporary Radio') slot that featured lectures from 'personalities in public life and

⁸ Julie Thorpe, *Pan-Germanism and the Austrofascist State, 1933–38* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 45–81.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 54–7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 55–6. On the *Heimwehr* as the 'paramilitary wing' of the Christian Socials, see Jill Lewis, 'Conservatives and Fascists in Austria, 1918–1934', *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London: Routledge, 1990), 106–9 (p. 108).

¹¹ With the obvious exception of Viktor Ergert's official three-volume history of Austrian radio, discussed in this article, the typical approach to the subject has been that of Wolfgang Duchkowitz: two or so pages within a larger discussion of Austrofascist culture. See Duchkowitz, 'Umgang mit "Schädlingen" und "schädlichen Auswüchsen". Zur Auslöschung der freien Medienstruktur im "Ständestaat"', *Austrofascismus: Politik – Ökonomie – Kultur*, 366–8.

¹² See 'Eine Umbildung der Regierung', *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 11 May 1933, 1, and 'Vom Tage', *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 13 May 1933, 2.

¹³ See Viktor Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk in Österreich*, 3 vols. (Salzburg: Residenz, 1974), i: 1924–1945, 134–41; also Thorpe, 'Austrofascism', 325.

Austrian statesmen', and series dedicated to historical 'fatherland commemoration', Catholic spiritual themes and (as we shall later see) Austrian composers of the present.¹⁴ The contemporary statements of Dollfuss and his successor Kurt Schuschnigg, meanwhile, laconically frame the importance of radio in ways that recollect Goebbels and his German propaganda ideologues of the same years. Radio must wholly serve the ends of propaganda, declared Dollfuss in March 1933, in 'awakening understanding for government actions and encouraging the public approval of its activities'.¹⁵ Even so, as I shall argue, all these changes were in fact part of a far longer process that had gradually reinforced Christian Social dominance over Austrian radio, tying it inextricably into the cultural economy and mobilizing it as a polarizing tool in political and cultural terms. In this sense, from its inception in late 1924, radio was a long-term means both to construct the platform on which Austrofascism would eventually stand and to draw together an apparent public consensus for what would emerge as Austrofascist aims. Through a pervasive policy of alleged broadcast 'neutrality', it was also a central technology in marginalizing the voices of Austrofascism's opponents.

In this article, I begin from this example of radio, which I want to treat specifically as one key instance of a national *musical* institution. This treatment, in my view, is fully justified: music occupied the majority of Austrian airtime across the 1920s and early 1930s, and so it became one of the chief means through which a rapidly increasing number of Austrian households encountered musical performances of varied styles and genres. Simultaneously, as theatres and orchestras struggled in the aftermath of the First World War, radio stepped in as a principal employer of stage and orchestral musicians, and offered a fillip to those writing music criticism for the print media.

To take a specifically musical perspective on radio, moreover, is deliberately to promote focus on the wider territory of other Austrian musical institutions of the period, and on radio's interaction with them. Unlike its counterparts in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, musical life under Austrofascism has rarely been addressed by scholars, and has been typically overlooked in favour of literature, film and theatre.¹⁶ This lack of attention should not be taken to suggest music's marginality as a cultural form for Austrofascism. On the contrary, music's often-stated centrality to Austrian history gave it pride of place in what Dollfuss, in his speech at the

¹⁴ See Erich Kunsti, 'Heimat im Rundfunk', *Radio Wien*, 9/31 (1933), 1; also 'Neues von Radio Wien', *Radio Wien*, 9/32 (1933), 1, and 'Neues vom Radiobeirat', *Radio Wien*, 9/33 (1933), 1. The new spiritual series is discussed by Siegmund Guggenberger, 'Geistliche Stunde', *Radio Wien*, 9/40 (1933), 1.

¹⁵ As quoted in Emmerich Tálos, *Das austrofascistische Herrschaftssystem: Österreich, 1933–1938* (Vienna: LIT, 2013), 420–1. On Schuschnigg's comparable comments, and those of RAVAG director Oskar Czejka, see Duchkowitsch, 'Umgang', 367.

¹⁶ Note, for example, the absence of music-specific contributions – and the inclusion of those focused on other cultural fields – in the collected volumes on Austrofascism and Austrofascist culture already cited: *Austrofascismus: Politik – Ökonomie – Kultur* and *Das Dollfuss/Schuschnigg-Regime 1933–1938*. In English-language scholarship, see also *The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003).

Trabrennplatz in September 1933, identified as the native ‘Christian-German culture’ that the new corporative Austria must swear to protect.¹⁷ Schuschnigg was no less committed.¹⁸ Music’s general absence from the scholarly discourse on Austrofascist culture may instead reflect the scarcity in public archives of some contemporary sources or, perhaps, a historiographical judgement on the part of scholars. Under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, Austria never created a state music chamber to rival, for example, the contemporary German *Reichsmusikkammer*, and so – leaving to one side the complex question of how effective such a music chamber could actually be – scholars have often assumed that Austrian musical institutions were ultimately left autonomous by the regime, provided that they made (in the broader culture-sphere summary of Alfred Pfoser and Gerhard Renner) appropriate ‘conservative-reactionary concessions’ to the new regime.¹⁹

This assumption fits quite well in some cases, such as that of the Wiener Philharmoniker, for example, as the work of Fritz Trümpi has shown.²⁰ In other cases, however, it is clearly inadequate. In response, I turn here from radio to the distinct example of the Wiener Symphoniker. The Symphoniker is often treated as the ‘second’ Viennese orchestra after the Philharmoniker, as a less-exalted, lower-brow cousin, but it is this very identity that, I shall argue, made it a far more compelling site for Austrofascist intervention in musical life, largely undertaken through the orchestra’s existing relationship with radio. Indeed, the very name ‘Wiener Symphoniker’ was imposed from above in June 1933 as part of negotiations with radio representatives that saw the orchestra, then known as the Wiener Sinfonie-Orchester, become a house ensemble for the broadcaster. This was part of a suite of state-led changes to the orchestra’s structure that attempted to turn it into a unique ensemble to rival those both within and outside Austria – ‘the only true concert orchestra in Vienna and Austria’, as its principal conductor, Oswald Kabasta, once called it.²¹

Again, this is not to imply that the reinvention of the Symphoniker in 1933 was a straightforward imitation of developments in Austria’s fascist neighbours (such as the prominent regional concert orchestras that sprang up in 1930s Germany). On the contrary, as we shall see in the final part of the present article, both the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes made use of the newly formed Symphoniker as a flagship to

¹⁷ Quotation from Engelbert Dollfuss, ‘Wir wollen das neue Österreich’, in *Dollfuss an Österreich: Eines Mannes Wort und Ziel*, ed. Edmund Weber (Vienna: Reinhold, 1935), 37.

¹⁸ See, for example, Schuschnigg’s account of the Salzburg Festival as a proud Austrian musical institution that provided a bulwark against German Nazi incursion, in Schuschnigg, *Ein Requiem in Rot-Weiss-Rot* (Vienna: Amalthea, 1978), 205–7.

¹⁹ Alfred Pfoser and Gerhard Renner, “Ein Toter führt uns an!”: Anmerkungen zur kulturellen Situation im Austrofascismus’, *Austrofascismus: Politik – Ökonomie – Kultur*, 338.

²⁰ As Trümpi shows, the Wiener Philharmoniker was spared interference in its structure and its programming on the basis of its members’ political concessions, spearheaded by the Austrofascist enthusiasm of its chairman and principal bassoonist, Hugo Burghauser. See Fritz Trümpi, *The Political Orchestra: The Vienna and Berlin Philharmonics during the Third Reich*, trans. Kenneth Kronenberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 82–92.

²¹ Oswald Kabasta, ‘Das achte Sendejahre beginnt... Neuerungen im musikalischen Programm’, *Radio Wien*, 8/1 (1931), 2.

'fascistize' their cultural environment along lines specific to Austria. This argument hinges on a view of radio and orchestra as key agents in the dissemination of Austrian 'pan-Germanism': a nationalist ideology that proclaimed the supremacy of German Austrians over others in central Europe and envisaged union with neighbouring German lands, often working directly against the terms proposed by Hitler and Austrian Nazis. In turn, pan-Germanism allows us to derive a working definition of Austrofascism that interacts well with practices and concerns central to the radio service and its orchestra: Austrofascism was the drive in Austria from 1933 onwards to form a community of citizens answering to this pan-German identity.²²

Ultimately, I intend my argument here to bring into focus a further point still. In English parlance, at least, many scholars and other interest groups routinely use the compound 'Austro-German' as something of a convenient music-cultural commonplace, casually assuming as they do so the place of Austrian musicians in an all-embracing German canon (and, indeed, vice versa). As, for example, the work of Celia Applegate has suggested, we might therefore be far more alive to the compound term and the inconspicuous work that it does – we might become both historically and ideologically attuned to its emergence in centuries past, and critically aware of its 'unmarked' status in many current discourses. This study of Austrian pan-Germanism in music is a contribution to such awareness, in that it traces the development of Austrian-German constructions specifically from the perspective of Austrian history of the 1920s and 1930s.²³ As I shall claim, both radio and Wiener Symphoniker, as tightly intertwined musical institutions, played a role in establishing and reinforcing Austrian national identity in this period. Yet in so doing, also they helped to lay the common cultural ground that, in March 1938, would ultimately smooth the passage of Hitler's troops into Austrian territory.

From that point of view, this article is also an extension of Karl Christian Führer's scrutiny of one of the 'self-evident truths' of radio broadcasting, namely that its inception in the early twentieth century 'fostered a new homogeneous and commercialized "mass culture" or "popular culture" that leveled cultural distinctions and blurred class lines'.²⁴ Undoubtedly such a fostering was part of the imaginary of the Austrofascist project, an envisaged trajectory towards a *Ständestaat* (literally 'state of

²² These definitions are drawn from Thorpe, 'Austrofascism', 318–28, and are elaborated in this article.

²³ See Celia Applegate, *The Necessity of Music: Variations on a German Theme* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 183–210, and her *Bach in Berlin: Nation and Culture in Mendelssohn's Revival of the St. Matthew Passion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 81–5; also Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, *Music and German National Identity* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 18–19. Karen Painter, in *Symphonic Aspirations: German Music and Politics, 1900–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 125–205, details comparable 'Austro-German' trajectories in the symphonic reception of the early twentieth century. For a perspective from German historical studies which problematizes concepts of German 'nation-state' and Austrian 'diaspora' in the early twentieth century, see Pieter Judson, 'When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?', *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness*, ed. Krista O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal and Nancy Reagin (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 219–47.

²⁴ Karl Christian Führer, 'A Medium of Modernity? Broadcasting in Weimar Germany, 1923–1932', *Journal of Modern History*, 69 (1997), 722–53 (p. 723).

estates'; 'corporative state') in which relationships between employees and employers, individual and state, would be nationalistically harmonized and there would be no need for political parties or their disruptive dissent. Yet if that is so, it should be recognized as an acutely politicized attempt at the creation of a German-centred national mass culture that, whatever its intended Austrian blueprint and sporadic resistance to Hitler's aggression, implicitly built bridges to Nazi Germany as well. In still-current expressions like 'Austro-German', we hear, amplify and broadcast the echoes of this attempt even today.

Radio music and 'neutrality'

This is an account that begins with the Austrian radio service, Österreichische Radio-Verkehrs-Aktiengesellschaft, typically abbreviated with the acronym RAVAG.²⁵ Under the Christian Social Chancellor Ignaz Seipel, RAVAG had been granted its franchise in February 1924, with a monopoly over broadcasting within Austrian borders for the next 28 years.²⁶ As elsewhere in early European public radio, the creation of the service was closely managed by the state.²⁷ Its major shareholders were two federal government departments (business and the post and telegraph service), two banks (the Steirerbank and the Österreichische Credit-Institut, the latter largely government-funded) and the Gemeinde Wien (the municipality of Vienna, from which broadcasts would originate). The Austrian radio industry, charged with the potentially lucrative production of equipment for domestic reception, took a minor stake in the company²⁸ – yet there were strict limits placed on the lining of private pockets: any profits in excess of 8% would have to be handed straight over to the state by law.²⁹

This strong state presence led directly from ownership of the rudimentary technical infrastructure for a large-scale radio service: a national telegraphy network was already in place in Austria, and on 1 October 1924, the first broadcasts would take place from the Ministry of Defence on the Stubenring in Vienna, on account of its existing military mast equipment. But as RAVAG's founder and first general director Oskar

²⁵ Note that contemporary Austrian sources usually style the radio service as 'die Ravag'; here, for clarity, I have followed the more recent tendency to present it as an upper-case acronym.

²⁶ Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 36.

²⁷ On the directly comparable beginnings of German public radio, for example, see Führer, 'A Medium of Modernity?', 724–7, and the summary in Kate Lacey, *Feminine Frequencies: Gender, German Radio, and the Public Sphere* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 25–35. The transition of the BBC from private company to public corporation is treated in James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting, and New Media in Britain*, 7th edn (New York: Routledge, 2009), 103–10. Links between early Italian radio and Mussolini's fascist state are considered by David Forgacs and Stephen Gundle, *Mass Culture and Italian Society: From Fascism to the Cold War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 168–75.

²⁸ See the table in Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 45. These share proportions are confirmed by 'Der Rundspruch in Sicht', *Reichspost*, 14 June 1924, 7.

²⁹ See 'Wie kann man die Programme des Wiener Senders verbessern?', *Die Stunde*, 14 December 1924, 8. Führer, 'A Medium of Modernity?', 726, remarks that there were similar profit restrictions in early German radio, at a threshold of 10%.

Czeija also confirmed, the monopoly model was intended to quell fears of fracture into private interests, not least those of investors – domestic and foreign – inspired by the new public technology of radio, and the divisive politics these might bring with them. As in Germany, moreover, early legislation would outlaw amateur experimentation in building radio equipment and in sending and receiving broadcasts outside the dominant network.³⁰ From its beginnings, then, Austrian radio was constructed and safeguarded as a concern of the state. Implicitly, this would free the service from the acutely competitive, perhaps even scurrilous interests that had driven print media proliferation, and would instead focus its brief, as Czeija put it enigmatically, on the carrying out of specifically Austrian ‘cultural tasks’.³¹

In turn, however, bearing in mind the huge propaganda potential of the new medium, this monopoly model raised fears of exploitation by the government of the day. Accordingly, assurances of political ‘neutrality’ (*Neutralität*) were woven into RAVAG’s structure, policy and rhetoric from even before broadcasting began. Political position-taking in radio programming was forbidden, for example, and news broadcasts were to be prepared by an external body.³² The composition of the company’s management boards was also mandated by its charter to be politically ‘proportionate’, that is, to give equal representation to the three foremost Austrian political camps: Catholic-conservative, socialist and German-national.³³ Most importantly, a *Beirat* (‘advisory council’) was founded alongside the other boards, the twenty-four members of which included nine representatives from the various Austrian radio ‘clubs’ – organizations populated by members of the general public (usually styled *Amateure* in the press) and, again, holding loose affiliation with the main political confessions. RAVAG’s *Beirat* was thus, as one press commentator put it, conceived as a kind of ‘Radio Parliament’, steering the service’s most prominent public-facing issues – primarily, domestic subscription fees and programming – according to perceived need and taste as defined through its debates.³⁴

Against this background, it is not hard to see why Viktor Ergert, in his 1970s official history of the Austrian radio service, places ‘neutrality’ as its core guiding concept during the 1920s, and as one of its principal claims to universal value and adoration amongst the Austrian listeners of its founding decade.³⁵ Yet it is no less vital to realize

³⁰ Paul Bellak, ‘Rettet das Radio!’, *Der Tag*, 9 February 1924, 6, describes this legislation and takes a stand against it in the name of technological progress.

³¹ See the quotations from Czeija in Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 33. Thus Czeija might be directly compared to Hans Bredow, the German *Reichs-Rundfunk-Kommissar* and ‘father’ of German broadcasting; see Führer, ‘A Medium of Modernity?’, 728.

³² Namely the Amtliche Nachrichtenstelle (‘Official News Bureau’) on the Börseplatz in Vienna, a state press agency founded in 1922 and operative until 1938. See Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 46, 73.

³³ See ‘Mehr Sachlichkeit in Radio!’, *Der Tag*, 14 December 1924, 5, which satirizes the deadlock effects of this political proportionality. Also Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 13, 45–6, and for comparable legislation passed in Germany in 1926, see Lacey, *Feminine Frequencies*, 34.

³⁴ On the composition of the *Beirat*, see ‘Der neue Sender und der Radiobeirat’, *Die Stunde*, 24 August 1924, 6. The phrase ‘Radio Parliament’ is coined in ‘Die österreichischen Amateursender’, *Der Tag*, 31 July 1925, 9.

³⁵ See Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, for example, vol. i, 45–6.

that, from the very beginnings of RAVAG, this ‘neutral’ stance was not simply accepted uncritically by all commentators, but rather brought into question on an almost daily basis. Consequently, what ‘neutrality’ really meant – and what, indeed, it might conceal – formed a central part of the discourse of early Austrian radio, informing much of the debate within its administrative and advisory bodies and dogging RAVAG’s every move in its endless press coverage. ‘Politics may indeed be excluded,’ as one critic trenchantly put it in a front-page column just after the service began, ‘yet as a result it sweats out of the broadcaster’s every pore.’³⁶

Early claims of radio manipulation sometimes stemmed from the political centre and right wing. When, in December 1924, the largely social-democratic Gemeinde Wien moved to levy a public entertainment tax (*Lustbarkeitssteuer*) on RAVAG to cover radio broadcasts received in public venues, it was accused of issuing an ultimatum to the service: that it either align its programming with Viennese socialist themes, or be forced to pay for its freedom.³⁷ The advisory *Beirat*, meanwhile, having apparently been created as a result of social-democratic pressure, was dismissed as little more than a socialist lobby group.³⁸ In November 1925, the right-wing satirical magazine *Kikeriki!* joked that a broadcast of Wagner’s *Lohengrin* planned for Republic Day had been rejected by the ‘social-democratic Beirat’ as too monarchic, and would be replaced by its ‘red’ version – in which the knightly champion of ‘Elsa von Ravag’ was immediately sent packing to his Grail mountain, as in the following excerpted verse:

So ist’s, nicht dulden werd’ ich diesen.
Der Lohengrin wird ausgewiesen!
Der sich als Monarchist entpuppt,
Nach Monsalvat wird abgeschubt!

(Loosely: ‘That’s it: I won’t suffer him any more/This Lohengrin is out the door!/He who as a monarchist displays/To Monsalvat will be shoved away!’)

These lines are given to Michael Hainisch, the first president of the Austrian Republic; though declaredly ‘independent’, he is here mocked for his inclination to the left and the alleged whims of the *Beirat* in curating an appropriately Republican cultural heritage.³⁹

³⁶ ‘Ravag’, *Der Tag*, 31 December 1924, 1.

³⁷ There are endless contemporary accounts of this affair from across the political spectrum. See, for example, the article ‘Was sie wollen’ in the staunchly Christian Social *Reichspost*, 31 December 1924, 1–2, and the rejoinder (‘Die Lustbarkeitsabgabe vom Radio’) in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 31 December 1924, 7. See also ‘Ravag’, *Der Tag*, 31 December 1924, 1, and – for concerns that this tax would be passed on to radio subscribers – ‘Kommunale Steuerpläne bezüglich der Radioabonnenten’ in the liberal *Neue Freie Presse*, 30 December 1924, 20–1. Several reports indicate that the affair was still not resolved by mid-1925: see, for example, ‘Der Kampf um die Radiosteuer’, *Die Stunde*, 14 May 1925, 6. ‘Die “Ravag” muss Lustbarkeitssteuer zahlen!’, *Reichspost*, 16 March 1926, 7, reports that RAVAG had ultimately agreed to pay 6% of its Viennese revenue as *Lustbarkeitssteuer*.

³⁸ The circumstances of the creation of the *Beirat* are recounted in ‘Die Radiogesellschaft und ihre Aufgaben’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 6 January 1925, 6. The same newspaper (3 July 1924, 9) had previously reported the radio authorities’ initial rejection of an advisory body.

³⁹ *Kikeriki!*, 15 November 1925, 2.

Increasingly, however, accusations of politics emanated from leftist critics, who remained deeply suspicious of the radio service on account of the limited involvement of socialists in its founding, and in particular the close relationships between RAVAG, its big bank backers and Austria's succession of Christian Social governments throughout the 1920s.⁴⁰ For these commentators, Austrian radio was little more than a bourgeois concern tightly bound to the capitalist interests of its originating bodies and to narrow, reactionary class interests, and ultimately uncommitted to using radio's potential for improving the prospects of the country's poorest working audiences. This was all the more troubling as most radio subscribers lived in and around largely 'red' Vienna, particularly in the early days when only Viennese broadcasting masts existed and signal was weak in other regions; the service, in other words, was not seen to represent fairly the subscribers who helped to fund its ongoing operations.⁴¹ Additionally, there were early, rather sinister reports that new radio legislation would severely curtail civil liberties, allowing police to enter private homes in order to confiscate illicit receiving equipment and arrest those who failed to respond to summons. These were powers not yet extended to, for example, the rail administration: treatment of *Schwarzhörner* ('subscription dodgers') would be far worse than that of *Schwarzfahrer* ('fare dodgers') on trains.⁴²

It is perhaps not surprising to find that RAVAG's extensive music programme became strongly marked as a target for such political critique of 'neutrality'. Music, after all, formed a large proportion of early Austrian radio's airtime, filling approximately six of its ten daily broadcast hours.⁴³ Indeed, official schedules for 1924–5 printed in *Radio Wien*, RAVAG's house magazine, demonstrate that each broadcast day was structured around three two-hour music slots loosely modelled on bourgeois concert life and typically spanning entertainment and art-music genres: a matinee (11am–1pm), an afternoon concert (*Teekonzert*, 4–6pm) and an evening concert (8–9pm). These structural slots were interspersed with brief news, weather and stock exchange reports, as well as occasional lectures, poetry and play readings, and (non-political) special interest programmes.⁴⁴ Some left-leaning commentators homed in on the lightness of this music programming, its pandering to the safest of Christian Social bourgeois tastes as well as the most ephemeral of dance-floor trends, and thus its utter lack of suitability for the serious socialist goal of *Volksbildung* ('mass education', or

⁴⁰ As Hans Heinz Fabris has pointed out, such suspicions would linger even into the Second Republic after 1945: see Fabris, 'Österreichische Rundfunkgeschichte: 50 Jahre Rundfunk im Spiegel österreichische Zeitgeschichte', *Zeitgeschichte*, 3 (1975), 276–84 (p. 277).

⁴¹ See 'Tagung der Arbeiterradiohörer', *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 25 March 1929, 4, which reports that, even five years after the service was founded, approximately two thirds of radio subscribers lived in Vienna, and that two thirds of those were 'Arbeiter und Angestellte', i.e. workers and employees.

⁴² See 'Das neue Gesetz für Telegraphie und Radio', *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 3 July 1924, 9. Subsequent articles (e.g. 'Großkampf gegen die Schwarzhörner', *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 4 July 1930, 4) suggest that action against *Schwarzhörner* intensified towards the early 1930s. Lacey, *Feminine Frequencies*, 32, identifies a similar policy in contemporary Germany.

⁴³ This statistic, which I derive from early schedules in *Radio Wien*, is comparable to that given by Führer for Bavarian radio in 1929: see the table in Führer, 'A Medium of Modernity?', 743.

⁴⁴ See, for example, *Radio Wien*, 19 October 1924, 1–4.

‘popular education’) through radio.⁴⁵ Others complained conversely of RAVAG’s musical sobriety, its focus on alienating art-music genres at peak listening times of day, and therefore its ignorance of the rhythms of working life in favour of those of bourgeois intellectual leisure. ‘Again and again, classical music is played,’ one critic complained in late 1924: ‘Dance music only comes on when the worker, dog-tired, finally wants to turn in for the night.’⁴⁶

There is no doubt that comparable criticisms emerged from the right wing as well: the German-national *Linzer Tages-Post* complained in 1924, for example, of the shamefully ‘motley’ (*bunt*) music programme broadcast from Vienna, and suggested that listeners in Linz switch over to their nearby German stations instead for true artistic sustenance.⁴⁷ But specific to the left are the citations of RAVAG’s music in larger concerns over direct censorship: the claim that socialist voices were being deliberately and strategically silenced on the airwaves. When, for example, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* critic noticed the absence in the official RAVAG schedule of the full title of the well-established *Arbeiter Symphonie-Konzerte* (‘Workers’ Symphony Concerts’) series, he tapped into long-held anxieties over other, similar redactions within radio programming, exacerbated by rumours of direct Christian Social intervention.⁴⁸ A quotation from the founder of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Austria, Viktor Adler, had allegedly been removed from a lecture before it was broadcast, as had mention of trade unions; likewise, passages depicting the poor in the broadcasts of a Gerhart Hauptmann play had disappeared, alongside those treating revolutionary and anti-clerical themes in Goethe’s *Egmont*, Schiller’s *Wilhelm Tell* and Wilde’s *Ballad of Reading Gaol*.⁴⁹

Some critics, moreover, complained of the deliberate alignment of RAVAG’s musical calendar with a Catholic religious one, permitting, for example, no music on Good Friday; and reports from *Beirat* debates demonstrate its socialist members’ suspicion that imperial marches heard on the radio actually supported a covert right-wing agenda – regardless of RAVAG’s claim that they were part of its commitment to ‘historic’ repertoire.⁵⁰ For the same reasons, many opposed the demand from the right and centre that the Austrian national anthem – based on Haydn’s *Kaiserhymne* – be

⁴⁵ There are countless press articles from this period treating radio music. For an early expression of frustration, see ‘Musik im Radio’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 1 May 1926, 9; also ‘Die Ravag und ihre Ziele’, *Der Tag*, 7 November 1924, 10. *Volksbildung* is treated by Ludwig Neumann in ‘Das Radio im Dienste der Arbeiterbildung’, *Bildungsarbeit*, 16 (1929), 65–8, and by Otto Koenig in ‘Volksbildung durch Radio’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 16 May 1926, 17.

⁴⁶ ‘Gegen eine Erhöhung der Gebühren’, *Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung*, 3 December 1924, 7.

⁴⁷ ‘Das Wiener Rundfunkprogramm’, *Linzer Tages-Post*, 1 November 1924, 10.

⁴⁸ ‘Die neutrale Ravag’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 12 April 1931, 8; also ‘Eine Beschwerde über das Programm des Radios’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 17 October 1926, 7.

⁴⁹ These examples are drawn from ‘Ravag’, *Der Tag*, 31 December 1924, 1; ‘Aus der Radiowoche’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 26 February 1928, 19; also ‘Die neutrale Ravag’, 28 September 1926, 5, and ‘Aus der Radiowoche’, 20 November 1927, 19.

⁵⁰ Alignment with the Catholic calendar is raised by ‘Ravag’, *Der Tag*, 31 December 1924, 1, and ‘Steht das Radio unter klerikaler Aufsicht?’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 11 April 1925, 6. On complaints over marches, see ‘Aus der Radiowoche’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 22 January 1930, 6, and ‘Auseinandersetzungen im Radiobeirat’, *Reichspost*, 25 January 1930, 6.

aired every day.⁵¹ On what was supposed to be a ‘neutral’ radio service, all such items seemed concessions to the governing Christian Socials, their friends in business, and the identities, practices and calendars of their preferred national audience. They also allowed establishment advocates to rally behind certain ‘common sense’ majority positions designed to make the opposition look ridiculous. ‘The social democratic *Abendblatt* claims a mortal grievance’, one such critic wrote sardonically in late December 1924, ‘because Viennese radio offered a Christmas-themed musical programme at Christmas.’⁵²

Music programming, then, certainly formed a particularly conspicuous site of conflict over RAVAG’s neutrality, and for many socialists it audibly confirmed that their influence had languished on the outside from the very beginning, and had since been further beaten back, while bourgeois positions and representations only strengthened towards the 1930s. At first glance it might seem reasonable to place these developments under the heading of what Führer calls ‘defensive modernisation’, the deployment of new radio technology to shore up the Christian Social status quo and its accompanying atmosphere of conservative nationalism, while simultaneously fending off the perceived threat of socialism.⁵³ Such emphasis on conservative defensiveness seems to assume, however, that the transition into Dollfuss’s Austrofascist regime received no direct prompt from its Christian Social predecessor, and instead seeks to explain radio’s sharp turn towards nationalist programming in 1933 (an ‘essence-changing structural transformation’, in Ergert’s summary) as a response to some other impetus. Most likely, as Ergert continues, this would be the new model of German Nazi radio, and in particular the airtime it gave to Austrian Nazis so that they might denounce the Austrian regime and call for its immediate subordination to German demands.⁵⁴ In this view, German machinations provoked Austrian ones; fascism begat more fascism.

Yet it can equally be argued that Christian Socialism actively prepared the ground on which Austrofascism would stand, and delivered the impression of a stable national public consensus on which it would feed. It did so through RAVAG’s long-standing ‘neutrality’ principle and its associated radio censorship, which had demonstrably advanced Austria’s political polarization over the course of the 1920s and early 1930s, heaping power into the hands of the already powerful and silencing those who would stand up to oppose them. In the introduction to this article, we saw the appointment of Richard Steidle – Christian Social politician and regional leader of the paramilitary

⁵¹ On the *Kaiserhymne* controversy, see ‘Aus dem Radiobeirat’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 8 May 1931, 5.

⁵² ‘Was sie wollen’, *Reichspost*, 31 December 1924, 2. It is not clear to which socialist (evening) daily the correspondent means to refer.

⁵³ Führer, ‘A Medium of Modernity?’, 730.

⁵⁴ Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 49, 137–40. See also the echoes of Ergert’s position in Táló, *Das austrofascistische Österreich*, 101; also John Warren, ‘“Weiße Strümpfe oder neue Kutten”: Cultural Decline in Vienna in the 1930s’, *Interwar Vienna: Culture between Tradition and Modernity*, ed. Deborah Holmes and Lisa Silverman (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 32–56 (pp. 46–7).

Heimwehr – as RAVAG’s vice-president in May 1933.⁵⁵ But long before that, as early as 1926, the leader of the Styrian *Heimwehr* had been permitted to serve as director of RAVAG’s Graz operations as it began to expand beyond Vienna and into the Austrian *Länder*.⁵⁶ The corporative encroachment on radio by the *Heimwehr*, meanwhile, had begun in 1929 at the latest, when, to the outrage of onlookers, 400,000 of the group’s members had been enlisted in their representative radio club, forcing the case for greater representation on the service’s steering *Beirat*. Bearing down on the advisory council, the *Heimwehr* contingent proclaimed its mission to ‘build a dam against Austromarxist propaganda activity’ on the airwaves, for which there was little convincing evidence bar a short radio slot that had been granted to the workers’ interest lobby (*Arbeiterkammer*) the previous year.⁵⁷ This barrage against ‘Austromarxism’, echoed at the time of Steidle’s appointment, sounds very much like fascist rhetoric, and indeed, the *Heimwehr* is usually identified as one of Austria’s indigenous fascist groups, in some regions supported by Mussolini and directly modelled on his blackshirts.⁵⁸ Fascism, then, had clearly made its mark on Austrian radio long before the ‘structural transformation’ that Ergert sees in 1933; it had done so in and through the expansion of the public service, driven by a succession of Christian Social regimes.

From this standpoint of political polarization, perhaps most telling of all are the events surrounding the Viennese socialist revolt of July 1927. As protesters closed in on the Palace of Justice, the site where some 90 of them would be shot dead by police, government-directed forces moved quickly to occupy the Viennese radio premises in order to protect it as a key strategic asset that should not under any circumstances fall into ‘enemy’ hands. The press reacted with horror: the Christian Social *Reichspost* because RAVAG had subsequently broadcast a ‘tendentious’ and ‘political’ speech given by the social-democratic city councillor Hugo Breitner; the socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung* because Breitner’s speech had been redacted to remove criticism of the authorities, and yet the words of Johann Schober, former Austrian chancellor and chief of police, were heard in full.⁵⁹ It is thus not surprising to find, after this point, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* addressing RAVAG only in the starkest oppositional and revolutionary terms. From being the holder of a truly liberating technology for the masses, the seat of a potential national *Volksbildung*, it had become simply a ‘class enemy’ – a

⁵⁵ For a press report of this appointment, see ‘Dr. Steidle Vizepräsident der Ravag?’, *Der Abend*, 11 May 1933, 3.

⁵⁶ See, for example, ‘Rintelen vor dem steirischen Landtag als Angeklagter in der Banknotenfälscheraffaire’, *Arbeiterwille*, 13 February 1926, 2, which names the Styrian *Heimwehr* convenor Franz Huber as RAVAG director for the Graz service.

⁵⁷ See ‘Für klare Verhältnisse in der “Ravag”’, *Reichspost*, 29 September 1929, 11, from which the quotation is taken, and the article of the same title in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 1 October 1929, 4. On the establishing of the ‘special interest programmes’ (*Kammerstunden*) in late 1927, see Ergert, *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 93; for the inadequacy of the *Arbeiterkammer* slot, see Neumann, ‘Das Radio im Dienste der Arbeiterbildung’, 67–8.

⁵⁸ See Ludwig Jedlicka, ‘The Austrian Heimwehr’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (1966), 127–44. On Steidle and anti-Austromarxist rhetoric, see ‘Dr. Steidle Vizepräsident der Ravag?’, *Der Abend*, 11 May 1933, 3.

⁵⁹ See ‘Die “Ravag” im Dienste der sozialdemokratischen Partei’, *Reichspost*, 22 July 1927, 4–5, and ‘Die Ravag und die Christlichsozialen’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 24 July 1927, 10.

‘terror’ that must be brought to an end by ‘a great organization of proletarian listeners’ eager to seize its valuable technological means for the purposes of the ‘class struggle’.⁶⁰ By the late 1920s, the battle lines were already sharply drawn, not least by means of radio, radio music and their discourses. What the Christian Social Dollfuss did in 1933 was mobilize the machinery of state to build his Austrofascist edifice on one side of them.

Sanierung (‘rehabilitation’)

Austrian socialists may have increasingly believed, then, that what they heard on the airwaves in the 1920s was entirely under the control of their class enemy. Even so, programming was not the sole radio battleground in which this sense of political polarization emerged. More significant on a national-structural basis, and just as closely scrutinized, were the economic relationships that had quickly sprung up between the radio service and the culture industry, not least that sector of it that centred on Austria’s considerable wealth of bourgeois musical and theatrical institutions. Since its inception, RAVAG had enjoyed large revenues from its domestic subscriptions; exceeding all estimates, these had increased more than tenfold in four years (from some 30,000 to 315,000 subscribers), prompting RAVAG director Czejka to boast with some conviction in 1928 of radio’s now-central importance to the Austrian economy, against the diminishing trend of almost all other industries.⁶¹

Yet, on account of exactly the same success, radio rapidly became part of the discourse of public decadence, and was repeatedly attacked across the political spectrum as the ruin of most other areas of the cultural sector. Cafés, cinemas, authors and foreign-language teachers all complained of the damaging effects of radio’s burgeoning popularity on their incomes: cafés and cinemas had lost trade at peak times to radio, authors had no mechanism to receive royalties for the broadcast of their works, and language teachers had become second best to popular radio instruction courses. Similarly aggrieved were celebrated opera houses and theatres (and their attendant ensembles), many of which had already been thrown into dire financial circumstances in the long aftermath of the First World War.⁶² If potential consumers now increasingly stayed at home to listen to the radio, the hardships faced by these other cultural providers were judged, in part, to be RAVAG’s fault, and for this – a succession of

⁶⁰ See ‘Der Arbeiterradiobund, eine Kampforganisation’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 15 June 1929, 8.

⁶¹ Figures from ‘Der Rundfunk in Österreich’, *Tages-Post*, 12 October 1924, 9. Czejka’s words are reported in ‘Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Rundspruches’, *Reichspost*, 17 November 1928, 10. This Austrian growth appears to be greater than that of Germany, where the number of registered radio sets rose from c.550,000 in 1924 to 2.6 million in 1928, a fivefold increase. See Führer, ‘A Medium of Modernity?’, 731.

⁶² ‘Radio und Kaffeehaus’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 27 February 1927, 6, reports the complaints of the *Kaffeehäuser*, while ‘Der Schriftstellerkampf gegen die Ravag’, *Der Tag*, 18 November 1927, 3, gives an account of the position of authors, focused on a high-profile lawsuit launched by Arthur Schnitzler. Viennese cinemas made the request in 1925 that RAVAG broadcast no music between 8pm and 10pm (‘Radio und Kino in Wien’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 16 May 1925, 13), and private language teachers made their representations in the same year (‘Die “Ravag” macht alles’, *Neues 8-Uhr Blatt*, 4 November 1925, 3).

Christian Social governments decided – it would have to make a show of public reparation.

In these circumstances RAVAG took a leading role across the 1920s in the so-called *Sanierung* of numerous musical and theatrical institutions. This term, often associated with the Christian Social chancellor Ignaz Seipel (hence the expression ‘Seipel-Sanierungen’), had become common currency in early post-war attempts to stabilize the volatile Austrian economy; it most readily translates as the ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘refloating’ of an enterprise in financial terms, but clearly brings with it implications of ‘sanitization’ – a return to cleanliness from decadence, or health from disease.⁶³ Immediately from its inception in 1924, RAVAG had visibly participated in *Sanierung* operations by channelling funds into musical institutions in return for various forms of collaboration: the building of physical broadcast links and permission to air their performances, for example, as well as the pooling of resources in terms of orchestral musicians, singers and actors. As the press records, this sometimes led to long and vituperative debate over what these connections were worth, and bitter clashes with performers’ unions.⁶⁴ Yet, as a general trend, it meant that RAVAG became quickly and tightly intertwined with the Austrian musical-cultural economy over the course of the 1920s – to the extent that it not only underwrote it financially and provided a lifeline for its underemployed personnel, but also took the lead in important public-facing functions such as advertising campaigns.⁶⁵ Czeija was correct: radio had become a central node of the Austrian cultural infrastructure, without which the latter could hardly function effectively.

Moreover, key parts of this *Sanierung* network were increasingly guaranteed and protected from above, since government figures often provided close continuity between radio, culture industry, banking sector and state ministries. One conspicuous example here is the Styrian Christian Social politician Jakob Ahrer, who sat on the executive boards of both RAVAG and one of its principal shareholders, the Steirerbank, and in late 1924 became the state finance minister.⁶⁶ In mid-1926, moreover, the prominent Christian Social Anton Rintelen, also governor of Styria, stepped straight from the founding presidency of RAVAG to the role of state education minister, in which he was immediately involved in guiding the leadership succession of the ailing Bundestheater (‘Federal Theatre’), a largely autonomous organization centred on the Viennese Staatsoper and Staatstheater, and theoretically incorporating some provincial theatres as well.⁶⁷ The Bundestheater had run at a massive loss since

⁶³ For a pre-radio critique of *Sanierung*, see ‘Eine Kulturstadt’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 28 December 1922, 1.

⁶⁴ See, for example, the debate over radio *Sanierung* for the Vienna Volksoper in late 1924 as revealed by ‘Geld für die Volksoper?’, *Die Stunde*, 18 December 1924, 6, and ‘Die Wiener Volksoper geschlossen’, *Welt Blatt*, 16 December 1924, 3. On performers’ unions, see ‘Die Musiker gegen die “Ravag”’, *Neues 8-Uhr Blatt*, 30 October 1925, 2; also ‘Die Musiker und die Ravag’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 15 Jan 1930, 8.

⁶⁵ See the report ‘Radio und Theaterkrise’, *Kleine Volks-Zeitung*, 9 September 1926, 2–3.

⁶⁶ See ‘Finanzminister Dr. Ahrers wirtschaftliche Mandate’, *Reichspost*, 22 November 1924, 10.

⁶⁷ See ‘Dr. Rintelen – Unterrichtsminister’, *Reichspost*, 22 June 1926, 2, and ‘Schneiderhan – Generaldirektor der Bundestheater’, *Reichspost*, 18 July 1926, 8. On the autonomy of the Bundestheater – here referred to by its alternative name Staatstheater – see ‘Die Reform der Staatstheater’, *Neues Wiener Journal*, 4 December 1923, 2.

the beginning of the decade; across his roles, Rintelen could ensure its ongoing financial support, overseeing the flow of funds from RAVAG in return for the transmission of opera broadcasts.⁶⁸ Yet as the socialist press rapidly realized, this was not necessarily as beneficent as it first appeared: the ongoing link put radio subscription costs at the perpetual risk of increase, ultimately threatening the domestic consumer with the burden of large-scale institutional rehabilitation, and suggesting that this cultural *Sanierung* was little more than a Christian Social political strategy. In the hands of Rintelen, it could easily be seen as a means of refloating and maintaining favoured bourgeois institutions at the expense of workers who could not afford their high ticket prices anyway and benefited little from them, a kind of stealth tax on those of already limited means.

Above all, what such *Sanierung* efforts make clear is that when Dollfuss moved to dissolve parliament in March 1933, the Austrian radio service offered several key benefits to his Christian Social leadership, far beyond those of broadcast propaganda through programming alone. In the wake of the financial rehabilitation campaigns begun in the 1920s, numerous Austrian music-theatrical institutions had become dependent on the prosperity and popular reach of RAVAG. A strong grip on radio, therefore, promised further leverage over public-facing institutions that could now be pressed upon to do foundational cultural work in the transition from Christian Socialism to Austrofascism, speaking to some 500,000 registered households, an uncountable mass of unregistered ones and any number of public spaces. This was an unequalled audience share in a country of almost seven million inhabitants.⁶⁹ Thus RAVAG was drawn ever more tightly under the control of the Ministry of Education in late 1932, and once again took the lead in *Sanierung* efforts for the Bundestheater. Commentaries suggest, indeed, that the management and administration of radio, federal theatres (including programming decisions) and music conservatories were now to be merged under the general aegis of the Ministry of Education, its minister Rintelen and its Catholic clergy-inclined, anti-socialist ideologues.⁷⁰ In March 1933, this reach would be extended still further: RAVAG agreed to pay to the ministry the large sum of 410,000 Schillings, to be put towards the nebulous ends of the ‘subsidy of theatres throughout the federal lands and other support for the arts’; and to use its network to run a newly scheduled *Bundestheaterwoche* (‘Federal Theatre Weekly’) radio programme, as an explicit form of ‘propaganda service’.⁷¹

⁶⁸ For the beginnings of this *Sanierung* process, see ‘Wie die Radiohörer die Bundestheater sanieren sollen’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 16 October 1925, 9, and for a less sensationalist estimate of possible subscription increases, ‘Die Radiohörer sollen die Bundestheater sanieren’, *Der Tag*, 26 September 1925, 5.

⁶⁹ According to *Radio Wien*, subscriptions stood at 492,571 at the end of 1932. See ‘Die Teilnehmerbewegung der Ravag’, *Radio Wien*, 9/34 (1933), 1.

⁷⁰ ‘Ravag und Staatstheater’ and ‘Rosenhügel und Opernring’, *Der Tag*, 14 December 1932, 1–2. Also ‘Die Ravag soll den Klerikalen allein gehören’ and ‘Hände weg von der Ravag!’, *Der Abend*, 14 December 1932, 2–3.

⁷¹ ‘Einigung zwischen Ravag und Unterrichtsministerium’, *Radio Wien*, 9/26 (1933), 1.

At the very moment of Dollfuss's dismantling of parliament, then, RAVAG had been confirmed by these political manoeuvres in its long-held identity as lynchpin, a key component holding together others in the cultural sector and now merging them into attempts at the control of national education. It is no additional surprise to find that the service's 'parliamentary' *Beirat* council – in effect, radio's last bastion against political monopolization – was now wound down, finally dropping out of official reports in early 1934.⁷² Much like the national parliament, RAVAG's steering mechanisms, once alive to the voices of *Amateure* and their distinct radio clubs, were brought to a halt. On the airwaves, as elsewhere in Austria, the conceit of due democratic process was finally abandoned; Austrian national culture, like its political culture, was to be formed from the top down.

The rebirth of the *Symphoniker* and *Entpolitisierung* ('depoliticization')

Much like other Austrian musical and theatrical organizations, the Wiener Sinfonie-Orchester had become dependent on RAVAG over the course of the First Republic.⁷³ Refounded in 1922 as a professional orchestra-for-hire, the ensemble had soon turned to radio performance to provide one of its streams of income, alongside concerts organized by Viennese agencies and music associations.⁷⁴ Under this arrangement it had taken part in exactly the kinds of religiously inflected public broadcasts to which the socialist press had long objected. We find the orchestra, for example, presiding over radio performances of Haydn's *Die Schöpfung* on Easter Saturday in 1925 and Mozart's Requiem on All Saints' Day in 1927.⁷⁵

This relationship with radio strengthened over the course of the decade, largely displacing other orchestras sometimes heard on the air; it became particularly tight in late 1931, when, facing acute financial hardship and lacking sufficient subsidy from federal and regional government, the Sinfonie-Orchester entered into a contract to provide a large proportion of the radio service's daily concerts.⁷⁶ RAVAG's recently appointed music director Kabasta was one of the initiators of this arrangement:

⁷² Ergert, in *50 Jahre Rundfunk*, vol. i, 136, states that the *Beirat* was dissolved in autumn 1933. See also, however, 'Neues von Radio-Wien', *Radio Wien*, 10/19 (1934), 1, which gives details of a new *Beirat*; no further reference to the body appears in this publication, and the new *Beirat*'s socialist contingent, the Arbeiter-Funkverband Österreichs, was anyway banned a few weeks later. See 'Alle marxistische Gewerkschaften und Vereine aufgelöst', *Neues Wiener Journal*, 15 February 1934, 6.

⁷³ Here I adopt the now-standard spelling ('Wiener Sinfonie-Orchester') in accounts of the orchestra before 1933. It should be noted, however, that contemporary press reports refer to the same ensemble in numerous different ways across the 1920s and early 1930s: it was also known as the (Wiener) Symphonieorchester, Symphonie-Orchester, Sinfonieorchester and Symphonisches Orchester. Furthermore, its players were occasionally referred to as the 'Wiener Symphoniker' even before the official name change in 1933, and 'Sinfonie-Orchester' and its variants are still found after this change.

⁷⁴ See Ernst Kobau, *Die Wiener Symphoniker: Eine sozialgeschichtliche Studie* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1991), 40–1.

⁷⁵ See, respectively, *Radio Wien*, 1/25 (1925), 12, and 4/5 (1927), 156.

⁷⁶ On subsidy arrangements leading up to 1931, see Kobau, *Die Wiener Symphoniker*, 43–5; also Alfred Rosenzweig, 'Die Musikstadt Wien und das Funkorchester', *Der Tag*, 11 July 1933, 7.

according to his categorization, the orchestra would now give ‘symphony concerts’ using its full deployment of at least 70 players, smaller ‘entertainment concerts’ featuring ‘easy-to-grasp, popular programmes’, and, as a synthesis of these opposites, ‘orchestral concerts’ consisting of ‘lighter genres by our great masters’.⁷⁷ In so doing, the orchestra paved the way to its own financial *Sanierung* by becoming something like the service’s ‘house’ ensemble, working across the various musical genres that still filled the majority of airtime. As some press reports noted, this was a model typical of German broadcasters.⁷⁸ It also brought the Sinfonie-Orchester closer to perceived public mores driven by the new practice of radio listening, while simultaneously meeting widely held aspirations to improve public taste and awareness of Austria’s musical heritage.

In April 1933, however, on the heels of further financial crisis deepened by the collapse of one of its key concert promoters, the Sinfonie-Orchester had no option but to negotiate an even more extensive agreement with radio.⁷⁹ This also meant that it could be forced to enter explicitly into the Austrian political sphere. Since its inception, the ensemble had claimed artistic distance from any direct political affiliation. It had nonetheless attained a political colouring from the manner of its operations: as Clemens Krauss had noted in 1923, opposite the stately, more leisurely, far older Wiener Philharmoniker, the Sinfonie-Orchester was the professional Viennese orchestra of hard graft, playing a concert every day of the week, often on very few rehearsals.⁸⁰ It had also long been associated with the social democratic initiative of the Workers’ Symphony Concerts and other popular series, and its principal union, the Vereinigung der Wiener Musiker, held strong socialist affiliations throughout the 1920s.⁸¹ In the immediate political context of early 1933 – particularly Dollfuss’s dissolution of parliament due to alleged socialist disruption – this identity made it a clear political target. The ‘neutral’ RAVAG refused to be involved with such a dangerous ‘red’ enterprise and broke off discussions over the Sinfonie-Orchester’s new radio contract, bringing the ensemble’s existence into dire jeopardy.⁸²

To save the situation, the orchestra’s leadership at this point offered the unoccupied presidential position above them to the prominent Christian Social politician

⁷⁷ Kabasta, ‘Das achte Sendejahre beginnt’.

⁷⁸ See ‘Veränderung in der musikalischen Leitung’, *Neues Wiener Journal*, 9 February 1930, 6, which also gives details of Kabasta’s initial appointment at RAVAG.

⁷⁹ On this collapse and its aftermath, see ‘Dirigenten, die fürs Dirigieren zahlen’, *Wiener Sonn- und Montags-Zeitung*, 25 July 1932, 7. On the Sinfonie-Orchester’s financial hardships, see ‘Krise des Wiener Symphonieorchesters’, *Kleine Volks-Zeitung*, 12 May 1932, 5.

⁸⁰ Julius Biströn, ‘Gespräch mit Klemens Krauß’, *Neues Wiener Journal*, 4 December 1923, 2–3.

⁸¹ On the workers’ concerts, see Paul Stefan, ‘25 Jahre Arbeiter-Symphoniekonzerte’, *Die Stunde*, 19 November 1929, 6. On the union’s socialist links, see ‘Politische Musik?’, *Reichspost*, 28 March 1926, 12.

⁸² See the retrospective accounts of the affair given in ‘Das Schicksal des Wiener Symphonieorchesters’, *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 June 1933, 5, and ‘Intimes vom Wiener Symphonie-Orchester’, *Der Morgen*, 19 June 1933, 6.

Alexander Hryntschak.⁸³ Numerous factors make this a significant appointment. Hryntschak's background was not in the cultural sector but in finance. Since his election to parliament in 1929, he had regularly appeared in the press as commentator on and policymaker for issues relating to housing, transport and industry and, in early 1933, had been widely tipped as Austria's next finance minister.⁸⁴ This specifically political – as opposed to musical – capital sets him apart from the Sinfonie-Orchester's former head, Leopold Hlawatsch, a well-known dignitary in Viennese musical life; it distinguishes him, too, from Hugo Burghauser, the bassoonist of the Wiener Philharmoniker who would be elected to the chair of his ensemble in June 1933.⁸⁵ Hryntschak was also, as the Sinfonie-Orchester surely knew and perhaps calculated, amongst the most strident of the early Christian Social ideologues of Austrofascism. Indeed, around the time of his appointment to the Sinfonie-Orchester, the press would accuse him of attempting to implement a national 'Hitler-system' of *Gleichschaltung* ('equalization') after his maverick proclamation that 'free-thinkers, spiritual nihilists and Austromarxists' would not be welcome in the country's new all-encompassing Vaterländische Front ('Patriotic Front') movement, Dollfuss's intended replacement for party-political affiliations.⁸⁶ Hryntschak took to the print media, moreover, to present himself as a public theorist of the *Stände*, the professional 'estates' of the new Austria, within which employer–employee interests were supposed to be fully aligned and party politics therefore made redundant.⁸⁷

In fact, we might even see the Sinfonie-Orchester as a testing ground for the cultural implementation of these theories. Clearly drawing on them, Hryntschak immediately demanded a programme of what he called *Entpolitisierung* within the ranks of the Sinfonie-Orchester.⁸⁸ This term, in spite of its literal translation ('depoliticization') was a buzzword of Dollfuss's political agenda after the closure of parliament – and what it really meant, as commentators well knew, was the strategic marginalizing of opposition, particularly socialist opposition, to make intervention more difficult; it therefore institutionalized the cultural work that the radio service had been carrying out for almost a decade.⁸⁹ In the specific case of the orchestra, *Entpolitisierung* entailed its expansion through the hiring of another 30 or so players. But the auditionees for these

⁸³ 'Die Verhandlungen zwischen der "Ravag" und dem Symphonieorchester', *Neue Freie Presse*, 22 May 1933, 4.

⁸⁴ On Hryntschak, see, as a few examples of many, 'Der jüngste Abgeordnete', *Wiener Sonn- und Montags-Zeitung*, 14 January 1929, 4, and 'Marxistische Vernichtung des Mittelstandes!', *Neues Wiener Journal*, 8 April 1932, 2. On his potential appointment as finance minister, see 'Rekonstruktion der Regierung Dollfuß', *Der Morgen*, 27 February 1933, 1.

⁸⁵ Hlawatsch had until 1928 been president of the renowned Wiener kaufmännischer Gesangverein ('Vienna Businessman's Choir'): see, for example, 'Ein Wiener Abend zu Ehren Richard Strauß', *Neues Wiener Journal*, 5 February 1927, 4. On Burghauser, see 'Der neue Vorstand der Philharmoniker: Burghauser', *Der Tag*, 15 June 1933, 9.

⁸⁶ 'Die vaterländische Front des Herrn Hryntschak', *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 July 1933, 1.

⁸⁷ See 'Dr. Hryntschak skizziert Ständestaat', *Neues Wiener Journal*, 29 September 1933, 2.

⁸⁸ Alexander Hryntschak, 'Wie es um das Wiener Symphonieorchester steht', *Neues Wiener Journal*, 20 June 1933, 8.

⁸⁹ On *Entpolitisierung* in Austrofascist views of the employer–employee relationship, see Tólos, *Das austrofascistische Herrschaftssystem*, 354–5.

new places were allegedly vetted for their readiness to join the so-called ‘independent’ or ‘yellow’ union – that is, the union unaffiliated with socialism and closely bound to the employer – as well as Dollfuss’s Patriotic Front; ‘the new patriotism’, as the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* put it, thus entailed ‘the breaking up of union solidarity’.⁹⁰ All existing permanent contracts were, moreover, substituted by one-year arrangements, giving RAVAG – which now provided some two-thirds of the orchestra’s business – a high level of flexibility over the future size and shape of the ensemble. Finally, in order to facilitate these changes from a legal perspective, Hryntschak refounded the orchestra under the name by which it has been known ever since: the Wiener Symphoniker.

Ernst Kobau, closely following Ergert’s official radio history, suggests that the obvious political intervention in this affair was a reaction against a sudden drop in subscriptions caused by the simultaneous launch of radio’s patriotic programming – the commemorations of fatherland and celebrations of *Heimat* broadcast from early 1933 onwards.⁹¹ On this view, RAVAG deliberately tightened its grip on a Viennese orchestra of note and used the allure of professionally played music to soothe public resistance to Austrofascist propaganda and stabilize radio’s revenues. (Subscription numbers did indeed recover towards 1935, though it is hard to assess the orchestra’s specific role in this.)⁹² Yet surely Hryntschak’s negotiations had achieved far more than an attempt at public appeasement. The new Wiener Symphoniker had undergone a process of *Sanierung* in two senses: it was fully financially ‘rehabilitated’ (*saniert*) but in return, to translate the term more literally, it was ‘sanitized’ in the name of ‘depoliticization’, those members deemed undesirable forced out or made unwelcome by an influx of carefully vetted newcomers.

It would be presumptuous, however, to conclude that Hryntschak’s ‘depoliticizing’ treatment of the Wiener Sinfonie-Orchester turned solely on political identities. According to Michael Mann’s statistic, some three-quarters of the Viennese Jewish population at this time voted socialist; thus it seems plausible that what appear to be political motivations for *Sanierung* were bound up with racial and religious ones.⁹³ Indeed, according to some contemporary newspaper reports, Jewish members of the orchestra were no longer welcome from 1933 onwards, reigniting the accusations of a deeply ingrained antisemitism that had often surfaced against RAVAG programming in the preceding years. Certainly, the Jewish leader of the orchestra, the prominent violinist Hugo Gottesmann, was the only existing member to lose his post outright (though his subsequent lawsuit against the orchestra complained only that he was dismissed as ‘red’, not on the basis of antisemitism).⁹⁴ And certainly, there is no

⁹⁰ ‘Das Wiener Symphonieorchester wird politisiert’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 20 June 1933, 7. On the emergence of the ‘independent union’ movement in Austria after 1929, see Jill Lewis, *Fascism and the Working Class in Austria, 1918–1934: The Failure of Labour in the First Republic* (Oxford: Berg, 1991), 150–8.

⁹¹ Kobau, *Wiener Symphoniker*, 51–2; also Ergert, *50 Jahres Rundfunk*, vol. i, 137, 142.

⁹² Duchkowitsch, ‘Umgang’, 367.

⁹³ Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 228.

⁹⁴ See ‘Gleichschaltung des Symphonieorchesters’, *Der Abend*, 19 June 1933, 11; also ‘Musikalischer Funk’, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 22 May 1933, 5, and ‘Das Wiener Symphonieorchester wird politisiert’,

shortage of evidence that the Jewish members of the Symphoniker's chief Viennese competitor, the Wiener Philharmoniker, were subject to frequent attacks and the threat of dismissal at about the same time.⁹⁵ It is perhaps best, then, to point to a broader overall conclusion: the Symphoniker's new one-year contracts projected a close shaping process – on political or racial grounds, or both – into the immediate future. This would be overseen by a new management board that comprised not only a RAVAG representative but also various members of Austria's political, spiritual and commercial elite. As one correspondent saw it (with a direct echo of *Sanierung* rhetoric), these changes represented the letting in of a 'draught of fresh air'.⁹⁶

Structurally, the Symphoniker's expansion also made possible its division into two separate, permanent ensembles, a 65-player *großes Orchester* and a 32-player *Funkkapelle* ('radio band').⁹⁷ The latter was to be dedicated entirely to what Kabasta termed 'entertainment music of almost all kinds' and thus, in continuation of processes begun several years before, entailed an end to radio's 'engagement of bands and orchestras thrown together largely on an ad hoc basis'.⁹⁸ As this rhetoric suggests, RAVAG's principal argument for this change was one of musical standards. Kabasta writes elsewhere of the 'considerable raising of artistic level' offered by a permanent orchestra.⁹⁹ But it meant too, of course, that unvetted musicians, many of whom had existing affiliations to the strongly socialist-leaning unions of the First Republic, would no longer be employed by the service. Furthermore, the fixed two-part division of the orchestra meant that some of those who were successful in joining the ranks of the new Symphoniker could be threatened with demotion if they refused to align with what its leadership demanded of it. The *Funkkapelle* players had far longer hours than the *großes Orchester*, and anecdotal evidence suggests the fear amongst players of the former's 'chain gang' work – endless performance, direct to broadcast, of music of questionable quality played with little rehearsal.¹⁰⁰ The new orchestra of Austrofascism, then, still relied on age-old aesthetic hierarchies of music and musical work: in addition to new social and political pressures, these also exerted force on the Symphoniker's membership and kept it in line with what now rolled forward as its contribution to Austrofascist culture.

Arbeiter-Zeitung, 20 June 1933, 7. 'Shaw und Einstein im Rundfunk', *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 1 November 1930, 17, is one example of accusations of antisemitism as a factor in earlier radio programming. Gottesmann's suit against the new Symphoniker leadership is detailed in 'Professor Gottesmann klagt die Königinwitwe von Bulgarien', *Neues Wiener Journal*, 25 April 1934, 12.

⁹⁵ See, for example, Trümpi, *The Political Orchestra*, 100–1.

⁹⁶ Kobau, *Wiener Symphoniker*, 55; also 'Die Reorganisation des Wiener Symphonieorchesters', *Die Stunde*, 20 June 1933, 10, from which the quotation is taken.

⁹⁷ These figures come from 'Radiopost', *Radio Wien*, 9/39 (1933), 71. 65 players was the projected size of the ensemble for later that year.

⁹⁸ Kabasta, 'Bedeutsame Neuerungen im Musikprogramm', *Radio Wien*, 9/29 (1933), 1.

⁹⁹ Kabasta, 'Das achte Sendejahre beginnt', 2. See also the debate over standards of entertainment music in 'Neues vom Beirat', *Radio Wien*, 9/33 (1933), 2–3.

¹⁰⁰ See Kobau, *Wiener Symphoniker*, 56. 'Chain gang' is my translation of Kobau's 'Knochenmühle und Strafkompagnie' (p. 51).

Austrian Composers of the Present, pan-Germanism and Ernst Krenek

The detailed weekly schedules printed by RAVAG's house publication, *Radio Wien*, indicate the refounded Symphoniker's contribution to Austrofascism. Specifically, they reveal the new national emphasis in the repertoire it now played. This development was largely driven by the Kulturverband vaterländischer Rundfunkhörer ('Cultural Association of Patriotic Radio Listeners'), a pressure group whose chief spokesperson, the composer Joseph Rinaldini, was appointed to the RAVAG advisory council in January 1933. In Rinaldini's words, the Kulturverband saw an opportunity in radio programming for the 'nurturing of patriotic art and patriotic spirit': this could be achieved not only by 'lectures and reports focused on *Heimat*' and through certain ceremonies such as the broadcast of Haydn's *Kaiserhymne* at the end of each evening, but also by means of special emphasis on the lives and music of Austrian composers of the present.¹⁰¹ RAVAG immediately accepted this recommendation and created from it a weekly programme (*Stunde österreichischer Komponisten der Gegenwart*) that began on 7 April 1933, and often involved members of the Symphoniker playing the works showcased. The first episode focused on Egon Kornauth, and over the next five years, some 100 or so other Austrian composers were featured; each was profiled by an essay in *Radio Wien*, typically written by a leading Austrian music critic or music scholar. The strong impression is therefore of an attempt to generate a musical network, again with radio as its central node, comprising national composers, performers, critics, readers and listeners.¹⁰²

Rinaldini's new composers series can be seen as a continuation of numerous other contemporary music series and one-off contemporary concerts that had been delivered by the Symphoniker and broadcast by RAVAG over the past few years, some of which had centred on Austrian composers of the day.¹⁰³ Likewise, it served as an 'art music' counterpart to the countless Vienna-themed light music concerts that the Symphoniker *Funkkapelle* had now taken over from the ensembles that had established them over the past decade, broadcasts with wistful titles like *Mein Lebenslauf ist Lieb und Lust* ('Love and Joy are the Story of my Life').¹⁰⁴ As Rinaldini's written introduction to it confirmed, however, the new series was also intended to give the limelight to significant Austrian *individuals*, one only per programme. 'Each time,' he writes, 'a duration of 40 minutes or so will be dedicated to a sole composer, delivering a fully rounded impression of unique artistic individualities.'¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ 'Vom Radiobeirat', *Radio Wien*, 9/17 (1933), 3; also 'Neues vom Radiobeirat', *Radio Wien*, 9/23 (1933), 3–4.

¹⁰² See 'Der Komponist Egon Kornauth', *Radio Wien*, 27/2 (1933), 2.

¹⁰³ See, for example, the *Radio Wien* listings for the series *Querschnitt durch das österreichische musikalische Schaffen der Gegenwart* (from October 1932) and *Zeitgenössische österreichische Komponisten* (from January 1933). See also the Symphoniker programme dedicated to contemporary Austrian orchestral works, as detailed by *Radio Wien*, 9/38 (1933), 4.

¹⁰⁴ *Radio Wien*, 9/42 (1933), 38.

¹⁰⁵ Joseph Rinaldini, 'Stunde österreichischer Komponisten der Gegenwart', *Radio Wien*, 9/27 (1933), 1.

At first glance, therefore, the new series seems potentially artistically deep and rich; it also appears to some extent inclusive, since its 100 or so subjects prove to be of various ages, backgrounds, compositional styles and institutional links, their common bond being the simple fact of connection by birth or career to the Austrian Republic. Numerous composers of Jewish heritage – Gál, Pisk, Weigl and Schulhof, for example – were profiled early in the series, and Korngold's programme in October 1937 was the occasion for the public premiere of his song cycle *Unvergänglichkeit*, op. 27.¹⁰⁶ Three (but only three) women composers were also featured: Müller-Hermann, Bach and Kern.¹⁰⁷ Bortkiewicz, though born in the Russian Empire in 1877, was included on account of his residence in Austria since the early 1920s.¹⁰⁸

On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that an exclusionary cultural politics is in force in Rinaldini's new series, although it is difficult to discern whether it excludes according to precise criteria, and if so, what these might be and how they might combine – religious and racial background, perhaps, or overt socialist links, or modernist compositional aesthetics, or age, or 'absentee' status (the simple fact of having left Austria some years before and being domiciled elsewhere). Schoenberg and Eisler, for example, were never profiled; nor were Krenek, Wellesz, Reznicek and Schreker. Berg and Webern were also excluded, but, perhaps in deference to their continued presence and influence in Austria, were instead given a programme under the *sui generis* rubric *Moderne österreichischer Musik* ('Modern Austrian Music') in the usual Wednesday evening slot, a broadcast that saw them condemned as 'Jewish' by neighbouring Nazi-controlled Bavarian radio.¹⁰⁹ Most surprisingly, bearing in mind his place as doyen of Austrian symphonic music after Bruckner, Franz Schmidt was never profiled by the series. He was instead given a separate radio broadcast in 1934 on the occasion of his 60th birthday – but then again, so was Schoenberg, though he was only represented by his early works up to the Six Piano Pieces, op. 19 (1913).¹¹⁰

How do we interpret these choices? Krenek, one of those excluded, had little trouble formulating a summary. Responding in a journal article to the decennial celebration of RAVAG music in September 1934 – a succession of broadcast festival performances

¹⁰⁶ For the accompanying essays on these composers, see Paul Stefan, 'Hans Gál', *Radio Wien*, 9/29 (1933), 5; Paul Stefan, 'Paul Amadeus Pisk', *Radio Wien*, 9/37 (1933), 6; Kurt Roger, 'Karl Weigl', *Radio Wien*, 10/8 (1933), 2; Erwin Felber, 'Otto Schulhof', *Radio Wien* 10/27 (1934), 2; and Rudolf Hoffmann, 'Erich Wolfgang Korngold', *Radio Wien*, 14/4 (1937), 4–5.

¹⁰⁷ See Maria Komorn, 'Johanna Fr. Müller-Hermann', *Radio Wien*, 10/12 (1933), 2–3; Hans Ewald Heller, 'Maria Bach', *Radio Wien*, 11/20 (1935), 2–3; and Andreas Weissenböck, 'Frida Kern', *Radio Wien*, 11/36 (1935), 4–5.

¹⁰⁸ See 'Serge Bortkiewicz', *Radio Wien*, 11/17 (1935), 2–3.

¹⁰⁹ See Paul A. Pisk, 'Alban Berg – Anton Webern', *Radio Wien*, 10/10 (1933), 2–3, and its programme listing (p. 25). For Berg's outraged letter to the Bavarian broadcasting company responding that he is of "100%" Aryan and German extraction, see Margaret Notley, '1934, Alban Berg, and the Shadow of Politics: Documents of a Troubled Year', *Alban Berg and his World*, ed. Christopher Hailey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 235–6.

¹¹⁰ See Fritz Hochberg, 'Franz Schmidt', *Radio Wien*, 11/14 (1934), 4–5, and Hans Heller, 'Arnold Schönberg', *Radio Wien*, 10/50 (1934), 4–5.

presided over by the Symphoniker and closely interlinked with Rinaldini's *Austrian Composers of the Present* series – he wrote the following:

We must conclude that the music leadership of Ravag, a partly or completely official institution, whether on its own or as instructed by some other authority, has taken the decision to suppress as far as possible the sector of contemporary Austrian music that is oriented in a different direction (the organizing of an extremely modest Schoenberg celebration hardly counts as a sufficient alibi).¹¹¹

By this 'different direction', Krenek meant specifically 'representatives of the new music [...] that same music that is being forced into silence in today's Germany, heaping massive spiritual and material damage on to its creators'.¹¹² This seems, bearing in mind the exclusions noted above, a reasonable conclusion to draw: that RAVAG's principal musical attitude was anti-modern, antisemitic, suspicious of international renown, and thus dancing to Nazi Germany's protectionist tune. Yet, as Krenek also acknowledged, one of the RAVAG festival concerts of 1934 had featured the premiere of a work by Gál, namely the op. 43 Concertino for piano and string orchestra. This was hardly representative of Krenek's idea of the maligned 'new music', perhaps, but still it was the music of a Jewish Austrian recently removed from his post at the Mainz Conservatory by its new German Nazi administration.¹¹³ Counter to Krenek's claim, this premiere could equally be interpreted as an Austrian gesture of solidarity *with* Gál and *against* German antisemitic oppression.

It is ultimately the *Radio Wien* essays on *Austrian Composers of the Present* that illuminate this complex situation and the murky cultural politics shaping it. Rinaldini's overall introduction to the series lamented what he saw as the contemporary critical tendency to 'rant, in a party-political fashion, for one small avenue or another' – for which he gave the example of what he simply called 'atonality'. Echoing surrounding Austrofascist calls for 'depoliticization', he instead demanded the honouring of the exceptional *Führer*-like individual who transcended such party lines: that is, public engagement with the 'special characteristics of an autonomous mentality [*Geistigkeit*]', not with the 'bland expression of a *Zeitgeist* measured according to genre'.¹¹⁴ Rinaldini's new radio series, with each programme dedicated to an individual composer, would of course privilege such engagement, and in so doing would highlight the 'eternal fundamentals' of art that, whatever party factions might proclaim, had not changed, and were now to be shown as the specific preserve of the Austrian musical mind.

As the series proceeded through its profiles week by week, however, this projected exploration of the Austrian mind devolved rapidly into the endless repetition of a collection of core tropes of 'Austrianness', all of which had long existed in discourses of

¹¹¹ Austriacus [Ernst Krenek], 'Ravag-Sendung und Oesterreichische Sendung', 23: *Eine Wiener Musikzeitschrift*, 15/16 (1934), 18–24 (p. 20).

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ See 'Das Rundfunk-Musikfest', *Radio Wien*, 10/51 (1934), 6–7, and the programme listing in *Radio Wien*, 10/52 (1934), 18.

¹¹⁴ Rinaldini, 'Stunde österreichischer Komponisten der Gegenwart', 1.

national music: Austrian melodiousness, for example, or the close bond to nature and landscape, or the healthy suspicion of modernism, or the sure sense of form derived from Viennese classicism.¹¹⁵ Crowded out by these tropes, Jewishness in music – as one example of possible difference against the reinforced norm – was never thematized, even for Jewish composers like Gál. It was Schubert, Bruckner, Mozart and Haydn who were repeatedly cited as the primordial models for Austrian composition of the present, never Mahler; Gál's simple 'joy in music-making [*Musizierfreudigkeit*]', indeed, 'leads straight back to Schubert'.¹¹⁶ Likewise, although the prior reputation of the Viennese composer Ernst Kanitz was as *Atonaler*, the reader and listener were strongly reassured (by the musicologist Robert Konta) that he actually composed because of his great Austrian passion for melody. His harmony is 'predominantly tonal', however it might sound, and it is 'certainly not based on any of the atonal systems (the 12-note row)'.¹¹⁷

An extended example of the same strategy – we might tentatively call it 'musical Austrofascistization' – concerns Vinzenz Goller, the second composer to be profiled by the radio series, in April 1933. The introduction to Goller, written by the musicologist Andreas Weissenböck, presented him as a Bruckner-like naïve, his father an organist and teacher in the *Volksschule*, his mother a singer in the church. Members of the Symphoniker presided over a 45-minute broadcast of his accompanied choral music, intended – predictably – to showcase what Weissenböck identified as his 'melodic invention' and 'utmost dexterity in formal construction', and, through these qualities, his 'inward bond to nature'. But it is the specifics of Goller's given curriculum vitae that are still more telling. Born in St Andrä bei Brixen (part of the formerly Austrian Tyrol, granted to Italy by the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919), he had spent years in and around Regensburg, bringing his Austrian mastery to the German Catholic church and (so the introduction goes) at last overcoming the unfruitfulness of musical Cecilianism. This reputation he had brought back to Vienna and the Akademie für Musik und darstellende Kunst, where he had founded the department devoted to church music in 1910. Thus Goller's personal-musical qualities were matched by civic credentials (Austrian citizenship, Viennese service) and ethnic ones (Catholicism, Tyrolean ancestry). He united all this through a sense of 'artistic mission', as Weissenböck put it, that both served Austria and was symbolic of Austria's influence beyond its immediate state boundaries.¹¹⁸

As this example suggests, it would be simplistic to view RAVAG as enshrining a consistent and unilateral exclusionary policy in its music, whether antisemitism, anti-modernism, anti-socialism or anti-absenteeism. Its policy combined all of these; but over and above them, and marshalling them flexibly, was an identity politics closely aligned with what Julie Thorpe has termed 'Austrian pan-Germanism' at the beginning

¹¹⁵ See, as examples, the *Radio Wien* profiles dedicated to Pisk (9/37, 1933, p. 6), Alexander Spitzmüller-Harmersbach (10/3, 1933, p. 2), Franz Hasenöhl (11/2, 1934, pp. 6–7), Richard Wickenhauser (12/1, 1935, pp. 4–5) and Rinaldini himself (10/13, 1933, pp. 2–3).

¹¹⁶ Stefan, 'Hans Gál', 5

¹¹⁷ Robert Konta, 'Ernst Kanitz', *Radio Wien*, 10/21 (1934), 6–7.

¹¹⁸ Andreas Weissenböck, 'Vinzenz Goller', *Radio Wien*, 9/28 (1933), 8.

of the period of Austrofascist rule. Pan-Germanism, for Thorpe, was a nationalist ideology operative across numerous fields including education, media and local government: it brought together civic features with ethnic ones and, at its fringes, also made use of racial ideas reminiscent of National Socialism.¹¹⁹ From this platform, pan-Germanism extolled the hegemony of German Austrians, their right and mission to Germanize and govern their non-German counterparts in central Europe, and the immutable identity of Christian Austria as a stronghold of German thought and culture. Moreover, despite the obvious implications of the term and its historical links to the 'pan-German' movements of the nineteenth century, its proponents did not necessarily advocate territorial union with Germany, particularly a union in Hitler's terms that might leave Austria as the silent partner and lesser power.¹²⁰

If we accept this pan-Germanism as strongly operative in Dollfuss's new corporative Austria from 1933 onwards, and likewise Thorpe's definition of Austrofascism as 'the process of forging a community of citizens who conformed to the official pan-German identity', then Rinaldini's composer series can easily be seen as part of the Austrofascist process, accessing and shaping the national community via the medium of state-controlled radio.¹²¹ Thus it smoothly advanced the fortunes of the Catholic church composer Goller and his gentle motets in the manner of Bruckner. It could also flex, however, to embrace the likes of Kanitz and Gál. The decisive factor in all these cases was seemingly that all could be claimed as 'forgotten by the fatherland' (and, in Gál's case, perhaps, rejected abroad).¹²² This 'overlooked' status played at least a twofold role: it gave Rinaldini the opportunity not only to chastise radio listeners for ignoring significant artists in their midst (and thus failing in their own pan-German civic duty), but also to project aspects of pan-German nationalist identity on to figures and musical works that in the public mind were still little more than blank canvasses. Thus Goller is made 'the pure [*echt*] Austrian man who cleaves to a high ideal without losing the ground beneath his feet [...] his art prepares countless people to receive the most noble of joys'. Gál is the 'pure Austrian master [...] whose dignified seriousness ever remains that of the people [*volkstümlich*]'. Kanitz binds the 'positive achievements of recent times' to the 'more practical musical [*musikantisch*] character of us Austrians'.¹²³

This is not to imply, however, that pan-German concerns were the sole preserve of RAVAG, Rinaldini and his exclusive register of Austrian composers of the day. That they were also important to one not so favoured, Krenek, is clear from the 1934 essay cited above, in which he too writes of an 'Austrian mission', namely 'to ensure the

¹¹⁹ Thorpe, 'Austrofascism', 318.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 317–19. Also Thorpe, *Pan-Germanism*, 16–44.

¹²¹ Thorpe, 'Austrofascism', 328.

¹²² Rinaldini, 'Stunde österreichischer Komponisten der Gegenwart', 1.

¹²³ Weissenböck, 'Vinzenz Goller', 8; Stefan, 'Hans Gál', 5; Konta, 'Ernst Kanitz', 7. That comparable claims for 'Austrianness' in music persisted long after the *Anschluss* and the war is clear from the debates surrounding the Großer Österreichischer Staatspreis ('Grand Austrian State Prize') of 1950 and beyond, as evidenced in Monika Kröpfl, 'Preise und ihre Vergabepolitik im Österreich der Nachkriegszeit am Beispiel von Hans Gál und Egon Wellesz', *Musik des Aufbruchs. Hans Gál und Egon Wellesz: Continental Britons*, ed. Michael Haas and Marcus G. Patka (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2004), 121–7. I am grateful to Michael Haas for bringing this to my attention.

continuity of the true German culture and keep it alive for the future of Germanness in its entirety [*Gesamtdeutschtum*]. Krenek fully agreed that RAVAG was an artistic institution perfectly placed to accomplish this; his title puns on this point, in fact, as *Sendung* translates as both ‘mission’ and ‘broadcast’, and so Austria’s mission is presented as intertwined with its radio service. Even so, he complained that RAVAG had missed its opportunity through series like Rinaldini’s *Austrian Composers of the Present*, and had instead clung to an ‘oppressive one-sidedness’, not least in what he hears as its Nazi-like preference for conservative tonal styles.¹²⁴ Thus the radio service had, to paraphrase Krenek’s critique, forced little-known composers into its own narrow vision of a pan-German rank and file and then paraded them before its considerable public, all the while ignoring those figures who, more obviously technically progressive, already enjoyed international renown as Austrian leaders of the compositional fraternity. In that case, the new Austrian corporative state had in fact become fundamentally indistinguishable from ‘the totalitarian state of mechanical coordination [*Gleichschaltung*]’ in Germany: the Austrofascism promulgated by RAVAG’s music was no different from, and no better than, Nazism.¹²⁵

This is, then, an instructive polemic, as it interjects Krenek across the stereotyped alliances we might otherwise assume between artistic styles and political positions in this period. He summarily rejects political and territorial union with contemporary Germany; he writes of Austria taking the world lead against Nazi ‘barbarism’ and passionately rejects any claim for the ‘natural’ basis of the received laws of harmony and melody.¹²⁶ But he also implicitly accepts cultural union with Germany: the reaching out of the ‘brotherly hand’, in his phrase, with the caveat that it must be extended from the Austrian side to those deemed ‘sincere’ (*aufrichtig*). Moreover, he envisions contemporary Vienna – home of the tradition-devoted *Wiener Schule* – as the true stronghold of German culture, its radio transmitters bringing ‘the real Austrian soul before the entire world’.¹²⁷ This last is actually a quotation from the new Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg in a speech given at a Musikverein concert for the tenth anniversary of RAVAG’s founding, at which Kabasta and the Wiener Symphoniker played both Wagner and Bruckner.¹²⁸ In citing it, Krenek seeks to reinforce his essay’s own advocacy of ‘the will and decisive acts of our Führer’ in forming the new Austrian stronghold-state, as well as the ‘Christian and corporative principle of cooperation’, the ‘ideal vision of orderly multiplicity’ and the principle of shared devotion to the ‘proclaimed national interest’ (*Staatsraison*) that should properly underpin it.¹²⁹ Krenek may clearly be, in short, what we might endeavour to call an ‘Austromodernist’; yet he comes across also as a venerator at the shrine of the assassinated Führer Dollfuß (shot dead by Austrian Nazis just before the essay appeared) and a vocal supporter of

¹²⁴ *Austriacus* [Krenek], ‘Ravag-Sendung’, 20.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20–1.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 24, 22.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 23–4.

¹²⁸ See the reported speech in ‘Jubiläum der Ravag’, *Kärntner Tagblatt*, 4 October 1934, 4, and the listing in *Radio Wien*, 1/11 (1934), 85.

¹²⁹ *Austriacus* [Krenek], ‘Ravag-Sendung’, 23, 20.

Dollfuss's successor Schuschnigg. In his own anti-RAVAG and anti-Nazi terms, he is a pan-German Austrofascist.

Indeed, Krenek tried hard to deliver his alternative vision of an Austrofascist music, launching his own series of contemporary Austrian music concerts in October 1934. The first of these featured piano works by Schoenberg (including the 12-note op. 25), Schmidt's Second String Quartet (1930) and songs by Julius Bittner: all these composers had turned 60 in 1934, and, as Krenek's introduction states, the point was to display the diversity within the Austrian contemporary whole, the stylistically old alongside the new, regardless of the homology of chronological age.¹³⁰ In the final concert in April 1935, moreover, he extended a 'brotherly hand', programming new works by himself, Wellesz and Robert Leukauf alongside those by Germans drawn to Vienna: Hans Erich Apostel's *Sonata ritmica* and some Lieder by Theodor Adorno.¹³¹

Yet Krenek's series took place at the inconspicuous, outmoded Ehrbar Saal in the fourth district of Vienna, and attracted little press commentary.¹³² Crucially, it was not broadcast on national radio, which at the time of the first concert preferred to deliver two Wiener Symphoniker programmes to its listeners, one entitled 'Sport in Music and Song', the other 'From Old Myths and Tales'.¹³³ Such picturesque and easily assimilable offerings, alongside RAVAG's *Austrian Composers of the Present*, continued for the next five years, and were galvanized along the way by other similar series that held this most prominent of national podiums as they continued to shape the pan-German community of Austrofascism – in ways that, even if they could be read as gently critical of Nazi Germany, never stiffly opposed it. Krenek and his conception of Austrian music had no such mouthpiece and no such audience; increasingly, they were drowned out of the public discourse, and friends discussed his failing energies in promoting his concerts.¹³⁴

Conclusion: pan-Germanism, Austrofascism and National Socialism

Austrian pan-Germanism, then, is one useful means of capturing the principal ideological thrust that developed out of Christian Socialism and one way of approaching Austrian public musical life around and after 1933. As we have seen, a platform of German Austrian superiority and mission operated across the boundary lines that this historiography implies, inflecting not only Rinaldini's new radio series but also Krenek's counterpunch against it. Both camps, I think, would have seen a prevailing common sense in a turn of phrase like 'Austro-German music'. Krenek, to reiterate,

¹³⁰ See 'Österreichisches Studio', *Der Tag*, 16 October 1934, 8; also 'Österreichisches Studio', *Neue Freie Presse*, 2 November 1934, 15

¹³¹ See 'Schlußabend des "Österreichischen Studios"', *Der Tag*, 3 April 1935, 9.

¹³² The most extensive account of the Ehrbar as a concert venue, including mention of Krenek's series as a continuation of its commitment to contemporary music, can be found in 'Renaissance einer Altwiener Kunststätte', *Der Tag*, 24 February 1935, 8.

¹³³ See the listings given in *Radio Wien*, 11/4 (1934), 26.

¹³⁴ See the letter from Willi Reich to Theodor Adorno (1 February 1935), as reproduced in Notley, '1934, Alban Berg, and the Shadow of Politics', 267–8.

wrote of the need for Austrian intervention in the struggle to preserve the ‘true German culture’.¹³⁵

To this it might be added that a comparable pan-German drive also fed into the concert programmes that the Symphoniker delivered outside RAVAG’s direct purview. The evening of 4 December 1933, for example, saw Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, Hryntschak and countless other Austrofascist dignitaries attend the Vienna Konzerthaus to hear the Symphoniker play a so-called *Monsterkonzert*, a special performance for which the ensemble had been massively expanded to some 140 players. This event was organized by Dollfuss’s Patriotic Front, soon to be Austria’s only permitted political organization, and for which Rinaldini served as music advisor.¹³⁶ At first glance, its programme appears simply to pander to the tastes of Viennese opera- and concert-going elites through its presentation of short works by Rossini, Wagner and Richard Strauss. The centre of gravity of the ‘monster-concert’, however, was a performance of Schubert’s ‘Great’ Symphony, dwarfing the surrounding Italian and German offerings and seemingly condescending to them – not least because it gave Viennese critics, amongst them the establishment composer Joseph Marx, the opportunity to extol superior Austrian musical virtues (for example, *Melodienseligkeit*, ‘melodic bliss’) and to admonish the conductor, the Italian Arturo Lucon, for inevitably failing to grasp them.¹³⁷

The Symphoniker’s foreign tours, too, can be viewed through this particular pan-German lens. In the first two weeks of May 1935, the orchestra gave concerts across cities in Italy, a schedule that must be seen in the context of contemporary political overtures to Mussolini and the promise of solidarity against Hitler’s aggression towards Austria; an Italian Cultural Institute had been opened by Schuschnigg in Vienna only two months previously.¹³⁸ Yet press reports emphasize not only this tour’s enthusiastic reception by Italian audiences but also, in overtly military terms, its success as a ‘triumphal march of Viennese art’ – to which, apparently, Mussolini, the Pope and Queen Elena had bowed in deference, the last expressing her delight, symbolically, in German.¹³⁹ Similarly, in Great Britain in late 1936 – according to Ernst Decsey’s report in *Radio Wien* – the very mention of the name ‘Vienna’ brought audiences around the country flocking to their local concert halls, so that they might witness the ‘fundamental Austrianness [*das Urösterreichische*]’ of the Symphoniker’s flagship Bruckner performances.¹⁴⁰ Once again, this neatly intersected with Austrian state propaganda, which sought at precisely this time to soothe British foreign policy fears

¹³⁵ Austriacus [Krenek], ‘Ravag-Sendung’, 21.

¹³⁶ On the organization of the Patriotic Front, see Irmgard Bärnthaler, *Die Vaterländische Front: Geschichte und Organisation* (Vienna: Europa, 1971), 186–7.

¹³⁷ Joseph Marx, ‘Monsterkonzert der Wiener Symphoniker’, *Neues Wiener Journal*, 5 December 1933, 4. Also ‘Monsterkonzert im Zeichen der Vaterländischen Front’, *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 December 1933, 5.

¹³⁸ See ‘Eröffnung des italienischen Kulturinstituts’, *Kleine Volks-Zeitung*, 22 March 1935, 3.

¹³⁹ See ‘Ungeheurer Erfolg’, *Salzburger Chronik für Stadt und Land*, 13 May 1935, 3, from which the quotation is taken, and ‘Heimkehr der Wiener Symphoniker aus Italien’, *Welt Blatt*, 17 May 1935, 5.

¹⁴⁰ Ernst Decsey, ‘Die Wiener Symphoniker in England’, *Radio Wien*, 13/7 (1936), 2

over the fragility of central Europe and, simultaneously, to attract renewed patronage for Austrian culture from Britain's wealthy elites.¹⁴¹ The Symphoniker's tour was thus, to use Decsey's word, a 'crusade' on several fronts at once: a display of cultural superiority and political stability communicated through the 'Austrian orchestral art and Bruckner, the most Austrian of all its masters', and delivered by a 'first-class orchestra on the march'.¹⁴²

Nonetheless, just as Krenek had seen in 1934, the new Austria was in perpetual danger of failing to become the stable, autonomous, unified nation that such Brucknerian symphonic excellence seemed to mobilize through sounding forms. As Krenek's essay confirms, numerous points of overlap clearly existed between the Austrian pan-Germanism projected by the radio service and National Socialism; at times, indeed, their ideas, claims, personnel and practices were difficult to separate, and this proved as productive for both these camps as it was ostracizing for their critics. Certainly, it had sometimes suited RAVAG to silence Nazi voices: as, for example, in June 1932, when the 'neutral' service had refused to broadcast a speech given by the prominent German Nazi Gregor Strasser, leading to demonstrations in the streets and a march on the Viennese RAVAG premises.¹⁴³ But, far more frequently, the radio service had ignored obvious Nazi sympathies amongst those it broadcast, thereby granting an implicit acceptance that had the benefit of shoring up the Austrian state's cultural provision on the airwaves and simultaneously formed a precarious solidarity against social democracy and 'foreign' incursion into hallowed German territory. The leadership of the Symphoniker is here a case in point. Leopold Reichwein, one of the orchestra's star conductors, well known to the Viennese public through radio and concert life, had been a highly active member of the German Nazi party since March 1932. From that time onwards he fronted a range of propaganda activities in Austria on its behalf, with only the occasional intervention from the authorities for fear of the civil unrest that his vehement politics might cause.¹⁴⁴ Leading up to the German annexation, Reichwein also acted as informant on the Austrian radio service: in a report of February 1937, he complained to Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry about Kabasta's orchestral concerts with RAVAG for their continued reliance on 'dyed-in-the-wool Jews', 'rejected Aryans' and other 'questionables'.¹⁴⁵

Likewise, of the 100 or so composers profiled by Rinaldini's *Austrian Composers of the Present* series, many can be shown to have held allegiances to Austrian or German Nazi organizations; and while it is sometimes hard to discern whether these were politically expedient responses to the annexation of 1938, in some cases it is absolutely clear-cut

¹⁴¹ See Thorpe, *Pan-Germanism*, 70–3.

¹⁴² Decsey, 'Die Wiener Symphoniker in England', 2.

¹⁴³ See 'Keine Parteipolitik im Radio', *Reichspost*, 15 June 1932, 1–2.

¹⁴⁴ See Fred K. Prieberg, *Handbuch deutsche Musiker 1933–1945* [CD-ROM] (Kiel: Prieberg, 2004), 674, 2181, 3027–8, 5653–62, 9425. On Reichwein and his relationship with Vienna, see Philipp Stein, *Das Wiener Konzerthaus 1930–1945* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 2013), 27–73; political action against Reichwein in 1936 is detailed on p. 62.

¹⁴⁵ Prieberg, *Handbuch*, 3492.

that they were convictions professed many years before.¹⁴⁶ Perhaps the most conspicuous example is that of the Viennese composer Friedrich Bayer, who in April 1933 had his symphonic poem *Deutschland* premiered by Reichwein at the Vienna Konzerthaus to an audience of some 5,000 people, as part of permitted nationwide Nazi party celebrations for Hitler's birthday.¹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, only a month later, Bayer was featured in Rinaldini's composers series as a key contemporary Austrian, praised for his peculiar ability – specifically as an Austrian German – to maintain his creative faculties 'free from extramusical reflection' and, in so doing, to synthesize 'northern rigour' with 'southern melodic bliss'.¹⁴⁸ Even after the proscription of National Socialism in Austria in June 1933 and Dollfuss's assassination by Austrian Nazis the following year, Bayer could still surface as an Austrian establishment composer. As Krenek pointed out, although Bayer's piano concerto was initially removed from the RAVAG celebratory programme of September 1934 owing to 'political concerns', it nonetheless reappeared, unannounced, in the last broadcast of the series.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, Bayer was the author of a 1934 article for *Die Kunst in Österreich* ('Art in Austria', a periodical much vaunted by the education minister Rintelen) in which some of RAVAG's implicit biases had been turned into strident statements of fact. As Krenek protests, Bayer had launched an attack on atonal composition as 'rootless, alien to the land and the people' and had placed it in sharp contrast to the 'joyful melodies and charming harmonies of indigenous Austrian music'.¹⁵⁰

Bayer, therefore, was one example of a pan-German composer who could be representative of both Austrofascist and National Socialist musicianship, depending on the immediate context and function in which he and his works appeared. What this impresses upon us is that, ultimately, to study Austrian institutions like RAVAG and the Wiener Symphoniker must also be to add another strand to the already complex skein: it is to consider the emergence of National Socialism, the other major fascist grouping in Austria during the First Republic, and to track its development within and against Austrian pan-German ideology towards the crucial annexation year of 1938.

To commentators like Krenek, this was initially an era of great possibility, of productive political forces that might shape a path towards a higher Austrian culture, born of rich tradition and leading Europe and the wider world; indeed, as we have seen, the regimes of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg continued to make overtures to foreign powers such as Great Britain and Italy, even after the political rapprochement with

¹⁴⁶ Wilhelm Jerger (*Radio Wien*, 10/25, 1934, p. 2) and Leopold Welleba (*Radio Wien*, 10/11, 1933, p. 2) are examples of Austrian composers in the series whose biographies show clear Nazi allegiances; many others could be demonstrated. On Jerger and Welleba, see Prieberg, *Handbuch*, 3409, 7654–5.

¹⁴⁷ See 'Hitler-Feiern in Österreich', *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 21 April 1933, 4, and 'Hitlers 44. Geburtstag', *Grazer Tagblatt*, 20 April 1933, 2. The full programme, including Bayer's premiere, can be found in the online archive at <https://konzerthaus.at/concert/eventid/9969> (accessed 20 September 2021).

¹⁴⁸ Fritz Kuba, 'Der Komponist Friedrich Bayer', *Radio Wien*, 9/35 (1933), 47.

¹⁴⁹ Austriacus [Krenek], 'Ravag-Sendung', 21. Compare also the original schedule given in 'Neues von Radio-Wien', *Radio Wien*, 10/48 (1934), 1, with that listed in *Der Tag*, 28 September 1934, 8.

¹⁵⁰ As reported in Austriacus [Krenek], 'Ravag-Sendung', 21–2.

Hitler of July 1936.¹⁵¹ Simultaneously, however, the many points of close contact between pan-Germanism and Nazism enabled sympathetic transformation of the one into the other, a change led and disseminated by prominent figures who saw the advantages of holding a stake in both. This included well-known cases, politicians like the founding RAVAG president and education minister Rintelen, who was imprisoned in 1935 for having taken part in the Nazi assassination of Dollfuss; but it also included those acting primarily, and perhaps somewhat less conspicuously, within the cultural sphere that surrounded and informed the political one – figures like the Symphoniker conductor Reichwein and the Viennese composer Bayer. It is in the efforts of this latter group, in particular, that we might account for the frictionless interface between Austrofascism, pan-Germanism and the National Socialism of the annexed state, a slick *Bruderkuss* proclaimed from the Großer Saal of the Vienna Konzerthaus and broadcast to Austrian and German audiences on the now-integrated national radio network in April 1938.¹⁵² It is in these efforts, too, and in the Christian Social and Austrofascist contexts that nurtured them, that we might locate a contribution to the historiography of twentieth-century European culture that has proved rather more enduring: the tightening of the fraternal bond between Austria and Germany that maintains ‘Austro-German music’ as a valid currency even into the twenty-first century.

¹⁵¹ A second Symphoniker tour to Italy took place in mid-1937: see ‘Die Wiener Symphoniker in Italien’, *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 11 May 1937, 5–6.

¹⁵² See Stein, *Das Wiener Konzerthaus 1930–1945*, 80–2. The post-*Anschluss* history of the Symphoniker is detailed by Manfred Permoser, *Die Wiener Symphoniker im NS-Staat* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2000).