

theoretical contribution of the book could be enhanced. Giving an extended discussion on how religion and politics have been conceptualized in anthropology (Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*, 1999; Eric R. Wolf, ed., *Religious Regimes and State-Formation: Perspectives from European Ethnology*, 1991) and adjacent social sciences (Racie G. Davie, “Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge,” in Nancy T. Ammermann, ed., *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives*, 2007; N. J. Demerath III, “The Rise of ‘Cultural Religion’ in European Christianity: Learning from Poland, Northern Ireland, and Sweden” *Social Compass* 47, no. 1 [2000]: 127–39; and Umüt Parmaksız, “Making Sense of the Postsecular” *European Journal of Social Theory* 21, no 1 [2018]: 98–116) would have been helpful.

Secondly, it is puzzling that local concepts on the role of religion and the state such as *symphonia* are not discussed at all. Although I am critical about the analytical value of such a concept, I still believe that it is worthy of discussion. In addition, I was wondering why there is no extended analysis on religion and politics in neighboring states with Orthodox majority populations, such as Romania or Russia, where we find similar close entanglements and processes of creating meaning (Tobias Koellner, “On the Restitution of Property and the Making of ‘Authentic’ Landscapes in Contemporary Russia,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 7 [2018]: 1083–1102; Koellner, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Russia: Beyond the Binary of Power and Authority*, 2021; and Giuseppe Tateo, *Under the Sign of the Cross: The People’s Salvation Cathedral and the Church-Building Industry in Postsocialist Romania*, 2020). Finally, it was surprising to see a strong reliance on the notion of relatedness without any reference to ongoing discussions in the new kinship anthropology (Janet Carsten, *Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship*, 2000). Here it would have been interesting to know how the findings from small-scale kin groups can be transferred to complete nations, such as Ukraine.

To conclude, despite some weaknesses, it is fair to say that Wanner’s book is an insightful account analyzing the role of everyday religiosity in relation to politics in contemporary Ukraine. In the analysis, the author gives useful ethnographic insights, which provide evidence for the fact that religion can be helpful for creating belonging. Drawing on the concept of affective atmosphere, Wanner is able to show how the group of the Just Orthodox is incorporating religion into public life and wider society with relevance for wider spheres of society in Ukraine.

TOBIAS KOELLNER
WIFU, Witten/Herdecke University

The Moscow Factor: US Policy toward Sovereign Ukraine and the Kremlin.

By Eugene M. Fishel. Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 82. Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute, 2022. vii, 307 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. \$29.95, paper.

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This book examines the inherently trilateral nature of US policy toward Ukraine. For Eugene M. Fishel, the intrusion of Russia disrupts both Ukraine and Russia policy through a specific set of faulty assumptions he calls the “Moscow factor.” These assumptions include notions that presume Russia’s view of the region and its interests, granting its understandings of Ukraine and Ukrainians as undeserving a state and so deeply intertwined into Russian culture and history as to prevent success on their own.

Fishel demonstrates the malign influence of these faulty assumptions on US policy by examining Washington's response to four key turning points in recent Ukrainian history: the recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign state; the denuclearization of Ukraine; the Orange Revolution; and Russia's intervention in eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. These events occurred under Republican and Democratic presidents (from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama).

Fishel's case for the influence of the Moscow factor is a strong one, though it is difficult to unravel this influence from other factors of great power relations, nuclear weapons, and internal U.S. politics that make their way into relations with Ukraine. The book is at its strongest when insisting that we are still laboring under views of Ukraine and the region that reflect Russian political and foreign policy interests.

The first Bush administration, with the exception of Dick Cheney, made plain its preference for Mikhail Gorbachev and a reformed Soviet Union to an uncertain future of new and unpredictable states like Ukraine. It wanted above all a unified command and control of nuclear weapons. While these priorities reflect an understandable hedge against an uncertain future, Fishel underscores the role the Moscow factor played in the thinking of the president and most of his senior advisors, one that led to Ukraine being cast as the potential source of "suicidal nationalism" (13) and nuclear backsliding. This approach distorted Ukrainian conditions and ended up making denuclearization more difficult.

Fishel is more sanguine about the Clinton administration's management of the process of Ukrainian denuclearization, though he is critical of assumptions the administration made that seem to continue the Bush administration's reliance on the Moscow factor. However, the Clinton administration quickly came around to greater engagement with Ukraine, showing Kyiv both "carrot and stick" with respect to the future of US-Ukrainian relations with and without denuclearization. Though Fishel is skeptical of the trilateral process as an extension of the Moscow factor, American formal presence in the talks on denuclearization made negotiations steadier and provided greater support for Ukraine at a time when Russian voices were questioning existing borders and the status of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Leaving the process solely to the Russians and Ukrainians would have courted disaster.

The Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 brought the Ukrainian people into the streets to denounce a manipulated and corrupt election. Fishel notes that this crisis was preceded by a period of stagnation, corruption, arms sales to Iran, election manipulation, and malfeasance by the Leonid Kuchma administration, stalling momentum in domestic reforms and US-Ukrainian relations. Though Fishel again concentrates on the role of the Moscow factor in US deliberations, he rightly praises the Bush administration's condemnation of the corrupt presidential election and support for the popular protest and rerun of the final round of voting. It later made the case for Ukrainian membership in NATO.

Fishel is most critical of the Obama administration's reluctance to provide Ukraine lethal aid in response to Russia's 2014 military intervention in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He sees Obama as choosing engagement with Russia over the Iranian nuclear deal and resupply of US forces in Afghanistan rather than facing the serious security repercussions of Russia's actions in Ukraine. There are many who would agree with Fishel that the Obama response was tepid and strategically short-sighted, though whether the Moscow factor was decisive here is more of a question.

Fishel's book makes a persuasive case for the existence of the Moscow factor, one that should make policymakers pause to consider assumptions that lie at the base of policy options. The book stops before analyzing the turning points in Ukrainian policy in the Trump administration or the current Russian war against Ukraine, key test cases for examining the continued influence of the Moscow factor, as well as

its interaction with other factors at work within the US shaping notions of Russia, Ukraine, and larger European security issues.

SHERMAN GARNETT

James Madison College at Michigan State University

Without the State: Self-Organization and Political Activism in Ukraine. By Emily Channel-Justice. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022. vii, 275 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. \$34.95, paper.
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Emily Channel-Justice's book, *Without the State*, explores Ukrainian self-organization from its philosophical roots in Marxism and leftism to the present. The primary focus is the revolution in Ukraine 2013–14, variously called Euromaidan and/or the Revolution of Dignity, which the author experienced directly. The book is ethnographically nuanced, theoretically sophisticated, and the text is supported by no fewer than thirty-six high quality photographs that bring the revolutionary events to life. Readers of *Without the State* will gain a better understanding of the significance of self-organization for the trajectory of Ukrainian politics in the past and its implications for neoliberal governance in the future. The thesis that the Euromaidan changed the way Ukrainians think about the state and politics is both compelling and vindicated by Ukrainians' response to Russian aggressions after the book's publication.

The book begins with a clear explanation of what self-organization is, and how it is philosophically and theoretically related to leftism and socialism. Readers learn that self-organization has a far longer history than contemporary observers of Ukrainian civil society may imagine. Self-organization's remarkable fluidity has helped make it the most significant platform for political organizing and participation in Ukraine. This adaptability, however, also makes it vulnerable to being mischaracterized or misunderstood. Like many good ethnographies, the book is dense: the author has a keen eye for twists, turns, and paradoxes in the many lives and movements she follows.

In Chap. 2, readers find the stories of two very different activists. Channel-Justice demonstrates that the left is expansive enough to accommodate a variety of paths to activism and beliefs. With a deepened understanding of Leftism at top of mind, readers are well prepared to absorb the author's discussion of decommunization efforts in the third chapter. Having personally read Ukrainian newspapers in Ukraine at the time the author describes, I valued the powerful analytic tools—tools that are useful for Ukrainian politics in general—that Channel-Justice provides.

Channel-Justice supports her argument with extensive ethnographic fieldwork that included participation in some of the demonstrations she describes. Her argument about how leftism inspired self-organization and how self-organization then shaped a number of movements is not, however, limited to demonstrations. She also opens a window on the more subtle ways the events of the Maidan shaped her interviewees' awareness as members of neighborhoods, apartment blocks, and other collectivities. A methodological strength is the longevity of the author's rapport with some of the subjects, whom we learn about over a nine-year time span. They provide the book with important throughlines in the midst of enormous change.

At the heart of the book are two chapters, one on education reform and another on feminism. In the chapter on higher education reform, the author argues that self-organization can also work *within* the state, an intriguing idea considering most of