

had lost much of their earlier élan, although the Democratic Society (since its expulsion from the European mainland) had found a new home in London. There it succeeded in reviving its journal, the last issue of which appeared in December 1862, on the eve of a new insurrection in Poland which broke out the following month.

The second—and more readable—part of Dr. Kalemka's book deals with ideological problems discussed in the columns of the radical émigré press. He has selected four questions for special treatment: To what causes did the radicals assign the partitions and the subsequent failure to achieve independence by armed action? What methods did they consider to be most effective for regaining their country's lost freedom? How did they view the role of the emigration in the life of the Polish nation? And, finally, how did they envisage the frontiers and sociopolitical regime of Poland after the planned insurrection, which they all believed would be fought to a successful conclusion? These were all topics which were fiercely disputed not only between the émigré left and right, but often within the ranks of the left wing itself.

The book includes both a useful appendix listing bibliographical data concerning each of the left-wing émigré publications and a summary in French, but it lacks an index. It is also unfortunate that the print is rather ugly and the general appearance of the volume unattractive. Even taking into account the rising costs of book production, I cannot help thinking that the publishers might have produced a more comely volume to encase the results of Dr. Kalemka's research on a subject of considerable importance for nineteenth-century Polish history.

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POLSKA-JUGOSŁAWIA 1934–1939: Z DZIEJÓW STOSUNKÓW POLITYCZNYCH. By *Anna Garlicka*. Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Historii. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977. 225 pp. Paper.

Anna Garlicka's study of the foreign policy of Poland and Yugoslavia and the mutual relations between the two countries emerged from her doctoral dissertation. She relies primarily on the archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supplemented by the Central Archives of the Ministry of the Interior and the archives of the Polish general staff and War Ministry. The author was unable to gain access to Yugoslav and Czechoslovak archives, but has made good use of the Polish and Yugoslav press, memoirs, and key monographs. The book is a significant contribution to the history of East European relations between the two world wars, for Garlicka adds the Polish dimension for those already familiar with J. B. Hoptner's *Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934–1941* (New York, 1962). It is also of interest to those working in the field of Italian and German foreign policy and, to a lesser extent, French and British policy at this time.

The study deals with Polish-Yugoslav aims and relations, but always within the context of the policies of the Great Powers—Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. Relations between Warsaw and Belgrade were friendly for most of this period, but they were never close, because each country faced threats from different quarters. Thus, whereas Poland feared German and Soviet expansion at her own expense, Yugoslavia's main fear was Italian expansion combined with, or followed by, Hungarian expansion. Their reactions to the growing might of Hitler's Germany were similar. Observing French weakness and British conciliation of Germany, they sought to normalize their relations with the latter. Poland did so by signing a declaration of nonaggression with Germany in January 1934. Yugoslavia went much further. Economic needs and the desire to balance Italy with Germany led to almost total eco-

conomic dependence on Berlin by 1937. Only a state-directed and consistent British policy of increasing trade with Yugoslavia could have provided a counterweight. However, imperial preferences and the principle of free enterprise, bolstered by the view of Eastern Europe as a natural sphere of German economic influence, prevented any significant British effort to stem German economic domination of Yugoslavia and other Balkan states.

Garlicka correctly views Polish and Yugoslav policies within the context of Western policy toward Germany and Italy. Western conciliation of Germany convinced both Warsaw and Belgrade to accept the Anschluss and to view German annexation of the Sudetenland as inevitable unless France and Britain made a stand. Earlier, French attempts to reach an understanding with Italy provided a political motive for Yugoslav efforts to seek good relations with Germany. It was also Western policy toward Germany which prompted the Polish foreign minister, Józef Beck, to attempt to form a "Third Europe," a bloc consisting of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia backed by Italy. However, Italian weakness, Hungary's reluctance to limit her revisionist aims, and thus Rumanian and Yugoslav fears of Budapest all doomed this concept to failure. Similarly, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente failed to protect Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia because of the lack of Western support. British attempts to check forceful German expansion by guarantees to East European states in 1939 came too late and were not buttressed by any plans to attack from the west if Germany attacked in the east.

In sum, Garlicka confirms the view that the policies of East European states depended on those of the Western powers. She has made excellent use of Polish archives in her documentation of both Polish and Yugoslav attempts to find security when there was very little room for maneuver. In the end, both fell victim to invasion and occupation, Poland in 1939 and Yugoslavia in 1941. Garlicka's study contributes significantly to our understanding of how they tried to avoid this fate and why they failed.

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THE UNITED STATES IN PRAGUE, 1945–1948. By *Walter Ullmann*. East European Monographs, 36. Boulder, Colo.: *East European Quarterly*, 1978. x, 205 pp. \$13.00. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

Eurocommunism is not entirely a new phenomenon: it was attempted in Czechoslovakia during the period covered by this book. And in spite of the analysis of Eurocommunism by a number of authors, there are still many areas of uncertainty. The present volume throws light on a few of these areas by viewing the events through the eyes of the United States embassy in Prague. This is both the book's merit and its limitation, for it is based primarily on State Department archives, since Czech sources are not available.

One of the crucial, unresolved problems is why Eisenhower first ordered American troops to advance all the way to Prague, only to rescind his order. Ullmann describes the two ranking experts at the State Department's Central European desk—Riddleberger and Williamson—as "literally crawling on hands and knees to try to persuade the powers to send American armies to Prague." Eden also pushed for military involvement, but without success. The decision may have been one of the most fateful of the Truman administration.

In essence, the Ullmann book deals with the Prague ambassadorship of Laurence Steinhardt. His conclusions are not very favorable. He states that Steinhardt may have been adequate for a conventional station, but that he was hardly a counterweight for