

by his thorough knowledge of Eastern patristic philosophy and Russian monasticism. Unlike Masaryk and other skeptics, he avoids all speculation about the psychodynamics of Kireevsky's religious experience, concentrating instead on the intellectual content of his relationship with Optyn' (Optina Monastery). Each patristic text that Kireevsky read is taken up separately, its possible influence detailed with admirable precision. One can only wish Christoff had done the same for the Germans, Schelling in particular, whose contribution he discusses only in general terms. But the conclusion—that for Kireevsky, as for the Orthodox Fathers, knowledge was an accompaniment of faith—is unexceptionable. Like Kierkegaard in the West, Kireevsky never tired of warning against the perils of Hegelian reason. Christoff draws an apt parallel between these two existentialists. Moreover, his emphasis on Kireevsky's diagnosis of alienation as the fatal disease of Western intellect suggests an affinity between Slavophile epistemology and Dostoevsky's vision of the dreamers of reason who inevitably engender monsters. While Christoff falls short of exploring this link, he deserves much credit for all his other numerous allusions and explorations. His text and notes reach out into germane areas of Russian thought, always in pursuit of that religious strain in the blood which nourished the imagination of so many Russian novelists and poets.

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THE CRIMEAN WAR: A REAPPRAISAL. By *Philip Warner*. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1973. vi, 232 pp. \$9.95.

Mr. Warner, in trying to correct some of the common errors about the Crimean War, has not been entirely successful, especially in his treatment of the diplomacy. The treatment of the campaigns is better. He certainly shows the British lack of planning and organization that proved so costly.

The narrative is on the whole accurate. It covers the landing and the Battle of the Alma, where the British did well, and then the march around Sevastopol to the shore south of it, while the Russians hastily threw up earthworks to protect the port. The initial bombardment failed, and the Russians counterattacked at Balaklava and then at Inkerman, where they almost destroyed the British army and won the war. The winter storms caused further havoc. But a remnant of British survived, and, with the large French force, continued the siege. Under Todleben, however, the Russians improved their defenses so much that the allies could do little until July 1855. In June a general assault on the fortress failed, with terrible casualties.

The siege went on, and allied superiority in resources turned the tide. Although the Russians had plenty of cannon, they did not have the huge mortars that the allies used, and—the author to the contrary—they often lacked gunpowder, bombs, and shells. Most of their army was in Poland, the Baltic area, and the Caucasus.

Warner also emphasizes the Russian siege of Kars, but largely disregards the allied raids elsewhere. In summing up, he gives top credit to the French, and warmly praises Todleben and the Russians. The British, who did poorly in 1855 and failed dismally in the final assault, lost much prestige. The Turks made a miserable showing. On the whole, an accurate judgment.

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