

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE ROLE OF THE CPSU IN INDUSTRIAL DECISION-MAKING, 1917-1970. By *William J. Conyngham*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973. xxxvi, 378 pp. \$9.50.

This is a book with a broader horizon than its title suggests, and should not be overlooked by students of Soviet politics or political scientists. It is not a narrow study of the intricacies of industrial management in the Soviet Union but a comprehensive evaluation of the record of the Soviet Communist Party's general political direction of the industrial and agricultural economy of the USSR. The study combines a well-drawn analytical perspective of party leadership (*rukovodstvo*) of Soviet economic development from Lenin to Brezhnev with a perceptive case study of Khrushchev's ultimately abortive design for a major departure from past—principally Stalinist—direction of the economy.

The author quite rightly makes Khrushchev's 1962 reform of party structure the centerpiece of his investigation. He also appropriately places Khrushchev's bifurcation of the party structure into industrial and agricultural branches against the backdrop of his decentralization of state industrial management in 1957—a bold but finally abortive attempt to replace the system of Stalinist ministerial centralism. Conyngham convincingly shows that the party reform was not simply a "harebrained scheme" which can be ignored. On the contrary, the study reveals that the party reform offered a serious alternative to traditional methods of economic leadership, which were and continue to prove of decreasing effectiveness even in the Soviet leadership's own lights. The study analyzes in detail Khrushchev's concerted effort to reshape the party institution from top to bottom into an agency directly serving the mundane economic concerns of Soviet society. He sought to break the party institution out of its Stalinist mold as a single-purpose instrument and political-ideological force for the forced-draft industrialization of the USSR.

Conyngham shows that the 1962 party reform sought to absorb the traditional economic functions of the state into the party apparatus. The evidence even suggests that Khrushchev's long-term goal was to make over the party itself into a kind of substitute for the state and thus erase the long-standing dualism of party and state in the Soviet Union. The reform foundered on the ire of state functionaries fearing loss of status and ultimate displacement, regional party leaders opposed to their conversion from political chiefs ruling territories to executives responsible for an economic sector, and party ideologue-guardians wedded to the party-state dualism as essential to the ideocratic regime.

Although the precise interplay of precipitating causes of Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 remains unclear, Conyngham's view that the political consequences of the leader's party reform were central among the factors contributing to his downfall is hard to fault. Khrushchev's attempt at a "real ideological and structural adaptation of the party to modern conditions," Conyngham concludes, was debilitated from the start by the constraints of the Leninist-Stalinist monocratic tradition. Conyngham's able review of the reconsolidation under Brezhnev of the party's monocratic structure by a return to a traditional approach to ideology and organization illustrates the remarkable rigidity of the institution Lenin founded and Stalin perfected. After all of the changes and undoing of changes in party economic leadership methods in the post-Stalin period, a reading of Conyngham's

study provides a forceful reminder of how little has, in fact, changed in the basic practice of the Soviet party dictatorship.

Conyngham nonetheless sees an intensifying conflict between the urge for total power of the monocratic-ideocratic party and the need in modern Russia for a political institution that can function effectively and responsively in an intricate, modernized continental state. At the same time he shies away from the notion that the conflict will one day produce a sudden breakdown of the party institution. Rather, he thinks a strong impulsion remains at work urging the party leadership toward a new choice between a modernized and computerized neo-Stalinist economic centralism or a decentralized, incipiently pluralist, market socialism. The cross-purposes Conyngham's study finds operating in the area of party economic leadership find their echo in Brezhnev's overall political strategy. He has of late demonstrated once more the party-state's capacity to generate power-political force for Soviet purposes in world politics, yet he betrays in his détente efforts its incapacity to resolve the economic and technological difficulties it now faces without major assists from its proclaimed adversaries in the West.

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VELIKII OKTIABR' I INTELLIGENTSIIA: IZ ISTORII VOVLECHENIIA STAROI INTELLIGENTSII V STROITEL'STVO SOTSIALIZMA. By S. A. Fediukin. Moscow: "Nauka," 1972. 471 pp. 1.81 rubles.

Despite the title, this book is about neither the October Revolution nor the intellectuals; it is a carefully revised and expanded version of the author's earlier work on the use of technical personnel by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s, *Sovetskaia vlast' i burzhuannye spetsialisty* (Moscow, 1965). Fediukin argues that the intelligentsia was initially hostile to the Soviet regime but by the time of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32) was generally supportive. By "intelligentsia" he means professionals and specialists: army officers, engineers, doctors, teachers, professors, and, to a lesser extent, artists and writers.

In his first two chapters Fediukin cites numerous examples of early intelligentsia opposition to the Bolsheviks in 1917–18 (such as the teachers' strike of December 1917) and of Lenin's benign toleration intended to win them over. In chapter 3 he uses statistics from Soviet archives to document the recruitment of tsarist army officers and technical personnel (including doctors and pilots) by the Red Army during the Civil War; of artists, writers, and teachers by Narkompros; and of engineers and economists by Goelro and Vesenkha. By the mid-1920s, Fediukin argues in chapter 4, the "significant part" of the intelligentsia had accepted the Bolsheviks by direct support or by involvement with the fellow-traveling *Smena vekh* (Changing Directions) movement which sought to reconcile intellectuals and professionals to the new regime. Finally, in chapter 5, he concludes that the First Five-Year Plan witnessed the final transition of the intelligentsia's attitudes from hostility through neutrality to acceptance.

Fediukin's book is most useful to the scholar seeking statistical data on Soviet professional groups in the 1920s, or selected statements of opinion by individuals. Yet much of this evidence may also be found in his 1965 volume. His new sections on artists, writers, teachers, and doctors are less significant than his revisions of the 1965 sections on military specialists and engineers. For example, Fediukin had