

VICEREGAL PERSISTENCE VERSUS INDIAN MOBILITY:

The Impact of the Duque de la Palata's Reform Program on Alto Perú, 1681–1692*

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Charles II named the Duque de la Palata as viceroy of Perú in 1680 with the hope that he would be able to revitalize the production of royal revenue in the realm. The key to accomplishing that goal, the king believed, was to assign more Indians to the mines and silver mills of Potosí because the crown ostensibly received 20 percent of the silver marked in the Villa Imperial. One-seventh of the adult population of male *originarios* (Indians living in their assigned pueblos) in the obligated provinces could be assigned to Potosí in any one year under Francisco de Toledo's ordinances, and the Duque was authorized to extend this *mita* obligation to any or all of the fourteen previously exempted *altiplano* (highland) *corregimientos*, that is, to increase the base from which the one-seventh ratio was taken. The number of new *corregimientos* to be added would depend upon the results of a prerequisite census in the thirty *corregimientos* of Alto Perú (sixteen *mita* and fourteen exempted).¹

The crown and its Council of the Indies had been pressing for an enumeration in Alto Perú since the 1650s because the census was fundamental to the drafting of a new *repartimiento de la mita*, a viceregal order outlining the number of Indians serving in the *mita* that each *corregimiento* was obliged to send to Potosí and assigning them to *azogueros* (mill and mine owners). Compliance with the *mita* had declined from roughly forty-five hundred Indians per week, the *mita ordinaria* prescribed by Toledo and the most recent *repartimiento* of 1633, to an effective two thousand or less. Moreover, approximately half of the *mitayos* (*mita* laborers) arrived in the Villa Imperial not in person, but in the form

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of money payments made by *kurakas* (Indian nobles) to the mine and mill owners (azogueros) to pay for hiring volunteers (*mingas*). Because the azogueros habitually used those funds not to hire replacements for the ransomed Indians but for their own purposes, the council also demanded that that practice be halted.² Both the census and the abolition of "mita service in silver" were meant therefore to boost the production of silver at Potosí and thus to enlarge the royal share of that production.

The twin issues of the census and the misuse by the azogueros of mita service in silver were also employed by the system's enemies in their campaign to eradicate it. Those enemies were the *encomenderos*, ranchers, *kurakas*, other mining interests, and local officials in the sixteen mita provinces that competed with the azogueros for access to and control of the native work force. These competing interests claimed that the Potosí mita had caused a vast depopulation of their pueblos and provinces and that the abuses of the azogueros proved that they did not deserve royal assistance via the mita. Abolishing the system, they promised, would halt the demographic disaster in Alto Perú and allow the native society there to stabilize.³

The azogueros countered that no overall depopulation had taken place, that many Indians simply had moved away from their home pueblos and provinces and thereby had won exemption from the mita by becoming *forasteros* (outsiders) and false *yanaconas* (the progeny of Indians assigned by Toledo to nonmining labor). Indeed, huge numbers of runaways were said to be living in the fourteen exempted provinces and cities of Cuzco, Paucartambo, Carabaya, Condesuyo de Arequipa, Larecacha, La Paz, Atacama, Misque, Lipes, Tomina, Oruro, Pilaya y Paspaya, Yamparaes, and Potosí. The azogueros argued that misuse of mita service in silver was not nearly as prevalent as their detractors claimed, being limited to a few "rotten apples." They warned, moreover, that unless the effective weekly total of mitayos again reached four thousand, as a result of including more pueblos or the currently free *yanaconas* and *forasteros*, the mining industry at Potosí would soon grind to a halt.⁴

Both sides demanded that the government conduct a census to prove that their assertions were correct. The azogueros called for a thirty-corregimiento enumeration that would demonstrate the effects of Indian migration. The mita's enemies wanted to include only the sixteen provinces in order to prove that they were virtually abandoned. The Council of the Indies left the question of how many provinces to cover in the census to the viceregal administration in Lima. The viceroys, however, were squeezed between the competing interests and doubted that they had the time or the means to complete the census. Furthermore, if the enumeration were to show a decline in the originario population of the mita provinces, the system might have to be cut back (to bring it into line with Toledo's one-seventh ratio) and silver production at Potosí would

fall accordingly. So rather than risk antagonizing either side or suffer the possible professional and fiscal consequences of the census, the viceroys chose to postpone its execution indefinitely.⁵

The biggest obstacle to the census was the issue of which agents should carry it out. The viceregal apparatus in Lima opposed the use of local kurakas and corregidores, who would have a vested interest in misrepresenting the Indian population in their areas in order to lower mita and tribute obligations and to protect the Indians who worked in their personal enterprises. The government could not afford to pay professional census takers, however, and it did not think that the azogueros or the Indians could bear that cost either.⁶ By 1670 the crown had grown impatient, and it ordered two judges from the Audiencia of La Plata to inspect that court's jurisdiction. The program was never carried out, however, apparently because of the time required for the two judges to travel throughout Alto Perú and the demands of their other judicial duties.⁷

During the viceroyalty of the Conde de Lemos (1667–72), Visitador Juan de Ibarra suggested that the census be conducted via the ecclesiastical hierarchy, with local curates reporting to their superiors about the Indians living under their guidance. The cost of the process would be minimal, Ibarra argued, and the results would be untainted by personal interest. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of the proposed ecclesiastical enumeration was to remain a secret. This plan was approved by Madrid, but it too was shelved when the Conde de Lemos chose instead to advocate the mita's abolition.⁸

After the Council of the Indies and Queen Mariana rejected Lemos's abolition proposal in 1673, largely for fiscal reasons, they ordered his successors—the Conde de Castellar (1674–78) and Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros (1678–81)—to suggest the best means to reintegrate the Potosí mita. The azogueros had convinced the crown that the level of silver production at Potosí was directly related to the number of mitayos assigned to them. The two viceroys therefore were instructed to consider the extension of the mita to more pueblos.⁹ In 1680 Liñán's *asesor general* (general consultant), Francisco de Valera, produced a printed "Propuesta" that provided a step-by-step procedure leading to a new repartimiento de la mita. The local officials in the thirty corregimientos of Alto Perú would perform a coordinated census that would keep the cost low and minimize the impact of Indian mobility during the count, and church sources would be employed to check the accuracy of their work. Meanwhile, the corregidor of Potosí and the president of the Audiencia of La Plata would determine the optimal number of mitayos for the Villa Imperial. If there proved to be too few Indians in the sixteen provinces to meet that number (one-seventh of the adult male originario population), then the system's domain would be extended to include as many new

areas as necessary. Valera also suggested that the Toledan three-shift mita might be replaced by a two-part regimen in order to reduce the number of Indians who would have to travel to and from Potosí each year.¹⁰

The Duque de la Palata reviewed the Valera propuesta with the Council of the Indies before departing for Lima. By the time he embarked at Cádiz, he had been directed by the king to make the reintegration of the Potosí mita, and the production of royal revenue in the viceroyalty of Perú in general, his principal concern.¹¹ Charles II had unusually deep faith in Palata, who had served on the regency that ruled the Spanish Empire during the king's minority and had earned a reputation for devotion to the crown during his previous quarter-century of government service.¹²

Soon after his arrival in Perú in November 1681, Palata received another *cédula* from the crown urging him to formulate a new repartimiento de la mita as quickly as possible because the azogueros had predicted that the Potosí silver industry would collapse within two years unless the mita was revitalized.¹³ Working in league with the Real Acuerdo of Lima, the archbishops of Charcas and Lima (the latter being Liñán), the corregidor of Potosí, and the president of La Plata, the Duque devised a program that followed Valera's format closely. As the propuesta had suggested, the census would be conducted by the corregidores, assisted by local kurakas and curates, with a parallel enumeration to be undertaken via the ecclesiastical channels as a check. Rather than limit the count to the thirty corregimientos of Alto Perú, however, the viceroy decided to extend the area covered by the census to all eighty-three of the Peruvian corregimientos. He concluded that if the ultimate purpose was to raise royal revenue, a census in lower Perú and the environs of Quito would further that effort as well.¹⁴

The orders to begin the ecclesiastical census were dispatched on 7 April 1683 and were followed by the instructions to the corregidores on 24 July. The government enumeration was to begin in all of the corregimientos on the same day (1 October) in order to prevent Indian mobility from distorting results. The entire process was supposed to be completed within two years, when the tallies of the corregidores would have been compiled into master lists in Lima by two specially appointed *contadores* (controllers), Joseph de Villegas and Pedro Antonio del Castillo.¹⁵

The instructions for the *numeración general de indios* were extremely detailed and demanding. Each corregidor was to produce eight tomes that would list the originarios who were present (book 1), temporarily absent (book 2), or missing (book 3); the forasteros who remembered their pueblos of origin (book 4) and those who did not (book 5); *mitimaes* (the progeny of Indians resettled during the Inca period) (book 6); and yanaconas who worked in Spanish-owned enterprises (book 7) or in

municipal or church activities (book 8). Within each of these books, every Indian's age, sex, and *ayllu* (moiety) affiliation was to be noted. Once in the hands of the *contadores*, the results from the various *corregimientos* were to be compared to determine the true patterns of Indian migration and other demographic trends. Furthermore, with all eighty-three Peruvian *corregimientos* to be included, any future migration could be documented simply by repeating the process.¹⁶

The delineation of *yanaconas*, *forasteros*, and *originarios* was meant to serve another purpose as well. The viceroy and his advisers had agreed, during their discussions on the form of the census, that the traditional exemption from the *mita* and tribute currently enjoyed by the *yanaconas* and *forasteros* should be abolished—that no Indian should be able to evade those responsibilities simply by leaving his *pueblo* of origin. Thus the *yanaconas* and *forasteros* were given the choice either to return to their places of origin within six months or be treated as *originarios* where they currently resided. Once the enumeration was over, there would be no *yanacona* or *forastero* status.¹⁷ As Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz and Brian Evans have already noted, Palata clearly was attempting to complete the first modern census in Perú, something very different from the traditional lists of tributaries that had formed the bases for the *mita* and tribute in the past.¹⁸

The zeal of the Duque de la Palata is apparent in the care with which he planned for the 1683 enumeration and in his decision to extend the census to cover all Perú. Unfortunately, his good intentions and diligence were not enough to make his census proceed according to plan. Most of the problems that developed were caused by Indian mobility, but they were exacerbated by the various *corregidores*' uneven application of Palata's instructions.

In the sixteen *mita* provinces, the Indians responded to the enumeration the very moment that it was announced. The prologue to the instructions for the *corregidores* stated that the census was the first stage of a process that would force the *forasteros* to bear their fair share of the native community's responsibilities. Well-versed in evading government programs, the *forasteros*—joined by many of the *originarios*—took to the roads and headed for those *pueblos*, cities, and provinces that traditionally had been exempted from *mita* recruitment. They surmised that once tallied in those areas, they would be spared the physical and financial rigors of compliance with the Potosí *mita*. This effort to evade future personal service increased the number of Indians on the move, as the would-be exemptees joined the few *forasteros* who had agreed to return to their *pueblos* of origin and the already large force of Indians who traveled during the course of any year as migrant laborers and traders. The payment of tribute seems to have concerned them less because they would have been required to pay it even in the "free" *pueblos* and

provinces.¹⁹ Indeed, the Indians already living in the exempted areas took little notice of Palata's enumeration or its ultimate purpose.²⁰

The effects of Indian movement were compounded by uneven compliance with Palata's instructions in the altiplano corregimientos. The viceroy's orders did not arrive in Alto Perú until just days or weeks before the enumeration was scheduled to begin, and when they were received, the corregidores were generally unable to decipher them. Many officials wrote to Lima asking for clarification and postponed the execution of the census until they received a reply. In other cases, the corregidores chose to follow local (and varying) custom in the formulation of their census rosters, and their districts consequently had to be recounted later to bring them into line with the Duque's directions. Despite the two-year limit designated by the viceroy, the enumeration in Alto Perú dragged on for five years until it was finally finished in 1688.²¹

Because the local officials were not paid for their efforts, the only incentives to comply with the viceregal orders were the stiff penalties for the failure to report extant Indians and the prizes for uncovering undocumented natives that Palata had included in the instructions. When the census finally got underway in Alto Perú, the kurakas and corregidores therefore included every Indian for whom they had a shred of evidence, such as migrants passing through and absentees for whom they had only a baptismal record.²² Even the demonstration of receipts by once-counted Indians could not dissuade officials bent on providing the contadores with as complete a list as possible.²³ To make things worse, some Indians gave false names and places of origin to the corregidores and kurakas in yet another attempt to avoid the ultimate consequences of the census.²⁴ As a result of these factors plus the five years that the enumeration lasted, many Indians came to be listed as residents of two or more locations. Often they appeared as yanacunas in one place, as forasteros in two others, and as originarios in yet another—and sometimes with different names in each instance.²⁵

Most of these irregularities were recognized while the enumeration was being conducted. Contador Joseph de Villegas expressed his doubts about the viability of the results from Alto Perú to the Duque de la Palata in 1685, but the viceroy was unconvinced.²⁶ By that point, the Duque's honor and reputation were at stake, and he refused to turn back. He simply called upon everyone concerned to do their best to minimize the problems that Villegas had identified and to complete the task as quickly as possible. When the census was finally completed, Palata reported to the crown that while it was not perfect, it had gone more smoothly than anyone had anticipated, and the results were surely the best possible, given the circumstances.²⁷

The findings of the 1683 enumeration, however flawed, were significant. Even with overcounting and other irregularities, the figures for

Alto Perú showed that the Indian population had declined by nearly half since 1573, with the demographic decline in the sixteen mita provinces being the worst. While some of the fourteen other altiplano corregimientos had received a large influx of migrants (nearly three-quarters of their inhabitants were now forasteros), most showed no net increase in Indian population. Thus, the large pockets of runaways that the azogueros of Potosí had predicted failed to materialize. The greatest loss was in the number of originarios; even within the sixteen mita provinces, the yanacunas and forasteros now represented some 50 percent of the native population.²⁸

Beyond portraying the rough contours of the Indian community of Alto Perú, the 1683 census failed to achieve its expressed goals. Palata had hoped, for example, to compare the professed origins of the forasteros (from book 4) in any given corregimiento to the lists of absent originarios (books 2 and 3) from the corresponding areas, but the uneven application of his instructions by the corregidores made that impossible.²⁹ The issue of overcounting also put the enumeration's accuracy in doubt. Brian Evans contends that little serious overcounting occurred during the 1683 census, but it undoubtedly happened on many occasions. Palata later argued that any double-counting had been offset by the failure to include other Indians at all, an assertion with which both Sánchez-Albornoz and Evans tend to agree.³⁰

The viceroy's insistence that the enumeration was accurate presented no great problem as long as it was not used as the basis for any reforms. The reformation of the mita and tribute was the *raison d'être* for the census, however, and the results demonstrated that profound changes would have to be made if royal revenues from Perú were to be augmented. In terms of implementing those changes, the question of alleged overcounting was far less consequential than the inclusion of absent, migratory, and even nonexistent Indians on the census rosters. When Palata issued a new repartimiento de la mita and new tribute requirements in 1688 and 1689, he tried to do more than meet Potosí's need for mitayos by making the forasteros bear their share of the Indians' obligations. Palata also intended to hold each individual Indian accountable for his own mita and tribute obligation by using the census rosters to draft the new mita and tribute lists. From the beginning, tribute and mita obligations in Perú had been met by communities and collected from their kurakas—albeit with each community's quotas based on the number of resident tributaries. Palata's effort to make the mita and tribute personal, rather than communal, responsibilities therefore attempted to alter the very nature of the relationship between the Andean Indians and their sovereign.³¹

Given the results of the numeración general, the Duque de la Palata had no choice but to include some of the previously exempted cor-

regimientos in the Potosí mita. He chose Larecaja, Tomina, Pilaya y Paspaya, Misque, Yamparaes, Porco, some of Cochabamba, and the barrio of San Pedro de La Paz, as well as eight *curatos* and eighteen pueblos within the sixteen mita provinces that previously had been exempted because they were the closest to the Villa Imperial. Palata considered the trip to and from Potosí to be the most onerous aspect of the draft labor system. The cities of La Plata, Potosí, Oruro, and La Paz remained free because their Indian residents were needed for municipal labor projects.³² All the male Indians living within the designated areas were obliged in future to serve in the mita, regardless of whether they had been forasteros, yanaconas, or originarios. The viceroy reasoned that it was unfair for the native community's responsibilities to rest only on the originarios.³³

A concern for fairness also underlay the other changes that Palata made in the mita. He lowered the total number of mitayos (the *mita gruesa*) that would have to travel to and live in the Villa Imperial by cutting the weekly total (the mita ordinaria) to 2,829 (and limiting the recipients to the owners of the fifty-seven most productive mills) and by shortening the Toledan two-week rest period to one week. Palata believed that there were now enough mingas (volunteers) to allow the mitayos to rest rather than work during their off-weeks and that one week of rest therefore would suffice. He also thought that the Indians who would have comprised the other third of a conventional mita gruesa would appreciate staying home and that their communities would benefit by their presence.³⁴

The new tribute regimen was also supposed to be more equitable. The forasteros and yanaconas were now to pay the same amount of tribute per capita as the originarios; and they would be assessed that sum wherever they moved. The amount of tribute owed by each Indian was also lowered in relation to that ostensibly paid by the originarios under the Toledan system, and no Indian was to be forced to pay the tribute owed by another, whether the latter was dead or absent. Tribute was thus to be an unavoidable personal responsibility, but an unburdensome one.³⁵

The reforms that the Duque ordered for the mita and tribute seem quite benign in comparison to Toledo's ordinances. They failed to take into account, however, that the two institutions had long since stopped performing as Toledo had intended—if indeed they ever really had. The Indians who served in the mita, for example, did not rest two weeks in every three, but every other week at best and often not at all. The number of mitayos living in the Villa Imperial was rarely much greater than the effective weekly total of mitayos serving in person, so two groups of 2,829 represented a large increase rather than a reduction in the number of Indians that would have to be delivered to Potosí. Moreover, because

the mitayos rarely returned home after a year in the mines, remaining instead in the mining zone for years at a time, Palata's demand that they serve in one-year shifts would have increased, not lowered, the number of Indians that traveled back and forth.³⁶

As noted above, approximately half of the mita was now delivered in silver. That money, as well as the funds to pay tribute, was gathered by the kurakas not only from the originario tributaries, but through collections among women and old men, by renting land to forasteros or selling it to Spaniards, and via economic enterprises such as the production and sale of coca. Every resident of an Indian pueblo thus contributed to the satisfaction of that community's obligations, at least to some extent; everyone's participation was absolutely necessary because of the ever-falling number of originarios and the unchanging tribute and mita quotas. When the Duque de la Palata included forasteros and yanacunas on a par with the originarios, he not only asked for more than they were accustomed to paying, he failed to understand that they were not untapped resources, but were already integrated into the de facto taxation system.³⁷

The viceroy's reform program also failed to allow for the demographic changes that had taken place in Alto Perú since the numeración general was begun in 1683. The region had been plagued, for instance, by a number of deadly diseases during the mid-1680s, and many of the Indians who appeared on Palata's tribute and mita rosters had died by 1689. Important economic centers, which attracted voluntary Indian laborers by the hundreds, had either been abandoned (as with the mining zone at Porco) or founded during the interval.³⁸ Thus, the figures produced during the course of the census, and those that were used to prepare the new mita and tribute quotas, often bore little resemblance to the 1689 reality, no matter how closely they might have reflected the status quo ante.

But the most crucial factor that Palata failed to consider was that the de facto mita and tribute systems depended upon the ability of the kurakas to control and extract money from the Indians in their communities. Although the kurakas used a combination of financial, psychological, and corporal pressures to keep the originarios in line, the imposed obligations could not outweigh the attractions of land, family, and community.³⁹ The kurakas asked relatively little of the forasteros and yanacunas, especially those who lived and worked on nearby ranches or farms, because the kurakas had little to offer them in exchange, and thus little leverage. The viceroy's attempt to replace a community-based taxation system with individual-based mita and tribute regimens as well as the inclusion of forasteros and yanacunas on an equal footing with originarios thus asked more of the kurakas than they could realistically accomplish. In one pass of the hand, the various means by which the kurakas

had met obligations of their pueblos in the past were proscribed while the levels of those obligations were increased.

Francisco de Toledo had based the original Potosí mita on the labor practices that were extant when he arrived in Perú. He borrowed from prehispanic tradition and the experiences of Potosí during its first thirty years of silver production.⁴⁰ More importantly, he traveled to Alto Perú and examined the situation there at first hand. In contrast, the Duque de la Palata based his new repartimiento de la mita not on the de facto mita and tribute, but on the Toledan ordinances, and he did so from Lima. Palata thus ignored the current situation in Alto Perú, which was the product of a century and more of metamorphosis, and relied only on legal considerations. His failure to base reforms on reality consequently occasioned a bevy of problems.

The novelties and flaws involved in the Duque's new mita and tribute ordinances would have made them difficult to implement under the best of circumstances, but the speed with which they were introduced destroyed any remaining chance of success. Yet because the census in Alto Perú had taken so long, the viceroy's reforms had to be implemented quickly, if they were to be in place when his successor arrived. Palata feared that the next viceroy would neglect any unfinished aspect of his program rather than attempt to complete this difficult endeavor.⁴¹ The first payment of tribute under the Palatan regime fell due on the feast of Saint John, 24 June 1689, and according to the new repartimiento, the first contingents of mitayos were to arrive in Potosí by the end of June, less than five months after the new orders were sent to the provinces from Lima.⁴² Palata's enthusiasm in extending the enumeration to include the entire viceroyalty and his perseverance in conducting the census were also manifested in his determination to complete what he had begun. Once again, however, the viceroy's good intentions were woefully misguided because his haste to implement immediately his changes amplified the ill effects of his misconceived reforms.

When the Indians who had been yanaconas or forasteros and those who had lived in or moved to the exempted areas learned that they were now subject to the mita, they fled forthwith.⁴³ A few went into the cities, which were still free, but most moved southeast into the *yungas* (lowlands) or to other regions completely outside the reach of the Spanish.⁴⁴ In the process, families were broken up, pueblos were abandoned, and ranchers were left without laborers.⁴⁵ Moreover, because the deadlines for compliance with the new orders were imminent, the exodus took place at once. While the Potosí mita during its first century had caused the Indians to migrate out of the sixteen obligated provinces and into the fourteen exempted corregimientos, Palata's new repartimiento sent them fleeing from the colonized zone altogether.

The kurakas had been the key to the community-based mita and tribute regimens of the past, but they could not play that role within the new individual-based systems. Many of the originarios listed on the rosters were unknown, absent, or dead.⁴⁶ Most of the newly incorporated forasteros and yanaconas had worked on ranches and farms, in convents, or in other activities that were outside the kurakas' traditional bailiwicks and hence outside their spheres of influence. When those Indians chose to flee, the kurakas could do little to hold them.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the women and old men who had contributed in the past now refused to do so, and the enterprises that the kurakas previously had run to raise some of the money for tribute and mita quotas suffered from the same flight of laborers as did the ranches. The kurakas therefore were unable to comply with the new obligations by using either the prescribed or the traditional methods.⁴⁸ The mandated methods were illogically linked to an obsolete and ill-done census, and the traditional methods were outlawed. Faced with these overwhelming problems, some of the kurakas fled with the other departing Indians.⁴⁹ Others tried to resign their posts, but more often than not, they found themselves jailed by their corregidores.⁵⁰

When the kurakas proved incapable of meeting their mita and tribute quotas, some of the corregidores tried to deliver the required number of mitayos themselves; they could not hope to raise their corregimientos' tribute. The corregidores sent their lieutenants into the field to round up all the available males, and they shipped them off to Potosí as prisoners.⁵¹ The violence required to deliver the first contingent of Indians, however, ensured that no other would be forthcoming; any remaining Indian men headed for parts unknown. Furthermore, the dispatch of Indians did not guarantee that they would actually arrive in Potosí. On at least two occasions, the mitayos revolted en route to the Villa Imperial and fled, leaving their guards dead or wounded. In the end, violent conscription was met with violent opposition.⁵²

The Palatan reforms had great effect within the sixteen historically obligated mita provinces, but they were even more devastating in the newly incorporated corregimientos and pueblos. In Larecaja, Tomina, Pilaya y Paspaya, Misque, Sicasica, Tarija, and parts of Cochabamba, the conquest of Perú was still ongoing in 1689. Settlements of colonists and recently attracted Indians were located within a few leagues of the unconquered "infidels" and were therefore inhabited entirely by forasteros from other colonized areas as well as Indians who had been coaxed from the other side of the frontier—often only with the promise that they would never have to serve under the mita. Usually, no kurakas had yet been appointed, and those who had been were just beginning to establish their control over the Indians living under their jurisdiction.⁵³

When Palata's reform orders arrived in the frontier provinces, the

Indians demonstrated immediately and literally that they would not stand for the mita. They quickly moved across the frontier and into "infidel" territory, where they would have to pay tribute to their "hosts" but would be spared compliance with the Potosí mita.⁵⁴ The Indians clearly considered the mita to be more onerous than tribute. The colonists and officials in the frontier settlements wrote to Palata to protest his decision to include their corregimientos in the mita, citing the historical (Toledan) reasons for their exemption and complaining bitterly about the impact of the 1689 decrees.⁵⁵ The complaints from the frontier were joined by equally adamant protests from the traditionally obligated provinces.⁵⁶

The Duque de la Palata tried to quell the uproar over his reforms on 29 April 1689, when he issued a set of printed "Advertencias" that were supposed to clear up the confusion regarding his orders and the means to be used to comply with them. The viceroy insisted that his program had been designed to benefit everyone and that all opposition would quickly evaporate if only his orders were followed. He noted, for example, that the amount of tribute required of the Indians per capita was no higher than the sum demanded by Toledo; if a pueblo's quota had been raised, it was because forasteros and yanaconas were now included. Equating these groups with the originarios was necessary and just, the Duque explained, because of the ease with which they moved about. No Indian was obligated to pay the tribute owed by another, and in the event of deaths or absences, the kurakas had only to produce documentation to that effect to win a reduction in their overall remittances.⁵⁷

Palata also noted that the kurakas had claimed to be helpless in controlling the forasteros and that the corregidores had supported their assertions. This protest he would not countenance, for he had included a 40 percent discount in the number of mitayos who were drawn from forastero populations in anticipation of their probable opposition to mita service. He did yield some ground where tribute was concerned, however, by moving the deadline for the first deliveries under the new system from the feast of Saint John to Christmas 1689 in order to give the kurakas more time to bring the reluctant forasteros to heel.⁵⁸

For the most part, the "Advertencias" simply repeated the premises that lay at the core of the 1689 reforms. The Duque de la Palata's invocation of the Toledan ordinances and his assurances that his own orders were just both failed to address the real cause of the opposition to his program in Alto Perú, which was that it lacked any relation to current reality and any comprehension of the limitations it placed on the kurakas' powers. The advertencias therefore had little effect. Indeed, soon after their publication, the viceroy was forced to halve the amount of tribute that the kurakas were to collect from the forasteros. But even that

concession could not halt the social destruction wrought by his reform program.⁵⁹

The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova (1689–1705) arrived in Lima to face the mass of complaints from Alto Perú concerning his predecessor's measures. That mass had grown still larger after regional officials learned of Monclova's impending arrival, which gave new life to their hopes for reversal of the 1689 mita and tribute ordinances. The complainants had some cause for optimism because the Conde, who arrived directly from his tenure as Viceroy of México, was critical of the Potosí mita from the outset. New Spain had long since progressed beyond the need for draft labor in its mines, and the new viceroy saw no reason why it should be maintained in Perú.⁶⁰

With the assistance of Fiscal Matías Lagúnez and a junta of notables in Lima, Monclova undertook a thorough investigation of the complaints generated by Palata's reforms. After months of deliberations and proposals, the Conde decided that the crisis in Alto Perú could only be resolved by reversing most of what the Duque had done. Convinced by the corregidor of Potosí that the mita should not be abolished completely, Monclova decided to tailor the traditional system to the originario population documented by the 1683 census. By virtue of his 1692 repartimiento de la mita, therefore, the Conde once again made the mita the responsibility of the originario population of the sixteen original provinces. All of the recently added areas, as well as the forasteros and yanaconas, were liberated. The result was a mita ordinaria of only 1,367 Indians, assigned to a mere thirty-four mills (on the basis of forty mitayos apiece). The Toledan two-week rest period was also resurrected. The enumeration results for forasteros were deemed unreliable because of the length of time the count took in Alto Perú and their widespread migration since its completion. The amount of tribute that the forasteros would have to pay was reduced to the seven pesos per year assessed the yanaconas in the past until a more dependable census of the non-originario population could be completed. These measures would lower government revenue in the short run, the Conde argued, but they would also ensure that Alto Perú would remain of some value to the crown in the future.⁶¹ The new viceroy was correct because his actions permitted the mita—the *de facto* mita—to function once again.

The Duque de la Palata died en route back to Spain (in Portobelo, Panamá), and his papers were unavailable when his ship docked at Cádiz. As a result, the Council of the Indies was unable to balance his account of the 1683 census and the 1689 reforms against the conclusions of the Monclova inquiry until 1697. When the councilors finally considered the matter, five years after Palata's reforms had been overturned by Monclova, they confirmed the Conde's decisions rather than reopen what had become an administrative can of worms. So ended the Duque

de la Palata's program for the reinstitutionalization of Alto Perú, an end vastly different from the one that he had envisioned.⁶²

The Viceroy Duque de la Palata had arrived in Perú with clear orders to reintegrate the Potosí mita and thus revitalize the production of royal revenue in that realm. He tried to achieve those ends despite a limited understanding of *altopereuano* reality and a problematical administrative apparatus. On the basis of extensive instructions, legal considerations, and sheer persistence, he tried to execute an extremely detailed census in the entire viceroyalty, to incorporate new pueblos, yanaconas, and forasteros into the mita, and to transform the Indians' communal mita and tribute obligations into personal responsibilities.

The census was supposed to produce the requisite data base for the reforms, but because it was too complicated for the corregidores, it was badly executed and took so long that the results were unreliable. Worse still, the viceroy did not comprehend the nature of the society that he sought to transform. He believed, for example, that yanaconas and forasteros were not participating in the extant taxation system when in fact they contributed (along with women, old men, and other exemptees) to the satisfaction of their communities' responsibilities. When Palata insisted that they contribute at the same levels as the originarios and ordered the kurakas to collect those contributions only from designated individuals, he demanded more of the kurakas than they could possibly accomplish.

The forasteros and yanaconas fled from the new impositions, and they were joined by many originarios. As previously free regions were brought under the mita, the fugitives sought asylum in areas outside the reach of the colonial administration. In their wake, the local government that depended on the kurakas to control the Indians broke down when the kurakas were unable to restrain the fleeing originarios, let alone the departing forasteros and yanaconas.

The Indians' response to the Duque de la Palata's reforms revealed the limitations to which the exploitation of their communities in Alto Perú were subject. As long as the mita and tribute were communal obligations, and as long as those responsibilities could be satisfied by the kurakas using the traditional means, both regimens continued to function, albeit at levels that were less than satisfactory to the Spanish crown. In his effort to increase royal income from Perú, Palata exceeded those limitations, and his reforms were well on their way to destroying altopereuano society when the Conde de la Monclova arrived to take his place. Fortunately, the new viceroy responded to the complaints of the corregidores and kurakas, reversed his predecessor's orders, and thereby brought the crisis to an end.

NOTES

1. Royal cédula to the Duque de la Palata, San Lorenzo, 25 October 1680, Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter cited as AGI), ramo Audiencia de Charcas (hereafter cited as Charcas) 416, lib. 6, fs. 269–71. The viceroy responded in a letter from Lima on 21 August 1683, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 16.
2. The Council of the Indies' twin orders are: (1) "Cedula q^e se cometio al Conde de Salv^a Virey p^a la reduccion de los Indios," 28 April 1650, AGI, Charcas, leg. 266, no. 19C; and (2) that of 6 May 1651, ordering that an end be put to *indios de faltriguera* (pocketed mitayos in silver), described in Francisco Nestares Marín, president of the audiencia of Charcas, to the crown, Potosí, 30 May 1652, AGI, Charcas, leg. 266, no. 15—acknowledging his responsibility for local enforcement of the edict. For various reports concerning compliance with the Potosí mita, see tables 2 and 3, "Estimated Mita Service, 1651–1665" and "Mita Service according to Corregidor Oviedo, 1668–1673" respectively, in Jeffrey Austin Cole, "The Potosí Mita under Hapsburg Administration: The Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1981), pp. 274, 339. An overview of the process leading from the cédulas of the 1650s to those of the 1680s is Francisco de Valera, "Propuesta, y parecer que haze, y ofrece [to the Archbishop-Viceroy, Melchor Liñán y Cisneros] Sobre el mejor cumplimiento de la cedula de su Magestad de 8, de Julio del año de 676 . . ." 30 January 1680, AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, nos. 69A and 69B (printed).
3. The enemies of the Potosí mita, as well as their arguments, are identified in two printed works that defend the system against its detractors: Sebastián de Sandoval y Guzmán, *Pretensiones de la Villa Imperial de Potosí* (Madrid, 1634); and Nicolás Matías del Campo y de la Rynaga, *Memorial apologético, histórico, jurídico, y político* (Lima, 1672). Ann Zulawski, a doctoral candidate at Columbia University, is preparing a dissertation that will discuss the competition for Indian labor among the miners of Oruro, the vinticulturalists of Pilaya y Paspaya, and the azogueros of Potosí; she will have much to add to the present discussion.
4. The azogueros' guild was prolific in its production of petitions. The two most famous are Sandoval y Guzmán's *Pretensiones* and Campo y de la Rynaga's *Memorial*, cited in the previous note. Another notably effective one was issued circa 1680 (AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 70B, printed), which led to a 28 May 1681 cédula to the Duque de la Palata, ordering him to act quickly to revitalize the Potosí mita, AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, fs. 287v–93. Valera, in his "Propuesta y parecer," lists the sixteen mita provinces and the fourteen exempted corregimientos.
5. Cole, "The Potosí Mita," chap. 5.
6. The Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 15 December 1682, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 14. Also noted by Valera in his "Propuesta y parecer," and by Ramón Ezquerria Abadía, "Problemas de la mita de Potosí en el siglo XVIII," *La minería hispana e iberoamericana: Contribución a su investigación histórica*, vol. 1 of the *Ponencias del VI Congreso Internacional de Minería*; León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1970), pp. 491–92.
7. Royal cédula to the president of the audiencia of Charcas, Madrid, 9 December 1670, AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, f. 105v. The reason for the order's suspension is noted in the "Relación de don Melchor de Navarra y Rocaful, Duque de la Palata, Príncipe de Mesa, Virrey del Perú, al Conde de la Monclova, su sucesor, del estado de los diversos asuntos sujetos a su gobierno desde 1680 a 1689," 18 December 1689, *Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria*, ed. by Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodríguez (12 vols.; Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, nos. 273–77 and 281–86; Madrid: Editorial Atlas, 1976–80), vol. Perú 6 (no. 285), p. 227.
8. Jeffrey A. Cole, "An Abolitionism Born of Frustration: The Conde de Lemos and the Potosí Mita, 1667–73," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 2 (May 1983): 307–33.
9. The orders to Castellar were: (1) that of 8 July 1676 (described in the Conde's response to the crown, Lima, 22 February 1678, AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 57); and (2) 16 November 1676, AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 51 (also noted in Castellar's response). The two dicta were repeated for Archbishop-Viceroy Liñán: (3) royal cédula to Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros, Madrid, 13 September 1678, AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, fs. 215–

- 16v (and his response is his letter to the crown, Lima, 7 August 1681, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 3).
10. Valera, "Propuesta y parecer."
 11. Royal cédula to the Duque de la Palata, San Lorenzo, 25 October 1680, AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, fs. 269–71.
 12. For Palata's background and an overview of his other viceregal activities, see Margaret E. Crahan, "The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata: Viceroy of Peru, 1681–1689," *The Americas* 27 (1971): 389–412.
 13. Royal cédula to the Duque de la Palata, Madrid, 28 May 1681, AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, fs. 287v–93. Palata's response to that royal order came in his letter of Lima, 15 December 1682, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 14. The *azogueros'* petition is AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 70B (printed).
 14. The entire procedure is described in the Duque de la Palata's report to the crown of Lima, 21 August 1683, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 16; the letter is also included verbatim in the Duque's "Relación," *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 6, pp. 217–29. Also see the comments of the Council of the Indies' *fiscal* on the Palata report of 21 August 1683, of Madrid, 18 May 1685, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 10; and the crown's response to the viceroy, of Madrid, 10 June 1685, AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, fs. 350v–53v. Royal orders for the other officials to assist the viceroy were issued along with the crown's cédula of San Lorenzo, 25 October 1680 (e.g., that for President Bartolomé González de Poveda is AGI, Charcas, leg. 416, lib. 6, fs. 273–75). Copies of their reports are: (1) Bartolomé González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 24 December 1681, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 4; (2) Pedro Luis Enríquez, corregidor of Potosí, to the crown, Potosí, 24 January 1682, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 5; (3) the archbishop of Charcas to the crown, La Plata, 28 February 1682, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 6; and (4) the archbishop of Lima (Liñán) to the crown, Lima, 27 November 1682, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 13. Finally, an overview of the deliberations and all other preparations for the numeración general is the "Libro y relacion sumaria" that Contador Pedro Antonio del Castillo prepared for the Duque de la Palata, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 33C.
 15. A copy of the instructions sent to priests from Lima, 7 April 1683, is AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 15 (second item). The printed "Instruccion que han de guardar los Corregidores en la numeracion general que se ha de hazer de los Indios, cada uno en su jurisdiccion," Lima, 24 July 1683, is AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 15 (first item). Another copy of the latter is included in the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires (hereinafter cited as AGNA), Sala 9, leg. 14.8.10; and it is joined by a one-page instruction to the curates not to impede the government's enumeration, dated 7 April 1683. An excellent summary of this process is Brian M. Evans, "Census Enumeration in Late Seventeenth Century Alto Perú: The Numeración General of 1683–1684," *Studies in Spanish American Population History*, ed. by David J. Robinson, Dellplain Latin American Studies no. 8 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 25–44, and especially pp. 28–32. For Evans's description of the pertinent materials in the AGNA, see his "Descripción de las fuentes disponibles para una investigación de la 'Numeración General' del Virrey Duque de la Palata, 1683–1684, con información sobre otros manuscritos importantes para la demografía del Alto Perú en el siglo XVII," *Guía de las fuentes en Hispanoamérica para el estudio de la administración virreinal española en México y en el Perú, 1535–1700*, ed. by Lewis Hanke, Gunnar Mendoza L., and Celso Rodríguez (Washington, D.C.: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1980), pp. 24–32. Another province for which the 1680s results are extant is Vilcashuaman, because those data were included by Palata with his letter to the crown, Lima, 6 April 1686, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 22 (the Vilcashuaman results are no. 22A). So far, however, the results from the rest of lower Perú and the audiencia of Quito have not turned up.
 16. Two copies of the instructions for the corregidores are cited in the previous note.
 17. In addition to the sources cited in notes 15 and 16, see the Duque de la Palata's "Relación," *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 6, pp. 217–29, and the "Papel de dudas" that Contador Joseph de Villegas submitted to the viceroy in 1685, questioning the ability of the numeración general to accomplish its principal goals, Lima, 12 June 1685, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 20A.

18. Evans, "Census Enumeration," p. 28; and Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, "Mita, migraciones y pueblos: variaciones en el espacio y en el tiempo: Alto Perú, 1578–1692" (typescript unpublished March 1983), p. 7. Evans and Sánchez-Albornoz have devoted their recent research efforts to the evaluation of the 1683 numeración general results for Alto Perú. Evans has meticulously analyzed the findings for individual pueblos and provinces, while Sánchez-Albornoz has compared the Palata census data to those of Toledo (1573) in the article cited above and the Marqués de Mancera (1645) in "Migraciones internas en el Alto Perú: el saldo acumulado en 1645," *Historia Boliviana* 2, no. 1 (1982): 11–19. Both scholars have concluded that the Potosí mita was primarily responsible for the massive migration of Indians out of the sixteen obligated provinces and that the system thus combined with epidemic disease and other, lesser demographic factors to deplete the Indian population of Alto Perú and to disrupt its native society. See also Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978); Brian M. Evans, "The Value of the 'Numeración General' of 1683–1684 to the Study of Alto Perú in the Late Seventeenth Century" (unpublished typescript); and Evans, "The Holding of the Numeración General of 1683" (unpublished typescript).
19. The impact of the 1683 numeración general is documented in two tomes of complaints: "Representaciones y quejas de las Provincias [La Paz, Tomina, Pilaya y Paspaya, Larecaja, Misque, Sicasica, Omasuyo, Pacajes, and Cochabamba], 1689–1690," AGNA, Sala 9, leg. 10.3.7 (hereafter cited as R&Q1); and "Representaciones y quejas de las Provincias [Porco, Chayanta, Tarija, Paria, and Carangas], 1689–1690," AGNA, Sala 13, leg. 18.7.4 (hereafter cited as R&Q2). Also of value are the letter from the Bishop of Cuzco to the crown, Cuzco, 3 October 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 8; and his *informe* for the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova "sobre la numeración Gen.¹ del año de 683 y Mita de Potosí," Cuzco, 19 March 1691, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 8A. The specific sources for the paragraph in question are: R&Q1, fs. 349, 350v, 371 (Pacajes), and 399ff. (Omasuyo); and R&Q2, f. 484 (Porco).
20. So noted by the corregidor of Pilaya y Paspaya, Lorenzo Fernández de Córdova y Figueroa, in a letter to the Conde de la Monclova (not dated but received in December 1689), R&Q1, f. 127.
21. Evans, "Census Enumeration," pp. 31–33; and Villegas, "Papel de dudas."
22. R&Q1, f. 3 (La Paz). For the various complaints about the overcounting that this caused, see R&Q1, fs. 12, 24v, 67–67v, 70v, 98v (La Paz), 247 (Sicasica), and 397 (Omasuyo); and R&Q2, fs. 497v (Porco) and 590 (Carangas).
23. R&Q1, f. 67v (La Paz).
24. R&Q1, f. 2 (La Paz); and R&Q2, f. 586v (Carangas).
25. In addition to the references to overcounting in note 22, see Evans, "Census Enumeration," pp. 33–35 (based on Villegas, "Papel de dudas"); and the bishop of Cuzco to the crown, Cuzco, 3 October 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 8 (and the *informe* for Monclova of 19 March 1691; 8A).
26. Villegas, "Papel de dudas."
27. Two reports from the Duque de la Palata to the crown express his continued faith in his program: the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 11 October 1687, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 26; and the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 19 February 1689, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 32.
28. Sánchez-Albornoz, *Indios y tributos*, pp. 26–34, compares the 1573 and 1683 figures for ten altoperuano provinces and finds a decline within them from 161,095 to 93,331; on pp. 76–77, he notes that the number of forasteros in the sixteen mita provinces had come to equal the number of originarios. Evans, "Census Enumeration," p. 36, notes the failure of the pockets of runaways to materialize; and on p. 37, he provides a table (2.1) entitled "Distribution of Altiplano and Yungas Population, 1683" that considers the number of tributaries versus the percentage of originarios within each province. On the patterns of migration being clear, see Sánchez-Albornoz, "Mita, migraciones," p. 15.
29. Villegas, "Papel de dudas."
30. For the Duque de la Palata's argument, see his "Advertencias para la ejecución de los despachos de la nueva retasa y repartimiento de mitas de Potosí, que han de tener

- presentes los corregidores y dar a entender a los indios," Lima, 29 April 1689, Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre (hereinafter cited as ANB), MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 301a–4. The "Advertencias" are also repeated in the viceroy's "Relación," *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 6, pp. 231–38. For concurrence by Evans and Sánchez-Albornoz, see Evans, "Census Enumeration," pp. 35–36; Sánchez-Albornoz, "Mita, migraciones," p. 11; and Sanchez-Albornoz, *Indios y tributos*, pp. 86–91.
31. The viceroy's intent is also noted in his "Advertencias" (ANB, MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 301a–4), f. 301a-v. It is clear, moreover, in his subsequent actions.
 32. *Provisión* issued over the signature of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata, Lima, 2 December 1688, ANB, MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 442–49 (printed). For a rather negative commentary on this decision, see Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros to the crown, Lima, 1 September 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 6. For Palata's own retrospective, see his report to the crown, Lima, 19 February 1689, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 32; as well as his "Relación," *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 6, pp. 217–38 (which includes his letter the crown of 21 August 1683 and the text of the "Advertencias").
 33. In addition to the sources cited in the previous note, see the Duque de la Palata's repartimiento de la mita, from Lima, 29 January 1689, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 30 (it is also reproduced in Contador Castillo's "Libro y relacion sumaria," AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 33C).
 34. Two copies of the 29 January 1689 repartimiento are cited in the previous note. For Palata's reasoning behind his changes for the mita, see his "Advertencias" (ANB, MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 301a–4). The initial draft of the new repartimiento was prepared by Fiscal Juan González of the audiencia of Lima. It was then sent to La Plata, to be reviewed by the president of the audiencia, the corregidor of Potosí, and the archbishop of Charcas as a junta. This procedure is explained in the viceroy's report to the crown of Lima, 18 March 1688, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 27A.
 35. Palata's "Advertencias" (ANB, MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 301a–4) and his "Relación," *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 6, pp. 217–38, both describe his tribute ordinances and the rationale for them.
 36. Cole, "The Potosí Mita," pp. 348–58, 403–7.
 37. For an overview of the communal nature of the mita and tribute, see Guillermo Lohmann Villena, "La minería en el marco del virreinato peruano. Inventiones, sistemas, técnicas y organización industrial," *La minería hispana e iberoamericana*, pp. 654–55. For two examples of how the mita was actually delivered in the mid-seventeenth century, see Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Lima (hereinafter cited as BNP), item B575, "Paucarcolla: Autos sobre el despacho de la mita de Potosí e información de los caciques de su gran dispación," Villa de Concepción, 24 October 1669; and BNP, item B585, "Despacho de la mita de Potosí," Puno, November 1673. An example of the extremes to which a kuraka had to go to do his job was shown by Bartolomé González, who was responsible for delivering the mitayos from Porco and received permission from the audiencia of La Plata to carry a sword and dagger to protect himself from violently defiant Indians, ANB, ramo Minas, tomo 125, no. 20 (1679).
 38. Sources for epidemics are R&Q1, fs. 77–78, 108v (La Paz), 141 (Larecaja), 200 (Sicasica), 396, 397, 399v, 401v, 420 (Omasuyo); and R&Q2, fs. 480v, 498v (Porco), 533 (Tarija); also, the bishop of Cuzco's informe of 19 Mar. 1691 (AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 8A), in which he claims that a 1687 epidemic killed eight to ten Indians per day in his diocese. Abandonment of the mining zone at Porco is described in R&Q2, fs. 483–84.
 39. The importance of the kurakas was noted by the Viceroy Conde de Lemos in three letters to the crown: (1) Lima, 12 January 1670, AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 5; (2) Lima, 4 April 1670, AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 14; and (3) Lima, 4 July 1670, AGI, Charcas, leg. 268, no. 16. An excellent study of the relationship between kurakas and the residents of their pueblos is Roger Neil Rasnake, "The Kurahkuna of Yura: Indigenous Authorities of Colonial Charcas and Contemporary Bolivia" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1982); chap. 3 is entitled "Kurakas to Kurahkuna: The History of the Authorities of Yura."
 40. Cole, "The Potosí Mita," chap. 2.
 41. The Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 18 March 1688, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no.

27. The viceroy had more time at his post than most of his predecessors because of the crown's problems in finding a successor to take his place. See Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "Un virreinato en venta," *Mercurio Peruano*, no. 453 (1965), pp. 43–51; summarized in *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 7, pp. 153–54, the introduction to the section on the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova.
42. The new repartimiento de la mita was signed on 29 January 1689 (AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 30) and sent out to the provinces on 2 February 1689. The deadline for tribute is noted in Palata's "Advertencias" (ANB, MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 301a–4). It is also referred to throughout R&Q1 and R&Q2. Administration of the mita was placed in the hands of Corregidor Pedro Luis Enriquez de Potosí; correspondence between Enriquez and the corregidor of La Paz, Bernabe Felipe de Aragón, concerning the deadline for mita deliveries (including a copy of the original order for La Paz) is found in R&Q1, fs. 28–39.
 43. R&Q1, fs. 5v, 17, 23, 23v, 26, 28v, 45v, 70, 94, 95–96, 98v, 109 (La Paz), 141, 153, 157, 159, 160–160v, 161v, 162 (Larecaja), 167–167v, 169 (Misque), 194, 198, 203v, 231, 232, 252 (Sicasica), 349, 371, 372 (Pacajes), 396, 396v, 397v, 399v, 402, 403v, 407, 408, 418, 424v (Omasuyo), 431v, 433v, 436, 468, 471v–72, 500, 501v, 524, 525, 534v, 558–59, 560v, and 567 (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 477, 480v, 484, 491, 495, 496, 497, 498 (Porco), 505 (Chayanta), and 588 (Paria).
 44. On Indian flight into the yungas, see R&Q1, fs. 6, 24v, 26v, 40–50, 52v–53, 54, 55v, 56, 57v, 58, 59, 69, 71 (La Paz), 115 (Tomina), 121, 123 (Pilaya y Paspaya), 153, 157, 158, 163 (Larecaja), 180 (Misque), 193v, 199v, 247, 251 (Sicasica), 393 (Pacajes), 405v, 411, 412v (Omasuyo), 435v, 470, 472, 509, 523, and 566v (Cochabamba).
 45. On families broken up, see R&Q1, fs. 43, 53v, 71, 99v, 109 (La Paz), 167v (Misque), 193, 199v (Sicasica), 396v, 399v, 405v (Omasuyo), 524v, and 556 (Cochabamba). On flight from ranches, see R&Q1, fs. 3v, 10, 12, 27 (La Paz), 122, 129 (Pilaya y Paspaya), 167v (Misque), 203, 229, 231 (Sicasica), 391 (Pacajes), 395v (Omasuyo), and 556v (Cochabamba). Other activities lost their Indian laborers too. See R&Q1, fs. 19v (La Paz: mail, hospital, *carnesia*, servants in the homes of public officials), 117 (Tomina: guards for livestock), 155 (Larecaja: gold mines), 169v ff., 180 (Misque: viticulture and convents), 203, 240 (Sicasica: haciendas), and 371 (Pacajes: convents, mail, and service in La Paz).
 46. R&Q1, fs. 75 (La Paz), 94v (Sicasica), 391 (Pacajes), and 478 (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, f. 478 (Porco). See the citations for epidemics in note 38, above. These problems were compounded by the fact that many kurakas in 1689 had not been in office when the census was undertaken and were therefore unfamiliar with the way the enumeration rosters had been compiled.
 47. R&Q1, fs. 16, 22, 24v, 108v (La Paz), 205v (Sicasica), 405, 413–17v (Omasuyo), 524, 529, and 530 (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 478v, 498 (Porco), 531 (Chayanta), and 583v (Carangas).
 48. R&Q1, fs. 1, 81, 82, 85, 90, 93–93v (La Paz), 424v (Omasuyo), and 560v (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 528v, and 529v (Chayanta). There was, furthermore, a great deal of competition for those Indians who had been included on census rosters in more than one place: R&Q1, fs. 3v, 67–67v (La Paz), 128 (Pilaya y Paspaya), and 532 (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, f. 497v (Porco).
 49. R&Q1, fs. 43 (La Paz), 155 (Larecaja), 509, 529, and 560 (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 501v (Chayanta), 586v, 597, and 600 (Carangas).
 50. On attempts by kurakas to resign, see R&Q1, fs. 16v, 61, 93–93v (La Paz), 160 (Larecaja), 403v, 419 (Omasuyo), 534–534v, 536v, and 564v (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 479, 480v, 484, 485, 491 (Porco), and 503v (Chayanta). On the jailing of kurakas, see R&Q1, fs. 27, 44v, 47v, 50v, 52, 60v, 72, 83v, 84, 86, 90, 97, 98, 102, 104, 105 (La Paz), 189 (Misque), 434, 501v, 529, and 534v (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, f. 578 (Paria).
 51. R&Q1, fs. 386–90 (Pacajes).
 52. R&Q1, fs. 169 (the contingent from Misque ran off at the Pilcomayo river) and 433 (the group from Cochabamba fled with the money provided to them to pay their expenses while in transit). The mitayos from Porco, moreover, fled once they had arrived in Potosí (R&Q1, f. 496); and the attempted arrest and return of the runaway kurakas of Cochabamba ended in an ambush of their guards (R&Q1, fs. 569–70v).

53. R&Q1, fs. 5v (La Paz), 110–20v (Tomina), 121–121v, 123–123v (Pilaya y Paspaya), 468, and 569–70v (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 574–574v (Tarija).
54. R&Q1, fs. 153, 158 (Larecaja), and 229 (Sicasica).
55. R&Q1, fs. 153, 153v, 153v–54 (Larecaja), 193, 198, 241–241v, 247, 249, 251v, 252, 332, 334 (Sicasica), 350, 350v (Pacajes), and 472 (Cochabamba); and R&Q2, fs. 574, and 574v (Tarija).
56. Four overviews of this entire process are: (1) Archbishop Melchor Liñán y Cisneros of Lima to the crown, Lima 1 September 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 6; (2) the bishop of Cuzco to the crown, Cuzco, 3 Oct. 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 8; (3) the informe prepared by the same bishop for the Conde de la Monclova, Cuzco, 19 March 1691, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, no. 8A; and (4) the Conde de Canillas (Corregidor Pedro Luis Enríquez de Potosí) to the crown, Lima, 22 December 1691, AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, no. 1.
57. See note 30, above, for the full citation for the Duque de la Palata's "Advertencias."
58. *Ibid.*
59. Noted by the viceroy in his "Relación," *Los virreyes*, vol. Perú 6, p. 239.
60. The Conde de la Monclova to the crown, Lima, 15 March 1690, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 33; and the Council of the Indies' fiscal's comments on that letter, Madrid, 27 March 1693, AGI, Charcas, leg. 270, no. 33A. See as well Evans, "Census Enumeration," p. 35; and Sánchez-Albornoz, *Indios y tributos*, pp. 75–77.
61. *Provisión* issued over the signature of the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova, Lima, 27 April 1692, ANB, MSS 575, tomo 4, fs. 279–87 (printed); another copy is AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, no. 4B. The Conde's repartimiento de la mita (an eighteenth-century copy thereof) of Lima, 27 April 1692, is ANB, MSS 31, fs. 37–52. Another of the viceroy's provisions, dated Lima, 6 May 1692, details his ordinances concerning the distribution of mitayos at Potosí (ANB, MSS 31, fs. 53–64; also an eighteenth-century copy). A declaration of the Conde de la Monclova, Los Reyes, 19 July 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, no. 4A, summarizes the entire procedure. Three tomes of proceedings were sent to Madrid: (1) "Quaderno 1," AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, last item; (2) "Quaderno 2," AGI, Charcas, leg. 272, first item; and (3) "Quaderno 3," AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, last item.
62. For the problems with Palata's papers, see the correspondence between his secretary, Joseph Bernal, and Antonio Ortiz de Ojalora, a secretary to the Council of the Indies, from 6 January 1692 to 1 November 1692, AGI, Charcas, leg. 271, nos. 1–5 and 9–9B. For the individual opinions of the Councilors, from their deliberations on 18 January 1697, see AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, no. 19B (transcribed in Cole, "The Potosí Mita," pp. 456–58). The Council of the Indies' response to Monclova's report of 21 October 1693 (AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, no. 10) concerning everything that had been done with regard to the mita is evident in that body's recommendation to the crown, Madrid, 1 February 1697, AGI, Charcas, leg. 273, no. 21.