

threat in most circumstances. . . . There will arise a statesman who does not believe in a threat that the other party nonetheless made in earnest" (pp.640, 646; 649).

To "save war" for political purposes (and perhaps to save mankind from inherently purposeless violence) would be the exact opposite of concentration upon military "efficiency" alone.

PAUL RAMSEY

The Author Replies:

New York, N. Y.

Dear Sir: One can always count on Paul Ramsey for a spirited challenge; may it continue to be so. In this instance, I do not believe we are as far apart as his remarks indicate at first glance.

First of all, I do not propose to decide which French thinker is closest to Mr. Ramsey's thinking, and which to mine. Raymond Aron goes to great lengths to show how much more sophisticated he is than General Gallois and, if only to preserve the normalities of civil-military discussions, I would agree. But it often is difficult to figure out just what Aron is driving at. In another recent book (*The Great Debate*, Doubleday, 1965), Aron notes that a close aide to President Kennedy identified him (Aron) in 1963 as "in favor of the dissemination of atomic weapons"; but, continues Aron, "I am not in favor of dissemination . . . as such" (p. 237).

All weapons, of course, are both military and political. All I tried to say was that nuclear weapons are much more "political" than we Americans usually make them out to be. As Aron puts it, the "ultimate function" of nuclear weapons is "to prevent their own use" (p. 143), and this certainly has to be looked at as a "political" function. I am arguing that any nation is unlikely to use nuclear weapons against another nuclear nation except in the most "extreme circumstances" (Aron again, p. 135). I am arguing further that once it is decided to use such weapons, the conduct of the battle and its results will be much more "political" than "military." The war will most likely be "dirty" (against society), not "clean" (against weapons). This is what gives any nation having such weapons a certain amount of political leverage, but the same factor reduces the credibility of any nuclear guarantee extended to a third nation. This has been at least a major part of our recent problems in Europe, and we can hardly expect India, for example, to take seriously any guarantee we attempt to extend.

The quotation that Mr. Ramsey has italicized is, of course, the central paradox of nuclear weapons, pointed out more directly by Hans Morgenthau in his article in the *American Political Science Review* a few years ago. There are, nonetheless, some political circumstances in which the threat is credible because a prospective enemy knows that the weapons will be used.

At this point I think Mr. Ramsey and I are left only with a problem of jargon — a familiar one in recent years. It seems to me that I am arguing for the closest possible relationship between political and military factors, not for a dichotomy between them. Perhaps in using the French example, I overstated the case, for even if nuclear weapons are more closely related than any other weapons to the ultimate political purposes of a nation, they may not be wholly political in character. But they are mighty close to it, and they fall quite clearly in the category of "Give me liberty or give me death!" and "Better dead than Red!" Finally, the overall thrust of my essay is summed up in this sentence from its penultimate paragraph: "It is paradoxical to see such a dichotomy between political and military activities in a country that has been so lavish in its education of military leaders." I do not regard that as an argument for separation of politico-military factors.

About the ultimate effects of proliferation, I am not so certain. From what I have said before, I am dubious about the efficacy of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. "nuclear concert." I would hold that it is at least possible that proliferation could produce a more stable, rather than a less stable, world. After all, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. balance seems more stable than before each of us had nuclear weapons in any quantity. It is enough to say that I am not much disturbed at the development of the French deterrent.

JACK WALKER

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