

standards, and his proposals for a railway network foresaw future developments very clearly. Other foreigners do not emerge so creditably, and the author might have added that the American engineer G. W. Whistler's successful advocacy of the "narrow" 5-foot gauge was backed by an argument (that small units can carry traffic as economically as large units) which was technically unsustainable. The wiser von Gerstner had used the 6-foot gauge.

This is an informative and well-designed book, which incidentally offers useful insight into how decisions were reached in Nicholean Russia. Despite its fine and often fascinating detail the book is clearly written, and the author has evidently read practically all there is to be read on his subject.

J. N. WESTWOOD  
*University of Sydney*

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN EAST ASIA, 1857-1860. By R. K. I. Quedsted. Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968. xxx, 339 pp. \$9.75.

Recent hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border lend great interest and timeliness to the present study. Certainly, current tensions between China and the Soviet Union may be far better understood with a knowledge of this crucial period. The seizure of the Far Eastern provinces, the subject of this volume, represents the biggest mouthful of the Chinese Empire that Russia was ever able to devour and digest. Though Professor Quedsted emphasizes the grievousness of this loss, she has found no evidence to reverse the well-established verdict of historians that the Russian seizure of these territories was one of the most bloodless and condonable of conquests. She does, however, indicate that Chinese sources reveal far more resistance from the Manchus than published Russian works have heretofore indicated. Yet without access to the Russian archives it is impossible to be sure about the full extent of that resistance or what motives lay behind the Russian incursions up the Sungari in 1859.

Russian policy during the years 1857-60 emerges as a striking example of the virtues and failings of secretiveness as a government weapon. This policy of suspicion may have benefited the Russians in their dealings with England, but when it was directed at the American traders on the Amur it delayed the development of the Amur region and inflicted unnecessary hardships on the Russian settlers. Although there is no close study of Russo-American relations during these years, Professor Quedsted offers convincing evidence of the naïveté of American diplomats in this period. Though clearly better informed about Russian progress on the Amur than Britain, the United States apparently did not pass on this information to the British or attempt to bargain with Russia to gain better treatment for its Amur traders in exchange for its silence and good will. Moreover, the discreet and half-veiled understanding that apparently existed between the French and Russian envoys in China seems not to have been fully realized by the British at the time. It also is clear that the attitude of Britain was completely, though unintentionally, conducive to the success of Russian aggrandizement.

Professor Quedsted has based her study upon many official documents—Russian, Chinese, British, French, and American. The period covered has not been comprehensively surveyed until now, even though the passing of this vast area to Russia was certainly one of the decisive events in the history of the Far East. Although the book encompasses a great deal of detail and frequently reads like a

running summary of official diplomatic documents, the author has given a clear overall picture of the developments in policy-making at the diplomatic level without repeating slices of material found in published works in European languages. Because Professor Quested was unable to gain access to the Russian archives, her book is not definitive; nevertheless it remains the most complete and objective account of this vital subject to have appeared to date in any language.

BETTY MILLER UNTERBERGER  
*Texas A & M University*

GRÜNDUNGSDOKUMENTE DES BUNDES DER KOMMUNISTEN (JUNI BIS SEPTEMBER 1847). Edited by Bert Andréas. Hamburg: Dr. Ernst Hauswedell & Co., 1969. 79 pp.

Though the Marxist school has generally ignored or denied it, the sketch of the history of the League of Communists written by Engels in 1885 has long been known to contain several important errors and omissions. Having no documents of the period June–September 1847 at his disposal, Engels confused even his own role in his reconstruction of the events of that time.

Bert Andréas of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva has retrieved the missing documents from the manuscripts division of the Hamburg State and University Library. For the first time scholars can consult such crucial sources as the official report of the June 1847 congress of the League of Communists (as the League of the Just renamed itself at that congress). The collection of five documents (facsimiles are also provided) includes a draft of the statutes of the League of Communists dated June 9, 1847, a draft of the “Glaubensbekenntnis” of the same date (first question: “Bist Du Kommunist?”), and the first quarterly report of the new league’s leadership, dated London, September 14, 1847.

These documents prove that Engels played an important role in the discussions of the program of the June 1847 congress. He based his well-known “Grundsätze des Kommunismus” upon the “Glaubensbekenntnis” of that congress. All this in turn, as Andréas’s documents demonstrate, proves that the *Communist Manifesto* was not invented by the inspired genius of Karl Marx. The League of the Just, more particularly the progressive, radical section in London, had contemplated a party platform since November 1846. Engels and others had a hand in the rejection of the old conspiratorial practices and the decision to create a modern, working-class political party. Various documents were drawn up and discussed, including several versions of a “kommunistisches Glaubensbekenntnis” and Engels’ “Grundsätze.” The new party (i.e., the League of Communists) presented all these documents to Marx and asked him to write a platform. Marx accepted Engels’ suggestion that he call the platform a “manifesto,” and he wrote it in his own brilliant style *on the basis of the documents supplied by the league.*

In 1848, as in 1864 at the founding of the First International, the program of the revolutionary international party had its roots in existing movements and in its own ideas. Marx, in both instances, “only” formulated those ideas at the party’s request. It takes nothing away from him to have the record set straight.

WOODFORD D. MCCLELLAN  
*University of Virginia*