

Notes

How Political Systems Manage Their Policy Controversies

1. I did not conduct interviews with blame game actors because I am primarily interested in what blame game participants say and do during the actual blame game. To know what they think would certainly be interesting, but it is not a necessary requirement for the analysis of blame game interactions and their consequences. Moreover, I suspect that interview data would be useless for the most part as interviewees are driven by a very strong urge for social desirability when it comes to explaining their roles and actions during a blame game. Another reason against noncontemporaneous interviews is that memories on tactical issues are likely to fade quickly and that these memories are more likely to be influenced by outcomes than by what calculations interviewees were making at the time (Berry, 2002).
2. This is why I opted against counting the number of newspaper articles during a blame game. The second reason for a qualitative assessment is its flexibility, meaning that salience and proximity can be determined and compared across very different policy controversies.
3. UK newspapers: *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian*, *The Sun*; German newspapers: *Die Welt*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Bild*; Swiss newspapers: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Tages-Anzeiger*, *Blick*; US newspapers: *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, *USA Today*. I retrieved relevant articles from these newspapers mainly via the Factiva database. I used several controversy-specific keywords in each case to identify all relevant articles in the newspapers selected (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The time span during which I searched for articles starts significantly before the start of the blame game and extends beyond the end of blame game interactions until articles related to the blame game could no longer be found (the concrete time span varies considerably from case to case). Moreover, I occasionally consulted newspaper articles from other outlets in case they could provide further insights into a case.
4. Considering these different newspapers also controls for political parallelism, that is, for a situation in which only one political camp shows strong interest in a controversy while other camps largely ignore

it, and for poor reporting by journalists; two aspects of media coverage that may distort and misrepresent the relationship between blame game actors and the public.

5. While considering social media would have been interesting, I opted against it for practical reasons. Analyzing social media would have been very challenging because of social media bubbles (and only possible for blame games that occurred after 2008–2010 – Twitter, Facebook, and so on only became widely used around that time). The analysis of television would also have been interesting because it would have allowed me to better assess politicians' attitudes toward a blame game (which is not only expressed in public statements but also in facial expressions and gestures). However, I argue that the detailed consideration of print media allows for a sufficiently clear picture of blame game actors' attitudes.

Blame Games in the Political Sphere

1. From here on, I will simply refer to them as 'blame games'.
2. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that certain blame game (inter)actions change institutions in the longer run, for example, by eroding conventions (see Hall, 2016). I will discuss this possibility in the concluding chapter.
3. In my framework, policies influence blame games in two ways. First, as part of the institutional landscape, they emit incentives and constraints on the actors in a blame game. Second, they have interpretive effects on mass publics (Pierson, 1993), which will be accounted for in the section on issue characteristics.
4. In Switzerland, the executive consists of a collective government of seven federal councilors (the 'Federal Council'), each of which heads a department.
5. The public is thus exposed to two distortions when it comes to watching a blame game: the communication attempts by blame game actors and their reproduction by the media (Iyengar, 1990).
6. While journalists are trained to construct scandal narratives, I argue that their leeway in influencing the public's stance (or feedback) is constrained by issue characteristics. As both watchdog and scandalization machine, the media intensively covers policy controversies that are either very severe or have significant scandalization potential (both of these aspects significantly depend on issue characteristics).
7. The phenomenon of political parallelism has to be considered when assessing the general public's reaction to a blame game. If one considered only one quality outlet, there would be the danger of either over- or under-stating public feedback (see Section 1.4).

Blame Games in the UK

1. E.g., the media reported about a father who killed himself and his four children after receiving a high payment request from the CSA. A member from an anti-CSA movement claimed that this incident, while tragic and sad, was not unusual: “There are bound to be tragic cases because of the complete and utter incompetence of the CSA.” See “Debts drove father to kill himself and children,” *The Independent*, December 19, 1995.
2. “Labour eyes child agency,” *The Guardian*, April 25, 1997.
3. “CSA sums still wrong,” *The Guardian*, July 15, 1998.
4. “Ministers talk tough on CSA plans,” *The Guardian*, June 28, 1999.
5. “Families suffer as thousands of cases ignored,” *The Guardian*, March 11, 1998.
6. “Child Shambles Agency,” *The Sun*, November 10, 2004.
7. “Chief quits with CSA ‘on brink of collapse,’” *The Daily Telegraph*, November 18, 2004.
8. “CSA chief goes amid computer chaos: Blair admits that child support failures are unacceptable,” *The Guardian*, November 18, 2004.
9. “Crisis at the CSA highlights failure on a tragic scale,” *The Daily Telegraph*, September 9, 2005.
10. “CSA is fundamentally flawed, Blair tells MPs,” *The Guardian*, November 17, 2005.
11. “Chap support agency,” *The Guardian*, November 29, 2005.
12. House of Commons Hansard Debates, January 17, 2006.
13. “Anger at plans for yet another review of Child Support Agency,” *The Guardian*, February 9, 2006.
14. The National Audit Office is an independent parliamentary body that audits government departments.
15. “Watchdog dismisses CSA funds as waste of money,” *The Guardian*, June 30, 2006.
16. “New CSA to have more powers over errant parents,” *The Guardian*, July 25, 2006.
17. “Agents of disorder,” *The Guardian*, March 17, 1998.
18. E.g., “Chief quits with CSA ‘on brink of collapse,’” *The Daily Telegraph*, November 18, 2004; “Computer bungle ‘will hit the poor,’” *The Guardian*, August 14, 2002.
19. “Pay up now, Blunkett warns errant fathers,” *The Guardian*, September 27, 2005.
20. Committee of Public Accounts, “Child Support Agency: Implementation of the Child Support Reforms,” Thirty-seventh Report of Session 2006–2007, July 5, 2007.

21. “CSA blew Pounds 800m,” *The Sun*, June 30, 2006.
22. “We’ve done remarkable work at CSA,” *The Sun*, November 18, 2004.
23. House of Commons Hansard Debates, January 17, 2006.
24. Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health, September 1999, quoted in Flinders (2005, p. 215).
25. Louise Butcher, “London Underground PPP: background,” House of Commons Library Standard Note, January 16, 2012.
26. Andrew Stevens, “London’s transport network suffers from underinvestment and muddled strategy,” August 5, 2007. Available at: www.citymayors.com/transport/london-transport.html.
27. The Transport Committee is a parliamentary body that scrutinizes the Department for Transport.
28. Transport Committee, “The Performance of the London Underground,” Sixth Report of Session 2004–2005, March 9, 2005, p. 3.
29. Butcher, 2012, *ibid.*
30. “Tories call for auditor to investigate PPP after Metronet collapse: Brown ‘was given many warnings of problems,’” *The Guardian*, July 20, 2007.
31. Butcher, 2012, p. 13, *ibid.*
32. Transport Committee, “The London Underground and the Public–Private Partnership Agreements,” Second Report of Session 2007–2008, January 25, 2008.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. “Tube Lines ready to pick up the pieces of one Metronet contract,” *The Guardian*, July 23, 2007.
36. “Corruption claim in tube contract collapse: Transport secretary rejects MPs’ call for public inquiry,” *The Guardian*, November 8, 2007.
37. Transport Committee, Second Report of Session 2007–2008, January 25, 2008.
38. Butcher, 2012, p. 11, *ibid.*
39. Butcher, 2012, p. 12, *ibid.*
40. National Audit Office, “The failure of Metronet,” June 5, 2009.
41. Transport Committee, “Update on the London Underground and the Public–Private (PPP) Partnership Agreements,” Seventh Report of Session 2009–2010, March 17, 2010.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
43. “PFI will ultimately cost £300bn,” *The Guardian*, July 5, 2012.
44. “Revealed: Tube crisis as firms fined pounds 32m,” *The Guardian*, December 29, 2003.
45. E.g., “Brown should be much further ahead,” *The Daily Telegraph*, September 6, 2007.

46. “Brown bounces to strongest Labour lead over Cameron,” *The Daily Telegraph*, July 15, 2007.
47. This is in stark contrast to *The Sun*’s coverage of the CSA controversy. In 2006 alone (a year that saw intensive blame game interactions), it published fifty-two articles on the CSA controversy.
48. “Metronet: Learning lessons from the wreckage,” *The Guardian*, February 9, 2008.
49. Transport Committee, Second Report of Session 2007–2008, January 25, 2008, pp. 24–27.
50. “Down the Tube,” *The Sun*, July 17, 2007.
51. Transport Committee, “The Performance of the London Underground,” Sixth Report of Session 2004–2005, March 9, 2005, p. 6.
52. “Tube PPP reaches the end of the line,” *The Guardian*, December 18, 2009.
53. Transport Committee, Second Report of Session 2007–2008, January 25, 2008, Ev 43.
54. “How Blair urged his ministers to back the Dome,” *The Sun*, November 13, 2000.
55. “The Dome may be a failure – but it’s a heroic failure,” *The Daily Telegraph*, November 13, 2000.
56. “Mandelson takes charge of millennium showpiece,” *The Guardian*, June 21, 1997.
57. “PM will tell detractors to stop carping,” *The Guardian*, February 24, 1998.
58. “Blair hails ‘incredible’ dome,” *The Guardian*, December 14, 1999.
59. “More sackings to come in revamp,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2000.
60. “Tory van man – Interview with William Hague,” *The Sun*, February 16, 2000.
61. “Welcome to Britain’s prestige tourist attraction,” *The Guardian*, May 23, 2000; “Ministers forced on defensive over Dome,” *The Guardian*, May 25, 2000.
62. “Ministers forced on defensive over Dome,” *The Guardian*, May 25, 2000.
63. “An extra £47m for the Dome – but even that may not be enough,” *The Guardian*, September 6, 2000; “Falconer says . . .,” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2000.
64. “Dome too ambitious admits Blair,” *The Guardian*, September 25, 2000; “Falconer admits mistakes on dome,” *The Guardian*, September 26, 2000.
65. “Ministers break ranks on dome,” *The Guardian*, September 23, 2000.
66. National Audit Office, “The Millennium Dome,” November 9, 2000. According to this report, the main problems were flawed management,

- considerable overestimation of ticket sales, and exhibits that did not live up to ‘massaged’ expectations.
67. Each of the examined outlets published several hundred articles on the Dome – much more than on the CSA and METRONET controversies combined (which lasted longer than the blame game about the Dome).
 68. “Dome cash ‘should go to education,’” *The Guardian*, February 4, 1999.
 69. “The Dome may be a failure – but it’s a heroic failure,” *The Daily Telegraph*, November 13, 2000.
 70. “Lottery bail-out for sinking Dome,” *The Guardian*, May 22, 2000.
 71. Consider, e.g., “... it would be terrible if it started draining cash away from other, much better, causes,” *ibid.*
 72. “Dome cash crisis ‘utter nonsense,’” *The Guardian*, January 10, 2000.
 73. “The (almost) £1bn question,” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2000.
 74. “I feel at dome,” *The Sun*, January 6, 1999.
 75. “There for what purpose?,” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2000.
 76. “Blair visits dome to thank staff,” *The Guardian*, December 19, 2000.
 77. House of Commons, “Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust – Public Inquiry,” February 6, 2013; “Mid Staffs hospital scandal: the essential guide,” *The Guardian*, February 6, 2013.
 78. “Appalling care at foundation hospital may have cost hundreds of lives: Unprecedented criticism from health watchdog: Health minister apologises and announces inquiry,” *The Guardian*, March 18, 2009.
 79. “NHS culture that tolerated low standards and sold patients short: Francis report calls for openness and honesty to replace managerial cult,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2013.
 80. “The NHS needs to prepare for another bout of initiative-it is,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2013.
 81. “Cut off NHS head to save the patient,” *The Sun*, February 11, 2013.
 82. “Tory MPs accuse Labour’s Burnham of failing to heed warnings,” *The Daily Telegraph*, July 16, 2013.
 83. “PM rejects call to sack health chief over Mid-Staffs scandal: PM says targets of Labour ministers were to blame; Opposition accuses him of trying to politicise tragedy,” *The Guardian*, March 7, 2013; “PM: NHS Deaths Labour’s Fault,” *The Sun*, March 7, 2013.
 84. “Failing hospitals to be named and shamed but patient groups say move is not enough,” *The Guardian*, March 27, 2013.
 85. “Fact or Fiction? Targets improve quality in the NHS,” Nuffield Trust, February 13, 2005. Available at: www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/news-item/fact-or-fiction-targets-improve-quality-in-the-nhs.
 86. “The NHS is bracing itself for a fresh onslaught from the health secretary,” *The Guardian*, July 15, 2013.

87. “PM rejects call to sack health chief over Mid-Staffs scandal: PM says targets of Labour ministers were to blame; Opposition accuses him of trying to politicise tragedy,” *The Guardian*, March 7, 2013.

Blame Games in Germany

1. Otto Brenner Stiftung, “Die Berichterstattung über die NSU-Morde – eine Medienkritik,” OBS-Arbeitsheft 79.
2. “Zehn Mordfälle vor der Aufklärung; Rechter Terror schockiert Regierung; Sicherheitsbehörden wegen Versäumnissen in der Kritik; Merkel verlangt ‘größte Sorgfalt’ bei Ermittlungen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 14, 2011.
3. Deutscher Bundestag, “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses,” Drucksache 17/14600, August 22, 2013, pp. 3–4.
4. “De Maizière wusste von Mundlos-Akte; Minister: Nicht-Weitergabe an NSU-Ausschuss war unsensibel,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 13, 2012. All direct quotes were translated by the author.
5. “Der Mann, der von fast nichts wusste,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 14, 2012.
6. Ibid.
7. “Kritik an NSU-Aufklärung,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 18, 2012.
8. E.g., *ibid.*; “Aufklärungslawine; Merkel will weiteres Gremium zu Neonazi-Morden einsetzen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 16, 2012.
9. Deutscher Bundestag 2013, *ibid.*
10. Deutscher Bundestag 2013, *ibid.*, pp. 1031–1032.
11. “Jedem Ministerium sein eigenes Zentrum gegen rechts,” *Die Welt*, January 24, 2012.
12. E.g., “Verhängnisvolles Unvermögen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 3, 2012.
13. “Aufklärungslawine; Merkel will weiteres Gremium zu Neonazi-Morden einsetzen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 16, 2012.
14. E.g., “Becksteins Version; Der einstige Innenminister muss im Bundestag zur Neonazi-Mordserie aussagen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 24, 2012.
15. “Innenminister Friedrich fordert weitere Aufklärung zu NSU-Morden,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 5, 2012.
16. “Geheimdienste außer Kontrolle: Wer überwacht eigentlich die Überwacher?,” Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, available at: www.bpb.de/dialog/netzdebatte/169068/geheimdienste-ausser-kontrolle

- wer-ueberwacht-eigentlich-die-ueberwacher?type=galerie&show=i
mage&ci=169091.
17. “Der Mann, der von fast nichts wusste,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 14, 2012.
 18. I examined this case from a different perspective in Hinterleitner (2019).
 19. Ernst & Young, “Sachverhaltsdarstellung zu Störungen des Projektablaufes und deren Auswirkungen,” 2012.
 20. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 16/66, June 3, 2010, p. 6236ff.
 21. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2010, *ibid.*, p. 6243ff.
 22. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 17/13, May 10, 2012, p. 1002ff.
 23. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012, *ibid.*
 24. “Baufirmen haben Schuld an später BER-Öffnung,” *B.Z.*, November 15, 2012.
 25. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 17/17, September 13, 2012, p. 1553ff.
 26. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 17/19, October 25, 2012, p. 1829ff.
 27. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 17/23, January 10, 2013, p. 2238ff.
 28. E.g., “Wie geht es beim BER weiter?,” *Die Welt*, September 6, 2012.
 29. E.g., “Pressestimmen zur Verantwortung für das Flughafen-Debakel,” *B.Z.*, May 19, 2012; or “Dauersatire, nächste Folge,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 21, 2013.
 30. “So denkt Berlin über Wowereit, Henkel und die Koalition – Große Forsa-Umfrage,” *B.Z.*, January 11, 2013.
 31. “Länderfinanzausgleich: Die bittere Wahrheit über die Berliner Finanzen,” *Die Welt*, February 2, 2013.
 32. “Exklusiv-Umfrage der Berliner Zeitung: Mehrheit der Berliner lehnt neuen Flughafen ab,” *Berliner Zeitung*, January 27, 2012, available at: www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/exklusiv-umfrage-der-berliner-zeitung-mehrheit-der-berliner-lehnt-neuen-flughafen-ab-10859058.
 33. “Klaus Wowereit hat uns alle getäuscht,” *Die Welt*, June 18, 2012.
 34. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 17/13, May 10, 2012, p. 1007.
 35. “Macht nicht noch mehr Schulden!,” *B.Z.*, August 24, 2012.
 36. “Wowereit verweigert Bekenntnis zu seinen Fehlern,” *Die Welt*, January 11, 2013.
 37. These advantages are particularly visible in a committee meeting on May 18, 2012, Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Ausschuss für Bauen, Wohnen und Verkehr.

38. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Plenarprotokoll 17/19, October 25, 2012, p. 1831.
39. Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, October 2010.
40. Deutscher Bundestag, “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses als 2. Untersuchungsausschuss,” Drucksache 17/14650, September 2, 2013.
41. “‘Euro Hawk’-Drohne wird zum 500 Millionen-Euro-Fiasko,” *Der Spiegel*, May 14, 2013.
42. “Drohnen-Affäre: De Maizière verteidigt sein Vorgehen,” *Der Spiegel*, May 24, 2013.
43. “Euro Hawk: Bundeswehr ordnete Datenlöschung an,” *Der Spiegel*, June 2, 2013.
44. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/242, June 5, 2013, p. 30642.
45. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/242, June 5, 2013, p. 30645ff; “De Maizières Strategie in der ‘Euro Hawk’-Affäre ist gefährlich,” *Der Spiegel*, June 5, 2013.
46. “Germany’s defense minister evades blame,” Deutsche Welle, August 1, 2013.
47. “‘Euro Hawk’: De Maizière startet den Frontalangriff,” *Der Spiegel*, July 31, 2013.
48. “Drohnen-Ausschuss; Keine Ausreden mehr,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 27, 2013.
49. KPMG, “Umfassende Bestandsaufnahme und Risikoanalyse zentraler Rüstungsprojekte,” September 30, 2014.
50. Surveys by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, which track the popularity of German ministers, allow for a clear assessment of changes in the minister’s popularity during the blame game. See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politikbarometer 2013. www.forschungsgruppe.de.
51. Biehl, Heiko, and Rüdiger Fiebig, “Zum Rückhalt der Bundeswehr in der Bevölkerung – Empirische Hinweise zu einer emotional geführten Debatte,” SOWI.Thema 02/2011.
52. “‘Euro Hawk’- Drohne wird zum 500 Millionen-Euro-Fiasko,” *Der Spiegel*, May 14, 2013.
53. “Opposition, Medien, Wähler,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 3, 2013.
54. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/240, May 16, 2013, p. 30126ff.
55. “De Maizière: Wie ein Beamter,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 1, 2013.
56. “‘Euro Hawk’: De Maizière startet den Frontalangriff,” *Der Spiegel*, July 31, 2013.
57. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/242, June 5, 2013, p. 30644ff.

58. “‘Ethisch neutrale Waffe’: De Maizière wirbt für Einsatz bewaffneter Drohnen,” *Die Welt*, August 3, 2013.
59. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/242, June 5, 2013, p. 30642.
60. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/246, June 13, 2013, p. 31353ff.
61. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 44.
62. “Künast will Meldepflicht verschärfen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 29, 2002; “Politiker streiten über Schuld an der Nitrofen-Verseuchung,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 3, 2002.
63. “Giftskandal um Öko-Produkte,” *Berliner Zeitung*, May 27, 2002.
64. “Einzelhandel stoppt Verkauf von Bio-Produkten,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 29, 2002; “Raiffeisen-Verbund in der Kritik,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 3, 2002.
65. “‘Härtere Strafen für Lebensmittelvergehen,’” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 31, 2002.
66. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/239, p. 23835ff; “Deutschen Bio-Bauern drohen EU-Sanktionen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 10, 2002.
67. “Handelsketten wollen Lieferanten schärfer kontrollieren,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 14, 2002.
68. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/239, p. 23837ff; “‘Problem trifft auch konventionelle Landwirtschaft,’” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 7, 2002.
69. European Commission, Final Mission Report, DG(SANCO)/8686/2002 – MR Final, 2002.
70. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/239, p. 23845.
71. See esp. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/239, p. 23840.
72. “Nitrofen in konventionellem Futter,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 13, 2002; “Zu einer Agrarwende gibt es keine Alternative,” *Berliner Zeitung*, June 7, 2002.
73. “Vorschnelle Entwarnung,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 7, 2002; “Total-Blockade der Union beim Verbraucherschutz,” *Berliner Zeitung*, June 1, 2002; “Ein lehrreicher Skandal,” *Berliner Zeitung*, June 4, 2002.

Blame Games in Switzerland

1. Parts of this section are based on Hinterleitner (2018).
2. Ninck, M., “Der Verrat,” *Das Magazin*, March 28, 2014, 8–19.
3. Finance Commission of the Canton of Zurich, “Bericht der Finanzkommission betreffend Sonderprüfung der Oberjugendanwaltschaft durch die Finanzkontrolle,” 2014.

4. “Carlos wurde in geschlossene Anstalt verlegt,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, September 3, 2013.
5. “Ein unschöner, tragischer Einzelfall,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 7, 2013.
6. “Ich hätte Carlos das Sackgeld gekürzt,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, September 7, 2013.
7. “Die Justizkommission ist im Fall ‘Carlos’ unter Druck: Nach der SVP, der FDP und der BDP schliesst auch die CVP eine PUK nicht aus,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 10, 2013.
8. “Bundesgericht kritisiert das Vorgehen der Behörden scharf,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, February 25, 2014.
9. Protokoll des Zürcher Kantonsrates, 164. Sitzung, Montag, April 14, 2014.
10. Protokoll des Zürcher Kantonsrates 2014, *ibid.*, pp. 11414–19.
11. Political experts and the justice minister himself saw the CARLOS controversy as the reason for this outcome.
12. “‘Carlos’ und die Journalisten; Kontroverse Selbstreflexion innerhalb der Medienbranche über einen ergiebigen Aufreger,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 30, 2014.
13. E.g., “Jetzt kommt die Lex Carlos,” *Blick*, September 18, 2013; Protokoll des Zürcher Kantonsrates, 119. Sitzung, Montag, September 2, 2013.
14. E.g., Protokoll des Zürcher Kantonsrates 2013, *ibid.*; “Martin Graf auf Bewährung: Der Zürcher Justizdirektor muss im Fall ‘Carlos’ unangenehme Fragen beantworten,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 4, 2013.
15. “Ich hätte Carlos das Sackgeld gekürzt,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, September 7, 2013.
16. Ninck, “Der Verrat.”
17. One can only speculate about this deliberate exposure. In Chapter 9, I discuss the implications of ‘irrational’ behavior for our understanding of blame games.
18. Federal Council, Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Verbesserung der steuerlichen Rahmenbedingungen für unternehmerische Tätigkeiten und Investitionen, June 22, 2005.
19. SP, Unternehmenssteuerreform II: Vernehmlassungsantwort der SP Schweiz, April 29, 2004.
20. In Switzerland’s system of direct democracy, citizens can call referendums on laws passed by parliament.
21. “Erhebliche Steuereinsparungen; Eine Schätzung zum Effekt der Steuerbefreiung gewisser Dividenden,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 9, 2011.

22. To disseminate this information, the Federal Council authorizes and sends a voting guide to the public. The voting guide for the referendum on the CTR did not contain information on the revenue implications of the retroactivity clause.
23. “Im Abstimmungsbüchlein fehlten die Milliardenverluste,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, March 6, 2011; National Council, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Frühjahrsession 2011, 11.5159 and 11.5165.
24. “SP befürchtet Steuerausfälle in Milliardenhöhe,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, March 8, 2011.
25. National Council, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Aprilsession 2011, 601–613.
26. *Ibid.*, 602.
27. Statement by an SVP politician, *ibid.*, 604.
28. *Ibid.*, 613.
29. “Warmlaufen für die nächste Steuerdebatte; Die Unternehmenssteuerreform III wirft ihre Schatten voraus,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 3, 2012.
30. “Steuerreform für die Volksseele; Der Ständerat will mit einer defensiven Reform der Firmenbesteuerung einen Absturz an der Urne verhindern,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 31, 2016.
31. Milic, T., Reiss, T., & Kübler, D., VOTO-Studie zur eidgenössischen Volksabstimmung vom, February 12, 2017, March 2017.
32. Hirter, H., & Linder, W., Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom. February 24, 2008, April 2008.
33. E.g., National Council 2011, *ibid.*, 601.
34. National Council, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Aprilsession 2011, 601.
35. Parts of this section are based on Hinterleitner (2019). I also thank Tobias Arnold for interesting insights into the EXPO controversy.
36. The project was still named Expo.01 until the delay of the exposition from 2001 to 2002.
37. Rieder, S., Lehmann, L., & Ledermann, S., Analyse der Projektorganisation und Projektsteuerung der Expo.01/02: Bericht zuhanden der Eidgenössischen Finanzkontrolle EFK, Lucerne, 2004.
38. Rais, G., & Ammann, Y., Überlegungen zur konjunkturellen und strukturellen Entwicklung der Schweizer Wirtschaft, Neuchâtel, 2013.
39. “Lehrstück für die Bundespolitik: Die Expo 01/02 zwischen Chaos und Verwirklichung,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 6, 2005.
40. Swiss Federal Audit Office, Expo.01/02: Auftrag mit unbeschränkter Haftung: Sonderuntersuchung zur Landesausstellung im Drei-Seen-Land, 2005, 39.

41. “Alle Bundesparteien für Verschiebung der Expo,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 14, 1999.
42. National Council, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Herbstsession, October 4, 1999, 1946–1949.
43. “Der Streit um die Expo eskaliert,” *Basler Zeitung*, October 7, 1999.
44. Swiss Federal Audit Office 2005, 27; Council of States, Amtliches Bulletin, Sommersession 2001.
45. Council of States, Probleme bei der Vorbereitung und Organisation der Landesausstellung 2001 (Expo.01) – Bericht der Geschäftsprüfungskommission, March 27, 2001, 2567; Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle, Expo.01/02: Auftrag mit unbeschränkter Haftung – Sonderuntersuchung zur Landesausstellung im Drei-Seen-Land, May 2005, 26–27.
46. E.g., “Versteckspiele am Neuenburgersee,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 28, 1999; “Die Korken knallen,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 27, 2000.
47. “Wahlkampf flau, Lage stabil,” *Tages-Anzeiger*, September 17, 1999.
48. National Council, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Frühjahrsession 2002, 76–89.
49. E.g. “Immigration, Black Sheep and Swiss Rage,” *The New York Times*, October 8, 2007.
50. “Empörung und Entsetzen,” *Der Bund*, October 8, 2007.
51. Statement by an SVP politician, Berner Stadtrat, Stadtratssitzung Donnerstag, Oktober 18, 2007, Protokoll Nr. 27, 1457. Daniele Jenni was a Green parliamentarian.
52. Berner Stadtrat 2007, *ibid.*; “Herr Jenni, treten Sie zurück!,” *Der Bund*, October 19, 2007.
53. Berner Stadtrat 2007, *ibid.*, 1459.
54. Berner Stadtrat 2007, *ibid.*
55. Berner Stadtrat 2007, *ibid.*, 1463–1465.
56. “Gemeinderat liess Stephan Hügli handeln,” *Der Bund*, December 20, 2007.

Mapping the Influence of Issue Characteristics

1. This causes me to infer that there was strong public feedback to the VHA controversy. This is a precondition for the later examination of whether opponents and incumbents behaved similarly to the actors in the three in-depth case studies (which also exhibited strong public feedback).
2. “V.A. accusations aggravate woes of White House,” *The New York Times*, May 21, 2014.

3. “Colorado: Records are falsified at veterans clinic, inquiry finds,” *The New York Times*, May 7, 2014.
4. “Veterans secretary ousts health care official amid criticism,” *The New York Times*, May 17, 2014.
5. “Obama faces new test in mismanagement at veterans hospitals,” *The New York Times*, May 21, 2014; “Obama meets Shinseki over V.A. hospital problems,” *The New York Times*, May 22, 2014.
6. “V.A. hospital officials in Phoenix are placed on leave,” *The New York Times*, May 2, 2014.
7. “Three at Phoenix VA hospital placed on leave; VA head Shinseki says he takes seriously allegations that vets died waiting for appointments,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 1, 2014.
8. “Obama angry over falsification of veterans affairs data, chief of staff says,” *The New York Times*, May 19, 2014.
9. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Veterans Health Care,” May 21, 2014.
10. “House passes \$17 billion overhaul of Department of Veterans Affairs,” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 30, 2014.
11. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, “The State of VA Health Care” Hearing, May 15, 2014; “The scandal that shadows Memorial Day; The government has failed in its responsibility to veterans. Where is the administration’s sense of urgency?, by John McCain,” *The New York Times*, May 23, 2014.
12. “Obama pushes accountability at VA,” *The Wall Street Journal*, May 21, 2014.
13. “Obama angry over falsification of veterans affairs data, chief of staff says,” *The New York Times*, May 19, 2014.
14. “Obama faces new test in mismanagement at veterans hospitals,” *The New York Times*, May 21, 2014.
15. In this case, the VA secretary refrained from treating the waiting list manipulations as a systematic problem until the inquiry results were in.
16. “U.S. will miss half its supply of flu vaccine,” *The New York Times*, October 6, 2004; “Shortage was predicted,” *The New York Times*, October 7, 2004.
17. “Kerry says U.S. should have prepared for flu shot shortage,” *The New York Times*, October 10, 2004.
18. “Bush, Kerry trade blame over scarcity of flu shots,” *USA Today*, October 19, 2004.
19. “Kerry says U.S. should have prepared for flu shot shortage,” *The New York Times*, October 10, 2004.
20. “Flu vaccine policy becomes issue for Bush,” *The New York Times*, October 20, 2004.

21. “U.S. will miss half its supply of flu vaccine,” *The New York Times*, October 6, 2004.
22. “British action on vaccine a surprise, F.D.A. says,” *The New York Times*, October 12, 2004.
23. “Tough talk in final debate,” *USA Today*, October 14, 2004.
24. “Kerry says Bush is indifferent to health care,” *The New York Times*, October 19, 2004; “Kerry ad says flu vaccine shortage is typical of Bush’s policy blunders,” *The Washington Post*, October 17, 2004.
25. “Flu vaccine policy becomes issue for Bush,” *The New York Times*, October 20, 2004; “Washington wire,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 29, 2004.
26. “U.S. flu vaccines face rationing as plant is shut,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 6, 2004.
27. Media outlets had covered the controversy in a detailed, mainly problem-centered way. Moreover, polls suggest that there was rather moderate feedback to the controversy (see, e.g., “For some seniors, vaccine not a political issue,” *USA Today*, October 19, 2004; “Poll: Confidence in FDA still strong despite blunders,” *USA Today*, November 24, 2004). The reason for moderate public feedback may be that most people underestimate their susceptibility to the flu and misconceive the benefits of flu shots due to cognitive biases when observing their proximate environment (Chen and Stevens, 2017). Moderate public feedback makes the FLU controversy an adequate case for testing and refining the claims about opponent and incumbent behavior derived from the three in-depth cases.
28. “Bush responds to Kerry attacks, assures availability of flu vaccine in Florida campaign speech,” *Kaiser Health News*, June 11, 2009, available at <https://khn.org/morning-breakout/dr00026332/>.
29. “The year of fear,” *The New York Times*, October 20, 2004.
30. “Solar firm aided by U.S. shuts doors,” *The New York Times*, September 1, 2011.
31. “FBI raids solar-panel maker,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 9, 2011.
32. “Solar firm aided by U.S. shuts doors,” *The New York Times*, September 1, 2011.
33. “Romney campaigns at failed Solyndra factory,” *The New York Times*, May 31, 2002.
34. “Administration rushed solar guarantee, Republicans say,” *The New York Times*, September 14, 2011; “Parties clash over solar-panel maker,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 15, 2011.
35. “Solar firm aided by U.S. shuts doors,” *The New York Times*, September 1, 2011.

36. “Furor over loans to failed solar firm,” *The New York Times*, September 15, 2011.
37. “Trustee is sought for records of Solyndra,” *The New York Times*, October 1, 2011.
38. “2 more solar companies get U.S. loan backing,” *The New York Times*, September 8, 2011.
39. “Panel subpoenas emails on Solyndra,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 2011.
40. “Leader picked for review of U.S. loans on energy,” *The New York Times*, October 29, 2011.
41. The media coverage on the SOLYNDRA controversy was mainly problem-centered. While the corruption allegations drew significant attention and *The Wall Street Journal* ranted about ‘interventionism’ during the blame game, media outlets were in consensus that Republicans had indecently inflated the issue (see, e.g., “The Solyndra ‘panic’: One company’s failure should not deter robust public investments in clean energy,” *The New York Times*, September 25, 2011, or Paul Krugman’s statement about the controversy: “Haven’t written about this. But it is indeed a terrible scandal, because the private sector never ever puts money into ventures that end up failing,” quoted in *The New York Times*, September 25, 2011). Overall, this leads me to conclude that public feedback to this controversy, as suggested by its low salience and distance to the everyday life of citizens, was indeed low. Therefore, the SOLYNDRA case can be used to test and refine the claims about opponent and incumbent behavior derived from the three in-depth cases.
42. “Furor over loans to failed solar firm,” *The New York Times*, September 15, 2011; “Republicans attack on handling of stimulus money and green jobs,” *The New York Times*, September 23, 2011.
43. In some political systems, opponents can seek to free themselves from this constraint by pushing the controversy into inquiry procedures that regularly produce occasions for generating blame.

A Typological Theory of Blame Games and Their Consequences

1. The test cases cannot be used for the construction of the typological theory. In the test cases, I did not look at both the influence of

institutional factors and issue characteristics on blame game interactions and, therefore, cannot interpret interaction effects between these groups of explanatory factors.

2. More specifically, they represent combinations of variables.

Blame Games and Their Implications for Politics and Democracy under Pressure

1. “Barack Obama breaks his silence,” *The Atlantic*, July 17, 2018.