

appeals to Aristotle, Tillich, and Aurobindo. Bockover characterizes the relationship between *li* and *jen* in the *Analects* in a way designed to challenge uses of the subjective/objective distinction by Western thinkers. Both authors attempt too much. As a result, their arguments are compressed and they leave themselves no space to consider alternative and rival formulations of the questions with which they engage.

The four essays concerned with ethics in a comparative perspective are all of great interest. Purushottama Bilimoria, in "Ethics of Emotion: Some Indian Reflections," reinterprets what is said and shown about emotion in the *Bhagavadgita*. Joel J. Kupperman compares the expression of emotion in Western utilitarian altruism to the expression of emotion in Buddhist altruism. Joel Marks defends the goodness of dispassion and its place in the ethical life, with particular, but not exclusive, reference to the Buddhist Middle Way. And Graham Parkes, in his insightful "Nietzsche and Zen Master Hakuin on the Roles of Emotion and Passion," has put students of Nietzsche and students of Zen Buddhism equally in his debt. These essays represent just the kind of excellent work to which contemporary Western moral philosophy needs to pay attention as a prologue to deeper involvement with comparative enquiry.

In spite of the gallant editorial attempts there is an overall lack of unity to this volume. The contributors pose too many different kinds of question about too many different kinds of subject matter. And yet some central questions receive no or almost no explicit discussion: What is the appropriate unit of comparison for a comparative enquiry into the emotions? Is it each particular emotion, such as anger or grief? Or is it the set of the emotions in each particular culture? Or is it the ensemble of social relationships within which emotions function as responses to the actions and emotions of others? Or is one of these units appropriate to some types of enquiry, but not to others? These are questions to which unambiguous answers are required at or near the beginning of any comparative enquiry. Here they go unanswered, sometimes, it seems, unnoticed. Yet, given this fact, what is surprising and noteworthy is how much has been incidentally achieved. Future inquirers should be grateful to both editors and contributors.

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*Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim*. Edited by DENIS FRED SIMON. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. xxi, 266 pp. \$62.95 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

*Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization* is a loose assemblage of interesting ideas about technology, multinational corporate management, and military industrial prowess which the book's editor, Denis Simon, claims will determine the global security agenda in the third millennium. The concept was aired and fleshed out at a conference sponsored by the Center for Technology and International Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in November 1993 and refined thereafter in another session at the East-West Center in Honolulu. The working definition of "techno-security" suggested by Simon and adopted by the participants "refers to the enhancement and protection of the technological assets of a firm or nation-state. It involves not only protecting the integrity of a country's stock of technological knowledge, but also the capacity to enhance a country's capabilities

and promote its economic competitiveness and national defense through the use of both domestic and foreign technological know-how" (pp. xiv–xv).

Techno-security so defined is a series of interrelated business and defense issues. But sponsors and participants strongly believe that it is much more. Techno-security is a national security paradigm; a vision for the new age that makes technology-driven economic threats, rather than conventional and nuclear armed conflict the central focus of international security affairs. The approach appears to take Lester Thurow's and Francis Fukuyama's notions about the global triumph of capitalism and the end of history to heart. Traditional international security concerns, it is intimated, have become obsolete. Imperialism is dead, great nations are war averse, economic systems don't matter (because there is only capitalism), and Huntington's clash of civilizations is a mirage. What really matters today, the authors variously contend, are technological threats to sustainable deterrence, global economic anxieties, the maldistribution of world income, conflicts between free and managed trade, and other lower intensity quarrels.

This thesis is elaborated in twelve separate essays, half of which have an explicit Asian focus. Most of the chapters are descriptive and conceptual, but three case studies on the Korean automotive industry, the Hitachi-Goldstar strategic alliance, and the aerospace sector provide illuminating supplementary insights. All the authors adopt a liberal attitude toward the definition of technology. They do not conceive of it in narrow engineering terms, but rather as any technique including management and organization that helps companies, multinationals, and strategic alliances maximize profits in a heterogeneous cross-cultural context. Technology in this way is governed by the logic of the global market, and its dominant players, rather than by national governments which find it difficult to manage national security or prosperity through wise technology policies. But of course, it is cautioned, this has not completely dampened techno-nationalism. Japan and South Korea are striving to bar access to their most lucrative high technology assets in order to secure economic leadership, reap monopoly rents, and minimize their military vulnerability, behavior which it is suggested could become a source of global instability.

There is considerable truth in all of these observations. The economic and military industrial potential of nations, and the world collectively have always depended on the cross-currents of techno-economic competition and state controls. And, of course, the communications revolution of the 1990s has further muddied the waters. But this is a far cry from validating the assertion that techno-security in an age of globalization has superseded traditional international security concerns and become the main agenda. The Russians still possess more than 45,000 strategic nuclear warheads, and the Chinese are seriously contemplating a major program of military modernization. Other zones of potential conflict are equally obvious, so it seems premature to assume that the world is safe from armed conflict.

Techno-security no doubt can and will play a part in shaping the management of these conventional and nuclear challenges, but it is unlikely to supplant them as the core themes of international security relations. Readers therefore are advised to lower their expectations and focus their attention on the book's considerable merits as a guide to the business and international security implications of multinational technology competition and management, rather than allowing themselves to be distracted by the book's grander aspirations.

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