

## Images of Afghanistan

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Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, xvii + 261 pp.

Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1985, viii + 384 pp.

Edward R. Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985, 259 pp.

Ralph H. Magnus (ed.), *Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options, and Policies*, New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985, 221 pp.

Michael Barry, *Le Royaume de l'insolence: La résistance afghane du Grand Moghol à l'invasion soviétique*, Paris: Flammarion, 1984, 305 pp.

Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, vi + 253 pp.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society*, London: Frances Pinter, 1986, xxii + 206 pp.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 has prompted a large number of scholars and journalists to embark on the analysis of Afghan affairs. Even before the invasion, much valuable material was available in Western languages to the interested reader. The internal politics of Afghanistan had been studied by Louis Dupree, Vartan Gregorian, Hasan Kakar, Leon B. Poullada, and Richard S. Newell; Maxwell J. Fry and Gilbert Étienne had analysed the Afghan economy; and Afghanistan's international relations had been examined in detail by Ludwig W. Adamec.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, a recent bibliography of works on Afghanistan has listed no fewer than 1,611 items dealing with Afghan history and politics.<sup>2</sup> None the less, had it not been for the Soviet invasion, the study of Afghanistan would surely have remained the province of a few *cognoscenti*. In the wake of the invasion, however, a large body of literature on Afghanistan has been published, containing works varying in quality from the outstanding to the atrocious. An appraisal of the relative merits of some of the more widely cited studies therefore seems to be in order.

### American concern on Afghanistan

For the non-specialist reader wishing to gain a general grasp of what has happened in Afghanistan in recent years, undoubtedly the best starting point is Thomas T. Hammond's book *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*. In 19 carefully planned chapters, Hammond investigates in turn the period before the coup of April 1978 which brought Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin to power, the coup and its aftermath, and the Soviet invasion and its consequences. Hammond is an experienced student of Soviet and East European history, but the value of his study

of Afghanistan lies not so much in its comparative insights as in its clarity, and its focus on US perspectives on developments in Afghanistan before the invasion. By use of the provisions of the US Freedom of Information Act, augmented by extensive interviewing, Hammond provides an illuminating account of the bureaucratic politics within the Carter administration which contributed to the shape of American policy in the months before the Soviet invasion.

Hammond exposes a sharp conflict between on the one hand Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his chief adviser on Soviet affairs Marshall Shulman, and on the other hand Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski initially approved a restrained response to the communist coup (p. 63). From March 1979, immediately following the murder in Kabul of US Ambassador Adolph Dubs, Brzezinski recalls he began to press Carter 'to register American concern to the Soviets' (p. 108), and in both August and December 1979, the State Department vetoed specific references to increasing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan from, respectively, a speech and a backgrounder which Brzezinski was to present publicly. As Hammond observes, during the months preceding the Soviet invasion, 'No substantial statements were made in public by the president, the vice president, or the secretary of state, and when the national security adviser made a speech, his words were censored by the State Department' (p. 109). Raymond Garthoff in his monumental work *Détente and Confrontation*<sup>3</sup> details a number of actions taken by various officials to signal to the Soviets the growing concern of sections of the administration at developments in Afghanistan, but none signalled *more* than concern, and it is difficult to disagree with Hammond's conclusion that Carter and Vance 'may have engaged in the common human practice of wishful thinking' (p. 112). Hammond's crisp account is a significant source of fresh information about US policy, and is likely to remain so until the appearance of the history of US–Afghan relations on which Leon B. Poullada is presently working.

What Hammond lacks is a long-standing familiarity with Afghanistan's internal political dynamics. He makes reasonable use of secondary sources to produce an account of domestic developments, but focuses heavily on leadership politics, to the exclusion of the social context which has determined the character of politics and the identity of politically important social groups. His discussion of the resistance within Afghanistan is the weakest part of the book, dealing in a methodical fashion with neither the constituents of the resistance, nor its organizational structure, nor its bases of support.

### Afghanistan and the Soviet Union

The new and expanded edition of Henry S. Bradsher's book *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* covers similar ground to Hammond's, but in substantially greater detail. This makes it more daunting for a reader unfamiliar with the two countries under scrutiny, but of greater value to specialists. Bradsher was an Associated Press correspondent in South Asia from 1959 to 1964, and that agency's Bureau Chief in Moscow from 1964 to 1968. No doubt as a result in part of this fortuitous combination of postings, his book, originally drafted in 1980–81, and in its second edition updated to mid-1985 by the addition of two further chapters, is certainly the best so far produced by any journalist concerned with Afghan affairs. Although Bradsher does not appear to read either Persian or Pushtu, he has made extensive use of translations by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and of the Soviet press. His book is the best documented of all those on Afghanistan which have appeared since the Soviet invasion, and is within its limits a splendid example of meticulous scholar-

ship. Like Hammond's, however, it does not venture any detailed appraisal of the social characteristics which have accommodated the persistence in Afghanistan of a vigorous resistance movement.

Furthermore, while Bradsher's book is extremely informative in a number of ways, it does not convey the flavour of the war in quite the way that another book by a journalist, Edward Girardet's *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, manages to do. Girardet is a special correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor*, and has produced many informative stories about developments both within Afghanistan and in its immediate region. His book makes careful use of refugee testimony, which is an important and considerably under-used source of information about what is going on in Afghanistan. It also deals in detail with important matters not systematically addressed elsewhere, such as the work within Afghanistan of doctors from the international organizations Médecins sans frontières, Médecins du monde, and Aide médicale internationale. However, it is in a number of ways a frustrating book. First, it is entirely unburdened by documentation. One comes to expect this in newspapers, but a complaint should be registered against the absence of documentation in a book which attempts far more than 'actuality' reporting. At many points, one can recognize that information has come from official publications or from solid secondary sources; yet at no point is the reader favoured with the information which would allow him to examine the sources in order to assess the use which Girardet has made of the undoubtedly massive volume of material on which he draws.

Second, the book is curiously structured. A great deal of important information is assembled in the book, and its individual paragraphs are tightly written and unmarred by verbiage. However, by opening his account with the Soviet invasion, and only returning in chapters five and six to the historical context within which the invasion took place, Girardet risks creating the impression that the invasion came almost out of the blue. Such blemishes are most regrettable, for the book conveys the 'smell and feel' of events in Afghanistan better than any other sustained journalistic account. The dusty streets of Peshawar are instantly recognizable, from Girardet's account, to anyone who has had the experience of tramping them, and his account of developments in that isolated region of central Afghanistan known as the Hazarajat is especially informative.

### **The complexities of the resistance**

Girardet provides a more elaborate institutional description of the resistance than do either Hammond or Bradsher. However, for a concise account of the complexity of the resistance, it is necessary to look elsewhere. A good point of departure is Eden Naby's paper in *Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options, and Policies*.<sup>4</sup> This excellent volume contains papers presented at a November 1983 conference, together with formal commentaries, and a transcript of the contributions of the participants. The inclusion of the discussions makes its commissioned papers all the more thought-provoking. Naby's paper emphasizes that the Afghan resistance emerged *before* the Soviet invasion, and indeed before the coups of July 1973 and April 1978. She points out that the use of the terms 'fundamentalist' and 'revivalist' to describe parts of the resistance is liable to be misleading, as these terms 'have Western religious associations that may make the position of these Afghan groups less well rather than better explained' (pp. 74–5). The historian and diplomat Seyed Qassem Reshtia stresses the distinctive character of Islam in Afghanistan (pp. 83–4), and Professor Seyed Bahauddin Majrooh, Director of the reputable Afghan Information Centre in Peshawar, points out that the resistance has two sides, first the internal resistance in

Afghanistan, and second the political organizations in Peshawar and elsewhere with which the internal resistance is linked. All these contributions pay appropriate attention to the complexity of the resistance, although the complexities are by no means fully elaborated.

For such an elaboration, it is necessary to turn to two remarkable works which deal explicitly with resistance forces, both products of the distinguished Francophone school of Afghan studies. The first of these is Michael Barry's *Le Royaume de l'insolence*. Barry brings to bear a longstanding acquaintance with Afghanistan, in which he worked as a Peace Corps volunteer long before the advent of communist rule. He had already published in 1974 a short book about Afghanistan which won him the French Prix des Voyages and the Prix de la Société nationale de géographie.<sup>5</sup> He has also conducted extensive interviews since 1980 with Afghan refugees as part of his work as Observer for Afghanistan of the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights.<sup>6</sup> The second of these works is Olivier Roy's *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, a translation of his 1985 study *L'Afghanistan: Islam et modernité politique*. Roy, like Barry, brings to his work a rich background in the study of Afghanistan, having earlier written a doctoral thesis on 'State and Society in Contemporary Afghanistan'. Roy's book is quite outstanding. Both Roy and Barry are firmly in command of Persian, and each makes use of Mir Muhammad Ghulam Ghobar's famous 1967 study *Afghanistan dar masir-i tarekh* [Afghanistan in the Course of History], and other important Persian-language sources on Afghan history. They also display a familiarity with Afghan society and tradition which sets their books apart from most other works which have appeared in recent years. In addition, they are sensitive to the complexity of Afghan society, and to the existence of marked regional variations.

Yet the two books are quite different in focus. Barry writes not simply for a specialist audience, and therefore opens with some penetrating general observations about certain Western perceptions of the Afghan conflict, perceptions which he shows to be both ethnocentric and ill-informed. He then sets the scene for his survey of the phenomenon of resistance in Afghan history with a detailed discussion of Afghan social structure and tradition. The discussion is impressionistic rather than systematic; but the impressions are those of a very acute observer. His vivid prose pins down important features of Afghan society. For example, his metaphorical description of Islam as 'the central nerve of Afghan culture' (p. 57) is both evocative and accurate. His analysis is enriched by a knowledge of Islamic culture which—until the appearance of Roy's book—was unmatched in recent writings in English. In a massive third chapter—of 146 pages—Barry then examines Afghan history from 1649 to 1978. The chapter is wide-ranging, dealing with internal political dynamics, the genesis of the Afghan state, and great power rivalry, and moving from there to a study of the events of the twentieth century which set the scene for the Soviet invasion. He does not shrink from making harsh judgements. According to Barry, 'Daoud, and before him Amanullah, the two most important Afghan Heads of State of the 20th century, are the principal persons responsible for the Soviet occupation of their country.' However, he makes it clear that they were 'not at all traitors, but fervent patriots' who 'wagered on a community of interest between themselves and the Soviet Union while neglecting all precautions against their northern neighbour' (p. 204), and observes that his own 1974 book was 'steeped in the same spirit of optimism' as marred many analyses of Afghanistan's situation produced at that time (p. 207). Barry's book concludes with an account of developments since 1978. The great advantage of his book is that it supplies a thorough account of the historical roots from which the present situation derives, and one looks forward to its

appearance in English translation.

Olivier Roy's book is concerned with *contemporary* resistance in Afghanistan, and focuses on the way in which changes in relations between society and state in Afghanistan have interacted with distinctively Afghan patterns of religious belief, loyalty, and worship to produce the Islamic resistance which exists today. It is a much more disciplined work than Barry's, and indeed is the first systematic attempt to provide a political sociology of Afghanistan, although earlier works, most notably Ghobar's, had begun to move towards sociological interpretations of Afghan history.<sup>7</sup> In the opening chapter, Roy provides a judicious discussion of relations between state and society in Afghanistan, and notes that the 'need to have a strong central power to defend the community of believers against infidels is recognised by everyone . . .' (p. 20). This sets the context for his discussion of the character of Islam in Afghanistan, the emergence of an Islamic movement in Afghanistan, the communist coup and its aftermath, popular uprisings, the organization of the resistance, changes in society brought about by recent developments, and the course of the continuing war. All these topics are considered in great detail. The book is avowedly centred on the Afghan resistance, and does not purport to discuss in any detail either the regime in Kabul, or Soviet policy. The strength of Roy's book is that it is not a mere catalogue of events, but rather an attempt to explain the nature of the resistance by locating it within a sociological context. It is the most conceptually ambitious of the books under discussion, but also the most successful.

### The view of the Kabul regime

The conceptual richness of Roy's study stands in sharp contrast to the crudeness of another recent book with sociological pretensions, Bhabani Sen Gupta's *Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society*. This forms part of the new series on Marxist regimes being produced under the general editorship of Bogdan Szajkowski, and earlier contributions to the series, such as Ronald J. Hill's book on the Soviet Union,<sup>8</sup> have served both to set a high standard and to create high expectations for later works. Sen Gupta's book markedly fails to meet the standard of the earlier works.

Its fundamental flaw is apparent from the fourth sentence in the book. 'There is a terrible dearth of reliable credible information,' he writes, 'and almost every image is coloured' (p. xi). This is an accurate description of Sen Gupta's footnotes, which are coloured pink. However, it is not at all an accurate description of the material available to the industrious scholar. Sen Gupta makes no use of Persian or Pushtu-language sources. Furthermore, unlike other English-language writers such as Bradsher and Girardet, he shows no sign of having bothered to consult the abundant material published about contemporary Afghanistan in such French sources as the bimonthly publications *Défis afghans* and *Les Nouvelles d'Afghanistan*, and in general, he shows a very poor grasp of the available material relevant to his topic.

Perhaps as a result, his book contains numerous errors of fact. Shah Mahmud, Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1946 to 1953, is described as King Zahir Shah's son (p. 9), when in fact he was his uncle. The author creates the impression, perhaps by clumsy wording, that King Amanullah was overthrown in 1929 not by the Tajik adventurer *Bacha-i Saqao*, but rather by General Mohammad Nadir, the Pushtun aristocrat who subsequently overthrew the *Bacha* (p. 35). He purports (at p. 89) to quote from an 'American scholar', but the source in his footnotes is an article by the Soviet writer Henry Trofimenko, which in any case contains nothing like the passage allegedly to be found in it. Assadullah Sarwari is quite wrongly identified as 'a



Parcham leader who had been jailed and tortured when Taraki was in power' (pp. 114–15), when in fact he was a member of the Khalq faction, and headed Taraki's secret police until Taraki's downfall. Professor Hasan Kakar is described as a Pakistani historian, an error akin to labelling Sakharov a Bulgarian. Not only was Kakar Professor of History at Kabul University, but since 1983 he has been Afghanistan's most famous political prisoner, having been sentenced to eight years imprisonment after attempting to set up a human rights group at Kabul University. This has led Amnesty International to adopt him as a prisoner of conscience, and anyone setting out to write a book on contemporary Afghanistan should be well aware of who Kakar is.

More serious than these specific errors, though, is the misleading general image of the situation in Afghanistan which the book creates. As a rule of thumb, one can rely on Sen Gupta to present the views of the Kabul regime on almost any question he addresses. Very often he relies on patently dubious sources to support his claims. He provides two sets of figures on land distribution in Afghanistan, but both are from communist sources (p. 39), and in discussing the status of women in Afghanistan (p. 181, n. 18), he uses as a source one of the most consistently pro-Soviet magazines in North America, *New World Review*. Chapter 9 is the most intellectually arid in the book, and consists largely of an uncritical reproduction of the Kabul regime's propaganda pronouncements. For example, Sen Gupta writes that since February 1981, Babrak Karmal 'has succeeded in keeping the party together, no split has occurred, no plots have been reported, and Karmal has acquired certain aspects of a father figure, a national unifier under the umbrella of Soviet arms' (p. 115). When one turns to the footnotes, one finds that the most up-to-date source for this claim (a claim which makes Karmal's elimination appear quite inexplicable) is the May 1980 number of the Moscow journal *New Times*.

Other chapters are equally eccentric, although not on quite such a massive scale. Many would raise an eyebrow at Sen Gupta's description of the Soviet invasion as 'a Soviet action sparked off by the United States' (p. 135), or his claims that the People's Democratic Party has been striving to build a 'National Democratic state' (p. 1), and that one should shrink from suggesting that 'Karmal and members of the PDPA are not patriotic Afghans' (p. 162). His assertion that Hammond obtained State Department documents 'by invoking the Fifth Amendment' (p. 197) might amuse an American lawyer, but attests a sloppiness in drafting which has no place in a work of scholarship. Much of what he writes is simply ill-informed. Into this category falls his description of Ahmad Shah Massoud as 'Afghanistan's most fundamentalist Islamic rebel leader, who swears by the Iranian revolution' (p. 188, n. 12). At other points, Sen Gupta adopts a spurious even-handedness, treating transparently ludicrous regime denials of atrocities every bit as seriously as the meticulously documented scholarly studies which point, for example, to the use of anti-personnel mines disguised as children's toys. After referring (in inverted commas) to Soviet 'terror tactics', he comments that the 'guerillas have been equally brutal' (p. 107). No one even slightly acquainted with the most detached writings on human rights in Afghanistan, such as the reports from Amnesty International, the Helsinki Watch Committee, Amitié Franco-Afghane, the International Humanitarian Enquiry Commission on Displaced Persons in Afghanistan, or the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan to the UN Human Rights Commission,<sup>9</sup> could attach the least credence to this claim, which he makes no attempt to substantiate.

Sen Gupta also differs from writers such as Bradsher and Girardet in his appraisal of the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan. According to Bradsher, in the mid-1980s, there was superimposed upon both party and state apparatuses 'a layer above

them of Soviet advisers who controlled everything' (p. 285). Girardet bluntly labels the regime a 'Window-dressing Government' and states that 'according to middle and senior rank Afghan officials who have defected since the early days of the occupation, no minister can make a single decision, even a minor one, without consulting his omnipresent Soviet shadow' (p. 138). He discusses in detail (pp. 124–31) the functions performed by the Secret Police (KHAD), which until November 1985 was headed by Dr Najibullah. Girardet argues that 'KHAD is increasingly a "state within a state"' (p. 130). The recent replacement of Karmal as party General Secretary by Najibullah may well reflect a desire in the Kremlin to return to the pattern typical of other Soviet-type societies where the party bureaucracy fills this role, but there can be little doubt that for a considerable time to come, KHAD will retain this peculiar character. The Khalqis' hatred of the Parcham faction has incapacitated the party and prevented it from fulfilling an interest-integration function. It is no surprise that Soviet tanks were reportedly assembled outside the Interior ministry in Kabul when the Central Committee was convoked in extraordinary session to ratify Karmal's replacement by Najibullah,<sup>10</sup> from the perspective of Khalqi Interior Minister Gulabzoy, a much more dangerous opponent.

Sen Gupta is the odd man out in his appraisal of the Kabul regime. Implicit in his account is the view that the regime enjoys substantial autonomy from the 'limited contingent' of Soviet troops inside the country, and exercises control over sufficient territory to make its 'policies' of some interest to the reader. However, as noted earlier, he does not support this view with 'evidence' in the usual sense of the term, and virtually all his statements are based on regime propaganda. Sen Gupta takes the view that the regime's survival 'is not in doubt' (p. 1). Bradsher leans to this view, and while accepting that certain factors, not on the horizon in the early 1980s could cause the Soviets to leave, argues that although 'more aid to the resistance can cause escalating costs for the Soviets to hold the country, it is difficult to foresee a level of expense at which the costs would outweigh Soviet apprehension of abandoning Afghanistan' (p. 254). Hammond is equally pessimistic (p. 189). That one cannot foresee such a level as Bradsher describes does not however mean that there *is* no such level, and an awareness of this may explain why Bradsher none the less advocates support for the resistance.

Sen Gupta's views on the resistance are all too predictable. He argues that the communist regime was confronted in 1979 by two Islamic rebellions, one 'politically conservative' and the other 'fundamentalist' (p. 60). The former consisted in his view 'mostly, if not entirely, of propertied people dispossessed by the reforms', while the latter were revolutionaries wanting 'a radical restructuring of Afghan society based on an unequivocal and explicit Islamic 'mandate' (pp. 60–1). He is quite wrong when he claims that 'Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan evidently see themselves as part of the anti-imperialist and radically nationalist stream of Islamic fundamentalism which triumphed in Iran in 1979 under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini . . .' (p. 63). In fact, even the strand of the Afghan resistance which he misleadingly labels 'fundamentalist' is predominantly Sunni rather than Shi'ite, and regards Iran with considerable suspicion. As both Barry and Roy demonstrate, the inspiration of the revolutionary strand of Islamic thought within the resistance comes rather from figures such as the Pakistani Sayid Maulana Maududi and the Egyptian Sayid Qutb—and nationalist ideas have little or no place in the Islamists' political lexicon.

If Barry and Roy are at one on this point however, they are in conflict when it comes to the value which they attach to the revolutionary strand of the resistance. Roy in earlier writings has identified Islamic ideology as a way of integrating

modernism without a breach with cultural identity, and compared it to Protestantism of the sixteenth century. Barry thinks this a just comparison (p. 80), but clearly does not share Roy's somewhat sympathetic view of Protestantism, arguing that the Christian variety swept aside Saint Thomas Aquinas, and that the project of the English Puritan fathers of the seventeenth century consisted in the building on earth of the utopian New Jerusalem (p. 81). Roy implicitly responds to this by arguing that since the 'Islamists' are intellectuals who lack an independent grip on civil society, the key to their success must lie in liaison with the clergy, whose belief system embodies a notion of the rule of law.

The possibility of a negotiated settlement engages the attention of all the English-language authors. Here at least, one finds almost a measure of agreement. Girardet writes that the 'Soviet refusal to consider a withdrawal so long as the present regime in Kabul cannot survive on its own also spells doom, at least for the time being, for the peace talks' (p. 235). 'Even a whole team of Talleyrands could not carry off all these diplomatic miracles' comments Hammond (p. 187). Bradsher deals with the UN-sponsored negotiations in just two dismissive paragraphs (pp. 273–4). Even Sen Gupta, who devotes an entire chapter to 'Prospects for a Political Settlement', concludes that 'few informed observers believe that Cardovez [sic] will be able to deliver a comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan problem' (p. 143). Unfortunately, in a characteristic display of splenetic anti-Americanism, Sen Gupta blames this on obstructionism from Washington, whereas the obstacles to a negotiated settlement are much more complex, and rooted in the absolute unacceptability to the vast bulk of the Afghan population of a regime with even a trace of communist sympathies,<sup>11</sup> and in the ineradicable feud which afflicts the Soviet-backed regime.<sup>12</sup>

### The neglect of political sociology

If there is a disappointing feature in recent writing on Afghanistan, it is the neglect by most writers of perspectives from political sociology which might have enriched their analyses. Hammond and Bradsher have produced meritorious studies, but each is limited by its neglect of social networking. Only Barry and Roy seek to analyse in any detail the contribution of the characteristics of Afghan society to the shaping of recent political events, and only Roy seeks to use concepts in a systematic fashion to order his material. It is perhaps because he can also lay claims to an area expertise unrivalled by any of the other writers except Barry that his book is so illuminating. Afghanistan is peculiarly a topic of study which demands in harmonious proportions the skills of both the political sociologist, who can draw on critically-tested hypotheses about political behaviour to shed light on a particular case, and of the area specialist, who can sense whether a particular case can actually be subsumed under superficially attractive hypotheses. Among Afghanistan's lesser tragedies is that it has too often attracted the attention of writers who can do neither.

### References and notes

1. See Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, 1973); Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernisation 1880–1946* (Stanford, 1969); Hasan Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan* (Austin, 1979); Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919–1929* (Ithaca, 1973); Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* (Ithaca, 1972); Maxwell J. Fry, *The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development* (Leiden, 1974); Gilbert Étienne, *L'Afghanistan ou les aléas de la coopération* (Paris, 1972); and Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan's*



*Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations With the USSR, Germany, and Britain* (Tucson, 1974).

2. Keith McLachlan and William Whittaker, *A Bibliography of Afghanistan* (Cambridge, 1983), ch. 9.
3. Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation* (Washington, DC, 1985), pp. 942–5. This book makes extensive use of diplomatic cables sent to Washington by the US Embassy in Kabul, and published in Teheran after being seized by the militants who occupied the US Embassy in Iran from November 1979 to January 1981.
4. Also worth consulting is Tahir Amin, 'Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and Future', *Asian Survey*, xxiv (1984), pp. 373–99.
5. Michael Barry, *Afghanistan* (Paris, 1974).
6. See Michael Barry, 'Répression et guerre soviétiques', *Les Temps Modernes*, no. 408–409, July–August 1980, pp. 171–234.
7. See Kakar, op. cit., pp. 252–4. The emphasis on social structures in Ghoobar's history may explain in part why it has recently attracted the attention of various Soviet writers. See, for example, V. G. Korgun, *Intelligentsiia v politicheskoi zhizni Afganistana* (Moscow, 1983); and M. Davliatov, 'Afganskii istorik o politike Anglii v Afganistane v pervoi treti XX v.', *Narody Azii i Afriki*, no. 3, 1986, pp. 94–9.
8. Ronald J. Hill, *The Soviet Union: Politics, Economics and Society from Lenin to Gorbachëv* (London, 1985).
9. See *Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan* (London, Amnesty International, ASA 11/04/79, September 1979); *Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Background Briefing on Amnesty International's Concerns* (London, Amnesty International, ASA 11/13/83, October 1983); *Afghanistan: Torture of Political Prisoners* (London, Amnesty International, ASA 11/04/86, November 1986); Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin, *'Tears, Blood and Cries': Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Invasion 1979–1984* (New York, 1984); Barnett Rubin, *To Die in Afghanistan* (New York, 1985); Bernard Dupaigne (ed.), *Les Droits de l'homme en Afghanistan* (Paris, 1985); 'International Humanitarian Enquiry Commission on Displaced Persons in Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey*, v (1986), pp. 65–99; Felix Ermacora, *Rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme en Afghanistan* (E/CN.4/1985/21, Human Rights Commission, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, 19 February 1985); Felix Ermacora, *Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan* (A/40/843, General Assembly, United Nations, 5 November 1985); and Felix Ermacora, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan* (E/CN.4/1986/24, Human Rights Commission, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, 17 February 1986).
10. *Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly*, xii (May 12–18 1986), p. 2.
11. See William Maley, 'Prospects for Afghanistan', *Australian Outlook*, xxxix (1985), pp. 157–64, and William Maley, 'Political Legitimation in Contemporary Afghanistan', *Asian Survey*, xxvii (1987), pp. 705–25.
12. Amin Saikal, 'The Afghanistan crisis: a negotiated settlement?', *The World Today*, xl (1984), pp. 481–9.