

especially considerable growth in funding, despite Britain remaining the country that provides the least access of parties to public funding.

The final chapter assesses the extent to which Britain's political parties continue to fulfill their core political functions: governance, representation, communication, and participation. Just as with the rest of the book, the conclusion is a quite confident rejection of any notion of "parties in decline." Parties remain the dominant political actors in Britain, despite multiple challenges. But the authors do acknowledge that the dominant role of the two main players, Conservatives and Labour, tends to be embellished by an electoral and parliamentary system that has resisted much-needed essential reform.

This is a "big picture" kind of book. It not only contains plenty of empirical analysis, making great use of varied sources of data—including British Election Study survey data, Party Members Project Data, and Comparative Manifesto Project data—but also extensively reviews and appraises cutting-edge empirical research in the various relevant fields. In addition to being a major contribution to the field of British and comparative party politics research, perhaps the biggest service this book will do is providing students of British and comparative party politics with a fantastic overview of theories and empirical research. All the chapters include excellent introductions to major theories in the field—conceptualizing party systems, party competition, voting behavior, internal party politics, party finance, political trust, and so on. It also gives the reader excellent short but comprehensive overviews of British political history, most notably in the chapter about party ideologies (pp. 105–31).

If I am allowed some nit-picking, there are some small errors (and this is probably unavoidable with a book aiming to be this comprehensive). Being based in Scotland and knowing a little bit about Scottish politics, maybe I was bound to be regionally biased in which ones I picked up. Scotland does not use Westminster constituencies for the SMP districts in its mixed-member system: obviously it does not, because Holyrood elections have 73 constituencies compared with 59 Westminster constituencies (p. 19). Scotland also does not use multimember plurality voting but STV for its local elections (p. 38). Finally, the small number of valid responses to questions in the British Election Study about left–right positions of the SNP and Plaid Cymru do not indicate that voters do not know "much about the ideological positions of parties, especially minor parties" (p. 161). They are simply a reflection of the size of Scottish and Welsh subsamples in the BES, because only they were asked about these parties.

Those minor quibbles aside, this book is a tour de force through British party politics and should be read by anyone with an academic or general interest in the subject matter. It also manages to remain eminently readable for

the non-expert even where it discusses complex theories or regression models employed to produce empirical findings.

Second-Generation Liberation Wars: Rethinking Colonialism in Iraqi Kurdistan and Southern Sudan.

By Yaniv Voller. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

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— Michael M. Gunter , *Tennessee Technological University*
Mgunter@tntech.edu

This incisively written analysis of second-generation colonial wars of independence in Iraqi Kurdistan and South Sudan ironically illustrates how the concept of self-determination or right to independence originally used by the first generation has been used subsequently to the detriment of its first-generation adherents. Accordingly, for Yaniv Voller, "Postcolonial separatist wars, between postcolonial governments and insurgents, have often seen the resurgence of patterns and practices of previous liberation wars between European empires and anti-colonial rebels in the colonies" (p. 21). This is an important argument because it not only challenges the existing state system but also has the potential to question much of the validity of the original anticolonial movement that followed World War II. Thus, this book will be a significant contribution to the existing literature.

Although one might argue about the relevance of the two case studies chosen by Voller, there can be no debate about his deft use of primary documents to skillfully illustrate his points concerning how post–first-generation separatist violence evolved, rather than merely why it erupted or what its consequences were. The two excruciatingly lengthy post- or secondary colonial struggles that are analyzed enable us to understand the changing trends of anticolonialism "from armed insurgency to government building as a strategy of separatism" (p. 13). At the same time, India's mostly peacefully won independence from Great Britain in 1947 and Indonesia's from the Netherlands in 1950 largely belie the supposed necessity of armed struggle during the first generation, even by these two huge colonial states. What is more, even though both contained many possible seeds of second-generation colonial struggles, in most cases they never fully materialized. Pakistan, on initial Indian independence, followed by Bangladesh (a third-generation colonial struggle in 1971) from what was originally colonial India, and then Pakistan and East Timor (Timor-Leste) via a more tortured route of initial independence from Portugal in 1975 (incorporation by Indonesia from 1976–99 and finally independence) represent exceptions to this process.

As for the two case studies used in Voller's book, one might have wished to have seen what theoretical lessons

would have been offered by such other examples as Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the Soviet Union with its numerous minorities large and small. Indeed, as I write, murderously dangerous war in Ukraine rages, and a second war over Karabakh has only concluded in November 2020, both in the former Soviet Union. As for Israel, the Palestinian struggle has again been renewed, with possible consequences fraught with danger for regional and world peace.

The book's first chapter establishes links between roles and practices in international politics with analyses on the meaning of colonialism, anticolonialism, and decolonization. The second chapter examines how the interactions between the two generations of colonialists and anticolonialists enable understanding of the evolution of postcolonial conflicts, and chapter 3 closely explores the postcolonial governments' attempts at core rule over their peripheries.

The fourth chapter details how the second-generation liberation movements assumed their anticolonial role, followed by discussion of their struggles, self-perceptions, discourses, and strategies. Chapter 5 examines the all-important shift that both Iraqi Kurdistan and South Sudan made in the early 1990s from focusing almost exclusively on armed insurgency to developing basic civilian institutions with governing capacities: these developments enabled them to continue their liberation movements more successfully. The final chapter reflects on the lessons learned and how they might serve as the foundation for subsequent studies in postcolonial violence and civil wars. The book concludes with a lengthy bibliography and thorough index, which are often missing in today's haste to publish.

In developing his thesis on second-generation liberation wars for self-determination, by which he means independence, Voller gives short shrift to the all-important concept of territorial integrity or the term he prefers, *uti possidetis*. Indeed, the author never fully defines *uti possidetis* beyond decrying it as the “fear of border changes” (p. 28). The term stems from South American regional international law and literally means “as you possess, so shall you possess”; that is, the old Spanish and Portuguese colonial borders would remain legal international boundaries on independence. Thus, for all practical purposes the international law principles of *uti possidetis* and territorial integrity are synonymous.

Yet there is scarcely a more important doctrine in modern international law than that of territorial integrity or *uti possidetis*, because challenging it invites the suicidal breakup of practically every existing state on earth. Thus, in its famous “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” issued in December 1960, the United Nations, while proclaiming in paragraph 2 of this celebrated resolution that “all peoples have the right of

self-determination,” warned in paragraph 6 that “any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” This definitive interpretation that territorial integrity supersedes self-determination has been reiterated on several occasions, particularly by the “UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” in October 1970, which was adopted by consensus and is considered by most to be the authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 that recognized Europe's existing borders resulting from World War II also prominently recognized this interpretation. In 1993, the UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna concurred when it declared that the right of self-determination “shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.”

Indeed, the same reasoning has been used by the West to oppose Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its much larger aggression against Ukraine in 2022, as well as Moscow's earlier recognition in 2008 of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's secession and independence from Georgia. Moreover, in recent years, the UN unanimously passed four separate resolutions supporting continuing Azerbaijani territorial integrity over Karabakh against Armenia's claim to it by self-determination, a position that presents serious problems for Voller's emphasis on self-determination. On the one hand, the doctrine of territorial integrity trumps that of self-determination. On the other hand, there is nothing in international law that prohibits secession. International law eventually will recognize the winner of a civil war as legitimate. Indeed, traditionally in international law and still so today, the formation of a new state has been simply a matter of fact, not law.

These weighty concerns notwithstanding, Voller's explanation for how the Iraqi Kurds and South Sudanese—and by implication others—successfully transformed or may transfer their liberation status remains incisive: “Their anti-colonial identity and focus on guerrilla fighting began to give way to new perceptions, discourses and strategies, as both movements shifted their resources from armed insurgency to building governance capacity and rudimentary state institutions” (p. 191). As a result, “commentators, experts and policymakers came to see governability, namely the aspiring state's ability to govern itself according to international standards, as the path towards regional and global stability” (pp. 192–93). Therefore, Voller aptly shows how in some cases self-determination trumps territorial integrity.