

AGRARIAN CHANGE TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA

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THE THEME OF THE FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY¹ POINTED to the importance of technological change in agricultural production throughout the world and the social changes that accompany or follow it.

Examples can indeed be found in Latin America of rural technological change being succeeded by social change, but that proposition alone does not provide a good characterization of the present rural scene. Great social changes are being incubated, there is much latent and some open conflict, but little technological change leading to development.

This view of the situation finds support in many quarters, and amongst them, a recent report by the United Nations,² which states . . . "Changes and innovations introduced in agriculture have not substantially altered the traditional characteristics of the system. Agricultural technique has suffered only slight modifications since 1955, with the result that the level of resource-use of both land and labour remains low." This is in part attributed to the continued extensive use of both land and labour. Other important economic traits of the rural sector are referred to in the report: there is no marked increase in the internal market for national products brought about by an increase in the purchasing power of the peasants; systems of commercialization that throw the negative burden of price-fluctuations on the rural producer have developed, while the rigid structure of his enterprise prevents it from adapting quickly and effectively to changes in market conditions, such as increased demands for certain products.

Thus, to limit discussion to social change arising from the application of technology to agricultural production would tend to give an erroneous impression of the main stream of agrarian change. Clearly the development of technology is fundamental to the larger process of change, especially the diffusion of those innovations connected with public health and the population increase such as vaccines and antibiotics; those connected with transport such as the automobile and the bulldozer; those that have led to the free communication of ideas such as the battery-powered radio and the transistor; and especially all those that have conjointly created modern cities and industrial activities in the midst of archaic agrarian societies and have thus presented rural people with alternative values, fresh explanations of social realities, and other ways of life.

This resistance to development in the agrarian sector is critical, since it is responding inadequately to the demands made by the urban growth on its productive capacities. Latin America to-day has one of the highest rates of population growth in the world and a high rate of urbanization. The trends during the period 1950–1960 are shown in the table given below.

TABLE 1
Rural & Urban Population Ratio, 1950–1960³
(Thousands)

	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Percentage urban of total</i>
1950	155,913	95,099	60,814	39%
1960	205,925	110,981	94,944	46%

The population growth rates for the different countries range from 2.0 to 3.5 per annum. In general, however, the rural growth rate remains at around 1.5 while the urban growth rate is correspondingly higher due to in-migration. This implies a demand for increasing food production made on a decreasing proportion of the population.

The over-all situation in Latin America is suggested broadly in Table No. 2, which shows some production indices for the pre-war, post-war, and last ten-year periods. Agricultural production per head is lower to-day than in the pre-war period, and since 1960 the decline has been more marked. In most countries there has not been sufficient improvement in the agricultural sector to meet the growing demands for food, let alone to provide the surpluses required for economic development. There has been, of course, an increase in gross agricultural production. But figures on productivity per worker as a measure of changes in efficiency have not been given because those encountered have been dubious and uneven.⁴

It is probable, however, that increase in production per agricultural worker, which is apparent in certain countries, consists of two contrasting elements: on the one hand, where soil, labour and transport conditions favour it, modern capitalist enterprise has moved into the fields to establish well-mechanized units of production or to modernize some of the traditional estates, and has supplied the increasing urban market for rice, sugar, cotton, sesame and similar crops for vegetable oils, barley for beer, and of course meat and dairy products. These efficiently run enterprises have achieved high productivity.⁶ On the other hand there is little evidence of development in the activities of the smallholders, share-tenants, service-tenants, *comuneros*, squatters, and

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TABLE 2

Some Indices of Agricultural Production
(Harvest 1954–55: 100)

	<i>Gross Agr. Production in Latin America</i>	<i>Gross Food Production in Latin America</i>	<i>Agricultural Production per Head in Latin America</i>	<i>Food Production per Head, in Latin America</i>	<i>Food Production^a per Head, Region I</i>	<i>Food Production^b per Head, Region II</i>
Prewar						
Average	73	69	110	104	85	102
1948–49						
Average	88	88	98	97	94	95
1952–53						
1953–54	96	96	98	98	99	100
1954–55	100	100	100	100	98	100
1955–56	103	102	100	99	101	100
1956–57	107	109	102	103	104	103
1957–58	113	112	104	103	103	101
1958–59	117	116	106	105	109	103
1959–60	121	116	106	102	110	104
1960–61	121	118	103	101	111	104
1961–62	125	121	104	100	110	103
1962–63	127	123	103	100	113	104
1963–64	130	128	102	101	113	103
1964–65						
(Preliminary)	129	130	99	101	114	101

^a Region I refers to a grouping of four geo-economic zones representing developed countries (North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, USSR, and for some reason Oceania).

^b Region II refers to Latin America, the Near East, and the Far East excluding China.

gatherers of forest crops, with the exception of the small producers of an export crop strongly supported by technical agencies in the national interest.

The picture is one of a traditional agrarian system, which fails to react to demands for increased production but which is being penetrated by new entrepreneurial elements in certain areas. Indeed it is the theme of this article that change and transformation in the rural sector are provoked by the essential incompatibility of the rural social systems and the growing industrial urban systems diffused from the larger cities. The values, organizational norms, ideologies, economic practices, money, and technical means of the larger cities impinge upon the rural sector in such a way as to upset rural routines and structures throughout the continent. This does not mean that there have not been

changes and upsets before, but previously the process through which equilibriums were upset, regained, or transformed were local. To-day conditions of modern life have set in motion a total attack on the traditional system. We shall look first at some of the basic patterns of the traditional system, and then at the kinds and levels of transformation and change-sequences.

The level at which change-sequences will be viewed is that of the neighbourhood group, which may be a dispersed settlement of smallholders who identify themselves as belonging to the same place, an agricultural village or an estate in which the inhabitants are all limited to a single productive enterprise. This seems to be the point at which individual alternatives of habitual behaviour, techniques, aspirations, and perceptions may be transformed into new institutions and social values and may bring about shifts or transformations in social structure. The neighbourhood group functions as the most important control and reference group for the rural man and determines which novel behaviours of individuals are oddities and which may be granted legitimacy.

Thus the main focus of this article is upon the neighbourhood group (*smallholder community* or *estate*) as two different types of social systems adjusting themselves to the growing pressures of the active and expanding modern city-based society. This of course raises the question of whether there is any significant change that might be regarded as endogenous with respect to the neighbourhood group, i.e., change arising from the interplay of elements of the social system itself. Several cases of this kind are discussed. Certainly situations in which socially important transformations take place endogenously are hard to find: as soon as interaction with modernizing urban centres reaches a certain degree of intensity, the subsequent processes arising from external impulses converge with and tend to overwhelm the slower movement of endogenous change.

CHANGE ON THE ESTATES

The word "estate" is used in this paper to denote a rural property on which agricultural exploitation sustains several families regularly and on which there is a division of labour between ownership-entrepreneurship and the performance of manual labour. We shall also use the word to refer to such varied enterprises as *fundaciones* and *estancias* for cattle raising in the Upper Orinoco or Tierra del Fuego, for the *engenhos* or *usinas* producing sugar in Campos or Northeastern Brazil, the *plantaciones* producing bananas and sugar on the Coasts and islands of the Caribbean or cotton on the irrigated Pacific coast of Peru, for the grain and cattle *haciendas* of the Andean Highlands, and the various types of *fazenda* in Brazil.

The estates as we know them to-day have evolved from certain forms of

agricultural exploitation that replaced the *encomienda*, or from specific enterprises or "plantations," usually within the lands of an *encomienda*, in which intensive production was carried out by slave labour.

The *encomienda*, established as the process of Conquest continued, may be described as a political system of "indirect rule." It was an attempt to stabilize the newly conquered colonies, maintaining some of the local elements of indigenous social structure and seeking acculturation and social control by means of Christian indoctrination. At the same time it was the means whereby the Spanish sovereign rewarded *conquistadores* and other loyal subjects, delegating to them the substance of seigniorial power, with rights to exact compulsory labour (*servicios personales*) and tribute from the Indian populations entrusted to them.

In the last decade of the 16th century reforms were carried out whereby *de facto* control and possession of lands formerly in *encomienda* could be transformed into private property. Other lands, *resguardos*, which remained Crown property, were set aside for the subsistence of the Indian population. Labour for the new proprietors in excess of that which they could bind directly to their property was provided by the institution of the "repartimiento," a labour duty ascribed to the Indians of the *resguardos*, and by other contrivances obliging the Indian to do labour in public and private concerns as a status-duty derived from the terms of his subjection to the Spanish Crown.

The unsatisfactory nature of a constantly changing labour force impelled the proprietary class to build up a permanent resident work-force. A class of predial dependents which took a variety of institutional forms was established. The essential condition for creating such a class was to deprive a whole sector of the rural population of access to the land and its resources. Officially, the subsistence lands of the Indian communities were reduced by the sale of *resguardos* deemed to be underpopulated. Unofficially, the estates encroached on these lands with the connivance of local officials. Those who could no longer find subsistence on the traditional Indian lands, in addition to the poor rural undersettle with no rights whatsoever, sought usufruct of subsistence lands on the estates, and in return pledged themselves to labour-service or to the delivery of a part of the product.

Thus various historical forms cover a basic pattern of pre-capitalist relations which may be expressed in the following terms: In the national or colonial society there exists a landed elite. The exercise of power along with the enjoyment of prestige and all its trappings are means to this status, as well as results of it. Both the power and the prestige can be maintained *directly* by the acquisition of labour power and its application to the land *without* deep involvement in market relations. Applied to land, labour produces minerals, foodstuffs, building materials, skins, fibres, meat, etc. Skilled labour transforms these for

the table, or into houses, utensils, clothes, works of art. Similarly, manpower can be organized as porters, flunkies, canal-diggers, roadmakers, *capangas*,⁸ militia, and finally voters. Deficiencies are supplied by marketing surpluses and buying the required goods on the local market or by importation. Thus, ability to get and to hold labour matched the getting and holding of land as pillars of society, but the forms taken by the land-labour institutions have passed through various stages: 1) the corporal ransom⁹ was replaced by 2) the imposition of labour as a duty on a legally defined social stratum and enforced by state power, and by 3) African slavery; 4) the republican period is marked by the use of coercive state power against potential labourers by means of the legal contrivance of debt; 5) the monopolistic occupation of lands and the consequent exclusion of an adequate quantity of peasants from independent subsistence; and finally by 6) the buying of labour from the landless or land-poor peasant, in a buyer's market.

What we shall see in the estate to-day is the continuing use of labour acquired through the institutions of share-tenure and service-tenure (5), combined increasingly with wage-labour, in which payment in kind continues to play an important part. The estate still attempts to maintain as much internal subsistence as possible, implying that it seeks to make the land pay for its labour, but it is market-oriented. However, the earlier pre-capitalist forms and a whole cultural heritage have left the estate a complicated, rigid structure for which adaptation to modern conditions is extremely difficult.

Plantation organization of estates, in contrast, appears to have been one of the early responses to the growth of a European market for exotic tropical products with a high scarcity-value in the temperate climate, e.g., sugar, cotton, or coffee.¹⁰ The plantation therefore came into existence to produce for the market and make profits for its owners, and its internal arrangements are derived from the rational pursuit of this end.

The situation of the plantations was determined by the fact that certain areas not only offered soils and climate favourable to the cultivation of certain staples, but also transport facilities to the consumer-centres located near the coast.

In most cases, the areas in question did not offer locally recruitable labour, thus establishing African slavery as the typical means of securing it. Work in the fields was done in gangs under slave-drivers. Other coercive forms, such as indentured labour, followed the ending of slavery, and later the push of population pressures on subsistence either in other parts of the world or in the area immediately around the plantation provided the large supply of labour required for these products.

With these antecedents, "plantation" came to signify a capitalistic type of agricultural organization in which a large number of unfree labourers were

employed under unified direction and control in the production of a single crop.¹¹ Other writers have referred to the following characteristics: the addition of "processing" to agricultural production, at least to the point necessary for shipment; a sharp separation of worker and employer class, and frequently a cultural difference between them; and the fact that the plantation is community *sui generis*.

While the plantation has had great importance in the relations between the New World and the Old, it has been confined to certain areas and crops, and has had greater importance in the islands and on the coasts of the Caribbean, in the Southern States of North America, on the Northeast and East coast of Brazil, and on the Peruvian Coast than in the South American hinterland. The problems of the transport of agricultural goods to the ports insured that the plantation system did not develop great importance in the interior. The eighteenth century Caribbean colonies can be said to have existed for the sake of the plantations. The southern states of the U.S.A.¹² and Brazil¹³ in the nineteenth century have been shown to be societies structured internally by the economic and social imperatives of the plantation. It has been suggested¹⁴ that a "creole culture," emanating from plantation behaviours, institutions, and patterns of acculturation, has characterized these societies in which the plantation system dominated.

The more recent tendency, however, has been toward domestication. Internal markets for plantation products have become important, national personnel has taken over managerial and technical responsibility, and national ownership, either by individual persons and companies or by the State, is increasing rapidly.

On the estate without plantation organization, a careful look at land-labour arrangements shows the persistence of certain interrelated characteristics:

- its continuing combination of internal subsistence with external orientation to the market;
- its complexity as a social system due to the compound particularistic relationships based on exchange of usufruct, services, goods, cash and credit;
- its wide span of strata with excessive social, cultural, and economic differences, and the absence of the possibilities of social ascension from the lower ranks;
- its system of social control in which insulation from the larger society, coercion, and "paternalism" play their parts.

The following instance of service-tenure arrangements on a traditional estate in contemporary Peru is described by Martínez¹⁵. The obligations of the *yanacomas* or service-tenants were as follows:

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(1) They had to give 160 work-days to the estate as service-rent for the use of a plot of estate land.

(2) They had to render additional service without payment when required, e.g., taking turns as watchmen over the estate crops, looking after harness and harness room, supervising field-labour, domestic service in the owner's house, backyard tasks such as the care of pigs and the fetching of firewood. These duties were often rotated among the labourers who were compensated by meals, if the work period included a meal time, and a ration of coca.

(3) The pasturage to which the cattle of the service-tenant had access was paid for by delivery of a part of the annual increase, provision of beasts of burden for use within the estate, and by use of the service-tenant's cattle to manure the estate fields.

(4) Of a variety of other petty obligations, it is worth mentioning those that bound the service-tenant to pay fines when, in the opinion of the owner or his servants, something happened to the prejudice of the owner; and to replace cattle damaged by whatever cause while they were in the charge of the service-tenant.

In return for the above duties, the service-tenant had the right to cultivate the lands allotted to him as he wished; the right to plant corn and potatoes in special lands set aside for this purpose, if he chose to pay additional rent; rights to pasture his cattle on the terms given above and to benefit from the manure of the owner's cattle when they grazed his field after harvest; the right to one lamb from the master's flock per year; and the right to receive fifty centavos and a ration of coca and cornbeer as payment for obligations fulfilled each week.

The main labour force on the estates of the Highlands of Ecuador consists of service-tenants known as *huasipungeros*,¹⁶ while a similar arrangement known as *inquilinaje* continues to be the backbone of the labour force in Chile.¹⁷ In an example of share and service tenure on an estate in N. Santander, Colombia, the proprietor raised cattle on unimproved pastures, employing three cowboys. He rented houselots with small gardens to the landless peasant families for one week's labour per month. He also rented lands for planting sugar cane to each family, who paid for them by delivering half of the sugar loaf (*panela*) produced by the share-tenant's primitive mill. In Brazil, where share-tenure is widespread, Feder insists that the tenant can be considered nothing but a labourer, due to the enforcement of conditions with regard to cropping, time and form of sale, etc. Even the cash tenant, whose situation is economically stronger, may be obliged to pay the hated labour-service (*cambão*).¹⁸

In the past these institutions were frequently accompanied by a contrived debt bondage, so that the coercive powers of local officials could be evoked against predial dependents who might set out to look for a better livelihood elsewhere.

Occasional labour tends to be contracted for wages, either directly or by means of contractors. Within the service-tenure system, the sons of the service-

tenants are likely to be available when required. In most countries there is also a reserve of seasonal migrant labour, of which very little knowledge is available. In Ecuador occasional labour can be obtained from smallholders and members of Indian communities as payment for right of way, grazing rights, collection of firewood, and gleaning rights. In some places the shadow of the *encomienda* persists even to-day and legally free peasant proprietors pay labour-service to a local landlord "because it is the custom," just as they pay labour-service to the church and municipality. In Brazil a similar case is reported in which cash-tenants obliged to pay *cambão* were not permitted to hire a labourer as replacement because they were required to pay the labourer due as "homage" to the landowner in their own person.

In Guatemala seasonal labour for the coffee estates is drawn from Highland Indian communities of "microfundistas" whose own lands do not provide even a minimal subsistence. The agrarian system involves a large and regular migration. This is equally true of the sheep estates of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, which draw seasonal labour from zones of Chile and Argentina lying to the North, and the coffee harvesters of Western Venezuela, who come over the border from the overcrowded smallholding of N. Santander, Colombia.

As would be expected, the two-way orientation (internal-subsistence and external-market) of the estate shows profound differences in the rewards for different socio-economic functions. The *patrón* (using the word to express the embodiment of ownership and entrepreneurial functions) by definition belongs to the top social positions in the society, while those who labour are of the lowest. The function of land-ownership combined with a dubious entrepreneurship brings rewards incomparably greater than the function of productive labour. On eight large estates studied in the province of Valdivia, Chile, it was found that the annual income of the patrons varied 80 to 218 times as much as the income of their workers.¹⁹ Over-all figures for the agricultural sector of the Chilean economy in 1954, described by Varela in 1958,²⁰ showed an acute maldistribution of income. (See Table No. 3.)

TABLE 3
Income Distribution by "Social Strata"
Chile 1954 (Varela)

	<i>Agricultural Sector</i>		<i>Chile</i>	
	<i>in %</i>		<i>in %</i>	
<i>"Social Strata"</i>	<i>Persons</i>	<i>Income</i>	<i>Persons</i>	<i>Income</i>
Worker	92.1	34.0	76.5	30.0
Middle	0.3	0.4	14.0	27.1
Owner-entrepreneur	7.6	65.6	9.5	42.9

According to these figures there exists a sharp polarity between patron and worker, the former receiving on the average 24 times the income of the latter.

In the following diagram an attempt is made to show differences in compensation for the fulfillment of different economic functions in Ecuador, noting sex and race as variables.²¹

TABLE 4

*Levels of Monthly Remuneration on Ecuadorean Cattle-Farm
According to Economic Function, Sex, and Socio-Ethnic Qualification*

MALES	"Whites"	Sucres ^a	"Indians"	Sucres
<i>Functions of ownership and entrepreneurship:</i>		6,363	<i>Function of traditional labor</i>	
(For the year studied, the net profit on operations was 24% of capital. The owner lived in Paris.)			Herdmen	300
			Grass-cutters	210
			Permanent labourers	100
			Occasional labourers	90
<i>Functions of Management and Supervision:</i>				
Administrator		3,080		
Bookkeeper		1,581		
Mayordomo		1,244		
<i>Function of operation of modern machinery:</i>				
Tractor-driving		500		
FEMALES			Dairymaids	52

^a Approximately 20 *sucres* equal \$1.00 (US).

In the Ecuadorian case given above, the income derived from ownership and investment by the owner who lives in Paris is 64 times that of a labourer's income.

A great variety of figures are available for further illustration. They show that mechanisms holding down the workers' remuneration to subsistence level do not appear to be related to productivity of labour nor to the efficiency of the enterprise in which they work, while the rewards of land ownership and entrepreneurship are secure and unrestricted, even with low capitalization and inefficient management.

The complexity of the social system of the estate was very apparent in the

case studies done for the ICAD reports, especially in Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile.

In addition to the complex picture of the duties of the service-tenant described by Martínez, the estate may have lands rented out to share-tenants or cash-tenants who may be service-tenants of the same estate or outsiders. Arrangements will exist for the use of occasional labour by predial dependents for water, fire wood, etc., based on what they owe rather than on specific labour needs. There may be special concessions granted on terms to outsiders, for example, to cheese-makers. The supervisory staff are also likely to receive some payments in kind, to the point that on a larger scale an administrator may be able to maintain an enterprise of his own within the estate.

Though custom may be involved from time to time, contractual relations are particularistic, depending on the power and caprice of the patron and to a lesser extent on those who can maintain the patron's favour and manipulate power on a smaller scale. The withdrawal of patronal power leads to the decay of the estate as an economic whole and its replacement by a warring confusion of smaller units.²² Yet this need not lead to the bankruptcy of the proprietor, who in one form or another will collect rents.

On the other hand, the patron may be attracted by the rewards that should follow technification and capital development. Decisions of this nature are his alone. He may be wholly traditionalist in formation and outlook, or he may be quite modern in perspective. Generally he is a person who straddles both worlds. He will certainly have contact with the city and access to knowledge of technical processes, new seeds and breeds of cattle, and it is likely that he will live in the city. But this does not necessarily mean that he has the time or the capacity to devote to the additional work that technical development and innovation would involve. He may prefer to leave supervisory responsibilities to a loyal manager who will not steal and will oversee the performance of traditional technical routines. Nor does it mean that he considers it reasonable to invest money in agricultural production beyond what is necessary to obtain the accustomed return. Rates of interest are so high in the capitals and the rewards for speculation in urban lands or commerce are so substantial that they may prove more attractive. It may be worth more artificially to "fatten" one's estate by political activities leading to the building of a road through it or to the securing of some other utility that will lead to its rapid appreciation, or even by simply fighting land reform. Even to-day, the political influence and social prestige accruing from estate ownership may often be considered worth more than the annual profit.

In spite of the arbitrary authority exercised by the patron on his estate, its traditionalism will offer further obstacles to innovation. His work-force is

accustomed to very routine operations and will resist changes and differentiation of tasks. Since the compensation they receive for their labour is more a function of their individual relation and loyalty to the patron than a reward for their output, they enjoy little of the motivation required to overcome the special problems involved in a difficult transformation.

But if, in spite of the many problems of adaptation—only a few are mentioned above—the proprietor pursues his plans in a radical manner, he is likely to find that he has brought about structural and cultural changes that go far beyond the technical modifications intended to increase productivity.

Money wages become universal and must be competitive for special skills. Traditional resident labour will be in excess of needs and uneconomic. It will no longer be possible to maintain estate-like distinctions between labouring and supervisory classes, since special skills will be recruited where special ability is found, and education will be desirable for all. In addition to technical roles, a small bureaucracy and impersonal bureaucratic procedures become necessary to manage the growing technical complexity.²³

Many persons interested in this subject have had the opportunity to visit estates that have been recently modernized and have admired the achievements of their patrons. It is probable that the visitor noticed that the patron's career and attributes set him apart from the majority of his counterparts: for example, he may not be a man of the local tradition by upbringing or education, he may be a national or international figure with a reputation based on agricultural innovation, or may be an exceptionally gifted organizer. His contributions are invaluable, but he does not represent a general trend.

A second kind of modern agricultural entrepreneur has made his appearance in most countries, and is fairly well represented by the banana producers of El Oro studied by Baraona in Ecuador.²⁴ This entrepreneur may come from the non-proprietary rural strata or from an urban environment. He is as likely to be a renter as a proprietor. He probably concentrates on a single market product, appreciates the necessity for investment, uses modern technical methods as far as possible, and pays his labour force in cash. He is not likely to establish himself on his farm as a permanent rural resident. It is suggested that he makes his appearance in answer to favourable market conditions for a particular product, and the economic and land-tenure structures to which his forms of exploitation give rise do not outlast the boom. In the case of El Oro, the lands now occupied by small and medium-sized commercial producers belong to large estates, formerly traditional cacao producers. The estate economy has been replaced by the commercial farms and their proprietors are *rentiers*. A fall in the market price for bananas, or their destruction by disease could produce either a reversion to subsistence small-holding or to traditional estate relations. These ups and downs have been characteristic in Latin America. In

Northeastern Brazil, highly commercialized plantations have regressed to share-tenure and service-tenure estates.²⁵ And where commercial wheat was produced in Chile for the California gold rush, to-day smallholders are struggling to harvest 80 bushels of grain to feed the family for the year.²⁶

The third modernizing producer is the estate organized as a plantation. The single-mindedness of the search for profits that has marked plantation ownership has led in many places to the depersonalization of management, the rationalization of cropping procedures, and the technification of the process of production, elaboration, and transport. In short, the conditions necessary for modernization have existed, and for this reason the plantation of to-day does not belong to the archaic rural sector. The plantation labourer is more proletarian than peasant in his culture even though he may retain something of the latter.²⁷ In certain areas, at least, his conditions have led or are leading to his unionization, and some of the more accessible rights of citizenship are guaranteed to him by law. He can expect to receive the support of the law in attempting to realize his legally guaranteed labour and social security rights. His union adherence has also pushed him into political participation not as a peon obeying his patron nor as a peasant following the local *caudillo* but as a class-conscious voter seeking improvements in the conditions of labour common to him and his fellows. Thus the modernization of the plantation leads to important changes in values and in the social and political structure of the local system and to a lesser extent in the national system.

The land-labour institutions on which the estate has been based were elaborated for the benefit of the proprietary class, but have also depended on the labouring class for fulfillment. Since consensus could not be expected, the institutions have been based on systems of official and unofficial coercion, the deprivation of alternative means of subsistence, and other forms of social control. One of the principles of this social control has been the isolation of the individual estate and the patron's monopolization of interaction with the larger society. The estate historically has been an autocratically governed, quasi-independent social entity, and those within it had little alternative but to accept the patron's justice, his *regalia*, his trading arrangements, his favour, his orders, and his punishments. When people became accustomed to estate structure, questions of welfare depended on whether the incumbent patron was a "good" one or a "bad" one, and individual success consisted of gaining the patron's favour. This has been called paternalism.

While isolation and paternalism characterize the estate, an estate society requires a convention of racial or estate-like discrimination to sustain it.²⁸ An open society in which citizens may claim universal rights is incompatible with the personal rule of the patron on an estate, in which the writ of the public law officers in effect does not run. The helot class must be effectively and pub-

licly discriminated against so that its members continue to feel isolated from the society even when outside the bounds of the estate. The phenotype by which this class is recognized may be a matter of biological features, "Indian" dress, or other elements of physical behaviour. Correlative to discrimination is the development of a special mentality and system of values in the group discriminated against, which has the effect of producing in them a deep distrust of their own ability to better their situation and if possible a fatalistic conformity with their lot.

The system of social control required by the traditional agrarian structure is confronted to-day by a developing urban society and the menace of social justice. Some examples of the resulting changes are discussed below.

The arrival at the thresholds of power of new sectors that do not represent the landed proprietary interest has brought with it laws and administrative measures based on slogans such as human rights, social justice for the peasant, redemption of the Indian, etc. The new political aspirants are tempted by the growth of a rural vote.

The Ecuadorian law of the Communes, 1935, authorizing smallholder's communities to elect *cabildos* who might represent communal rights of usufruct, water, etc., limited the arbitrary powers of landowners to require labour of the communities which surrounded their estates. A Social Security Law of that country which regulated the rights of *huasipungeros* has been responsible for the abolition of the system by a number of proprietors. After years of neglect in the payment of monthly dues, these proprietors found themselves with a heavy debt to their *huasipungeros*, and they preferred to liquidate it by giving the *huasipungero* property rights to his *huasipungo*, thus finally cutting the bonds of serfdom.²⁹

Law No. 200, enacted in Colombia by a liberal government in 1935, had the effect of unsettling relations between proprietors and share- and service-tenants. The government, pursuing the doctrine of the social function of property and bent on modernizing the fabric of the state, wished to give property rights to those who had cultivated the land during a specific period, without regard to previous titles. Unfortunately the law was not codified, nor was an effective organism set up to administer it. Rural local government and the administration of justice remained firmly in the hands of the proprietary class. The dissemination of the terms of the new law by populist politicians and the legitimate claims made by the peasants led to widespread ejections by threat or violence, and to the signing of rental agreements under pressure.

In the following decade, urban populism allied itself with a peasantry in the process of politicization and threatened the traditional order at the polls. In 1947 the government opened a general attack by means of police terrorism on peasant areas loyal to the opposition Liberal Party, which included within

it the new populist stream. Since that time there has been continuous rural violence in Colombia, with a balance of several thousand deaths per year.

In fact, numerous examples could be given of labour laws enacted in Latin America during the last thirty years, which, if practiced, could have given the peasant greater security and better economic conditions.

There is no intention of suggesting here that in some miraculous way these laws have *caused* changes. What may be said, however, is that situations of latent tension and open conflict have developed essentially between the patrons and the peasant class (whether small proprietors or not), whom they regard as their labour force. These conflicts concern the rights and duties of each, and the proprietors, by their superior power and class position, had hitherto been able to claim legitimacy for themselves, to manipulate the institutions of local administration and informal social control, and to maintain a labour force under the accustomed conditions. The specific impact of the new law in each case is to deny legitimacy to the claims of the class of proprietors and to restrain their use of the local administration.

The result of these laws may be a gain for the peasant, especially where he can operate through some sort of organization. Most of the information available has suggested that the more common result is the development by the patrons of more generalized extra-legal forms of control, based on a "unionization" of patrons, including "black-lists," threats of dismissal, and, on occasion, terror against leaders.

In the organization of the Peasant Leagues in Pernambuco, it was found extremely difficult to take advantage of the Labour Code, both in the registration of a new organization and in the settling of a dispute. However, it was discovered that the Civil Code of 1918 provided an adequate legal basis for both, and access to it could be obtained more easily through the local municipal capital.³⁰

Once again the incompatibility of the traditional rural systems and the extending modern society is seen. In the towns, the new members of the industrial working class, though poor by the standards of developed countries, enjoy cash wages, normal citizens' rights, and some form of social security, all of which are still denied to their brothers, fathers, and cousins who have remained in the country. When representative democracy is allowed to operate, aspirants for election are increasingly obliged to propagate a social programme for all, since their constituencies are not conveniently divided between rural and urban. Personal communication between the family in the country and the members who have already migrated, as well as the mass media, carry the universal message of citizens' rights, so subversive to the paternalistic social order. Thus, the new values generated in the industrial-urban sector cannot be prevented from penetrating the rural traditional sector.

When peasants begin to act in ways other than the accustomed one, we might conclude either that previous obstacles to the fulfillment of aspirations no longer deter them, or that their view of the world has changed and that they now aspire to new values.

The sociologically important values in the present instance are those that concern the status of the different sectors of the agrarian population, and it seems to be in those sectors that change has been greatest and most fraught with consequences, though least visible. The Quichua-speaking peasants of Carabuela, a smallholders' neighbourhood in Otavalo, Ecuador, are expected to pay labour service to the Hacienda Pinaquí because they must pass across one of the estate fields to reach the main road, must use water from the brook that passes through the estate, and also because it is still considered a duty they owe to their *Seigneur* or feudal overlord. The means of enforcing this important contribution to the economy of the hacienda is the old game of "forfeits." The estate servants present themselves in the peasant community and proceed to confiscate an item of clothing from each individual which can only be "redeemed" by the payment of labour service. Attitudes held by members of the community to this imposition were divided into three groups: those who appeared to accept the "legitimacy" of the payment of labour service and went customarily and without complaint to pay it; those who felt it unjust but recognized their "contractual inferiority" in the matter, and paid it; and those who regarded it as unjust, who knew that it was illegal, and who preferred to forfeit a *poncho* or a hat to the indignity in the eyes of their fellow dissidents of forced labour service. The latter group consisted of the younger men who were frequently outside the community and in the towns. The implications of this example are that in places like Carabuela, isolation has made it possible to maintain a form of serfdom that was instituted by the *encomienda* system and had already passed into illegality 250 years ago, and that contacts with the modernizing urban world have provided the younger people of the community with an alternative view of their rights. One also notes the function of the cultural segregation of the Highland peasants partly descended from indigenous stock.

These three types of attitudes, with their accompanying behaviour patterns, represent degrees of evolution in the scale of values of the members of a small community of rural producers, and are paralleled by the observations a Brazilian sociologist, José Pastore, made in various parts of his country. Among the collectors of wild rubber (*seringueiros*), Brazil-nuts (*castanheiros*), and jute (*juteriros*) in the Amazon Region, he found a submissive acceptance of the authority of (and commercial conditions dictated by) the buyers of these products, based on the collector's ignorance³¹ and his isolation. These factors oblige him to sell to the only *seringalista* or buyer who comes near him, and to buy from the same *seringalista* as the only seller of essential

AGRARIAN CHANGE TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA

TABLE 5

Annual Per Capita Income in North and East Brazil—1959

	<i>Rural Population</i> \$ (U.S.)	<i>Urban Population</i> \$ (U.S.)
Maranhão	31	123
Piauí	23	96
Ceará	39	96
Rio Grande do Norte	35	53
Paraíba	56	81
Pernambuco	50	129
Alagoas	53	101
Sergipe	55	118
Bahia	46	122
Minas Gerais	75	146
Espirito Santo	60	153

Figures originally given in Cruzeiros, which averaged about 150 to the \$ (U.S.) for the year.

commodities whom he ever sees. The popular stereotype of the peasant of Northern Brazil represents the same stage; it is characterized by an internalized resignation, already a part of the cultural matrix, in face of the overwhelming power of the social sector that controls access to natural resources: "The Northerner is a sufferer, but he is calm and patient" (*O Nortista e um sofredor, mas calmo e paciente*). The second degree of evolution to which Pastore refers is that of the share-croppers, labourers, squatters, etc., who by their relative proximity to the towns have come to aspire to a better life and see themselves not only as poor, but as poorer than they should be, and as unjustly exploited.

Pastore has calculated per capita income of rural and urban populations in the states of the North and East of Brazil, 1959, and these are the areas in which there is the greatest amount of open conflict. (See Table No. 5.)

SMALLHOLDERS' COMMUNITIES

The origins of these communities are various and include estates that have been sold out in parcels or have been fragmented by inheritance until individual properties have been reduced to family size; the establishment of *ejidos* and *resguardos*; the spontaneous or organized colonization of new lands; land grants to emancipated or manumitted slaves and disbanded soldiery; and various forms of adjudication of state lands.

With regard to settlement patterns, the most common form is the dis-

persed neighbourhood consisting of collections of families occupying and exploiting contiguous parcels of land, with the whole parcel circumscribed by a recognized boundary and having a name. In certain regions dwelling houses are grouped together in an agricultural village surrounded by the holdings, or along roads or waterways forming line villages.

The three main forms of tenure are individual property in which there is presumption of legal title and in which the properties of the individual members of the nuclear family are exploited jointly by the members; some form of cash-renting or share-renting; and communally owned property such as a community of heirs enjoying undivided inheritance, or lands held by "Indian" communities. In this case, the intention of the legislator required that the principle of equity should guide the periodic distribution of usufruct to individual families, but generally when land is held communally one finds the same differentiation in access to land as in the communities of individual proprietors.

With reference to the numerical and economic importance of the smallholders' community, a very rough calculation has been made on the basis of the ICAD study in six countries. (See Table No. 6.)

Insofar as the smallholders' communities produce marketable surpluses, these are more often food crops for local and regional exchange. Cases where they are linked to an overseas market, like those of the Colombian coffee producers or the West Indian banana producers, are much rarer.

These communities belong to areas of settled and fairly heavy population, and their boundaries were set when they were established. Even though they may have been able subsequently to add to these lands at a high price, the

TABLE 6
Percentile Distribution by Countries and Land-Status Groups

Country	Of No. of Agricultural Families			Of Extension of Land Used		Of Value of Agricultural Production	
	Estate operators	Landless	Small- holders	Estate operators	Small- holders	Estate operators	Small- holders
Argentina	5.2	36.3	58.5	51.9	38.1	42.4	57.6
Brazil	14.6	61.9	23.5	93.5	6.5	78.7	21.3
Chile	9.5	49.7	40.8	92.6	7.4	80.0	20.0
Colombia	5.0	24.7	70.3	72.8	27.2	47.8	52.2
Ecuador	2.4	34.5	63.1	64.4	35.6	40.7	59.3
Guatemala	1.6	27.0	71.4	72.3	27.7	56.4	43.6

chronic tendency has been toward the diminution of the land available to each family, fragmentation, and the decline of fertility. Domestic crafts and rustic manufacturing become a necessary supplement to agricultural production.

The interplay of these factors in conditions of relative isolation has given rise to endogenous change sequences. An Indian community in the parish of San Rafael, Otavalo, Ecuador, provides an example³³ of pathological decay due to increasing population during several generations, fragmentation of holdings, impoverishment of the soil, and a failure to perceive alternatives in migration or in other productive activities. A typical holding studied was found to consist of 18 lots of land, giving a total extension of 2,400 m². In the last ten years the recorded deaths had substantially outnumbered births. Two children per family had become the desired norm. Infanticide by drowning was not infrequent and not condemned. For want of resources, alcoholic drinks were fermented by means of toxic substances, and drunkenness was regarded as the most probable means of enjoying some vestiges of traditional values.

It is also possible for social structures of rural communities to be transformed by endogenous process, as a study of a smallholders' region has shown.³⁴ The region of Tenza in Colombia was transformed from a society of estates, labourers, and artisans to a society of smallholders by the simple, slow process of division by succession.

However, if our hypothesis is correct, and if to-day's rural change is due to the impact of the modernizing industrial urban society on traditional rural communities and social systems, then the major factors initiating change in rural social systems are external to them, and the subsequent processes converge with and tend to overwhelm the slower movement of endogenous change. With the breakdown of the isolation of the rural community, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate the two.

The hypothesis also implies that the creation of the conditions of persistent interaction between the rural social system and the modern urban centre is one of the most important links in the chain. In the struggle of the Latin American countries to achieve nationhood during the nineteenth century, the establishment of the telegraph system and the building of railways undoubtedly made it possible for the central governments to learn about any challenges from the provincial centres and to face them with decisions and military force. During the last 30 years, the road and the development of cheap motor transport have facilitated the connection of the small town with the provincial and national centres. Inevitably this has meant the inclusion of the latter in the national money market, and the breakdown of the isolated market systems and the diverse rustic occupations linked to them, less subsistence agriculture, more absenteeism by the proprietors. Improved communications have also under-

mined the predominance of the local power structures and have increased the possibility of interference in political and bureaucratic affairs from the provincial centre.

What has perhaps not been given sufficient importance is the effect of these changes on the relationship between the little town or village (*pueblo* or *aldea*) and the peasant communities. Road-building has not yet made a great deal of difference to the peasant's journey from his holding to the pueblo at least in the mountainous areas. What has changed is what he finds in the pueblo, which now serves as the medium through which contact with the great world is made. Little is really known about the influence of radio in the peasant's home, or about its influence as an additional voice in the shops and taverns of the village. But the doors and windows to the modern sector have been opened for the peasant.

Available to him now, whether fully perceived or not, are a series of alternatives that respect material means, alternative ways of explaining social reality, alternative aspirations for the peasant and his children, and alternative persons and groups who exercise power and who are not necessarily the allies of the patron, and the traditional authorities and leaders.

While in the case of the estate today the productive organization is co-extensive with a system of social relations that approach auto-sufficiency, the agricultural enterprise of the smallholding peasant is co-extensive only with the family; the neighbourhood community to which it belongs is far from auto-sufficient, as it has no division of labour and requires a local town or village through which to participate in the market and a variety of other institutions necessary to the fulfillment of their goals, particularly those concerned with civic rights and duties, and religion. Moreover, the smallholding community usually consists exclusively of the lowest layer in the social order, and must look to the higher strata composed of merchants, administrators, teachers, doctors, and priests as intermediaries through whom they may gain some sort of hearing in the nation. Thus we must deal operationally with two levels of interaction, of "community": the locality grouping of peasants (*bairro, vizinhanca, vereda, parcialidad, comuna*, etc.) and the larger collectivity consisting of an urban (though still traditional) centre of a system of transport, marketing, and administration, which serves ten, twenty, or thirty similar locality groups. This larger collectivity often includes smallholder communities and estates. From the perspective of social change, the definition of this larger community is important since it is this social system as well as the locality grouping that will have to adapt itself to the innovations, institutions, structural conflicts, and changes of values to which it will inevitably be exposed.

In the first place it must be stressed that there are a number of conditions within the neighbourhood group operating against the individual's develop-

ment or modernization of his holding, and a decided tendency toward conservatism in the group. A very suggestive cultural generalization was put forward by the anthropologist, George Foster,³⁵ who observed that in smallholders' communities in a great variety of cultures one met with expressions and evidence of a belief in the limited and finite nature of the "goods" (land, riches, prestige, good health, etc.) available to the community as a whole, and consequently a tendency to view with distrust and fear the undue accumulation of "goods" by the individual since this implied the necessary deprivation of other members of the same collectivity. There is certainly evidence on all sides of a conflict between the two values of individual or family acquisitiveness and "commonweal."

Economic differentiation between those without land, or with so little that they are dependent on others, and those who have accumulated lands to the point that they regularly need the labour of others is an almost universal feature of the smallholders' community. Behind the protestations of harmony and unity there are chronic rivalries and competition, mitigated by the obligations of kinship and the periodic redistributions by inheritance. In many of the Andean Quichua-speaking communities, strong and traditional social pressures are put on the wealthier peasants to dissipate their accumulated wealth and even to mortgage their future livelihood by assuming the *priestazgo* and financing an extravagant *fiesta*.³⁶ Communal labour seems to have had and continues to have something of this wealth-distributing function through the amount of food and liquor consumed and portions of the product distributed in payment for services. It seems that the penetration of the money-market and the measurement of goods and labour in this medium have coincided with the decay of institutions of communal labour.

In the non-Indian peasant communities, redistribution pressures are not so drastic nor so effective. The individual peasant may become rich especially if he becomes a trader. As long as he remains a peasant, he will not enjoy prestige in the town. If his riches are to bring him prestige and esteem in his own community, he must assume certain paternalistic responsibilities and avoid ostentation and too great a break with tradition.

Although there has been little systematic study of the adoption of modern agricultural practices by Latin American peasants, the obstacles to a transformation of productive units do not necessarily imply the rejection of new technical elements, which may be proffered. But there seems to be great concern for security so that experiments with technological elements of undemonstrated value which threaten a change in way of life or in the precarious balance of social relations are not likely to be attempted.

A recent study by the author revealed that in a certain community reached by road transport 30 years earlier, adoptions included the following: the uni-

versal adoption of fodder-grass as property boundary, of quality breeds of cows, pigs, and fowls, of factory-made clothes bought in place of homespuns, and of hand mills for corn. Block-salt, food concentrates, and purges for cattle had been adopted by one-third and basket making by one-half. Adoption took place independently of extension services. The situation to-day at the end of the period of adoption is that the peasant is poorer than he was before the road came. His soils are worse and are producing less; he has come to rely on money to purchase his necessities and the price of consumer goods rises steadily while the selling price of his products fails to keep pace.

The structure of rural social systems operates against the technical development of the smallholder in another way. There is a full coincidence between the economic function of manual performance of productive agricultural tasks and social class. (The word *peasant* has been used in this article to denote a social class that can be operationally defined by its economic function). Increased interaction of rural communities with the city, the process of urbanization, and the extension of rural schools have presented the peasant with alternative means of livelihood, which imply not only change of occupation and probably change in place of residence but also an improvement in his social status and even more assuredly in that of his children. Thus the peasant whose circumstances facilitate the accumulation of capital that might be invested in the modernization of his productive enterprise without raising his social status is more likely to use this capital to move out of the peasant class, or to educate his children so that they can move out.

Another major factor impeding development is the inferiority of the peasant's situation within the total as well as within the local social system. Even if not excluded from exercise of the vote because of illiteracy, political representation of peasant interests has been rare. The peasant's relation to the party system and to the local administration is likely to show the following characteristics: the acceptance of self-imposed leaders from among the estate owners or commercial classes of the small towns, whose influence may be used to secure communal or individual benefits; the location of power and of decision-making outside the peasant locality-group, and the consequent inhibition of the growth of a peasant leadership with some validity in the larger society; and the absence of concern by decision-makers at municipal, departmental, and national levels for the peasants' social and economic interests.

The social gaps between peasant and townsmen also produce a contractual inferiority in the face-to-face relations between peasants on the one hand and merchants and officials on the other; the degree of this inferiority depends on the degree of cultural segregation of the peasant groups. The "Indian" may be required to bring gifts to the *alcalde* or perform some menial task before a problem of boundaries or inheritance is attended to, and at any point he may

be shouted down and the matter ended by the caprice of the official. The unlettered peasant who does not suffer from these cultural disadvantages is nevertheless likely to be led into unnecessarily complicated and expensive paths when he tries to legalize an inheritance; and no one is surprised if he arrives at the Agricultural Loan Bank after a twenty-mile walk to be told by the clerk to "come back tomorrow." The bureaucracy also suffers from the underdevelopment syndrome, and the clerk who cannot expect promotion on his merits must show off his social category in this manner and seek the influence of the powerful in order to better himself.

In these conditions it is not surprising that the smallholders are not a political force and have only recently begun to produce their own political leadership. Their lack of political weight has frustrated their legitimate and conscious demand for a share in services, such as education, credit, roads, irrigation, technical assistance. Even the wheels of justice will not turn for the powerless. The taking of lands by direct action and resort to arms have offered solutions to chronic problems when the societies' institutions could not. Close inspection of outbursts of violence show the smallholders acting primarily in defense of legality against an establishment combining and conniving to break the law in the interest of class solidarity.

It is true that various governments have recently established services designed to foster the development of smallholders by means of special extension services, supervised credit, "community development," the organization of cooperatives, and rural vocational training. One fate of these programmes seems to be that they are "kidnapped" by the pueblo, by those who live by the agriculturist rather than by agriculture. A more subtle result already observed is that the programmes and their promoters are additions to a small, emergent group of urban intruders in the rural neighbourhood; they serve as a new kind of reference group for the well-off peasants, and a rapid process of social differentiation ensues. A third result is similarly divisive: aid and credit designed to augment capital investment can be exploited best by those already on the path of capital accumulation, thus widening the existing economic gulf between *kulaks* and others and disorganizing the subsistence sector of the economy.

One is tempted to conclude that given a continuation of present tendencies, the traditional sector of the agrarian structure cannot now be expected to develop, but rather to disintegrate under the impact of government development and reform measures, the changing temper of the peasants and economic competition, and to be replaced by the urban-based incursions of commercial producers of various sizes. The latter group, in conjunction with the industrialized enterprises of the plantation type, would carry the main burden of agricultural production.

Nevertheless, despite increasing internal conflict and impoverishment,

large groupings of smallholders living at subsistence level can be expected to survive for generations, waiting in "cold-storage" for the time when industrial development will draw their children or grandchildren to city destinies.

NOTES

1. This is a revised version of a "background paper" prepared at the request of the organizer of the First World Congress of Rural Sociology held in Dijon, France, in 1964. It deals essentially with traditional Latin America and does not attempt to do justice to the agrarian structure that developed through post-colonial settlement, nor does it analyse the impact of the Mexican, Bolivian, and Cuban agrarian revolutions.

A variety of studies promoted by the Interamerican Committee for Agricultural Development was carried out in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru on problems connected with land tenure. On the basis of these, country reports have been prepared and those on Argentina, Guatemala, and Ecuador have just appeared. My own participation in the programme, and the studies and country reports prior to publication have contributed to this paper. My thanks are due especially to Solon Barraclough who directed the programme.

2. "El Desarrollo Social de América Latina en la Postguerra." (CEPAL) (Santiago, 1963).

3. *Ibid.*

4. For the seven countries reported on by ICAD, data showing change in productivity per worker between 1950 and 1960 were compiled for four—Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Guatemala. Their indices had risen from 100 to 131.7, 107.7, 133.3, and 124.6 respectively. Colombia showed a decline between 1950 and 1959 from 100 to 94.4.

5. This table compiles selected data from the report: "The State of Food and Agriculture 1965" (Rome, 1965).

6. This guess is confirmed by data from the ICAD countries, which show that in the ten-year period the rate of increase in production of tropical export crops was twice that of other crops.

7. Liévano describes a first wave of "demolition" of *resguardos* in New Granada from 1777 which he ascribes to the new policy of the Ministers of Carlos III. See: *Los Grandes Conflictos Sociales y Económicos de Nuestra Historia* (Bogotá, 1962).

8. *Capangas* is a word used in Brazil for the armed men maintained by a large landowner for defensive and terroristic purposes within and outside the lands of his dominion.

9. "Corporal ransom" is used to describe the common method of forcing natives to give up their wealth in the early days of the conquest. It implies "Your money or your life."

10. See Edgard Thompson—"The Plantation as a Social System." This article appeared in *Plantation Systems of the New World* (Washington, 1959), along with the articles referred to in note 11.

11. Sidney Mintz cites the Nineteenth Century author L. C. Gray on the plantation; see his paper "The Plantation as a Socio-cultural Type." See also Richard Adams, "On the Relations between Plantations and Creole Culture."

12. Thompson, *op. cit.*

13. *O Abolicionismo* by Joaquim Nabuco was reprinted in São Paulo, 1938.

14. Mintz, *op. cit.*

15. "La Hacienda Campana" was the name of a mimeographed report made a few years ago, but undated, by Héctor Martínez, and published by the Ministry of Agriculture in Lima.

16. ICAD reports.

17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. Helio Varela Carmona, "Estratificación social de la población trabajadora en Chile" (graduate thesis, University of Chile, 1958).
21. The estate in question was one of those used as case-studies in ICAD Ecuador report. I chose this one for analysis since the service-tenure system had recently been eliminated, and the larger part of wages and salaries were paid in cash and kind, thus simplifying calculations.
22. Baraona describes cases of disintegration of estates in Ecuador. I have visited similar cases in Colombia and Chile.
23. Ramiro Cardona, working at FLACSO, Santiago, attempted to apply the idea of a Traditional-Modern continuum to Chilean estates in a mimeographed paper entitled "Dinámica de Cambio."
24. ICAD, *op. cit.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. Study in progress by the author in Navidad on the coast of Central Chile.
27. Mintz., *op. cit.*
28. The use of the word "estate-like" is suggested by Beate Salz in *The Human Element in Industrialization* (Chicago, 1955), with reference to the situation of the Ecuadorian Indians. That is to say, the society of "estates" (estamentos), differentiated legally, disappeared with colonial status; but people go on behaving as if it continued to exist.
29. The new Land Reform law in Ecuador makes provisions for the legal transfer of huasipungos (service-tenure lands) to huasipungeros (service-tenants) and the process of legalization is now going on.
30. The Brazilian Labour Code dating from the Vargas regime was a measure disciplining relations between patrons and workers rather in the spirit of the Corporate State of Mussolini. The initial policy adopted by the Leagues was to build a movement in which the share-tenant or cash-tenant appeared not as a worker seeking his legal rights but as party to a contract concerned with renting of lands, according to the Civil Code. The League was not a syndicate. Attention was drawn to this by Clodomir Santos de Morais, former lawyer to the Peasant League and now a political exile in Santiago.
31. In this case, the *seringueiro* had been persuaded to believe that the plane which made periodic flights over the zone where he worked contained the *seringalista*, who used this method to supervise his collectors.
32. In Table No. 6, two points require comment: 1) While most of those given as landless work in the estates, a small proportion are to be found living in the smallholders' communities. 2) The Argentine smallholders include the modernized grain and cattle farmers of the Pampa, and are not covered in the discussion of traditional smallholders' communities.
33. Studies made by the author.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Lecture given by George Foster at the National University, Colombia (1963).
36. See explanation in note 28 above.